Nature, law and historical transformation : A comparative study with particular reference to China and India. by Wilcox, Russell Gerard
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
A bstract o f  T hesis
S e e  o v er  for  
n o tes on  
co m p letio n
Author (full names) ....Russell Gerard Wilcox.....................................................................
Title of thesis ....Nature, Law and Historical Transformation: A Comparative Study with 
Particular Reference to China and India.
Degree  PhD..................................
This thesis examines historical transformation through the prism of legal transformation. The 
central question it addresses is: what is the nature of historical and legal transformation?
Making demonstrative reference to recent legal change in China and India, and after setting 
that change within the broadest historical context, the thesis shows that both jurisdictions 
manifest a gradual though powerful trend towards legal uniformity through the remarkably 
similar developmental trajectories they each disclose. This it takes to comiote a wider trend 
within the culture of advanced modernity, one that involves a systematic departure from the 
basic precepts of the natural law. Observance of these precepts, it argues, represents an 
ineliminable guarantee of maximal individual freedom and cultural diversity.
Explaining these conclusions, the thesis distinguishes three normative orders each allowing a 
different degree of human volition: the linguistic, the physical and the legal. The third of 
these orders, the legal, is characterised as an admixture of the other two. Its particular 
distinguishing feature is that it is in some manner pressure bearing. Amongst the varieties of 
normative social pressure, a general movement can be detected towards greater formalisation. 
As legal norms become more formalised, they become less like the norms of language and 
more like those of physical nature. The degree to which this shift takes place is an indication 
of the extent to which society has been denatured.
This process of denaturing is rooted in a deeper process of materialisation. The human being 
is an irreducibly material and immaterial composite whose consequent material and 
immaterial inclinations need to be satisfied in an ordered fashion giving priority to the 
former. To the extent that choices are made which try to satisfy immaterial needs with 
material goods, fundamental distortions arise.
The principal significance of the thesis is that it demonstrates the fruitfulness for comparative 
analysis of traditional natural law thinking. On this basis it offers a new model for 
understanding social and legal change
ProQuest Number: 10673047
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10673047
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Nature, Law and Historical 
T rans formation:
A Comparative Study with Particular Reference to
China and India.
By
Russell Gerard Wilcox
School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London
Submitted in Part fulfilment of the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
Abstract
This thesis examines historical transformation through the prism of legal 
transformation. The central question it addresses is: what is the nature of historical 
and legal transformation?
Making demonstrative reference to recent legal change in China and India, and after 
setting that change within the broadest historical context, the thesis shows that both 
jurisdictions manifest a gradual though powerful trend towards legal uniformity 
through the remarkably similar developmental trajectories they each disclose. This it 
takes to connote a wider trend within the culture of advanced modernity, one that 
involves a systematic departure from the basic precepts of the natural law.
Observance of these precepts, it argues, represents an ineliminable guarantee of 
maximal individual freedom and cultural diversity.
Explaining these conclusions, the thesis distinguishes three normative orders each 
allowing a different degree of human volition: the linguistic, the physical and the 
legal. The third of these orders, the legal, is characterised as an admixture of the other 
two. Its particular distinguishing feature is that it is in some manner pressure bearing. 
Amongst the varieties of normative social pressure, a general movement can be 
detected towards greater formalisation. As legal norms become more formalised, they 
become less like the norms of language and more like those of physical nature. The 
degree to which this shift takes place is an indication of the extent to which society 
has been denatured.
This process of denaturing is rooted in a deeper process of materialisation. The human 
being is an irreducibly material and immaterial composite whose consequent material 
and immaterial inclinations need to be satisfied in an ordered fashion giving priority 
to the former. To the extent that choices are made which try to satisfy immaterial 
needs with material goods, fundamental distortions arise.
The principal significance of the thesis is that it demonstrates the fruitfulness for 
comparative analysis of traditional natural law thinking. On this basis it offers a new 
model for understanding social and legal change.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis examines the nature of historical transformation through the prism of legal 
transformation, and with particular reference to the legal systems of China and India. 
The central question it addresses is: what is the nature if historical and legal 
transformation? In the course of answering this question, it also considers a number of 
additional, closely related questions: how can historical change be understood through 
the medium of legal change; what conclusions can be drawn about the legal 
transformations taking place in China and India over the past thirty years; what do the 
answers to these questions reveal about the nature of advanced modernity and its 
prospects? By way of introduction, the present chapter, first sets out the context 
within which the study is situated, it moves on to elaborate the methodological 
approach employed in answering the questions identified above. Finally, it outlines an 
appropriate theoretical framework.
A: Context
Frequent attempts have been made to understand the nature and history of human 
society. In recent decades developments of unprecedented magnitude -  in science, 
politics and economics -  have given such attempts a renewed urgency.1 These 
developments disclose enormous disruption in every sphere of human life.2 At their 
heart lies an evolutionary dynamic of extraordinary power and complexity. The 
emergence of this dynamic as a distinctive, structurally elaborate, and integrated 
world system can be traced back to the sixteenth century, amidst the intellectual, 
social, and economic tensions that resulted in the European Reformation.3 Well before 
that time less extensive institutional complexes were constructed in many of the 
civilisations of the ancient world, but none was able to harness sufficient power to 
spread itself across the entire globe.4 The destruction of medieval European 
Christendom led to the historically unprecedented phenomena of widespread
1 In general see: Albrow, 1996; Axford, B., 1995; Beck, 1992, 1999; Castells, 1997; Giddens, 1990; Held, 2000, and Held, et.al., 
1999. In respect o f scientific developments see: Appleyard, 1999; Fukuyama, 2002; McKibben, 2003; Rifkin, 1998; and Silver,
1998. For political developments see: Beck, U., 1997; Linklater, 1998; McGrew, 1997; Ohame, K., 1995; and Rosenau, 1990. 
For Economic developments see: Dicken, 1998; Frank, A., 1998; Gray, 1998; Rodik, 1997; and Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998.
2 For example in the cultural and linguistic spheres: Dalby, 2002; Harvey, 1989; Robertson, 1992; and Rowland, 2003.
3 For the most well known materialist version o f  this thesis see: Wallerstein, 1974-1989. For alternatives that depart to varying 
degrees from Wallerstein’s approach but which nonetheless see the Sixteenth Century as, in some sense, structurally pivotal, see: 
Braudel, 1975,1981-1984; Fanfani, 2003; Gellner, 1983,1988; Hall, 1986; and, Tilly, 1974, 1984.
4 See: Braudel. 1981-1984; Gellner, 1988; Hall, 1986; Hall & Ikenberry, 1989; Nelson, 1973; Robertson, 1992.
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commercial and then industrial capitalist production. This created a mechanism 
efficient and ruthless enough to accentuate hugely the physical power of northern 
Europe and, by means of colonisation, to allow it gradually to dominate the world.
The ideological premises upon which this growing dynamic continues to be based are 
those most clearly elaborated by the ‘enlightenment’ thinkers of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.5 The central priorities of the enlightenment were to attack 
traditional and religious modes of thought and organisation, and to replace them with 
“an exclusive reliance upon human reason in determining social practices.”6 These 
attitudes cohered with a series of ground-breaking discoveries in the natural sciences, 
and the development of an increasingly materialist conception of humanity, to give 
rise to a hidden logic of domination, the fundamental requirement of which has been 
to instrumentalise and exploit all phenomena for the sake of the common objective of 
material advantage.7 Social relationships have been affected by it as much as the 
physical environment within which they have arisen, and there has resulted both an 
ever-increasing prominence of instrumental forms of rational action and an increased 
proliferation of bureaucratic forms of social organisation.8
It is a central argument of this study that programmed into this transformational logic 
at the most basic level is a metaphysic and an anthropology fundamentally at variance 
with that which had preceded it.9 Classical and medieval conceptions held that the 
universe was composed of a series of natural types representing differential gradations 
in complexity and reality.10 The human being was one of these types, occupying a 
unique position on the borderline between the material and immaterial, and in 
consequence being privileged unlike other en-mattered types with the capacity for 
free choice.11 As such, the whole project of ethics and morality was directed towards 
the cultivation of stable dispositions that would enable the human form to actualise its 
potentialities to the fullest degree -  and as with the individual, so with human society
5 See especially, Dupre, 2004; MacIntyre, 1981 and 1998; and Taylor, 1990
6 Jary & Jary, 2001
7 See here the classic works o f  the Frankfurt School: Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979; and Horkheimer, 1947, 1972.
8 Weber, 1978; Turner, 2000: Parts I and II.
9 An argument made previously by many others and stated classically in: Gilson, 1937. See also: Simon, 2001, and Sweetman,
1999. More recently see; Dupre, 1993, 2004; Koselleck, 1988; MacIntyre, A .,1990 . For the argument that this rejection is to be 
understood in explicitly theological terms and the recent revival o f interest in political theology, see: Cavanaugh, 2003; Hanby, 
2003; Lowith, 1949; Milbank, 2006; Tiryankian, 1996; and Voeglin, 1952,1975.
10 Gilson, 1991, 1994.
11 For a masterful overview o f classical and medieval conceptions o f  anthropology and liberty, see: Gilson, 1991: Chapters IX 
and XV respectively. It is not, o f  course, being suggested here that there were no significant differences amongst classical and 
medieval authors, or between the two periods more generally.
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as a whole.12 Indeed, within this framework each perspective — individual and social — 
necessarily presupposed the other, since human nature was viewed as essentially 
social and interdependent: society being dependent upon the individual, and the 
individual upon society.13
The post-Cartesian framework which replaced this analysis constituted a fundamental 
reduction in human understanding of reality.14 That replacement was a reduction, first, 
in its determination to view as real in the external world only that which could be 
directly perceived by the senses. It was a reduction, secondly, in its allied 
determination to view the human being as an essentially independent and self-reliant 
individual precedent to the social relations in which it was engaged, and subjectively 
determinative of the values to which it aspired. Finally, it was a reduction, thirdly, in 
its exploitative and predatory attitude towards the physical universe, which it 
characterised increasingly as a mere source of raw materials to be used or combined 
solely for the sake of human satisfaction.15 Despite best efforts to sure its foundations, 
the individualism underlying these reductions was inherently unstable and, thus, 
ultimately self-defeating. By placing the self at the centre of reality, both in terms of 
allowing it to determine what counted as reality in the first place, and in terms of 
allowing it to decide what value such reality should be accorded, it undermined the 
essentially symbiotic and social supports which render truly autonomous action 
possible.16 Based upon an erroneous conception of the human person, enlightenment 
attempts to secure the position of individual autonomy, have, in consequence, tended 
to disintegrate into varying forms of Nietschean and post-modern self-assertion, 
premised upon a meaningless ‘will-to-power’ and sustained, if at all, by increasingly 
manipulative and duplicitous cultural forms.17 Moreover, this extraordinarily powerful 
process of uprooting and dis-embedding has had the deeper effect of making it more 
and more difficult to resist the instrumental and expansive logic that has been 
programmed into the physical world and has become increasingly independent of 
effective control as the demand for human satisfaction has become insatiable.18
12 MacIntyre, 1981; Mclnemy, 1997.
13 MacIntyre, 1981: Chapters 14, 15 and 18. MacIntyre has further pondered and developed these notions o f  interdependence in: 
MacIntyre, 1999: esp. Chapters 7-10.
14 Gilson, 1932; Simon, 2001: Chapter 1.
15 For a remarkably clear analysis o f this reductive world-view see the first chapter in Schumacher, 1978; See also, Schumacher, 
1993; and, Smith, 1976..
16 For an argument similar to the one developed in this study see: Dennehy, 2002.
17 Jamieson, 1991.
18 Harvey,1989; Weil,2002.
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A feature of this dynamic that creates powerful barriers to its understanding, is its 
tendency to act in a way that shatters and reconfigures alternative social formations 
which offer resistance to its full development. Much of that reconfiguration is 
achieved in tremendously subtle, incremental, and thus almost imperceptible ways. 
This has the effect of cloaking the real mechanisms of transformation in a manner that 
presents them after a fashion quite different from their true function.19 This is very 
similar to what Marx was attempting to explain with his theory of false consciousness, 
and it signals a need to search for deeper explanatory currents that lie below the 
surface of social phenomena. In the spheres of continental and Marxist philosophy, 
this need has long been perceived, but the approaches adopted to tackle it, though 
instructive, have met with only partial success.20 More recently, writers in the 
Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions have identified this explanatory deficiency with 
the inadequate metaphysics such critiques have invariably employed,21 a contention, 
moreover, that is emblematic of a wider trend within certain strains of contemporary 
thought -  in the philosophy of science, sociology, natural law, and virtue ethics -  to 
re-engage the Aristotelian tradition at an increasingly profound level.22
It is in the spirit of these developments, and, where necessary, drawing upon them, 
that the present study has been undertaken. In attempting to put forward a 
comprehensive explanation of historical transformation, it makes three claims. First, it 
claims that the proper way to account for the processes reconfiguring the 
contemporary world is through an explanation of man and society grounded upon a 
non-reductive, pre-Cartesian metaphysic. Secondly, it claims that a peculiarly 
efficient way to analyse the contours and extent of these processes is to focus upon 
the development and nature of legal norms. Thirdly, it claims that ultimately only a 
properly metaphysical account of the variety suggested both fully preserves the 
diversity that exists between distinct cultures, and provides the coherent underlying 
explanation necessary to render such diversity properly intelligible.
19 Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979; Gramsci,1971; Herman & Chomsky,2002.
20 Horkheimer, 1971; Habermas, 1984,1987; Foucault, 1971.
21 MacIntyre, 1988; Taylor, 1990,1995.
22 Archer, et.al.,1998; Lisska,1996; Statman,1997.
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B: Methodological Approach
What is meant by a metaphysical account? Writing in his popular work on Aquinas, 
Frederick Copelston usefully characterised metaphysics as “inquiry into the nature 
and structure of the fundamental principles concerning the nature of reality.” As such, 
he goes on, “[t]he metaphysician concerns himself primarily with things considered in 
their widest and most general aspect, namely as beings or things... [he] directs his 
attention above all to things as existing...[he] considers the intelligible structure of 
things regarded precisely as such and the fundamental relationships between them. He 
concerns himself... [in other words,] with the categorical structure of empirical 
reality.”23 A metaphysical account, by extension, may be said to be an account based 
of the fundamental principles of reality; or an account that is explicitly co-ordinated 
within the most comprehensive possible framework of reality.
A metaphysical account of historical transformation involves three major tasks. It 
involves, first, an analysis of what the principles of dynamic reality are. These define 
the basic criteria for intelligibility. They also define the criteria for change and 
development as such. It involves, secondly, an analysis of the distinction between the 
different types, levels, or degrees of reality. This should clarify what distinguishes 
human life from other animate and inanimate substances, as well as what 
distinguishes an individual human being as such, on the one hand, and human beings 
in society, on the other. Finally, it involves, thirdly, a combination of the principles of 
dynamic reality with the differing types of reality to ground a consistent conception of 
social transformation over time.
A metaphysical account is necessary to draw out the fullest implications of the 
discrete social trends affecting the contemporary world. At the same time, more 
precise tools are necessary to ascertain the contours of those trends within particular 
societies and over particular periods of time. For these reasons, the study focuses on 
specific manifestations of the broad cluster of processes which have conferred upon
r\A
contemporary human society its peculiarly modem form. It does this by focusing 
upon the changing quality of legal norms, which it thereby employs as prisms through
23 Copelston, 1955:35.
24 Crow, 1997.
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which the mechanisms of social pressure and reconfiguration can be seen to operate 
The debate surrounding the transition to modernity has been both voluminous and 
contentious. Yet it is fair to say that one of its most noticeable characteristics has been 
an increasing elaboration of abstract norms or laws, particularly in the form of 
institutionalised state sanctions. Legal norms, however, have long been seen as 
extending well beyond the narrow and restrictive ken of the nation-state.25 In the 
current study, ‘law’ is defined very broadly as any species of normative pressure. 
When so defined, it is argued that law offers a peculiarly accurate record of society’s 
structural state, and that it does so at various levels of generality. It is precisely for 
this reason, it is further suggested, that focusing upon the development and nature of 
legal norms is a particularly efficient method of analysing the contours and extent of 
social and historical transformation.26
This examination of legal and social transformation takes place within the particular 
contexts of China and India over the Thirty-year period from 1978. During this time, 
each society recognised, more or less explicitly, the validity of a capitalist ffee-market 
model of economic development, thereby locking itself into a world economic system 
that had begun to emerge as early as the sixteenth century, and which, as has already 
been seen, lies at the heart of the emergence of a distinctively modem and post­
modern form of consciousness. What makes China and India, in particular, such 
appropriate subjects of investigation in the context of present study is not only the 
peculiar balance of similarities and differences they disclose, but also the fact that, 
precisely prior to the sixteenth century, and by some accounts right up to second half 
of the eighteenth century,27 they were materially the most powerful civilisations in the 
world and should therefore have offered that system the greatest potential resistance.
In effecting such a comparison, the study relies upon the considerable body of 
detailed secondary material that has already been produced in respect of each country.
25 Chiba, 1989; Griffiths, 1986; Merry,1988; Roberts, 2005; Woodman, 1998; Twining, 2009:362-375.
26 Cherry, ed., 2004; Cotterrell, 2002; Harding & Orucu, eds, 2002; Glenn, 2004; Goldman, 1999; Kahn-Freund, 1974; 
Legrand,1996; Nelken, 1997; Santos, 1995; Teubner, 1988; Twining, 2000,2009. The present author is particularly sympathetic 
to Twining’s call for the reconstitution of a general jurisprudence on a much broader scale than that conceived by analytic 
thinkers such as Hart and Raz.,Twining, 2009: 21.
27 See in this regard: Frank, 1998; and, Pomeranz, 1999.
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This approach enables it to ground an overview of the specific developments in each 
jurisdiction that is nonetheless sufficient to bring to light the manner in which their 
transformations have been effected in practice. It builds upwards from this 
comparative base to a theoretical model that is tied into the contours of detailed and 
tangible practical developments. It is organised around three sections. The first 
section - Chapters Two and Three -  contextualises the study. Chapter Two sketches 
large-scale trajectories of human societal transformation overtime, as well as 
suggesting how the recent histories of China and India can be fitted within this 
broader outline. Chapter Three mirrors the structure of Chapter Two, though it 
focuses instead upon underlying changes in the character of legal norms. The second 
section — Chapters Four to Six — draws out in greater detail the processes of social 
reconfiguration that have accompanied the systemic acceptance in China and India of 
the ‘free-market’ paradigm. Chapter Four examines the differing constitutional 
strategies employed by each country. Chapter Five examines laws dealing explicitly 
with state activity both in terms of administrative action and in terms of criminal 
justice. Chapter Six examines developments in the field of family law. The third and 
final section -  Chapters Seven and Eight — works towards an overall explanatory 
model. Chapter Seven moves from the conclusions reached in Section Two to a more 
abstract theory of law and legal transformation. This, it is argued, can properly only 
be understood within the context of the metaphysical explanation of social change 
elaborated in Chapter Eight. The final Chapter, concludes by drawing together the 
various levels of argumentation to indicate how they form an integrated whole.
C: Theoretical Framework
1. History and Modernity
The theoretical framework employed in the present study rests upon a particular 
interpretative strand within wider debates surrounding the definition and origins of 
‘modernity’. As such, it is heavily indebted to the long-canvassed, though in recent 
times powerfully restated, view that modernity cannot be properly understood 
independent of its rejection of the pre-existing theological cosmos which it grew to
11
replace.28 In particular, it centres upon the view that the vast complexities of the 
modem world can be traced back to what Louis Dupre has characterised as a double 
break-up, “the one between the transcendent...and its cosmic-human counterpart, and 
the one between the person and the cosmos” which splintered “the onto-theological 
synthesis” of the high Middle Ages that had come to represent a more-or-less 
harmonious fusion of classical Greco-Roman and Hebrew-Christian thought.29 In 
time, the consequences of this break-up gave rise to the distinctive cluster of social, 
political and economic developments that have spread across the globe with 
extraordinary speed and power since the industrial revolution.
More profoundly, each of these developments fit within a much broader time-frame in 
which a unique feature of the human species has been its ability to transform itself 
and its environment with rational deliberation and to leam form its collective 
experience. This ability, it is suggested, has opened the possibility of each generation 
receiving and adding to a common stock of knowledge, and to the gradual 
accumulation of that stock over time. In the application of this knowledge for material 
advantage this capacity has enabled man to effect transformations in the physical 
world of increasing magnitude. Thus, it is a further argument of the present study that 
whilst modernity in its industrial and post-industrial forms has witnessed an 
unprecedented reconfiguration and quickening of productive forces and 
transformation in societal consciousness, it has also moved along a continuous 
transformational trajectory with earlier historical era.
In the context of long-run human transformation, then, three broad phases are 
delineated.30 In the first phase -  prior to the neolithic revolution and the emergence of 
the first state structures -  human society was characterised by a nomadic, hunter- 
gatherer lifestyle, co-ordinated predominantly around ties of kinship. In the second 
phase ~ running from the neolithic revolution to the industrial revolution -  society 
was characterised increasingly by agriculture and pastoralism which led to the 
founding of the first state structures and the emergence of coordinative elites in order 
to facilitate the organisational discipline necessary for settled agricultural production. 
Finally, in the third phase -  running from the industrial revolution to the present -  it
28 Cavanaugh, 2003; Hanby, 2003; Lowith, 1949; Milbank, 2006; Tiryankian, 1996; Voeglin, 1952, 1975.
29 Dupre, 1993: 3.
30 Lessnoff, 2002.
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has been characterised by co-ordinated industrial production of goods and services, 
and of a particular form of ‘modem’ and ‘post-modem’ consciousness.
The two revolutionary transitions dividing these historical phases -  the neolithic and 
the industrial -  have been rooted in the process of materialisation which is the 
underlying cause of the process of rationalisation so beloved of social theorists since 
Weber.31 Thus materialisation is characterised as the means by which man’s social 
life becomes increasingly subject to rational calculation in an attempt to exert greater 
control over the surrounding world. Connected to this process is a dynamic which 
operates such as to confer a clear selective advantage upon those societies, and 
groups, in which the methods of production are comparatively better subjected to 
rational mastery. This rational mastery enables them to control and to exploit their 
physical environment more effectively. In order to avoid the risk of being 
overwhelmed, a less efficient society, or grouping, must imitate or improve upon the 
techniques employed by its more efficient competitors. A growing portion of social 
life is thus functionalised in the service of the underlying requirement of physical 
survival by being increasingly subjected to the disciplines of rational co-ordination 
and organisational control. Accordingly, the processes of rational calculation within 
human society rise gradually in efficiency, and also grow more impersonal, 
predictable and extensive.
Implicit in this framework is the claim that human transformation has been the result 
of a continuous interplay between material and immaterial forces, but that, latterly, 
especially with the onset of advanced modernity, the former have come to exercise 
increasing influence at the expense of the latter. To understand this properly, it is 
necessary to recognise that the structures that both facilitate and constrain human 
agency vary both independent of human action and as a result of it. They vary 
independent of human action consequent upon physical, chemical and biological 
developments in the ‘natural’ world. They vary as a result of human action 
consequent upon the continual interaction of agents, and the individual and collective 
choices those agents make. As such, a person’s development, consciousness, 
socialisation, hierarchical positioning and physical ‘entitlements’ are conditioned and
31 Elster, 2000; Sica, 2000.
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determined by a network of pre-existing structures.32 At the same time, the precise 
nature of those structures are the result of an aggregation of previous individual 
actions.33 Materialisation is the process by which those structures that are distinctively 
human in origin, and thus which do most to habituate and condition social 
consciousness, take on an increasingly material character. This results from the 
proportionate increment in actions directed towards material ends over and above 
those directed towards immaterial ends. The greater this increment becomes, the more 
powerful becomes the logic of competition to which materiality is inherenty related, 
and, consequently, the more difficult becomes resistance to further incremental 
advances.
2. Law
In its most general sense, the term law may be taken to connote any general principle 
of behaviour, and is thus to be contrasted always with the particular event or decision. 
Beyond this, however, an important distinction opens between laws of physical 
nature, on the one hand, and laws of human conduct, on the other. The difference 
essentially consists in two things. First, whilst the laws of physical nature apply to all 
things in the physical world, the laws of human conduct apply only to human beings. 
Secondly, whereas physical laws are determinative, it is of the essence of the laws of 
human conduct that they may be violated. Such violation may be either accidental or 
deliberate: accidental, since people have finite intelligence and are consequently liable 
to error; deliberate, because a person is capable of departing from the precepts of 
human conduct should they wish to do so. In both cases, the capacity for violation 
resides in man’s nature as a free agent. Although debate surrounding the application 
of the term Taw’ to human conduct has been extraordinarily intense, for present 
purposes it may be said to have given rise to three very broad approaches.
The first approach -  the natural law approach -  contends that there is an intimate 
connection between law and the basic precepts of human nature, which are given 
expression to in the norms of morality.34 Moral norms are, in this context, linked
32 Bourdieu, 1990; Parker, 2000.
33 Parker, 2000.
34 George, 1992,1999; Finnis, 1982, 1983; Hittinger, 1987; Kelly, 1992; Lisska, 1996; Maritain, 1943,1947,1951; Mclnemey, 
1992,1997.
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clearly to the conditions for human fulfilment. They constitute the minimum 
behavioural standards required for a human community to function in the co-operative 
manner necessary for its members to realise the highest of their natural inclinations.35 
All particular legal rules in accord with morality are seen as perfecting the natural law 
by laying down prescriptions for particular communities which give effect to its 
general premises and, for that reason, are also seen as obligatory. Legal rules that are 
not in accord with morality, on the other hand, if followed, are held to distort the 
natural order and accordingly are seen as lacking the quality of legal obligation, 
allowing St Thomas Aquinas to formulate the dictum subscribed to by many natural 
law theorists: “A law that is not just seems to be no law at all.”36
The second approach -  the socio-economic approach -  had its roots in nineteenth 
century historical and sociological jurisprudence, and extended subsequently to 
include a plethora of schools united by a determination to analyse legal phenomena in 
relation to the social, political, economic and anthropological contexts from which 
they emerged.37 It pays particular attention to the deeper coordinative, coercive, 
instrumental and ideological functions of law, and is especially concerned with 
analysing the contours of power within given societies as well as how these subtly 
operate to extend the influence of some groups whilst reducing or even excluding that 
of others.38 Although this approach is often associated with attempts to construct 
analytical tools to help expose perceived injustice and puncture the claims of ruling 
elites to be acting in the interests of the common good,39 it also includes conservative 
attempts to place jurisprudence upon a more economically efficient footing.40 
Whatever the specific motivations of theorists falling within this category, however, 
they each are concerned in some way to account for how the law comes to develop in 
the way it does, and to draw out the implications of this development for the future. 
Typically, then, it tends also to employ a much broader definition of what counts as 
law, and is sensitive both to the informal understandings upon which formal legal 
rules depend, and to the often unspoken pressures that constrain and promote human 
activities in differing contexts.
35 Lisska, 1996.
36 Lisska, 1996; Veatch, 1971.
37 Cotterrell, 1989,1992; Ghai,et.al., 1983; Hamilton, 1995; Kelly, 1992; Kidder, 1983; Moore, 1978,
38 Morrison, 1999.
39 Unger, 1986.
40 Posner, 1981.
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The third approach -  the positivist approach -  contends that questions of legal validity 
and definition should be separated strictly both from questions of morality and from 
questions of socio-economic origin.41 Instead, it holds to the view that law consists of 
data, such as legislation, decided cases and custom, which can be recognised by 
relatively simple formal rules, or ‘rules of recognition’. According to the positivist 
conception this data constitutes the raw material of a science, which it is the lawyer’s 
task to analyse and order. “In this sense law is a ‘given’ -  part of the data of 
experience...The tests by which legal positivism recognises the existence of law or 
particular laws are.. .analogous to those by which a scientist might recognise the 
presence of a particular chemical.”42 Thus the positivist is a thorough-going formalist; 
for whom the only law is positive, state law which remains law whether it is moral or 
not. It is this third approach which is most commonly encountered amongst legal 
professionals, and which is most commonly adhered to, at least explicitly, in the 
various judicial fora within which they operate.
The present study is primarily concerned with law as a direction of human conduct 
rather than with law as a regulator of physical nature, though it does ultimately make 
arguments as to how the two senses of ‘law’ or normative ordering are related. In 
respect, specifically, of the former, it employs definition that characterises law as 
normative social pressure. In so doing, it focuses upon a particular category of social 
phenomena with which all three of the approaches outlined above are in some manner 
concerned, namely regulative norms instituted by human action. The definition 
employed is made up of two components. The first component is normativity, which 
should be taken to mean the abstractive quality possessed by any type of implicit or 
explicit regulatory standard, rule, or principle. The second component is social 
pressure, which should simply be taken to mean any type of individual or collective 
pressure or coercion. The quality of normativity enables law accurately to represent 
multiple individual occurrences and thus as it changes, to act as a peculiarly efficient 
medium through which to chart the extent and nature of social transformation over a 
given period. The quality of social pressure, on the other hand, particularly
41 Dworkin, 1977,1985,1986; Hart, 1961.
42 Cotterrell,1992: 9.
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distinguishes law from alternative socially normative phenomena such as language.43 
All forms of normative social pressure, taken in this sense, presuppose a number of 
things. First, they presuppose the existence of socially accepted standards capable of 
being violated. Secondly, they presuppose consensus that such violation threatens 
social integrity and, therefore, requires resistance. Finally, they presuppose deliberate 
effort to uphold standards by actually resisting threatened violations in practice. As 
such, law understood in this broad manner acts both to give effect to the consensus of 
society as a whole by disciplining elements which might otherwise threaten its 
integrity by their dissent, and also, in the process of so doing, to give expression to 
what, in fact, the present state of such consensus is.
Just as it is argued that law, taken in the above sense, offers an accurate reflection of a 
society’s structural state at any given point, it is also argued that law is uniquely 
appropriate in elucidating the extent to which a particular society has become 
alienated from its natural, or truly human, condition. Immediately, of course, this 
raises the question of how legal analysis enables measurement of such alienation in 
practice. The answer suggested is that it does so by charting the degree to which a 
society’s legal norms have become formalised. The term formalised here is linked 
into notions of explicitness and fixation, so that legal norms may be said to become 
increasingly formalised insofar as they display an increase in each of these qualities.
In practical terms, this can be gauged both by examining the character of the laws that 
structure society through noting the subjects that they deal with, and by noting the 
increment in the number of formal laws actually being promulgated.
In adopting this approach it is, of course, necessary to prescind initially from 
questions relating to the morality or immorality of the specific normative structures 
under consideration. However, this does not mean that such questions need ultimately 
be denied a place of central analytic importance. Indeed, it is argued here that the 
process of formalisation referred to above is properly comprehensible only in relation
43 In this regard, it is important to note that, as a normative system regulating the action of free agents, law performs an 
irreducibly coordinative function such that it can be understood to provide those agents with real reasons for action. This is, of 
course, a feature it shares with linguistic/communicative normative systems, such that it is possible to speak o f the latter as also 
being to some extent legislative. Yet, whilst allowing for this possibility, the present study attaches the term ‘law’ exclusively to 
norms of ‘social pressure’ precisely in order to distinguish it from those same linguistic/communicative norm-systems.
Moreover, and for similar reasons, ‘social pressure’ is understood in the widest possible sense, ranging from the slightest sense of 
social obligation within an individual’s conscience to the most draconian use o f physical force. Thus, it is meant to capture what 
Hart famously labelled law’s ‘internal’ point o f  view, including in consequence, the propensity to adhere to such phenomena as 
the rules o f recognition etc.
17
to a clear definition of human nature and, therefore, of the minimum conditions 
necessary for the flourishing of a human person and of the human community more 
broadly.44 As the process of formalisation becomes more extensive so, at a deeper 
level, does the process of rationalisation and thus materialisation, and so, as a 
necessary concomitant, does society become less observant of those normative 
patterns of behaviour which are characteristic of it in its most natural or fully 
functioning state. As such, there is a certain correspondence between the different 
theoretical approaches to law and the different stages of historical development.
3. China and India
China and India have many things in common 45 First, they are inhabited by more 
than a billion people each. Secondly, they each include the historical foci of 
civilizations that embody religious, social and cultural traditions that stretch back 
several millennia. Thirdly, whereas prior to sixteenth century, and by some accounts 
right up until the late eighteenth century, these civilizations were the wealthiest and 
most powerful in the world,45 they each suffered as a result of Europe 
industrialisation, and consequently were each subject to some form of colonial 
penetration.47 Fourthly, in reaction to this colonial experience and in order to 
guarantee a strengthened position of political and economic independence, each 
country over the past fifty years moved away from a reliance upon agrarian 
production by embarking upon its own comprehensive programme of large-scale 
industrialisation 48 Finally, during the period with which the present study is 
concerned, each country has turned away from its initial attempts to secure economic
44 Ultimately, then, as should already be evident, this study is forwarding a theory very clearly rooted in the Natural Law tradition 
of Aquinas and Aristotle. Classical natural law thinking has been noticeably absent from the contemporary debates surrounding 
comparative law. For works which have tentatively explored the possibility o f mutual relevance see Del Vecchio, 1969 and 
Selznick, 1961. More recently, Twining, in Twining, 2000, though he does not attempt properly to investigate “the potential of 
recent natural law theory to the study o f  the problems of globalisation and law.” (n.18., p. 65.), nonetheless acknowledges, that 
“ideas on natural law are clearly directly relevant to questions about humanitarian law, human rights and related matters at global 
transnational and other levels.” Twining, 2000: 65.Similarly, an important retrospective essay Gordley, 2003, is strongly 
suggestive o f the role that classical tradition o f  natural law thinking might play in clarifying and ordering the methodological 
underpinnings o f  a more convincing theoretical foundation for comparative legal studies.
45 Charlton, 1997.
46 Thus Ponting, speaking o f  the late eighteenth century, states: “The products Europe could make or supply were o f little interest 
to the great powers o f India and China that already made a wide range o f  higher quality products. The Europeans had no 
technical or military superiority over these states and could deploy little power in the region, certainly not enough to conquer the 
great land empires. Without the gold and silver o f  the Americas, Europe would not have been able to buy the products o f  Asia, 
make money and gradually infiltrate and gain some o f  the wealth that could be derived from the trade of the area...” Indeed, 
although Europe had used the period between 1500 and 1750 to catch up and attain approximately the same GNP per head as the 
wealthier areas o f Eurasia, “China and India were still far bigger economies that any in Europe because o f  their sheer size in 
terms of land area, natural resources, and population.” Ponting, 2001: 535
47 Hsu, 1995.
48 Brass, 1994; Hsu, 1995.
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self-reliance and begun consciously to lock itself into the increasingly powerful global 
system of market capitalism, by pursuing policies of economic liberalisation and 
international integration.49
Alongside these structural and transformational similarities are also significant 
differences. The most important of these differences is the fact that the diversity found 
in India runs deeper and is of greater relative consequence than that found in China. 
This is reflected in a number of areas. First, since in India, unlike in China, the 
majority religious tradition exists alongside a numerically significant, geographically 
interspersed, and largely non-assimilable alternative, large-scale communal tension 
has been a constant theme since the Moghul invasions of the sixteenth century. 
Secondly, the systems of caste, jati and untouchability have rendered the strict 
hierarchical differentials evident in both societies distinctly more numerous, profound 
and inflexible in India.50 Thirdly, in China, where the majority is distinguished 
primarily by ethnicity rather than by religious affiliation, there is a much larger degree 
of ethnic homogeneity; and although this is accompanied by the existence of 
numerous ethnic minority groups on the periphery and by considerable linguistic 
diversity, these diversities are much less significant than their Indian equivalents.51 
Fourthly, whilst both countries have historically suffered from numerous political and 
dynastic transitions, these have generally had a less de-stabilising effect upon the state 
in China than they have had on its cognate in India, owing to China’s peculiarly 
enduring and powerful Confucian governmental elite. Fifthly, this has meant that 
whilst China has been more resistant to colonial penetration than India, it has also 
been far more susceptible to revolutionary change from above.53 Sixth and finally, 
these accumulated differences have together helped give rise to the profoundly 
different governmental, constitutional and legal systems that presently operate in each 
country.54 so that China is much more authoritarian in nature than is ostensibly 
democratic India, and has adopted a more coordinative, civil law system, as compared 
to what might be characterised as India’s more reactive, common law approach.55
49 Brass, 1994; Sachs.et.al., 1999; Tu,1993.
50 Brass, 1994.
51 Brass, 1994; Charlton,1997.
52 Hsu, 1995.
53 Guang&Muppidi,1997.
54 Chen,1998; Kusum,2000.
55 Damaska, 1986.
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By examining the developments within these societies, it is possible to bring their 
similarities and differences together to form a coherent picture of what it is argued are 
the essentially coordinate developmental trajectories each is following, to draw 
conclusions about the precise nature of these trajectories, and, further, to draw some 
tentative conclusions about the common forces which underlie them. These 
transformations are most amply demonstrated in the legal developments that have 
taken place and have been effected in each jurisdiction over the last three decades.
The chapters that follow disclose a situation in which the legal transformations in 
China and India, though superficially different, are nonetheless each developing in 
remarkably similar ways. This seems to indicate that such resistance as China and 
India have offered to the reconfigurative pressures of modernity is being gradually but 
conclusively undermined.
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Part 1
Historical
Part 1 offers a schematic outline for understanding the historical and legal 
transformations which have taken place respectively in Europe, China and India. One 
of the central contentions of the present study is the impossibility of comprehending 
the full implications of contemporary developments unless they are approached from 
a broad historical and deep-lying conceptual perspective. Not only, then, does Part 1 
serve a vital contextualizing function for the more detailed analyses in Part 2, it also 
anticipates a number of the conceptual precepts that receive fuller elaboration in Part
3. For this reason, a set of clear theoretical commitments will be apparent in each of 
the following chapters.
In the first part of Chapter 2 this manifests itself in a close engagement with the work 
of Christopher Dawson. It was Dawson’s special contribution to have highlighted the 
great spiritual currents running through world history and to have argued for their 
place of central importance. In so doing, he based his analysis, normally implicitly, 
sometimes explicitly, on a conception of the human person and of human society 
irreducibly possessed of both material and immaterial aspects. In addition to 
accounting for the extraordinary diversity of pre-modem cultures, his work contains 
within it, and in common with a number of other thinkers, a profound explanation of 
the emergence of the modem world in terms of an increasingly systematic redirection 
of the spiritual impulses which had shaped the Christian culture of medieval Europe, 
away form the transcendent towards the immanent such that attempts were made more 
and more to satisfy irreducible and inexhaustible needs of an immaterial nature with 
goods of a material and thus exhaustible nature. This redirection has recently and 
imaginatively been characterized by historian of western legal development, David 
Goldman, as a replacement of the Holy Roman Empire with a modem ‘Wholly 
Mammon Empire.’
The arguments in Chapter 2 are complimented by a similar framing of the narrative in 
the first part of Chapter 3 around the work of Heinrich Rommen. Rommen develops 
an ‘inversion thesis’ of his own, though this time, one which is more clearly of a 
normative/conceptual nature, whereby the relationship between the underlying 
principles of the natural law and the norms posited by particular communities in 
particular cultural and material contexts, is reversed such that the underlying 
normative principles shaping society come increasingly to result from contingent 
uncontrolled individual and collective assertions of the will. Emphasizing the intimate 
causative interplay between socio-historical and ideological-normative developments, 
Rommen identifies the roots of modem positivism in a late scholastic turn towards 
nominalism in a way which corresponds closely to the wider historical narrative set 
out in Chapter 2.
Importantly, the ‘inversion theses’ propounded by these authors are premised upon 
the unprecedented nature of the immanentizing developments at the origins of the 
modem world such as to explain the concentration in the first parts of Chapters Two 
and Three upon specific historical developments internal to Europe. Indeed, it is a
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crucial part of the story of those developments that one cultural form emerged and 
came to spread itself across the entire globe. Thus, whilst this culture emerged first in 
Europe, its transformative implications went far beyond. In fact, it is precisely owing 
to the spread of this pathological form that whereas prior to the sixteenth century the 
cultural trend in world history as a whole was towards differentiation, from that time 
onwards it has tended towards ever-greater uniformity.
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Chapter 2: Historical Transformation
A: Conceptual Framework
The purpose of this second chapter is to outline long-term historical transformation. In 
doing so, it pays particular attention to the gradual emergence of industrial and post­
industrial society in Western Europe, and then to how the institutional forms of that 
society were spread, and began to transform, the traditional societies of China and 
India. With this in mind it is useful to employ -  with important adaptations -  a 
framework suggested by the work of Jurgen Habermas in which he distinguishes 
differing stages or phases of historical development as characterised by certain core 
institutional forms which dominate society during the relevant period in question and 
confer upon it its distinctive nature. The first of these phases ran from the origins of 
human society to the Neolithic revolution. Here the core institutional form was 
constituted by the kinship group which was associated with a type of social 
interaction characterised by co-option and reciprocity and in which inter-personal 
loyalty and affectivity tended to be foremost. The second phase ran approximately 
from the Neolithic to the Industrial revolutions. During this period the core 
institutional form was the state which was associated with a form of political (or 
strategic) action characterised by asymmetrical relations of power and control 
according to which one group is, subtly or not so subtly, subordinated to, or placed 
under the direction of another. The third and final period, runs from the Industrial 
revolution to the present; its core institutional form being the capitalist market 
economy, according to which the most characteristic action is essentially functional in 
nature, whereby individuals are related to each other as economic producers and 
consumers.
56 Habermas, 1988: 17-24 Whilst Habermas distinguishes a total o f four stages in his particular theory o f social evolution, for the 
purposes o f the present study, and owing to deeper philosophical differences which centre upon doubts as to the possibility of 
redeeming the ‘enlightenment project’, the three principles o f  organisation he distinguishes will be taken to characterise just three 
corresponding phases o f  historical transformation.
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B: The Dynamics of Societal Change Overtime
1. Pre-Agrarian
The best estimates seem to suggest that modem humans, with their capacity for 
symbolic language and collective learning, emerged about 250,000 years ago in sub- 
Saharan Africa, and that they gradually began migrating outwards to other parts of the 
globe from about 100,000 years ago, as they evolved technologies which enabled 
them to live in new environments.57 The lifestyle of these peoples was characterised 
by an essentially reciprocal form of interpersonal interaction, comprising small bands 
roaming the earth as hunters and gatherers, utilising simple tools and bound together 
in a social order based upon kinship ties and clan groupings. They led, as Marshall 
Sahalins pointed out in his famous Stone Age Economics, a largely leisured and 
affluent life, living off the natural produce of the earth and being driven “by no 
systematic motive for producing more goods than were necessary to satisfy basic 
needs.”58
Even more strikingly, and almost without exception, they were imbued with world­
views that “engendered] a coherent vision of the social and natural world... [which 
was premised upon] a cosmos in which the natural and the social [were]... not sharply 
or systematically distinguished.. .”,59 in which language use was “multi-stranded”, 
performing simultaneously both descriptive and loyalty affirming functions, and in 
which all aspects of life were conceived in essentially religious terms. Consequently, 
the dominant semantic structures employed were neither wholly referential nor wholly 
unrelated to nature: they were both referential and, at the same time, “meshed in with 
other elements” which prevented them from fusing into a single, purely descriptive, 
extra-social whole.60
57 See, amongst other works: Foley, 1995; Klein, 1999; and, Schick & Troth, 1993. On the gradual emergence of nascent state 
structures more generally, see: Crone, 1989.
58 Sahalins, 1974
59 Gellner, 1990: 60
60 Ibid: 52.
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2. The Neolithic Revolution and Early State Structures
The end of the last ice age, about 10-12,000 years ago, marked a crucial turning point 
in human history, since it was at about this time that a number of hunter-gatherer 
bands began to cultivate and settle those regions of the world best suited to 
agricultural production.61 This is often referred to as the agricultural or Neolithic 
revolution, but the development of settled agriculture actually occurred at different 
times in different parts of the globe and took several millennia to reach its furthest 
extent. In time, however, its cumulative effect was felt with greater and greater force 
as the increase food surpluses to which it gave rise encouraged significant population 
growth, the establishment of permanent fortified settlement, nascent forms of 
urbanisation and eventually to the emergence of increasingly powerful, centralised 
and socially stratified state structures.62
In crude power political terms, this form of organisation meant that the many groups 
continuing to live a hunter-gatherer life-style had to face increasingly aggressive 
competition.63 As the number and size of agricultural societies increased and the 
political structures which sustained them became more complex, the scene was set not 
only for the almost complete marginalisation of the hunter-gatherer way of life, but 
also for mutual warfare and colonisation between the strengthening agrarian states 
themselves.64
In each of these developments, it is important to bear in mind the continuing 
importance of religious practice and the ceremonial consciousness that went with it. 
The increasingly sophisticated cultures that emerged alongside the growth of 
agricultural settlement remained “profoundly religious in their conception” insofar as 
men learnt to control natural forces “as a religious rite by which they cooperated as 
priests in the great cosmic mystery of the fertilisation and growth of nature”. For 
example, the annual “mystical drama” of the Mother-Goddess “and her dying and 
reviving son and spouse” was simultaneously “the economic cycle of ploughing and
61 Mellaart, 1975; Smith, 1955; Ward, 1954: 16
62 See, for example: Postgate, 1992; and Khurt, 1995.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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seed time and the harvest by which the people lived.”65 And the material surplus that 
resulted from the transition to agrarian production resulted in the emergence not only 
of a specialist coercive or ruling elite, but also that of a class specialist in “cognition, 
legitimation, salvation [and] ritual”66-  in other words, in a priest-hood.67 In addition 
to the possibility this opened up for the much more sustained investigation of the 
natural world, together with the service that this elite, trained in the newly developed 
techniques of written communication and record-keeping, could provide in the cause 
of political expansion, it also gave rise to the possibility of a more sustained, 
disciplined, penetrating and profound contemplation of spiritual and theological 
realities, as well as their more systematic collection and transmission.68
In time these various processes formed the basis for the development of the great 
archaic civilisations of the ancient world during the sixth and fifth millenia B.C. -  
those which appeared in Sumer and in Egypt, in the Indus valley and along the 
Yellow River in China,69 Yet, whilst, in the process, there was “realised an enormous 
material progress -  relatively the greatest perhaps that the world has ever seen -  this 
progress was strictly limited.”70 The tribal community may now have been altogether 
more elaborate, but the social order as a whole remained inextricably bound up with 
the processes of the natural world and with an “absolutely fixed ritual form from 
which it could not be separated.”71
Nevertheless, these largely riverine empires continued to expand and consolidate their 
territorial control at the expense their weaker neighbours until sometime in the third
• 79millennium B.C. From this point they began to be exposed to a series of barbarian 
invasions by peoples of Indo-European stock possessed of extraordinary but largely 
destructive vigour, invasions which came to press down from the north along the 
entire frontier of the archaic world.73 In time, these repeated waves of destruction 
cracked open the pre-existing ritual and civilizational orders and of throwing into
65 Dawson, 2001: 94. This section follows very closely the accounts given by Dawson in Dawson, 1997 and 2001. It will be quite 
apparent that the narrative developed in this Chapter owes a considerable debt to the thought and writings o f  Christopher Dawson 
more generally, though it also seeks to extend and update his argument in relation to more recent developments. For th recent 
revival o f  interest in the work o f Dawson, see esp: Caldecott & Morrill, 1997.
66 Gellner, 1990: 17.
67 Dawson, 2001: 104 & 109.
68 Gellner, 1990: 17 & 74. See also, Bright, 1996.
69 Burenhult, ed., 2003.
70 Dawson, 2001: 97.
71 Ibid.
72 Wittfogel, 1957.
73 Dawson, 2001:98.
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question the eternal verities that those orders had previously appeared to guarantee. 
Minds were rudely forced beyond the unquestioned cultural horizons of the past, 
losing the capacity to accept existing conditions as the whole of reality.74 More and 
more they “compared the world [they] knew with the social and moral order [they] 
believed in, and condemned the former.” By the middle of the first millennium B.C. 
this began to presage a cultural change of the most profound order. Indeed, it was 
during this ‘Axial Age’, as Karl Jaspers famously termed it, that “the transcendent 
was bom” across the widest possible civilizational front “in a ritual form [now] 
became moralised and spiritualised.”75
The longer-term importance of these ideas, however, lay not in the way they were 
presented by their original exponents, but rather in the precise manner they interacted 
with the cultures into which they were introduced. Here a common, and striking, 
thread running through the major oriental civilisations was a tendency for these new 
ideas actually to undergo a degree of re-absorption into their older archaic cultural 
hosts.76 Thus in Confucian China, for example, the new religious impulse tended to 
stop short of enquiring further into the fundamental nature of “the Reality the 
fulfilling of whose laws brought the Great Unity.”77 Instead, it turned towards the 
practice of virtue which, whilst certainly implying the assent of the mind to an imier 
law of benevolence and justice, also entailed the careful observance of an intricately 
elaborated external ceremonial which thereby “consecrated and preserved,” though 
admittedly also “somewhat rationalised” China’s pre-existent cultural forms.78
In India, by contrast, “the absolute metaphysical view of life was theoretically 
triumphant, and ruled the whole civilisation,” involving, in both its Upanishadic and 
Buddhist forms, a deliberate renunciation of the world for the sake of personal 
enlightenment. Nonetheless, such a standard proved altogether too austere for the 
large majority of people, who honoured the asceticism of countless holy men at the 
same time as they resorted to pre-existing rites and fertility cults. Whilst “[t]he ancient
74 Ibid: 99.
75 Ibid: 99-101. On the rich discourse surrounding Jaspers’ idea o f  the Axial Age see: Aranson et. al., 2004; Bellah, 2005; 
Eisenstadt, 1986; Jaspers, 1953, 1962; and, Voeglin, 1957. Also see the classic study o f  pre-Axial temple religion in the Near 
East: Fustel de Coulanges, 2006.
75 Dawson, 2001: 112.
77 Ward, 1954: 30.
78 Dawson, 2001: 112. The schools o f  Daoist philosophy were, o f  course, much more absorbed in exploring the fundaments o f  
reality than their Confucian counterparts, and occupied, to some extent, the gap created by the comparative worldliness o f  
Chinese culture, but, though o f  sporadic importance, these never came to play more than an ancillary role in official ideology.
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myths and rites [we]re interpreted as the symbols of a higher reality by the followers 
of the new religious philosophy.. .to the common people they retain[ed] their old 
meaning and continue[d] to embody the mysterious forces of the physical world.”79 
Consequently, in the two greatest centres of archaic civilisation, and owing to a 
certain one-sidedness, the ‘Axial’ breakthrough seems to have been to some extent 
abortive since the religious impulse to which it gave rise failed to permeate and 
transform its hosts in a manner sufficient to set them on a fundamentally new 
developmental path.
Turing to the cradle of western civilisation, namely the eastern Mediterranean and the 
Greek archipelago, the story seems, at first glance, to be somewhat different. Greek 
civilisation differed from it ‘oriental’ counter-parts in a number of ways, perhaps the 
most important of which was the fact that
Greek society lacked the kind of powerful bureaucracy that elsewhere might 
provide a locus for the formation of an elite culture (for example, in ancient 
Egypt); its temples were not prominent in the appropriation of economic 
resources (as was the case in the Near East), and there was no entrenched 
and hereditary priesthood (as there was in India). Greek culture was thus 
marked by a focus on the political that is largely absent from Indian culture 
as it has come down to us.. .At the same time this focus was significantly 
different from that of political reflection in ancient China, where even under 
conditions of fragmentation the scale of political organisation was much 
larger. In this way the culture of Greece stood out in being what we might
• » oncall a citizen culture.
Pan-Hellenic resistance to the Persian onslaught during the Persian war sparked a 
growing consciousness of shared cultural values and life-ways distinctive from those 
of the archaic East. The great creative achievement (and colonial expansion) to which 
this, in part, gave rise during the seventh and sixth centuries BC, settled Greek 
civilisation around the two poles of the free city and a common culture, which duly 
placed the greatest emphasis upon the free development of individual virtue and
O 1
character. Moreover, whilst the eastward direction of the second great wave of 
Hellenic expansion under Alexander the Great and his successors in large part
79 Ibid. It must immediately be recognised, however, that these are now no longer, if  they ever were, uncontroversial claims. 
What certainly cannot be denied, however, is the range and diversity o f  the changes that subsequently took place in these 
‘traditional’ cultures, particularly in those o f  China and India, as it is hope will be made abundantly clear in the following 
sections o f the present chapter. Nor, indeed, is it intended to deny the extraordinary diversity these cultures demonstrated even 
during the ‘Axial Age’.
80 Cook, 2004:218.
81 Dawson, 1998: 135.
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facilitated the rise of the Roman Empire to its west whose practicality and genius for 
administrative organisational efficiency eventually led to the Greek empire’s own
downfall, Greek culture and ideals were almost wholly taken over by their less
• • • « 82imaginative Latin successors.
Yet, upon closer inspection, the Hellenic world was itself subject to the same spiritual 
forces at work in India and the Far East, and there are strong indications that it too 
failed fundamentally to break with the common pattern of ancient civilisation. The 
cosmic vision of the Greco-Roman world, like that of the rest of the ancient world, 
was dominated by a cyclical conception of time in which the entire created order was 
subject to an inevitable cycle of birth, death and rebirth.83 This found particular 
expression in the theory of the Great Year which infiltrated Greek consciousness from 
the time of Heraclitus, having had its probable origins in Mesopotamia from which it 
gradually spread to the rest of the ancient world.84
It is only against this almost uniform background that the true uniqueness of the 
Jewish attitude to the material world and the temporal process that found expression 
in it can be appreciated.
.. .to the Jews, history possessed a unique and absolute value, such as no 
other people of antiquity had conceived.. .While the philosophers of India 
and Greece were meditating on the illusoriness or the eternity of the cosmic 
process, the prophets of Israel were affirming the moral purpose in history 
and were interpreting the passing events of their age as the revelation of the 
divine will. For them there could be no question of the return of all things in 
an eternal cycle of cosmic change, since the essence of their doctrine of the 
divine purpose in the world was its uniqueness. There was one God and one 
Israel, and in the relations between the two was comprised the wholeOff
purpose of creation.
Indeed, “while the general tendency in the new age was to syncretise the various local 
cults and to subordinate all these personal divinities to some transcendent impersonal 
principle.. .the tendency in Israel was to accentuate the unity and the universality of 
the national god.”86 Armed with this deep inner and exclusivist belief that the Jews 
were uniquely able to preserve their own distinctive religious vision and way of life.
82 Ibid: 136-137.
83 See here, the classic studies by Mircea Eliade: Eliade, 1971,1958. See also: Jaki, 1985.
84 Dawson,2001: 118.
85 Ibid: 123.
86 Ibid.
29
And it was also precisely by building upon the Jewish prophetic and apocalyptic 
tradition that Christianity was able to give still wider affirmation to “ the significance 
and value of history,” the world process now being conceived as a “divine drama 
whose successive acts were the Creation and Fall of Man, his Redemption, and his
on
glorious restoration.”
It is in this context, that of an unprecedented missionary zeal, the root of 
Christianity’s extraordinarily powerful dynamic of expansion and transformation, that 
the ultimate victory of the Church in the 4th Century can be seen as a violent 
interruption of the religious evolution of the ancient world which forced European 
civilization into an entirely new conceptual orbit. In the eastern part of the Roman 
Empire, Christianity maintained its position as the imperial state religion. In the 
western part, however, where the empire soon collapsed under the pressure of 
repeated waves of barbarian migration and internal instability, the Church was forced 
back on to its own devices, taking with it in the process many of the organisational
QO
accoutrements of its former host. Able to survive the disintegration and 
reconfiguration of the political landscape by creatively drawing upon its own inner 
spiritual resources, the Church became the one remaining conduit of classical culture. 
Through a process of conversion among the newly settled barbarian peoples, it 
represented the single most important factor in forging a new European society of 
nations.89
Consequently, although interrupted in the seventh and eighth centuries by the Islamic 
conquests of Spain and the Western Mediterranean and by renewed waves of 
barbarian migration from the north and east in the ninth, the conversion of 
Scandinavia and Hungry laid the final foundations of wholly new Christian society. 
Initially, this society focused upon the Frankish kingdom of the Carolingians, whose 
patronage, together with the reforming impulse of the Papacy, the monasteries, and 
the Irish/ Anglo-Saxon missionary scholars, produced a great revival of learning and 
liturgy.90 With the passing of Carolingian ascendency, however, it expanded hugely 
from its original eleventh century nucleus, over a period of some three or four
87 Irenaeus, 1916: 125.
88 Dawson, 1998: 138-139. See also: Jones, 1973.
89 Dawson, 2001: 131-133. See also and importantly: Brown, 1971; and, Hillgath, 1986.
90 Dawson, 1998:139-140.
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centuries, right across the heartlands of north-western Europe and deep into the Slavic 
east.91
This expansion was inspired, in particular, by a “conception of Christendom as a 
social unity, which included and transcended the lesser unities of nation and kingdom 
and city... [and which] found its primary expression, not in a universal empire but in 
the universal order of the Church.”92 At the same time, it was conditioned and limited 
at every level by the feudal nature of medieval society, which stemmed from Europe’s 
martial and agrarian bases, and had evolved as a system of land tenure that maintained 
a stable population engaged in agricultural production and to ensured that levies could 
be raised in order to meet external threats.93 Whilst this ideologically potent form of 
theocratic internationalism manifested itself in all aspects of medieval culture,94 it also 
resulted in relatively weak state structures, with relations between lords and monarchs 
characterised by varying degrees of mutual dependence and consent especially with 
respect to the raising of taxation and support for collective military enterprises.95 
Accentuated by the jealously guarded division between the secular and spiritual 
powers and the forceful assertion of the autonomous prerogatives of the of the latter,96 
it was the gradual formalisation of these struggles over taxation between the monarch 
and other elements of society that eventually led to the proliferation “parliamentary” 
or “estate” assemblies in which key social groups negotiated with the king on 
economic and legal matters, as well as to a distinctive, and remarkably powerful, form 
of urban local government.97
Despite undergoing an extraordinary process of expansion, consolidation and cultural 
advance,98 then, medieval Christendom was only ever able to forge the loosest of 
internal unities. Lacking the relatively greater homogeneity of the civilisations of 
China and India to its east, this fragile compact only precariously overlay the 
powerful and continuing traditions of the Latin Mediterranean and the
91 Ibid: 140.
92 Ibid. Also see, in general: Anderson, 1974 and Southern, 1979.
93 Bloch, 1942; Duby, 1974; and, Postan, 1975.
94 Among other works see: Baldwin, 1971; Baluffi, 1885; Gilson, 1938; Grant, 2001: Gregoire, et.al., 1985; O’Connor, 1921 
Panofsky, 1985; Schnurer, 1956; Ulilom, 1883; and, West, 1892.
95 Hall, 1986; Poggi, 1992; Mann, 1978; Tilly, 1992.
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Germanic/barbarian kingdoms of the north. As a result, with the ultimate failure of the 
Crusades, the growing wealth of the monasteries, the increasing veniality of the clergy 
and the proliferation of internal doctrinal and political disputes, there began to set in a 
process of decay, both intellectual and spiritual, which started to attack the 
foundations of this unity, destroying the scholastic synthesis and fracturing the 
alliance between the Papacy and the movement for ecclesiastical reform which had 
lain at its heart." At the same time, the older centres of civilisation in the Byzantine 
east were beginning to decline under the pressure of Mongol aggression that had 
opened up a vast front across Asia.100 This shifted the cultural centre of gravity 
towards the various Italian city-states, thereby propelling the Italian peninsula to the 
forefront of social, cultural, political and economic development.101 Moreover, the 
growing intra-regional competition in which this resulted, caused the Papacy to attend 
more and more to its own narrowly territorial interests and, in becoming one of the 
principal sponsors of the newer cultural trends,102 to further undermine the fragile 
cultural compact upon which Christendom had been based.
An important component of this process of disintegration was the increasingly 
determined programme of political and economic centralisation engaged in by
1 mEurope’s major dynastic states. This seems to have been driven by a rise in the 
intensity of later medieval warfare together with the development of new military 
technology and tactics. It required the recruitment, training, equipping and payment of 
much larger and more permanent armies than had previously been the case. This in 
turn presaged, and indeed facilitated, the growth of royal bureaucracies, the gradual 
co-option of alternative sources of power such as the Church and the lesser nobility 
and the development of much larger, more internally unified states.104 In consequence, 
it also led to a growing emphasis upon the authority of their ruling monarchies.105 A 
potent early source of the magnificence this concentration of power resulted in was 
provided by the Italian Renaissance, at the heart of which lay a determined and 
dazzling re-appropriation of the Hellenic tradition. Having its origins back in the 
recovery of Greek science and philosophy via the Arabic translators of the twelfth
99 See also, on the impact o f  the Black Death: McNeill, 1976; and, Zeigler, 1982
100 See the classic study: Oblensky, 1982.
101 Fanfani, 2003:96. See also: Burke, 1999.
102 Chambers, 2006.
102 For an illustrative study o f the rise o f  French absolutism, see: Major, 1997.
104 Supra, note 41. See also: Mallet, 1974; and, McNeill, 1982.
105 See, in general: Burke, 1999; and, Major, 1997.
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century, this gave rise not only to the most extraordinary works of art and music but 
also to an new spirit of enquiry into the material world which eventually bore fruit in 
the great scientific advances of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo and seemed to open 
up unlimited possibilities of material progress.
As these various processes unfolded and the dynamic map of Europe was recast, the 
impulse that had underpinned earlier reforming movements in France and Germany 
continued to manifest itself It now no longer did so, however, through the traditional 
monastic institutional channels. Instead, it became increasingly aligned to the dual 
forces of nationalism and conciliarism and to the much more radicalised, localised 
and heretical movements of Wycliffe and Huss. In the process it was transformed 
from being an ally to being an enemy of the Papacy, thereby sowing the seeds for the 
forthcoming Lutheran and Calvinist reformations which marked the ultimate 
disintegration of the Christian world.
These many strands of conflict, tension and reconfiguration soon divided the new 
Europe of sovereign nation-states between two quite different cultural forms.106 Thus, 
although in protestant Europe the influence of humanist culture continued to be 
considerable, “the influence of the Old Testament” became far stronger and gave rise 
to “a type of character and a way of life that [was] as hard as iron and as irresistible as 
a steam hammer.”107 It was this spiritual power that lay “behind the new economic 
order which was destined to transform Europe and the world” and upon which “there 
arose a society of godly merchants and shopkeepers and craftsmen who worked hard 
and spent little, who regarded themselves as God’s elect, and were ready to fight to 
the death against any attempt of King or bishop to interfere with their religion or their 
business.”108 In contrast, the Baroque culture of the Counter-Reformation which came 
to dominate the greater part of Southern Europe sought more thoroughly to integrate 
the art and music of the new age, but even it found it impossible properly to assimilate 
the new movement of scientific thought.109
106 Dawson, 1998: 142.
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At the same time, the state showed an increasing desire to harness the economic 
potential offered by a growth in Europe’s merchant classes and in its levels of 
urbanisation.110 Under a system which came to be known as mercantilism, these 
merchant classes were encouraged to maximise their profits from the buying and 
selling of goods through state sponsorship in the forms of discriminatory controls and 
tariffs, subsidies and the granting of monopolies. Controls on trade were not, of 
course new. What changed was that these extra-market controls came to be wholly 
moulded according to the priorities of national aggrandisement and power 
consolidation.111 Moreover, the state sponsored search for new markets that this led to 
took place at the very time when Europe, having suffered a final frustration of it 
eastern ambitions at the hands of the Turks in the last crusades, was being forced to 
explore new channels of trade and expansion elsewhere.112 This general reorientation 
of Europe from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic laid the foundations not only for the
eventual dominance by Europe of the rest of the world, but also for the still further
» » * • • • 1 1  ^intensification of intra-European competition.
3. The Emergence of Industrial and Post-Industrial Society
a. The Early Modern State
The widespread adoption of mercantilist practices was, in retrospect, an important 
step towards the development of a distinctively industrial and post-industrial society. 
At its heart was the development of an increasingly integrated system of capitalist 
production together with the attendant construction of self-regulating market 
economies. Prior to the to the late fifteenth century, private ownership of the means of 
production had existed to a small degree, anything other than the most minimal capital 
accumulation was extremely difficult to realise in practice. Under the mercantilist 
system, in contrast, capital accumulation came to be actively encouraged and a more 
robust system of private property instituted. Yet two essential components of later 
capitalist production -  land and labour -  continued to be largely shielded from 
commercial exploitation. The reason why the mercantilism “never [fundamentally]
110 Miskim, 1965.
111 Fanfani, 2003:50-51.
112 Wittek, 1971; and, Kafardar, 1995
113 Tracy, ed., 1991; and, Tracy, 1990.
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attacked the safeguards which protected these two basic elements of 
production. ..from becoming the objects of commerce”,114 is clear enough. For 
although the newly emergent absolutist monarchies were keen to harness the potential 
of the merchant classes within their respective territories, allowing those same classes 
to engage in practices that would undermine either their interests abroad or their more 
traditional dynastic sources of power and authority at home would have been entirely 
counter-productive.
Nevertheless, in the longer term, the rationale behind this semi-restrictive scenario 
was prevented from finding frilly stable social expression or of containing the partially 
released forces of market accumulation. The protracted struggles and enormous 
pressures of inter-state competition that resulted from the emergence in sixteenth 
century Europe of a multi-polar great power theatre, gradually forced national 
monarchies to concede more and more ground to the functional requirements of the 
market.115 In particular, it became increasingly clear that those markets labouring 
under the least external restrictions were likely to give rise to the most powerful 
national economies, and that if states were not to be overwhelmed by their stronger 
neighbours they would have to allow the new techniques of capital accumulation to 
flourish within their own territories.116 The story of the early-modern period and 
beyond became the story of a series of concessions by the traditional landed and 
dynastic elites in favour of their commercial compatriots. These concessions were 
rapidly generalised across the western world.117
To begin with, the actions of those imbued with the new ‘capitalist impulse’ tended to 
work indirectly against the old religious order by attempting to ease the restrictions it 
place upon economic activity. In proportion as Europe was riven by heresy and 
schism this attack became more explicit. This in turn gave rise to a growing insistence 
upon the state proclaiming and guaranteeing “freedom of conscience” so that the
114 Polanyi, 1957.
115 Kennedy, 1989.
116 See especially in this regard: Tilly, 1992: 103-104. There he states that: “After 1750, in the eras o f  nationalisation and 
specialisation, states began moving aggressively from a near universal system o f  indirect rule to a new system of direct rule: 
unmediated intervention in the lives o f  local communities, households, and productive enterprises. As rulers shifted from the 
hiring o f mercenaries to the recruitment o f  warriors from their own national populations, and as they increased taxation to 
support the great military forces o f  eighteenth century warfare, they bargained out access to communities, households and 
enterprises, sweeping intermediaries in the process...”
117 Thus, the overall expansion in state activity was o f a particular variety, which was at the same time stamped with the character 
o f a increasing level o f specialisation. Thus, Christian, developing the classive insight o f  Karl Polanyi, states that: “For the most 
part, Modern states intervene more widely and more effectively than traditional agrarian states; but they are also more aware of 
those areas o f  economic activity where excessive interaction can be counterproductive.” Christian, 2005: 429.
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relevance of religion to economic life could be reduced to an absolute minimum.118 
Already prior to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) this had begun to happen with the 
emergence of a third, secularising alternative. That alternative was represented best by 
the French Politiques and England’s post Civil War generation who, appreciating that 
the only hope of securing peace and order lay in some form of mutual toleration,
“were prepared to sacrifice the principle of religious unity for the cause of national 
unity.”119 In England this resulted in “a regime of limited monarchy and limited 
religious toleration combined with unlimited individualism and freedom of 
thought.”120 In France, there were ultimately abortive attempts to re-impose religious 
unity, but this was entirely in the context of consolidating royal power and this did 
nothing to counter the secularising trend.121 Indeed, it was this tendency, spread 
throughout Europe via the courts and aristocratic salons, which eventually gave rise to 
the great counter-religion of the Enlightenment.122
The role of the nation-state in implementing religious toleration was clearly of great 
importance. But its support for the deeper interests of capital nevertheless remained 
contingent. Consequently, a further development was necessary before a fully self­
regulating market system could emerge, namely capital’s co-option of the nation-state 
itself. This found its most tangible expression in the advent of varying forms of 
parliamentary and republican government. From a functional point of view, these 
increasingly operated “as.. .political instruments] guaranteeing that the State.. .never 
embrace[d] ideas not shared by members of the community, and.. .never propose[d] 
the realisation of programmes injurious to the economic interests”.123 of the 
enfranchised classes, bearing the stamp of commerce and trade. It was through the 
emerging “political liberties” of these classes that they were able actively to co­
operate both in “forming [and controlling] the will of the State”. It was no 
coincidence, then, that the industrial system of capitalist production first emerged in 
that country which was also the first major European power to institute a system of 
limited government into which the gentry and commercial classes were drawn as
118 Tilly, 1992: 103-104.
119 Dawson, 1959: 50-51.
120 Ibid: 54-55.
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122 For an analysis o f the conceptual underpinnings o f  the Enlightenment and their consequences for the modem world see 
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intimate partners of the older landed aristocracy. Nor further that big industry in 
Germany, Italy, Japan and Belgium (etc.) was bom only after they too had adopted 
nascent parliamentary forms.
b. The Case of Great Britain
The distinctive potential of British capitalism was demonstrated first in the area of 
agriculture where landowners raised productivity by introducing innovations on a 
large scale. Involved in this process was the gradual commodification of both land 
and labour which had hitherto been protected from the disciplines of the market. This 
was achieved, in large part, by a programme of enclosure legislation that coercively 
brought common lands under private ownership.124 Not only did this force the peasant 
communities thus expropriated to seek employment elsewhere on a commercial basis, 
but by propelling population growth, enlarging markets for agricultural produce and 
encouraging greater capital investment, the increased economies of scale such 
enclosure facilitated added further to the pool of labour available for exploitation.125
Taking place mainly in the late eighteenth century, this initial wave of 
industrialisation had little direct economic impact outside of Britain itself, and even 
the impact of a second major wave of innovation, which facilitated the harnessing of 
steam power and fossil fuels on a large-scale, was not fully felt until the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Nevertheless, owing to the fact that Britain lay at the heart of the 
some of the largest and most vigorous trading networks in history, many of its 
continental competitors soon became anxiously aware of these changes.126 For this 
reason, serious industrialisation had already begun in Belgium, Switzerland, France, 
Germany and the United States between the 1820s and 1840s, and by the 1870s this 
had led to a third wave of innovation giving rise to new industries such as chemical 
manufactures, electricity and steel-making. The industrial revolution now spread 
rapidly throughout the Atlantic economies, and be came linked to new forms of 
industrial organisation which, by vertically integrating tasks previously performed by 
numerous separate enterprises and horizontally integrating what had previously
124 Polanyi, 1957. See also: Hobsbawm, 1969; Moore, 1991; and, Thompson, 1963.
125 Christian,2005:416-417.
126 Ibid: 432-434.
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constituted different sectors of production, facilitated a huge increase in the levels of
1 97capital concentration.
During the initial stages of industrial capitalism, competition existed between small 
factories and mobile labour moved into the burgeoning industrial cities, but owing to 
hostility from employers, the small scale of units of production and instability in 
employment, the organisation of workers was rendered very difficult. Although the 
state did make efforts to regulate the conditions of factory work, such efforts were 
strictly limited owing to the numerous contemporaneous moves towards deregulation 
which corresponded to, and were driven by, a rise in ideas of individual freedom and 
the free operation of the market which extolled both the merits of rational self-interest
1 9Rand an idealised capitalist system, and which caused the state increasingly to 
restrict its activities to the protection of capital and the securing of law and order.129 
Consequently, whilst the first stages of industrial expansion resulted in the lifting of 
restrictions upon what could be produced, ownership of the means of production 
continued to be restricted to only a limited section of the population, and the levels 
both of material inequality and exploitation grew to unprecedented proportions. This 
was true even though the newly established industrial core displayed a constant 
tendency to expand outwards to colonise ever-new areas of production.
Moreover, this internal inequality was increasingly mirrored at the international level 
as vast numbers of people emigrated from Europe overseas bringing with them whole 
complexes of institutions, ideas and skills for the purposes both of setting up 
‘advanced’ European enclaves and of exploiting vast overseas territories. The result 
was a world sharply divided between societies that had and societies that did not have 
industrialised economies. In the process of erecting these enormous differentials 
Industrial capitalism carried the Modem Revolution to the rest of the world, 
decimating traditional political, social, and economic systems by the forceful 
asymmetrical penetration of peripheral economies.130
127 Ibid: 434.
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c. Initial Counter-Movements
From about 1870, the rapid increment in industrial power began to spark a series of 
reactive counter-movements. In the first instance, this involved a reassertion of the 
role of the nation-state pursuant to a breakdown in the Concert of Europe and the 
fragile post-Napoleonic balance that had emerged, in response to France’s 
revolutionary excesses, under the guise of the restored though modified monarchies of 
old Europe. As the imbalances unleashed by industrialisation grew so did the levels of 
felt insecurity as well as the impulse for governments both to protect their economies 
and to manage their resources in a more directed fashion, with a view to creating 
militarily strong polities capable of meeting external threats. Initially, this led to the 
greater internal consolidation of European states themselves, including their greater 
bureaucratisation and infiltration into the daily lives of their citizens through the 
mechanisms of expanded taxation, law and order, public health and state education.
As the dynamic of inter-state competition intensified further, it also led to the formal 
colonisation of huge swathes of overseas territory previously subject to complex and 
powerful webs of informal influence, though not to direct control. This phase of 
formal colonisation had the effect of temporarily sublimating the build up of intra- 
European competition and redirecting it away from dangerous hot spots within 
Europe itself, but it was a phase that was soon exhausted and, as it was, so Europe 
moved headlong into an intense and protracted period of internal disintegration and 
war.
From the second decade of the twentieth century, the threat of German military 
imperialism, resulting from a mixture of the new ideology of nationalism and the elite 
led and heavily militarised nature of German industrialisation, caused both Britain and 
the United States to abandon their previous policies of isolation and to redirect their 
economic and financial power to explicitly military ends. Resulting in the First World 
War, this led to the destruction of the “great military empires of Central and Eastern 
Europe”, clearing the ground for the construction of an entirely new social and 
political system. In the event, however, the attempt by the victorious Western powers 
“to reorganise Europe and the world on liberal democratic principles did not succeed 
in meeting the needs of the situation or controlling the revolutionary forces that has
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been released.” Instead, “[o]n the ruins of the military empires there arose the new 
totalitarian regimes of Soviet Russia and National Socialist Germany.”131 These, 
“destroyed the emergent democratic national states of Eastern Europe and precipitated 
the Second World War”, which finally exhausted Europe economically and morally
1 T 9and left it politically and socially divided.
The reassertion of the role of the nation-state as an independent extra-economic and 
thus, from a capitalist perspective, essentially irrational force, can nonetheless be seen 
as fitting within a coherent dialectic whereby latent extra-economic factors with a 
potential for inhibiting the free functioning of the market are drawn out in a manner 
which compels them to exhaust and de-legitimise themselves. In a somewhat different 
manner, a second variety of reactive counter-movement distinguishable from, though 
nested within, the renewed role of the nation-state, had the longer-term effect of 
undermining those inequalities thrown up by earlier stages of industrialisation which 
prevented individuals from being exploited by the market in the most efficient manner 
possible: namely, according to their natural or inherent capacities as consumers and 
producers, rather than in line merely with their socially ascribed status-roles.
The growth and expansion of working-class opposition to the inhuman excesses of 
unregulated industrial capitalism, the very growth and expansion of which, 
paradoxically, enabled such opposition to become an increasingly organised and 
enduring presence. As this opposition became more and more powerful, so the state 
was increasingly forced to intervene, both as a regulator and as a welfare provider, 
materially to offset the most damaging results of the earlier stages of industrialisation 
and, in so doing, redistributing its capital proceeds in an altogether more equitable 
fashion. Fitting in with the greater militarization of the nation-state itself, whose 
growing conscript armies needed not only to be properly fed, but also to be 
moderately healthy and even minimally educated, this trend helped to meet the still 
deeper problem that began to face capitalism towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, namely overproduction.
131 Dawson, 1998: 148-149.
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Over-production had first become a real issue when it sparked the “great depression” 
of the 1870s and it was an important cause of the renewed wave of national and 
international protectionism, which ran right through, via a second major depression in 
the 1930s, to the end of the Second World War.133 With these developments, it became 
clear that it was as important for capitalist economies to ensure stable markets and 
consumption as it was to ensure production and so it was entirely in accord with the 
functional requirements of the developing capitalist system that, rather than continuing 
to treat their workers as mere factory fodder, these economies place them in a position 
where they could act as an effective market, or series of markets, for the goods now 
being produced in such vast quantities.
Moreover, it was for this reason that governmental intervention in the economy did not 
tail off after the Second World War, but rather changed in its nature. Whereas before 
the World Wars state activity had concentrated upon the protection of national and 
colonial markets, ultimately this was seen to be “a self-defeating strategy, not only 
generating intolerable military conflict but also partitioning the huge world markets 
that had fuelled much industrial growth.”134 Accordingly, it was increasingly realised 
that “avoiding cyclical downturns mean[t] maintaining and sustaining markets rather 
than monopolising them.”135 The central problem of twentieth century post-war 
capitalism came to be how best to create, sustain and expand markets.
This change helps to explain the extensive process of formal decolonisation in the non­
white ‘periphery’ and ‘semi-periphery’ which began a pace in the late 1940s and was 
largely complete by the middle of the 1970s as well as “the ethical revolution that has 
made consumption a virtue as fundamental as abstinence was in the pre-capitalist 
world.”136 Whilst an important part of this latter process was the increasing protection 
-  legal or otherwise -  of the individual from external physical violence this needs to be 
understood in terms of sublimation whereby the methods of social control have 
become more effective because more internalised137 and a potential source of systemic 
instability has increasingly been brought under control by redirecting, rather than
133 Christian, 2005:447.
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frustrating, man’s primal urge towards competition in a manner which sustains and 
furthers the interests of capital accumulation.138
Likewise, whilst “[t]he spread of contraception and new forms of employment that 
depend less on physical strength have made it easier or women to take on many of the 
more specialised roles outside of the household that men had monopolised in 
traditional societies” and in the earlier stages of industrialisation,139 this again has to 
be seen within the context of a much deeper recasting of interpersonal relations 
whereby differential gender roles are increasingly undermined and the collective 
institutional supports which protect them -  particularly those of the traditional family 
-  are stripped away as being materially and systemically suboptimal. Importantly, the 
longer-term dynamic here is not towards the greater accessibility by women to 
traditionally masculine roles, but rather of their accessibility to debased forms of 
masculinity which have themselves been systematically distorted by the earlier stages 
of industrialisation.140
Consequently, what is actually taking place, is the gradually substitution of both the 
male and the female by that of the sub-systemic and gender neutral (even 
androgynous) unit of production and consumption.141 This ‘minimal self, as 
Christopher Lasch has so evocatively labelled it, has the dual characteristics of being 
both physically inviolable and yet at the same time emotionally, spiritually and 
metaphysically totally lacking in security so that it is constantly propelled toward 
superficial impulse satisfaction as a way of staving off deeper inner desolation. As 
such, “the conditions of everyday social intercourse, in societies based on mass 
production and mass consumption, encourage an unprecedented attention to superficial 
impressions and images to the point where the self becomes almost indistinguishable 
from its surface.” In this way, “[t]he consumer lives surrounded not so much by things 
as by fantasies. He lives in a world which has no objective or independent existence 
and seems to exist only to gratify or thwart his desires.”142 Consequently, what appears
138 This is, o f  course, the argument developed with such sophistication by various members o f the Frankfurt school.
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to be personal autonomy emerges as nothing more than superficial and unrestricted 
impulse satisfaction which undermines rather than supports true personal and 
interpersonal freedom. This, of course, fits perfectly with a form of ‘liberal* or 
‘democratic’ neutrality which eschews any form of public morality that does not 
support the constant urge to consume and the systematic commodification of ever 
more areas of life.
d. Second Counter-movements
Although, this peculiar form of consumer morality did not fully come into its own 
until the last quarter of the twentieth century, it had already begun to find extensive 
expression in the post-war economies of Western Europe. Even here, however, as 
earlier noted, state economic intervention continued to act to reduce material 
imbalances and to offset cyclical instabilities. In Eastern Europe, the Communist 
states of the mid-twentieth century sought to match the productive capacity of 
capitalist societies, but in an even more determinedly equalitarian fashion that 
required much more draconian state intervention and political uniformity. However, 
beyond a certain stage of development, it became increasingly apparent that this was a 
project dogged by systemic inefficiencies and sub-optimalities. Indeed, even in the 
Western European and North American states, Keynesian strategies were, by the 
1970s and 1980s, looking decidedly strained as materially empowered populations 
now came to express growing discontent with high taxation, restriction on consumer 
choice and lack of responsiveness within public services. Exacerbated by growing 
international competition, this increasingly gave rise to a new free-market orthodoxy 
which imprinted itself upon governmental policy to an ever-greater degree.
Thus it seems that after sufficient redistribution of resources had been effected, the 
state intervention thrown up by the initial market restricting counter-movements 
described above, started itself to become suboptimal, and was in its turn subject to a 
second reactive counter-move which had the effect of once more de-restricting the 
market and confining the state within an altogether more specialist regulatory role. 
Furthermore, insofar as these developments transformed the Atlantic economies, so 
those same economies came to represent and evermore powerful ideological and 
material challenge to the East European Communist societies which were forced to
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recalibrate their own strategies of government in a way that rapidly led to their 
collapse and to their eventual assimilation, in differing degrees, to the western 
democratic and free-market paradigm. There is strong evidence to suggest that these 
are tendencies which have made themselves felt in the third world also, albeit in a 
very unequal and variegated manner owing to their differing cultural, political and 
economic histories and the extent to which their particular models of post-colonial 
state have been capable of effecting earlier stages of industrial transformation in a 
compressed form.
C: Regional Contexts
Rather than undertake a full-blown historical narrative, the final sections of this 
chapter will offer brief accounts of how both Chinese and Indian societies have been 
specifically subjected to, and remoulded by, the dynamic of industrialisation. To 
avoid repetition of material contained in Chapter 3, they will concern themselves 
exclusively with the third and final phase of the overall framework of historical 
transformation hitherto elaborated. This is the period during which both civilisations 
lost their comparative material advantages, becoming subject eventually to differing 
forms of colonial penetration, as the newly dynamised commercial and then industrial 
European economy provoked a relentless search for investment opportunities. In both 
societies this involved substantial levels of structural adjustment with the 
establishment of new institutions conducive to the propagation of colonial markets 
and industries and the physical construction of extensive networks of communication 
to facilitate tighter governmental control along with the smooth flow of newly created 
capitals.
Mirroring the general dynamic of industrialisation globally, this movement of 
exploitation gradually gave rise to a further period characterised by a reactive counter­
movement during which portions of the indigenous populations emerged to resist 
colonial interference. Paradoxically, in mounting such opposition, these movements 
came to internalise many of the ideological and institutional precepts of the European 
industrial state in order to create a sufficient power-base of their own to enable them 
to assert their independence from colonial control. Eventually, this period was itselfs 
superseded by a third and final broad period, beginning in the late 1970s, which saw,
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once more, an end to national independence and self-reliance. This found expression 
in a more or less conclusive re-engagement with the world economy and the opening 
of domestic markets to greater internal and external competition, something which 
had been previously resisted, though in different ways, by both countries.
Fitting within this common developmental framework, the differences between the 
transformations in China and India have nonetheless remained very deep. Primarily 
these differences have been based upon the profound cultural contrasts and distinctive 
socio-ethnic compositions that emerged in each country over the millennia prior to the 
coming of European industrialisation. The consequences of these differences have 
become increasingly apparent, rendering China less diverse, religiously, socially, 
ethnically and linguistically than India and possessed of relatively more powerful and 
enduring state and governmental structures. This has also meant that it has been 
relatively easier to mobilise the collective efforts of the population in China than it 
has been in India. As a consequence, whilst China has been more resistant to colonial 
penetration than India, it has also been far more susceptible to revolutionary change 
from above. Transposing this logic into the context of the twentieth century, it has 
further meant that, whilst China has been more effective than India in forwarding its 
programmes of state directed modernisation/industrialisation, in so far as those 
programmes have been ill conceived, it has also suffered more greatly from their 
failures. Still more starkly, when the leadership of each country attempted to by-pass 
the normal mechanisms of state-power by appealing directly to the masses, this was 
achieved much more effectively and therefore more destructively in China, whilst in 
India it enjoyed only limited and very temporary success. Finally, whilst the 
devastation in China at the end of the Cultural Revolution was truly widespread, once 
Deng Xiaoping had made the decision that China should undertake comprehensive 
reform, it was able to do so much more effectively -  though not, of course without 
difficulty -  than was India. Indeed, whilst it was clear in India from the very 
beginning of the 1980s that the old strategy of import substitution and Ticence-Raj’ 
had failed, and despite a series of abortive and piecemeal attempts at liberalisation 
under both Gandhi governments, it was not until 1991 -  in the face of a huge loan 
default crisis -  that a firm decision was finally taken to initiate a truly comprehensive 
programme of reform.
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1. China
a. The Colonial Challenge and Industrialisation
During the latter half of the 18th century China began to experience a battery of 
economic problems.143 From 1650 to 1775, the Chinese population had exploded from 
60 million to over 265 million, and exerting a huge pressure on food and land. 
Meanwhile, from about 1660, Portuguese traders operating in Guangzhou had been 
joined by British merchants supported by the British East India Company in search of 
tea, silk and porcelain markets. Immensely rich, powerful and traditionally convinced 
of Chinese superiority, the empire was unwilling to establish direct contact with 
foreigners on an equal footing, while Europeans were unwilling to be enmeshed in the 
tribute system the Chinese demanded. With the failure of attempts at formal 
negotiation with the Qing court in 1793, the East India Company began to establish a 
clandestine market in China for western goods, and began paying for tea and silk with 
cheaply imported opium from India.144
As addiction rates escalated during the early 19th century, Britain’s initial trade deficit 
with China was reversed as China’s trade surplus itself became a deficit, meaning 
large amounts of silver started to drain out of the country in order to meet the growing 
opium bills. Eventually, deficit and addiction rates became so serious that the emperor 
issued an edict forbidding further trade in opium. When this was ignored, more than 
twenty thousand cases of opium from Guangzhou were confiscated and destroyed.
The British responded vigorously in defence of the lucrative trade, leading to the first 
so-called Opium War. After two years of coastal shelling by British gunboats, the 
Chinese were forced to sign the unequal treaty of Nanjing on August 24th 1842: five 
coastal ports were opened to British trade, governed according to European laws and 
customs, and Hong Kong was ceded to the British Crown in perpetuity.145 In sum, 
China had to deal with Great Britain on an equal basis. In the years to come, as it 
became clear that China’s military strength was no match for that of the newly
143 See: Leonard & Watt, eds., 1992; Millward, 1998; Moulder, 1977; Myers, 1980 ; Perkins & Chao, eds., 1975; Pomeranz,
1993; and, Rawski, 1972.
144 See: Gardella, 1994; and, more generally, Spence, 1969.
145 Some useful works on these events include: Chang, 1964; Polachek, 1992; Wakeman, 1966; and, Wong, 1998.
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industrialising countries, a succession of other treaties were imposed on the Chinese 
by Britain and other European powers, all characterised by territorial concessions and 
jurisdictions, and humiliatingly unfavourable trading terms.146
b. The Emergence of Resistance
i. The Experimental Stage
This growth in western influence coincided with rising discontent within Chinese 
society itself. Rebellions proliferated, precipitated by a mixture of population 
pressure, land scarcity, rising inflation and growing administrative corruption.147 It 
was in response to these mid-century rebellions, the last of which was put down by 
the middle of the 1860s, that a concerted programme of renewal was launched by the 
Qing court. Significantly, the goal of the “Tongzhi Restoration”, as this movement 
came to be known, was not to revolutionise the imperial system.148 Instead it was an 
essentially conservative attempt to reverse dynastic decline by re-establishing peace, 
order and social harmony along traditional Confucian lines. Corruption, political 
infighting and the overwhelming nature of the problems faced by China in the mid 
19th century meant that this lack of willingness to engage in root-and-branch reform 
only provided a relatively short respite from the deeper structural crises.
By the end of the 19th century, the vigour of the Tongzhi Restoration had largely 
subsided revealing once again the ubiquitous nature of social unrest and governmental 
degeneration. This weakness was graphically exemplified in China's defeat at the 
hands of its traditionally subservient neighbour, Japan, in the Sino-Japanese war of 
1894-1895. This humiliation catalysed attempts by reformers, led by Confucian 
scholar, Kang Youwei, and with the backing of the Guangxu emperor, to conduct a 
radical reform experiment over a period of a hundred days in 1898.149 This was 
dramatically truncated by a conservative backlash, palace coup and subsequent 
encouragement of the xenophobic Boxer Rebellion which, in turn, led to attacks on 
the foreign legations in Beijing, the despatching of a multi-national expeditionary
146 See especially: Fairbank, 1953.
147 See generally: Chesneaux & Bianco, 1972; Perry, 1980; and, Spence, 1996.
148 Wright, 1966.
149 Kwong, 1984. Also: Chang, 1971.
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force and further military humiliation. Reform of the old imperial system was 
inevitable.150
Yet, whilst this was accepted by Qing officials, a younger generation of foreign- 
educated intellectuals determined that China's problems could only be resolved with 
the overthrow of the imperial system itself.151 The most important of these reformers 
was Sun Yat Sen. A western-trained medic and a Christian, Sun was instrumental in 
establishing China’s first serious revolutionary movement -  the Tong Meng Hui -  
from his base in Tokyo.152 In 1911, revolutionary activity sparked insurrections in 
cities across China. For support, the Qing court turned in desperation to the military 
strong man Yuan Shi Kai. Yuan immediately set about exploiting the situation for his 
own ends. Although powerful in his own right, particular in the south where he had 
been elected provisional president of a new Chinese republic, Sun chose to stand aside 
and acquiesce in a plan by which the young Qing emperor abdicated and Yuan 
became the president of a unified China.153 This move was specifically design to 
legitimate and consolidate the new regime, but Yuan chose instead to bolster his own 
increasingly autocratic rule. An opposition party - the Guomindang - was formed in 
an attempt by the nationalists to stabilise the situation, but within five years regional 
counter-pressures became so strong that China disintegrated into a kaleidoscope of 
warring regional fiefdoms.154
Amidst this turmoil, intellectual ferment intensified and western ideas were 
propagated with increasing rapidity. A watershed came on 4th May 1919, when news 
arrived that Japan had been awarded Qingdao under the Versailles Treaty. Students 
demonstrated in cities across China, stimulating intense discussion about the problems 
facing the new republic.155 It was in this atmosphere that the Chinese Communist 
Party was formed, holding its first meeting in Shaghai in 1921.156 Initially its 
activities were directed by Soviet Comitem advisers, who urged co-operation with 
Sun Yat-Sen's Guomindang as the organisation in China best placed as a
150 Cohen, 1997.
151 See generally: Schiffrin, ed,, 1994.
152 Schiffrin, 1968.
153 Mackinnon, 1980.
154 On the various regional factions, see: Chi, 1976, McCord, 1993; and; Sutton, 1980.
155 For considerations on the significance o f  the May 4th Movement see: Schwarz, 1986.
156 Dirlik,1980; Meisner, 1967; and, Van de Ven, 1991.
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revolutionary vanguard.157 However, cooperation broke down after the Guomindang’s 
military strongman and leader after Sun’s death in 1925 moved against the CPC, 
killing 300 leaders in Shanghai on 22 April 1927.158
At the same time as Jiang's actions ended the Comitem co-operation with the 
Guomindang an abortive rural insurrection in Hunnan brought Mao Zedong, a man of 
peasant origins, to prominence, and set the scene for a shift in strategy within the CCP 
towards peasant based revolution.159 Mao and other rural-based organisers began 
developing experimental civilian-cum-military governmental structures in the form of 
Soviet base-areas. By 1931 this had coalesced into the Chinese Soviet Republic and 
could boast a population of almost 13m people.160 In response, Jiang moved against 
the Soviets in a series of bloody “encirclement” campaigns which forced the 
communists to abandon their strongholds and march north to safer ground in 
Shaanxi.161
Simultaneously, Jiang's Nationalist forces had to address the growing threat from 
Japan. By 1936 Japanese incursions and international events had advanced to such an 
extent that Jiang’s own officers persuaded him to conclude a second United Front 
with the Communists, who were permitted to establish their own autonomous region 
in Yan'an. Whilst war severely compromised the Nationalist government, the CPC 
was able to use it to great effect as a period of consolidation. When fighting resumed 
between CPC and Guomindang forces in 1947, the Communists could capitalise upon 
their strategic advantages. By 1949, Jiang and several hundred thousand Nationalists 
had fled to Taiwan to set up a separate government.163
ii. Nation-Building
On 1st October 1949, with CCP forces close to controlling the whole of main-land 
China, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was formally established with its
157 Wilbur & Lien-yin, 1989.
158 Wilbur, 1984; and, Stanahan, 1988.
159 In general see: Schwartz, 1961. For the theoretical origins o f Mao’s thinking, see: Schram, 1989.
160 Kim, 1973.
161 Yang, 1990.
162 Boyle, 1972; Hsiung & Levine, eds., 1992; and, Van Slyke, 1967
153 See: Pepper, 1978; Selden, 1971; and, Thaxton, 1997.
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national capital in Beijing.164 The Communist victory brought to power an essentially 
peasant and rural-based party that had little experience of the large-scale transition to 
socialism and industrialisation necessary for the consolidation of the Communist 
revolution. This post-civil war shift of focus towards soviet-style rapid 
industrialisation inevitably meant an associated shift of emphasis form the countryside 
to the city.165 Between 1947 and 1951, CPC adopted a strategy for socialist transition 
that lay in isolating large landowners and large-scale state sponsored capitalists, 
together with an allied policy of gradual nationalisation, achieved incrementally by 
“buying o ff’ commercial capitalist ventures rather than through their forced 
expropriation.
As basic economic indicators were brought under control, more far-reaching reforms 
were implemented. Between 1950 and 1953, 113 million acres were distributed to 
over 300 million landless peasants. The initially moderate programme grew in 
intensity and violence with China's entry into the Korean War.166 Over a million 
former landlords were executed amidst massive campaigns against “enemies of the
state”, “capitalists” and “counter-revolutionaries”. They were replaced by increasingly
• • • • * 1  ( \1widespread programmes of rural collectivisation for the peasantry left behind.
Between 1953 and 1957 China implemented its ambitious First Five-Year Plan, which 
aimed at a comprehensive programme of rapid industrialisation, an application of 
Stalinist long-term centralised planning in post-revolutionary China. Premised upon 
the rapid build-up of heavy industry through concentrated capital goods investment, 
by 1957 the application of this strategy had managed an impressive annual growth-
1 ARrate of 8% together with lasting improvements in education and public health.
Despite considerable economic growth, however, the leadership became aware that 
rapid industrialisation could not be sustained without considerable improvements in 
agricultural performance, and this, together with increased government responsibility 
for managing China’s urban enterprises, required the co-option of many more experts 
than before. Consequently, the CPC’s attitude towards the intelligentsia, which had
164 See generally: Meisner, 1977; and; Dittmer, 1987.
155 Shue, 1980.
166 Meisner, 1977: 100-112.
167 Wang, 1973.
168 Andors, 1977: 50-52.; Eckstein, 1977: 50-54; and, Rawski, 1980: 29 and 40.
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initially been extremely critical was, by early 1956, considerably slackened under the 
famous slogan -  ‘Let a hundred flowers blossom; let a hundred schools of thought 
contend’ -  in an effort to encourage discussion of party and state that would vindicate 
the superiority of Marxism-Leninism and speed the conversion of intellectuals to 
communism. The extent and depth of the criticisms that were finally aired rocked the 
CPC leadership, and triggered a comprehensive backlash in the form of the Anti- 
Rightist Campaign of 1957, during which great numbers of ‘Rightist’ teachers, 
students, lawyers and purged cadres were forced into the countryside to do manual 
labour.169
Before this backlash, Mao had entertained doubts about the applicability of the 
incrementalist nature of Soviet development strategy in China and the direction of 
Soviet ideological developments after the death of Stalin. Skilfully, he utilised the fear 
inspired by the Anti-Rightist campaign to shift the initiative to those who felt the time 
had come for a major break with Soviet strategy.170 He was thus able to outmanoeuvre 
his opponents in the Party leadership, and to inaugurate a more militant foreign policy 
during his trip to Moscow in November 1957 and a much more radical policy for 
national development at home in 1958 under the heading of the ‘Three Red Banners’
-  the general line of Socialist Construction, the Great Leap Forward and Rural 
People’s Communes.
Socialist Construction and the Great Leap Forward encouraged the political guidance 
of the country’s scientists and technicians by party cadres, and thus the requisite 
technical training of cadres in order to create a politico-technical elite. From August 
1958, all remaining privately owned agricultural land was to be pooled into a series of 
26,000 self-governing communes containing 500 million Chinese peasants. Likewise, 
the employment of seasonal workers for the construction of heavy industrial plants, 
canals and irrigations works was inaugurated to increase industrial activity. Mao 
believed that through these radical policies China could dramatically increase 
industrial and agricultural productivity.171 From the start, however, these initiatives 
were unworkable. Peasant motivation to work in the new units was limited at best and 
the poorly trained communal management led to an immediate slump in production.
169 MacFarquar, 1974.
170 Meisner, 1999: 204-216.
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51
Moreover, unrealistic quotas from the Beijing government, exacerbated by poor 
centre-local communications, meant that many peasants had no time to produce crops 
for their own consumption. When the harvests of both 1959 and 1960 failed, millions
1 79starved to death.
The complete failure of the Great Leap Forward weakened Mao’s position in the 
CPC.173 He was forced to step down as President of the People’s Republic in favour 
of Liu Shaoqi, who, along with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping worked, between 1961 
and 1965, to reverse the worst effects of the preceding years. Despite these setbacks, 
however, Mao remained a powerful figure and after a brief respite from political 
activism he became the focal point for those in the Party concerned that China might 
be on the path to Soviet style revisionism.174 Mao took a number of initiatives during 
the mid-1960s to ensure that class struggle remained high on the Chinese communist 
agenda, most importantly calling for a campaign of socialist education in 1962. His 
subsequent widening of this campaign to include the whole of the state bureaucracy, 
led to an increasing polarisation amongst the Chinese leadership itself. It was only 
with the launch of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that these tensions were 
finally resolved in favour of Mao and his supporters.175
iii. The Lurch Towards Populism
Initially, the Cultural Revolution appeared to be similar to any other mass campaign. 
However, in 1966, with Mao’s support a group of Beijing students organised 
themselves into a political militia -  the Red Guard -  and within weeks they were 
organising mass demonstrations on the streets. The Red Guards attacked anything 
remotely associated with the west, the Soviet Union, the bourgeoisie and any form of 
‘Revisionist’ or ‘Rightist’ activity. On August 5th 1966, Mao’s announcement that 
reactionaries had reached the highest level of the CCP led to the arrest and eventual 
death of Liu Shaoqi, the dismissal of Deng Xiaoping and the disappearance of 
Marshal Peng Dehaui. Between January 1967 and mid-1968, the discredited political
172 MacFarquar, 1983.
173 Dietrich, 1986: esp, 5-6.
174 Peck, 1975: esp. 57-217.
175 See generally: MacFarquar, 1997.
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establishment was replaced by revolutionary committees comprised of new radical 
organisations.
Towards the end of 1967, after much hesitation, Mao finally ordered the army to 
intervene and restore order, and between 1968 and 1969 students were sent out from 
the cities to the countryside.176 For the remainder of Mao’s life, Chinese politics was 
marked by a legacy of persistent factionalism and political struggles. In 1975, at the 
Fourth National People’s Congress, Zhou Enlai announced the fundamental 
reordering of the social and economic priorities of the Chinese state to achieve the 
Four Modernisations of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and 
technology. This attempt to re-establish Chinese policy on a more orderly footing was 
immediately met by determined resistance within the leftist factions of the Party led 
by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and three associates, later known as the Gang of Four.
iv. Re-Engagement and Marketisation
tPiOn the 9 September 1976, Mao died. Almost immediately, Hua Guofeng was 
confirmed as Party Chairman and state premier, the Gang of Four was arrested. By the 
beginning of 1977 Deng Xiaoping was rehabilitated and re-appointed to his former 
positions lost after the death of his mentor Zhou Enlai earlier that same year. By 1980, 
through a series of skilful manoeuvres, Deng was able to consolidate his political 
dominance by gradually undercutting the influence of Hua Guofeng and initiating a 
new era of economic reforms. During the Third Party Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee and the Fifth National People’s Congress in 1978, a new constitution was 
adopted confirming the goals of the Four Modernisations. This was superseded in turn 
, by another constitution in 1982 designed to consolidate the Dengist programme.177
The 1980s saw a gradual process of economic reform. Moves were taken to 
decentralise state authority and management and to begin privatising production. This 
began in the countryside with the introduction of the Household Responsibility 
System under which agriculture was de-collectivised and the land was divided into 
parcels that were leased to individual peasant households, which were entitled to
176 Bernstein, 1977.
177 See generally: Wang, 1995.
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produce whatever they wished and to sell surplus in open markets as long as they first 
met their contractual obligations to the state.178 As the rural standards of living rose, 
reforms of the urban economy were implemented from the mid-1980s in an attempt to 
replace the command system of central planning with the economic levers of the 
market. This included reforms of the pricing system, wage payments, legalisation of 
private enterprises, creation of labour and stock markets, tax reforms and the writing 
of a code of civil law.179 The leadership also affirmed its commitment to a policy of 
opening to the outside world. Five Special Economic Zones were set up along the 
coasts of Guangdong and Fujien provinces, offering special facilities and attractive 
financial terms of operation for foreign capitalists.180 Cognate with this package of 
liberalising reforms were China’s attempts in the 1980s and 1990s to create more 
cordial relations with it neighbouring states.
In the period up until 1989, economic reform had been accompanied by a degree of 
political and intellectual openness. Accordingly, a series of political movements 
throughout the late 1970s and 1980s pushed for the reform to go well beyond what the 
Dengist leadership were willing to countenance. By the end of 1988, tensions within 
the Party on this issue, exacerbated by inflation in major cities of 35%, caused reform 
to slow. In December 1988, disaffected student nationalism bubbled over in 
demonstrations against African students in Nanjing and when, on the 15th April 1989, 
Hu Yaobang died of a heart attack, students who subsequently gathered in Beijing to 
celebrate the anniversary of the May 4th Movement responded with a mass 
demonstration calling for greater democratic reform and a freer press. Spreading 
across China and attracting support from an urban population unhappy with 
corruption and high inflation, the demonstrations escalated to such a point that on the 
19th May martial law was imposed. After a prolonged stand-off between the army and 
protestors, on the 4th June 1989 troops opened fire in Tiananmen Square. Parallel to 
these student movements were a number of on-going demonstrations by ethnic 
minorities. Violent protests irrupted in Tibet in the autumn of 1987 and then again in 
the spring of 1988: both were brutally suppressed. In Xingjiang, a Muslim rising was 
forcibly put down in 1997.181
178 Tu, 1993.
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Following the events of June 1989 and the tightening of political controls, economic 
reforms were also curtailed and a number of private enterprises were shut down. The 
drive towards marketisation was reinitiated and given renewed emphasis, however, 
after Deng Xiaoping made a very public visit in the spring of 1992 to the most 
developed areas in southern China.182 Soon China’s economy once again became one 
of the most rapidly growing in the world, but also one that was increasingly dogged 
by inflation, corruption, provincial disparity and popular unrest. Finally, it was able, 
early in the new millennium, to secure membership of the World Trade Organisation.
2. India
a. European Penetration and the Emergence of Industrial Society
By the early part of the Sixteenth century the growth of competitive acquisitiveness 
within Europe began manifesting itself in a number of incursions along the shoreline 
of the subcontinent.183 As early as 1498 Vasco da Gama arrived with an expedition in 
Calicut and soon after a Portuguese trading empire, centred upon Goa, was
1 Rd.established. As in China, the Portuguese were followed by the Dutch, the French 
and the English who each set up their own small coastal trading posts. Under the 
auspices of monopoly trading companies these powers competed to secure 
concessions and privileges from the Mughal empire.185
A greater willingness on the part of English agents to forge native ties, to intermarry 
and to acquire local knowledge gave them an edge over their European counter-parts. 
Acknowledging Great Britain’s importance to Bengal in attracting international trade 
and bolstering the regional economy, this led emperor Farrukh-siyar (r. 1713-19) to 
make Britain a grant in 1717 of thirty-eight villages near Calcutta. With this grant 
came the privileges of extraterritorial status for British warehouses and the 
surrounding areas, allowing for the administration of British civil and criminal law as 
well as the first employment of European trained Indian soldiers known as sepoys for
182 Yang, 1997.
183 Chaudhury, 1978; and; Keay, 1991.
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their protection. As these enclaves grew in size and success they formed the nuclei of 
more extensive British administrative zones or presidencies and the services of their 
sepoy garrisons were increasingly called upon by regional rules to help in the 
settlement of local power struggles.186
Inevitably, this led to an increment in European influence over the internal politics of 
the subcontinent, but also to a greater belligerence in relations among the European 
powers themselves. By the mid eighteenth century this manifested itself in a 
protracted struggle between France and Great Britain for supremacy of influence 
involving the backing by each of different claimants to the Nawabates of Arcot and 
Bengal. After the decisive victory at the battle of Plassey (1757) of the British East 
India Company and the conclusion of favourable terms under the Peace of Paris, 
Britain emerged as the dominant power, and soon thereafter her agents were conferred 
effective suzereignty over Bengal, Bihar and Orissa by emperor Shah Alam.187 
However, the increasing bellicosity of the Company as it was drawn into an ever- 
larger number of conflicts led the British government to move towards the assumption 
of direct responsibility for Company affairs by instituting a system of ‘dual control’ in 
1784. By the end of 1833 the Company’s trading functions had been entirely removed 
leaving it as a purely administrative body.
At about this time the strands of Evangelical and Utilitarian thinking were gaining 
rapid prominence in the metropole and these combined to promote a policy of 
enlightened despotism on the part of successive Govemors-General.188 Prior to the 
early nineteenth century the Company had shown little interest in the religious and 
social lives of the general population. It now came to support the work of 
missionaries, to sponsor the eradication of the most visibly offensive traditional 
customs and to encourage the introduction an English education in an attempt to 
spread liberal ideas and values. The assumptions which underpinned this policy of 
indigenous uplift were elitist and were clearly premised upon notions of British moral 
and cultural superiority. Fuelled by a greater ease of access back to Great Britain, 
these assumptions contributed to the emergence of an extremely insular and yet 
conspicuously privileged ‘Anglo-Indian’ elite culture. It was in part as a result of the
186 Beaumont, 1977; and, Featherstone, 1992.
187 Bayly, 1983; Keay, 1991; and; Marshall, 1968.
188 Metcalf, 1994.
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hubris that this elitism inculcated and in part the long over-due indigenous reaction to 
it that the terms of imperial rule in the subcontinent were fundamentally altered by the 
Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and the brutal official reaction to it.189
b. The Emergence of Resistance
i. The Experimental Stage
Already, the introduction of English education into the subcontinent had helped to 
create a new Indian middle class and to inculcate increasing familiarity with western 
philosophies and institutions. It now began to elicit a variety of critical responses that 
would eventually mature to form the basis of a broader political awakening in the 
1870s and 80s, Central to these responses was a consideration of the relative merits of 
Hindu, Western and Muslim traditions. As early as the 1820s Ram Mohan Roy began 
work through the Brahmo Samaj upon a purifying renewal of Hinduism.190 This gave 
rise to a strain of Indian nationalism -  represented years later by figures like 
G.K.Gokhale and M.K.Gandhi — that insisted on the enduring value of Hinduism 
whilst calling for the reform of the most repressive social practices. In contrast, a 
reform movement much more insistent upon the superiority of Hindu truths and 
consequently considerably more resistant to western ideas developed in the 1870s 
through the Arya Samaj.191
From less than promising beginnings, these opinions mixed together to achieve a 
degree of institutional coherence in the Indian National Congress.192 This was 
established in 1885 in reaction to the failure of a proposal to allow Indian judges to try 
European defendants and rapidly became the main arena for nationalist agitation.193 
After an initial period during which Congress focused upon persuading the British to 
establish and expand representative institutions, a second generation of Congressmen 
started to advocate a more militant approach using Hindu traditions and symbols.
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By the early twentieth century, two distinct factions had emerged within Congress: 
the ‘moderates’ led by G.K.Gokhale, were very critical of British economic policy 
and its ‘draining’ effects on the subcontinent but were prepared to work for liberal 
reforms through official channels and according to an incremental timetable; and the 
‘extremists’, led by B.G.Tilak, who rejected western education and western political 
concepts and sought ways to force the British out of India altogether.194 The divide 
was sharpened by the partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon in 1905. A working truce 
gave way to subsequent power struggles amidst widespread anti-partition rioting and 
the emergence of nascent terrorist activity.195
A more significant consequence of partition was the emergence of a distinctively 
Muslim communal consciousness.196 Partition meant the formation of a new Muslim 
majority state in East Bengal. Apart from the inherent benefits this was perceived to 
convey, Muslims became increasingly concerned by the overtly Hindu character of 
the anti-partition movement. It was the attempt to placate, and to a degree even co­
opt, this concern that lay behind the creation of separate Muslim electorates within the 
emerging institutions of self-government.197 Indigenous representation within these 
institutions had been periodically expanded since their tentative introduction in the 
1860s so that by the eve of the First World War elite Indian representation, though 
somewhat impotent in practice, had become a permanent feature of the Raj. The First 
World War itself began with an unprecedented show of support and loyalty to the 
British. However, mounting casualty rates, growing inflation, and a worldwide 
influenza epidemic quickly led to disillusionment, such that moderate and extremist 
groups within Congress felt able to put aside their differences in order to stand united 
in opposition to the British and founded a Home Rule League in 1916.198
In 1917, as a way of alleviating this rising discontent, a declaration was made in 
parliament promising the gradual development of dominion style self-government for 
the subcontinent. The so-called Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, as this initiative came 
to be known, were enshrined in the Government o f India Act, 1919. This introduced 
the principle of dual administration or dyarchy, providing for the sharing of powers
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between Indian legislators and British officials, as well as the expansion of central and 
provincial legislatures and a considerable widening of the franchise.199 The impact of 
these reforms were, however, seriously undermined by the simultaneous passage and 
enforcement of wartime legislation authorising internment without trial and tight 
restrictions on the press.200 M.K Gandhi, a campaigner recently returned from South 
Africa, called a nationwide daylong cessation of work or satayagmha.201 This sparked 
agitation across the country and was met by forced suppression by the government, 
culminating in the killing of 479 unarmed civilians at the Jalianwalla Bargh on April 
13th 1919. The extraordinary bitterness that this atrocity fostered led Gandhi to call for 
a campaign of native non-cooperation with the imperial government. By 1922, 
however, escalating violence caused him to call off the campaign just before he was 
imprisoned.202
Despite all of this, Congress refrained from competing in government sponsored 
elections and, when in 1927, the British appointed an all-white commission under Sir 
John Simon to recommend further measures for the constitutional devolution of 
power, Congress responded in 1929 by drafting its own constitution under the 
guidance Motilal Nehru and demanding full independence. By now, more radical 
elements in Congress, led by the young Jawaharlal Nehru, adopted an increasingly 
confrontational mood and their Declaration of Independence Day on January 26th 
1930 inspired Gandhi to emerge from his long seclusion and to conduct a 240 mile 
march from his ashram (Sabarmati) to make salt illegally at Dandi in Gujarat, to 
protest against extortionate British taxes on the same.203
This led to a nationwide movement of civil disobedience. For the next 5 years, 
Congress and the government were locked in conflict and negotiation, which 
eventually culminated in the Government of India Act 1935, which articulated three 
main goals: first, the establishment of a loose federal structure; second, the achieving 
of provincial autonomy; and third, the safeguarding of minority interests through 
separate electorates. The 1935 Act clearly still fell short of aspirations for complete 
independence and remained, despite Gandhi’s overtures, implacably opposed to
199 Robb, 1992.
200 Moore, 1974.
201 Brown, 1977.
202 Minault, 1982.
203 Moore, 1974.
59
Muslim demands for separate representation. Relations between the two major 
religious communities in the sub-continent rapidly deteriorated, such that by 1940 the 
All India Muslim League passed a resolution demanding an independent Muslim 
state204
The real possibility of civil war led the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, to announce on 
3rd June 1947 terms for the partition of India into the nations of India and Pakistan, 
with Pakistan itself to be divided into an eastern and western wing, either side of 
India.205 Thus, at midnight on 15th August 1947, the subcontinent was formally 
partitioned. The new boundaries of the two nations, which cut through both Bengal 
and Punjab, led to a mass exodus of over 5 million Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan, 
and a similar number of Muslims from India, costing at least half a million lives in the 
process.206 The situation was only calmed by the assassination of Gandhi in January 
1948 by Hindu extremists, who resented his defence of Muslims. Such was the shock 
of this event that gradually the communal violence receded.
ii. Nation-Building
Quite apart from territorial consolidation, the new government undertook to transform 
the lives of the Indian population. In so doing it faced a number of obstacles, quite 
different to those faced by its post-revolutionary Chinese counterpart. Quite unlike 
China, pre-independence India did not undergo a revolutionary struggle. Instead, the 
independence movement had as its primary aim the liberation of the subcontinent 
from alien rule and, in attaining that goal whilst utilising the device of mass 
campaigning, relied heavily upon the assistance of pre-existing elites and socially 
dominant interest groups. In consequence, the power of the postcolonial state over 
existing interests in domestic society was altogether more limited and it was therefore 
forced to construct a development strategy altogether more accommodating to such 
interests. The situation was particularly exemplified by the fact that there was a 
fundamental constitutional continuity between the colonial and postcolonial state and,
204 See generally: Qureshi, 1962. For further background see: Page, 1982: and, Robinson, 1974.
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although they were given newer ideological and socio-economic missions, it presaged 
a continuing reliance upon the military, judicial and bureaucratic structures.207
What did appear unique was the extension of the franchise to the entire population, 
fulfilling a promise implicit in the newly adopted constitution of 1950, which 
described India as a “sovereign, democratic Republic”. Even here, the appearance 
of innovation did much to disguise the underlying continuity. Indeed, it served to 
complete a trend of political cooption which had operated under the Raj for some 
time, acting predominantly as a mechanism through which diverse interests could be 
mediated in the form of competing and normally elite dominated political parties, 
thereby legitimising the state and channelling popular agitation away from potentially 
destructive forms of direct action.
Although enfranchisement “provided a useful mechanism for the accommodation of 
diverse, conflicting interests”, the situation remained essentially one in which “the 
masses rarely had a direct say in the governing process”. Within these very real 
constraints, the objectives of the Nehru government were clear and were shaped by a 
nationalist mission of a free India, which had as its overriding priority the need to 
catch up with the West. For Nehru in particular this was the only way in which India 
could place its newly forged independence on a sound footing and avoid formal or 
informal client status in the international system.209 In this sense, the postcolonial 
state remained an essential mechanism of transformation, despite the many constraints 
placed upon it. It was the only actor in an economic position to undertake rapid 
industrialisation with an interest in forging a truly national consensus transcending 
regional divides. Nehru decided to impose linguistic uniformity at least in theory on 
the whole of the country designating Hindi as the official language of the Union, 
Whilst this was very much in conformity with his overall modernisation programme, 
it faced widespread and sustained opposition, especially in the south of the country.210
Nehru further attempted a rigorous programme of social and economic reform. Under 
three successive five-year plans inaugurated in 1951, stretching from 1951-64, Nehru
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took control of the “Commanding Heights” of the Indian economy and planned an 
orderly transition through the stages of economic modernisation.211 Despite 
considerable population growth and monsoon failure in the short to medium term, this 
policy proved a considerable success with significant increases in grain production, 
the development of a thriving heavy industrial sector, and the targeted and rapid 
accumulation of capital. Across the country, industrial complexes emerged, alongside 
the expansion of research and teaching at universities and institutes of technology and 
research. Furthermore, Nehru persuaded parliament to pass law abolishing absentee 
landlordism, conferring titles upon the actual cultivators.
Abroad, the government of India adopted a policy of non-aligned, peacefiil 
coexistence and attempted to dispel tensions created by the Chinese invasion of Tibet 
by concluding a treaty with China in 1954. In 1959, however, India sustained losses in 
a confrontation with China over Ladakh, and in 1962 conflicts in Assam escalated 
into a war in which China proved to be far superior, advancing over India’s north­
eastern frontier This led India to abandon its policy of non-alignment and to conclude 
a defence treaty with the US. Just over a year later, Nehru’s long tenure came to an 
end with his death. As his replacement the Congress Caucus or “The Syndicate” chose 
Lai Bahadur Shastri who presided over the restoration of India’s military prestige in 
the second Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, triggered by a disturbance over a dispute about 
Kashmir, in which Indian tanks advanced within 5km of Lahore.
iii. The Lurch towards Populism
When Lai Bahadur died of a heart attack, he was replaced by Nehru’s daughter Indira 
Gandhi. Almost immediately, Mrs. Gandhi secured American financial support for 
India’s fourth five-year plan, but this was conditional upon economic restructuring in 
a more liberal direction and a devaluation of the rupee. Very soon it became clear 
these expedients were proving a political and economic disaster. When Mrs. Gandhi’s 
government mutinied, she moved to outmanoeuvre her opposition both inside and 
outside Congress by reversing her nascent attempts at liberalisation and adopting 
instead a radical and populist alternative. Accordingly, Gandhi wholeheartedly
211 Ibid: Chap 10. See also: Hanson, 1966.
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embraced the socialist principle by significantly increasing direct administrative 
control over the economy, nationalising major banks, passing anti-monopolies 
legislation, foreign exchange regulations and patent laws, and abolishing the former 
Maharaja’s privy purses and privileges.
A growing rift soon emerged within Congress over Gandhi’s style of government and 
populist appeals. In November 1969, she was expelled from the party and forced to 
establish Congress (r). At the same time, she moved decisively against the brutal 
repression of the struggle for independence in East Pakistan. Waiting until she had the 
moral support of the international community, Gandhi launched a simultaneous attack 
in western and eastern Pakistan, leading to the total capitulation of Pakistan’s forces 
and the establishment of a new nation, Bangladesh. Gandhi’s economic volte face 
(coupled with the great success of the Green Revolution and the introduction of high 
yield grain) led to an initial surge in industrial growth. It was not long, however, 
before the cost of the Indo-Pak war, a series of crop failures and skyrocketing oil
n  1 Q
prices led to renewed economic stagnation and unrest. Gandhi, in turn, declared a 
state of emergency in 1975 (lasting until 1977) under which fundamental rights were 
suspended and strict censorship of the press enforced.214
Whilst the backlash that this move provoked eventually cost her the 1977 election, by 
1979 she had made a remarkable political come-back, largely owing to the 
incompetence and disunity of her opponents, and was once again elected Prime 
Minister. The continuing mixture of populism and authoritarianism she displayed, 
however, precipitated renewed unrest and resistance to her rule on a number of 
fronts.215 In May 1984, Khalistani terrorists occupied the Golden Temple in Amritsar, 
calling for an independent Sikh state, organising a campaign of violence from its 
precincts. When, in June, Gandhi sent in tanks, two days of conflict resulted in the 
desecration of the Sikh shrine. The discontent this aroused led one of her Sikh 
bodyguards to assassinate her.216 In December 1984, Rajiv Gandhi, Indira’s eldest 
son, came to power on a wave of sympathy. Under Rajiv there were tentative attempts 
to revive the policies of economic liberalisation that had been undertaken by his
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mother during her first term in office. Owing to party tensions and conflict, however, 
it was possible only to effect reform on a piecemeal basis by targeting specific 
sectors, such as electronics and IT, in an attempt to spark a more general process of 
economic growth.217
iv. Re-Engagement and Marketisation
By the end of the 1980s opposition to Rajiv Gandhi’s rule had rallied under the 
leadership of V.P. Singh, former Congress minister. In December 1989, Singh 
managed to form a coalition government. The period of political volatility that 
followed led to a severe economic crisis in which India came very close to defaulting 
on international payments. P.V. Narasimha Rao, who took over the presidency of the 
Congress party to form a broad based coalition government, effected economic reform 
on a drastic scale, liberalising licence and controlling regulations in order to cede 
space in the economy for domestic and foreign private concerns. This finally and 
conclusively moved the government in the direction of greater reliance upon indirect 
fiscal, rather than direct administrative, controls.218
Paradoxically, just as it came to be accepted as a new and desirable reality on the 
Indian political landscape, economic reform was accompanied by increasing 
communal polarisation. The communal agenda systematically pursued by the B JP 
(Bharatiya Janata Party) and its allies seems to have been raised to a new level of 
permanent constitutional expression.219 Broadly speaking this agenda had two strands. 
First, there has been reluctance on the part of local and central authorities to step in 
and a growing number of quite gruesome attacks upon Christian and Muslim minority 
communities.220 Secondly, it is seen in the determined raising of tensions between 
India and Pakistan. Communal tensions have had a significant degree of regional 
expression and this is part of a much wider rise in prominence over the past decade of 
regional movements and parties in the South, Sikkim, Kashmir and Punjab. 
Secessionism has become a major theme of Indian national politics and a steady 
growth of regionalism has been underpinned by a gradual weakening of New Delhi’s
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grip as the nation’s capital. The ensuing instability that this has been accompanied by 
has taken a significant toll in terms of the absence of consistent policy, leading big 
businesses and the affluent classes to look increasingly to their own private interest, 
thereby escalating the gap between rich and poor and leading to increased levels of 
political corruption.
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Chapter 3: Legal Development
A: Conceptual Framework
The introductory chapter defined law as the normative or patterned complex of social 
pressure occurring within a given human grouping. For the purposes of the present 
chapter, this definition needs to undergo a degree of decompression. To this end, a 
modified version of the typology developed by jurist M. Chiba will be employed. 
Chiba distinguishes three types of socio-legal norm: legal postulates, unofficial laws, 
and official laws. A legal postulate he characterises as a value principle or value 
system specifically connected with a particular official or unofficial law, which it acts 
to found, justify and orientate.221 It is thus linked into the most fundamental notions 
that a particular society holds as to the moral orientation and organisation or 
principles governing the institutions of communal living. Unofficial law, Chiba’s 
second category, he defines as: “ a legal system not officially sanctioned by any 
legitimate authority but sanctioned in practice by the general consensus or a certain 
circle of people, within or beyond the boimds of a country.”222 For the purposes of the 
present study, this definition tends to restrict itself by association too much to the 
geographical jurisdiction of a particular state or territory. Consequently, the term 
informal law will be used as a substitute. Likewise, instead of the term official law, 
Chiba’s third category, which he defines as “a legal system.. .directly sanctioned by 
the legitimate authority of the government of the state to have overall jurisdiction over 
the country,”223 the term formal law will be substituted. Formal law, in this sense, as 
suggested in the introductory chapter, has the character of explicitness and fixation, in 
terms of the way that it is emitted from distinctive law-making bodies, the way that it 
is recorded and publicised, and the way it is implemented in practice. In all of these 
respects, informal law is more or less lacking such characteristics. What distinguishes 
informal law in this framework from legal postulates is the fact that the norms with 
which it is concerned are not directly and immediately connected in the minds of the 
social actor with a moral or religious vision, though they necessarily derive from one.
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In what follows, it will be noticed that there is a deliberate correspondence between 
this tripartite framework of legal analysis and the tripartite framework of historical 
transformation around which the second section of chapter two was structured. Thus a 
tentative attempt is made here to bring these two frameworks together in order to 
embody an implicit, though necessarily always heavily circumscribed, claim as to the 
trajectory and shape of legal development. In short, this claim is that as the history of 
legal development has unfolded, so there has been a gradual shift in preponderant 
emphasis from legal postulates, to informal law and finally to formal law and that 
these periods of emphasis correspond broadly to the three major stages of historical 
transformation. The appellation ‘preponderant’ is, of course, meant to signify that in 
each of these periods all three varieties of legal norm have been operative to some 
extent. The preponderant status of a given variety of norm refers solely to the fact that 
it expresses the normative Zeitgeist of a particular phase of development and that 
during that phase the matrix of forces with which it is especially associated play a 
central role of control and direction, co-opting other forces and varieties of norm for 
their own purposes. Finally, it follows from that there is also a certain correspondence 
between the different stages of legal and historical development and the different 
theoretical approaches to law outlined in the introductory chapter: the ‘natural law’, 
‘socio-economic’ and ‘positivist’ approaches best describing the variety of norm 
predominant in the first, second and third periods respectively.
The fact that the schools of jurisprudence most characteristic of the ‘socio-economic’ 
approach seem to flourish most in the final and not in the second period may at first to 
tell against this last suggested correspondence. To make sense of the apparent 
contradiction, it is important carefully to distinguish between the varieties of norms to 
which particular jurisprudential theories refer and the jurisprudential theories 
themselves. In fact, the increasingly sensitive and sophisticated explication of 
informal norms is an important part of the transition to positivity and it is certainly 
part of the co-optive process by which the capitalist state surveils those areas of 
society not yet brought fully under its control. Consequently, implicit in what follows 
is also the claim that precisely in proportion as informal socio-economic norms 
receive greater elaboration, and thereby begin to loose their quality of informality, so 
the preponderance of the forces upon which they are based is undermined.
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B: Legal Change Overtime
1. Pre-Agrarian
In the first period of legal development, during which legal postulates were the 
preponderant form of legal norm, little distinction was drawn, not just between law 
and morality as these terms would be understood today, but even between the norms 
of morality and the overall visions of universal order that would now normally be 
termed religious. It is in this sense that Ernest Gellner spoke of pre-neolithic man as 
being bound together by multi stranded networks of normative activities which were 
at once referential, social, descriptive and loyalty affirming and at the same time
O') Ametaphysically orientated. Fundamentally, in this pre-agrarian phase of human
existence, “mores and laws undifferentiated from the norms of religion were looked
99 cupon as being exclusively of divine origin.” The theological cast of law during this 
stage had two major characteristics: it was “essentially unchangeable through human 
ordinances and it is everywhere the same force within the same cultural 
environments.”226 Where a serious breach of the normative order did take place and 
an individual or group was wronged, authority to punish for such a breach almost 
universally resided with the “wronged individual [or group] and his immediate 
kinsmen” and lasted for only as long as was necessary “to follow through the 
procedural steps that lead to redress or punishment of the culprit.” Consequently, the 
very strong tendency was “to allocate authority [to punish] to the party [be it the 
group on its own behalf or on behalf of one of its members].. .directly injured.”227
2. The Neolithic Revolution and Early State Structures
A second period of legal development began to emerge alongside the development of 
the first state structures and particularly of the great agro-military empires of the 
ancient world.228 As early as 2350 B.C. there is evidence of codes being compiled as a 
method of consolidating existing ordinances laid down by Mesopotamian kings and as 
a way of publicising as well, perhaps, as standardising official sanctions or
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punishments. Over the following millennium, this earliest example was followed by 
others including the great code of Hammurabi (1700 B.C.), the Ten Commandments 
and the laws of Manu.229 All of these early forays into formal law-making, if they can 
be described as such, represent the earliest examples of a clear shift towards fixed and 
explicit legal norms. However, it should be remembered that right up to the 
emergence of the modem nation state round about the time of the industrial revolution 
and the transition to the third great period of historical and legal development, 
examples of what might today be termed positive state law, let alone of positively 
formalised legal systems, remained of limited significance when set against the vast 
body of informal legal norms, upon which they rested and alongside which they 
coexisted.
One of the most important consequences of the gradual movement towards greater 
socio-political consolidation and the growing inter-societal interaction which it 
implied was the gradual recognition that not all social groupings were organised or 
regulated in the same way and that consequently not all law was in practice the direct 
application of unalterable and unchanging divine mandates. As it became clear that a 
division did in fact exist between regulative norms in different human societies, 
questions soon began to arise as to the correct moral basis of human authority and to 
its legitimate scope. Within the West, it was the Greeks who first systematically 
reflected upon this question, as they did upon the nature of the human being and of 
human society as opposed merely to the nature of the physical world, and they 
recorded their reflections in a literature that gave rise to more or less a continuous 
European tradition. It is for this reason that it is useful to focus in some detail upon 
the development and transformation of that tradition since it was in Europe that the 
intellectual, social and cultural developments took place which propelled the first 
human societies into the industrial age and then, through coercion, spread the 
processes of industrialisation across the globe, with all the attendant implications that 
that had for the proliferation of formalised legal structures.
In the earliest examples of the Greek canon -  the great Homeric epics — there existed 
no real sense of law as it might be understood today nor, indeed, of any real normative
229 Harper, 1904; Johns, trans., 2000; and, Winton, ed., 1958.
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0^0customary order at all. Instead there was the much vaguer notion of themis, which 
can best be characterised as a sort of “god-inspired decision or directive or finding” 
that reflected a “shared sense of what... [was] proper” and of “what was.. .morally 
incumbent”, as opposed to what was merely expedient. Alongside, themis stood the 
related concept of dike, which only later came to develop a clear sense of its own. R. 
Kostler characterised the relationship of these two concepts in the following way:
“Themis is a law of the heavens, dike the earthly law which imitates it, the former 
rests on divine institution, the latter on direction from the law thus instituted, and is 
therefore derivative law which comes into effect through the sentence of the
• 9 T 1judge.” What is certainly clear is that themis came much more to be associated with 
the religious and the supernatural; dike with the earthly and the human. The real 
importance of these two concepts, themis and dike, lay in the fact that they 
distinguished between the supernatural and the human or natural order in a way that, 
whilst maintaining the fundamental connection between the two, enabled the 
beginnings of independent investigation into the human condition per se and it is this 
which lies at the basis of enduringly significant insights handed down under the rubric 
of the natural law.232
Among the forerunners of this natural law was Heraclitus of Ephesus who perceived 
in the endless rhythm of events, the idea of an eternal norm or harmony within an 
ordered cosmos, governed by laws which set it apart from disorder, confusion and 
chaos. Wisdom he went on to define as consisting of “a single thing, to know the 
thought which governs all things everywhere.”233 This thought was to become the 
Logos so familiar to the later Greek philosophical tradition connoting, as it did, reason 
insofar as it is common to all creatures.234 The Logos embodied a higher or ‘divine 
law’ with which all man-made institutions must ultimately find harmony and against 
which they must be tested. Where this harmony broke down and conflict arose, the 
only proper response was for the individual to remain loyal to the Logos, which was 
the ultimate ground of their being. That such a conflict could arise was given dramatic 
expression in the Antigone (454-450 BC) of Sophocles which, by contrasting Creon’s
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edict with the gods’ unwritten and infallible law, threw in to relief the tension 
between Antigone’s moral and legal duties with respect to the burial of her brother.235 
The courage she needed to resolve this conflict, even to the point of death, was a 
poignant testament to the fact that true wisdom often demanded the highest of 
sacrifices, but also carried with it the implication that ultimately the unseen was even 
more real and more valuable than the seen.
It is against this backdrop that, at a relatively early stage, a distinction began to 
emerge between two conceptions of the ‘natural law’ the ideological consequences of 
which were to reverberate right down to the present. The first conception, at odds with 
that intimated by the Antigone, is essentially revolutionary and individualistic. It is 
“bound up with the basic doctrine of the state of nature as well as with the concept of 
the state as a social unit which rests upon a free contract, is arbitrary and artificial, is 
determined by utility, and is not metaphysically necessary.” The second conception 
“is the idea of a natural law grounded in metaphysics that does not exist in a mythical 
state of nature before the "laws," but lives and ought to live in them.”236
The first of these alternatives was developed by the Sophists around the 5th century 
BC, at a time when the Greek city states were undergoing a significant period of 
political and social turmoil. What primarily impressed this rather opportunistic group 
of sceptics was the apparent relativity of human ideas and standards, such that law 
appeared to be nothing more than the product of expediency and self interest and, 
therefore, demanding of obedience only on the same basis. They “started from the 
freedom of the individual, who had to be liberated from traditional religious and 
politico-legal bonds.”237 For them the polis was not something natural or eternal, nor 
was law. Instead they spoke of a mankind’s ‘natural’ state in pre-social terms, which 
they conceived of in abstractly “civitas maxima of free and equal men.”238 The second 
conception of the natural law, which came to dominate and almost wholly, though not 
entirely, to supersede the sophistic alternative, was that collectively put forward by 
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Both Socrates and Plato, in particular, firmly resisted the 
idea that absolute standards beyond the individual were not discoverable and instead,
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asserted with tremendous rhetorical and literary power, that the true home of the 
human being was in society with his fellow man.239 Thus for Plato “the polis and its 
law were the indispensable means for realizing the idea of humanity.”240 Tme 
humanity can only reach its “completion in citizenship, in the ethical ideal of the 
citizen, of the law-abiding and just man.” Consequently, far from being an apparatus 
of oppression, the properly functioning state “is the great pedagogue of mankind”, 
which should function “to bring men to morality and justice, to happiness in and 
through the moral virtues.”241 And, indeed in the Republic Plato clearly defines justice
OA'yas that which conforms to nature.
These theories were elaborated and built upon by Aristotle who picked up on the 
sophist distinction between natural and conventional law, but went on to place this 
distinction within an essentially Socratic and communitarian framework. 
Consequently, he distinguished in the Rhetoric between two senses of the word law: 
as particular or positive, on the one hand, and as common or according to nature and 
thereby applying to the whole of the human race, on the other,243 Likewise, in the 
Ethics he points to the natural element in justice which applies everywhere and at all 
times and which does not depend for its force upon particular enactments. At the same 
time, or Aristotle, natural law did not “merely mean a law which is coextensive with 
man, or universal” but also “a law which has grown concurrently with man, and is, in 
a sense, evolutionary — yet not so evolutionary but that man’s ‘art’ has cooperated in 
its growth.” Consequently, “the antithesis between natural and conventional, which is 
only a prima facie antithesis,” disappears for Aristotle in favour of “a vision of an 
historically developed law, which has both a positive quality and a root in the nature 
of man.”244
The works of Aristotle were, in turn, subsequently built upon and adapted by a later 
school of Greek philosophy, the Stoics, which had a profound influence on the 
development of jurisprudence into and throughout the period of Roman political 
hegemony. For the Stoics, the emphasis was upon the capacity for human beings to
239 Maguire, 1947.
240 Rommen, 1998: 14.
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reason, which Aristotle had identified as their distinguishing function. Since, they 
concluded, reason governed the universe in all its parts, it governed man and ordered 
his faculties in a way which would enable him to fulfil his true nature as a social 
being and citizen. Thus when man lived in accordance with his reason, and thus in 
society with others, he lived naturally. Furthermore, for the Stoics, postulates of 
reason were of universal force, applying to all men, regardless of the particular 
societies in which they found themselves. Developing this idea, they drew a further 
distinction between absolute and relative ideals of natural law, envisaging an idealized 
golden age without governing institutions, whose emergence connoted a deterioration 
of the moral substance of mankind, and which inaugurated a subsequent age of 
relative natural law which demanded of governors and legislators that they 
approximate the elaboration of their sanctions as much as possible to the original 
absolute standards.
With the coming of the Roman Empire, many of these ideas were taken over with 
increasing enthusiasm by its leading statesmen -  Cicero, Epictectus, Seneca and 
Marcus Aurelius -  especially after Rome’s annexation of Greece in 146 BC.245 Very 
ancient Roman law, of course, knew nothing of the natural law since every law was 
considered, at that point, to be tied to particular political allegiances. However, this 
mindset underwent modification as Greek ideas gradually penetrated Roman 
consciousness through the praetor’s edict and the jurisconsults’ commentaries each of 
which drew heavily on the middle Stoicism of Panaetius and Posidonious. This can be 
seen in the writings of Cicero and in those, years later, of Marcus Aurelius who would 
state: “My city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a 
man, it is the world.” Gaius, in book 1 of his Institutes developed this notion by 
drawing a distinction between Lex Gentium and the Lex civile. Finally, Ulpian 
elaborated a further distinction between the Jus Naturale and the Jus Gentium to 
create a tri-partite categorization: natural law, human law and civil law.246
With the fall of the Roman Empire and the emergence of Christianity, the Catholic 
Church rapidly became the main institutional conduit for the preservation,
245 See generally: Buckland, 1963; and, Frier, 1985. Also, Watson, 1995.
246 See: Watson, 1966; and, Wieacker, 1981.
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development and transmission of the theories of natural law.247 Already in scripture,
St Paul had written in Romans 2:15 of a law written on the heart of every man, no 
doubt influenced by certain Neo-Platonic schools which had purchase upon the minds 
of educated men throughout the first millennium AD. Moreover, the Fathers of the 
early Church were keen to make use of Stoic notions of natural law.248 Amidst these 
principles they perceived the, ‘seeds of the Word’.
The Fathers were also quick to take over the Stoic distinction between primary and 
secondary natural law, which they recast within a theological framework.249 Primary 
natural law they saw as applying to human nature in the state of innocence prior to its 
corruption through the sin of Adam. Secondary natural law applied to the condition 
of fallen nature and had as its necessary correlates bondage, slavery and the coercive 
authority of the state.250 Much more spectacularly, St Augustine, in his City o f God 
developed this theological interpretation into a complete eschatological vision by 
which natural law is seen as the formulation of a moral and obligatory order in which 
man participates in the creative work of God by aligning himself with the divine 
mind. There is a clear hierarchy within this natural order between the inorganic 
world and living creatures, and between living creatures dominated by the life of the 
senses, and man who is able to reach out to eternity through the life of the mind.
In a quite different way, the traditional natural law ideas of ancient Roman 
jurisprudence were also taken up and commented upon in the great Justinian work of 
the 6th century, the Corpus Juris Civilis as well as by Isidore of Seville in his 
Etymologies in the 7th century.251 Some time later, the establishment of the University 
of Bologna in the 11th century led to a marked revival of Roman legal scholarship 
which, together with numerous commentaries that began to be produced on Gratian’s 
Decretium after its publication in 1140, meant that Roman law and the principles 
underlying it once more became a widely studied subject.252 It was from this newly 
fertile soil that the great Scholastic interpretations of the natural law begin flower, but
247 See also in respect o f nascent notions o f  natural law in the pre-Christian Jewish tradition, Novak, 1988.
248 Spanneut, 1967.
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also that the seeds of their undoing begin to be fertilised and grow into an increasingly 
powerful alternative.
In the overall development of Scholastic thought a noteworthy and increasingly clear 
antithesis emerged between “lex~ratio and lex-voluntas” which “coincided structurally 
with the doctrines of the respective thinkers concerning God” and which applied not 
only to theological speculation in general, but also, more specifically, to the nature of 
law. Natural law conceptions came to be the fruit of doctrines upholding the “priority 
of the intellect over the will (law is reason) in both God and man, of the knowability 
of the essences of things and their essential order, their metaphysical being and the 
ordered hierarchy of values.”.253 Positivist conceptions, on the other hand, resulted 
from doctrines holding instead to the primacy of the will. Importantly, voluntas here 
meant more than mere will, denoting, in addition, passion and irrational appetite. 
Accordingly, positivism signified “the renouncing of all efforts to know the essences 
of things (nominalism), the repudiation of the metaphysics of hierarchized being and 
value” and it was “the same conceptual pattern [found] in the thinking of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even though.. .concealed under different 
names.”254
It was in the genius of St Thomas Aquinas working to solve difficulties encountered 
by Alexander of Hales and his own master, St Albert the Great, that the first of these 
two alternatives — the dominance of the Lex Ratio over the Lex Voluntas — was given 
expression in an ambitious and systematic synthesis of Christian doctrine and 
Aristoteiian-cum-Neo-Platonic metaphysics.255 Aquinas distinguished between four 
types of law, building upon Augustine’s insight that the most basic of all ordering 
principles was the mind and reason of God himself, and that natural law is a 
participation in this more fundamental eternal law in so far as the eternal law concerns 
human functioning and is discoverable through it. The implications of this vision were 
clear. Finally, below the level of the natural law, Aquinas further distinguished 
between the special divine laws revealed in scripture, which attach to a particular time 
and a particular place, and merely human or positive law, which enjoys legitimacy,
253 Rommen, 1998:36.
254 Ibid.
255 See generally, Knowles, 1988; Post, 1964; and, Simon, 1965.
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and indeed its quality, as law, only in so far as it elaborates upon, or at least is not 
inconsistent with, the fundamental tenants of the natural law.
Very soon after the death of Aquinas, Duns Scotus began to question the supremacy 
of Divine Reason over the Divine Will on the basis that it appeared to limit divine 
action. This questioning developed into an altogether more comprehensive critique by 
William of Ockham and a number of other later medieval thinkers.256 By identifying it 
with the exigencies of the divine will, the moral law became for Ockham a species of 
positive law. An action was “not good because of its suitableness to the essential 
nature of man, wherein God's archetypal idea of man is represented according to 
being and oughtness, but because God so wills.”257 As a manifestation of pure will, 
law thus had no foundation in the essential nature of things: there existed “no 
unchangeable lex naturalis, no natural law that inwardly governs the positive law. 
Positive law and natural law, which indeed is also positive law, stand likewise in no 
inner relation to each other.”258 This was a line of thinking that bore strong 
resemblance to the arguments employed by Machiavelli in The Prince259 and by 
Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan What is certainly clear is that it was intimately 
linked to the refocusing of attention away from a truly cosmic vision to one centred 
exclusively on man and his priorities as well as to the great historical departures 
during the Renaissance and Reformation which lay at the origin of the development of 
the modem nation state and ultimately to the rejection of all institutional authority
« » * » * 0 f\ 1which seemed to constrain the mind of the individual.
Whilst the development of this age of rationalism and individualism has already been 
touched upon in Chapter 2, it has an interesting jurispmdential aspect through which 
can be charted the gradual redefinition of human nature amongst the leading post­
renaissance natural law thinkers and philosophers. Perhaps the turning point in the 
transition from a metaphysical to a more narrowly rationalistic view of the natural law 
may be identified in the thinking of Hugo Grotius, whose famous definition mns as 
follows:
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The law of nature [ius naturale] is a dictate of right reason which points out 
that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational [and 
social] nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and 
that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the 
author of nature, God.262
The fact that the father of the so-called school of Protestant natural law builds here 
upon the Aristotelian and Thomistic foundation is clear enough. Grotius’ distinctive 
contribution, however, was to have taken Thomas’ ideas well beyond their original 
limits 263 For Grotius, reason was no longer a reflection of divine nature but was 
inherent in that of man.
Furthermore, Grotius’ emphasis upon the rational nature of man as being the 
fundamental pillar of natural law meant that he had opened the way to the 
construction of a system no longer verified by experience but deduced abstractly. And 
then in so detailed a manner that they seemed to allow little room for the separate 
though connected body of positive law in the manner that Aquinas and late scholastics 
such as Suarez had envisaged.264 The fact that he spoke as specifically on the nature 
of man as opposed to the divine nature meant that he was still able to maintain a 
voluntarist position whereby good or bad acts were not so with respect to their 
agreement or otherwise with divine nature, but because God willed or forbade 
them.265
Grotius’ teaching was both confirmed and developed by subsequent thinkers. In 
particular, Samuel Pufendorf, in his De Jure Naturae Gentium, and his De Officio 
Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem, in further distancing earth and man from 
dependence on the divine mind and emphasising man’s essential individuality, argued 
that human laws and the other essential forms of community living evolved not by 
inherent necessity out of any natural human inclination for social living, but merely 
because society proved advantageous. Thus, sociality now became merely a capability 
or an impulse rather than a fundamental requirement.266 It was on this basis that the 
social contractarian theories began to emerge as a powerful strain in legal and
262 Rommen, 1998: 63.
263 Haakonssen, 1996. Also, Buckle, 1991.
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political thought, enduring right down to the present day.267 Thomas Hobbes was 
particularly drawn to this view, arguing as he did that far from being sociable, man in 
the state of nature was driven by fear, distrust and a desire to dominate his fellows. 
Consequently, there arose, out of a sense of intense insecurity, a mutual agreement to 
alienate the powers of government into the hands of a single absolute sovereign, 
thereby constructing an artificial leviathan for the protection of all. The law of nature 
rationally demands respect for this pact in regard to the justice emanating from the 
sovereign, but the particular sanctions and rules that this sovereign is pleased to 
impose are nothing other than fiats of his will.268
As an apparent counterbalance to Hobbes’ work, but actually developing a number of 
the themes he had touched upon in terms of fundamental priority of individual self- 
interest, John Locke, in his Two Treaties on Government, endowed man with 
inalienable natural rights premised upon man’s primordial freedom and complete 
equality, and from here Locke proceeded to assert that no-one could legitimately 
attack another’s life, health, freedom or property, or indeed their right to remain free 
from political subjugation, save by their own consent.269 Indeed, whilst sanctioning a 
form of the social contract, by which common decisions are freely vested in a 
sovereignly constituted majority, such an arrangement could never supersede the pre­
existing rights of the individual, which could be legitimately protected by force when 
not afforded the unconditional respect to which they were entitled. Likewise, 
Montesquieu’s Spirit o f the Laws, in developing the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, was essentially driven by the question of how best to guarantee these 
individual freedoms in practice.270
In fact, what the state actually became on this view was “the utilitarian product of 
individual self-interest, cloaked in the solemn and venerable language of the 
traditional philosophy of natural law.”271 What Locke did in practice was to substitute 
for the idea of natural law as being rooted in the metaphysical order of the universe, a 
conception of natural law as “a .. .nominalistic symbol for a catalogue or bundle of
267 See generally: Tuck, 1979.
268 Bobbio, 1993.
269 Andrew, 1988; and, Grant, 1987.
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individual rights that stem from individual self-interest.”272 At the heart of this 
position was the presumption that the common good was nothing real, being “merely 
the sum of the particular goods or interests of individuals”, such that “the free pursuit 
of self-interest on the part of individuals who are restricted only by the like freedom 
of others” would work “like the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith and produce, as it 
were automatically, a sort of social harmony.”273 As such, Locke can be seen to have 
prepared “the way for the destructive criticism of Hume and Bentham.”274
3. The Emergence of Industrial and Post-Industrial Society
The third period of legal development, which corresponded to the beginnings of the 
industrial revolution and the rise across the world of industrial and post-industrial 
societies is characterised in particular, as was seen in Chapter 2, by the emergence of 
autonomous or impersonal authority. It is possible to see how the various schools of 
jurisprudence which underpin late 18th, 19th and 20th century legal developments, 
although often apparently contradictory, actually cohere around a uniform 
developmental logic.
The emergence of impersonal forms of legal authority can, of course, be traced all the 
way back to the first manifestations of positive law or behavioural rules, which are 
found in the agro-imperial codes of antiquity. The significant feature of these codes, 
however, was the fact that they defined the personal power of the ruler or small ruling 
elite. With the failure of the short-lived republican experiments of Greece and Rome, 
it was not until the concessions embodied in Magna Carta 1215 and the development 
of the English Common Law culminating in the Glorious Revolution 1688 and the 
Bill o f Rights 1689, that the tradition of limitations between branches of government 
or social constituencies began to enjoy continuous, incremental and sustainable
/) ’7C
development. What had enjoyed piecemeal and informal expression in the English 
Common Law under such jurisprudential luminaries as William Blackstone and Sir 
Edmund Coke276 eventually attained rigid expression in the American Constitution
275 Baker, 2003; Bellomo, 1995;.; Brand, 1992; Glenn, 2005; Harding, 1973; Hogue, 1966; Ibbetson, 1988; Keeton, 1966; 
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1787 and its Bill o f Rights 1791, as well as the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the post-Napoleonic proliferation of codified systems throughout Europe.277 
Expressing some of the central tenets elaborated by Locke and Montesquieu and also, 
to a certain extent, those of Jean Jacques Rousseau, not to mention the formalism of 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative.278
These emergent structures were initially designed to protect the inalienable rights of 
the individual per se but, as has already been pointed out, Locke’s ideas were 
possessed of a certain internal instability, which tended to lead them in the direction 
of materialistic and utilitarian positivism. It was indeed in this way that the central 
jurisprudential tenets of modem formalised legal systems came to be elaborated
IIIthrough the works of Bentham, Austin and Mill in the 19 century, and, most notably, 
through Kelsen and Hart’s analytic jurisprudence in the 20th century.279 The studied 
neutrality as between differing metaphysical worldviews that each of these theorists 
espoused actually operated as a mechanism by which the rights discourse of Locke 
and the American Founding Fathers found itself functionalised in the service of an 
emerging market economy, whose fundamental requirement was to ensure observance 
of a set of principles conducive to competition between individual productive and 
consumptive units. As such:
[ajnalytical jurisprudence can be understood in part as reflecting a demand 
for a systematic, rational legal science to underpin modem legal 
professionalism and to accommodate the political idea of law as a technicalOO A
instmment of government in modem western states.
Indeed, for Carty, the “rapacious” and “subjectivist individualism” which “is the 
anthropological foundation for the consumerist market economy” has come to assert 
itself “through rhetoric about human rights[,].. .liberal democracy” and the mle of 
law.281 Thus the Western rights discourse has come to be premised upon an essentially 
voluntarist foundation rendering individual rights claims little more than “statements
277 See: Cassin, 1956; Friedrich, 1956; Varga, 1991. Also: Berger, 1999; Glenn, 1998; Gordley, 1994; Murillo, 2001; Strakosch, 
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of personal preference” devoid of any truly “transcendent or objective” content.282 
This is a perspective that not only accommodates the contractarian bases of classical 
liberalism, and the various schools of post-modern thought “which see.. .the 
world.. .as a cacophony of.. .desire,” but also, and most importantly, “the
r)0'l
consumerism of advanced capitalism.” In this context, the democratic process
degenerates into little more than the “manipulation” and the “manufacture of 
consensus” writ-large. Law, together with its various elaborate state-sponsored 
enforcement mechanisms, “comes in to express the conclusion of this process” in 
order to sustain the consensus thereby reached by enforcing it “against those who 
[remain].. .recalcitrant.”284 In this way “an anarchy of affirmations will, in fact, be 
resolved through the pressure, if necessary violent, of a preponderance of voices”, and 
is precisely in this way that “voluntarist individualism fits so well with the market 
economy.”285
Immediately it is necessary to recognise that in addition to the explicitly positivist 
legal systems of the nation-state, and their jurisprudential underpinnings, there 
emerged a growing interest in the historical, sociological and anthropological bases of 
that law with ever greater sensitivity to the mechanisms by which it was formed. In 
many ways, this originates in the Romantic reaction of the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries. Initially it was based particularly on the anti-rationalist and anti­
revolutionary philosophy of traditionalism put forward by De Maistre and De Bonald 
in France and by the German Historical school under the leadership of von 
Savigny.286 Common to all of these thinkers was their characterisation of law as an 
organically grown expression of the soul of a people latent in people’s manners and 
customs.
These historical conceptions of law demonstrate an affinity, in particular, with 
Rousseau’s conception of the General Will, and they also shared a certain amount in
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common with Hegel’s historical dialectic. It is interesting, therefore, that both of these 
theorists were consequently to provide the ideological bases for the considerable 
extension of the power of the modem nation-state.287 Likewise, whilst at first sight, 
the tenets of the historical school seemed to be fundamentally at variance with the 
increasingly positivist character of the industrial and post-industrial systems, looked 
at more closely they were actually premised on very similar ideological foundations. 
Thus, when faced by the decisive question of a conflict between positive law and 
natural law (or ethics, as he termed it), De Stahl could only say: “Subjects may not, 
relying upon the natural law, set themselves singly or collectively in opposition to the
no o
positive law; that would be the crime of the Revolution.”
What the reaction of the historical school was mainly directed against was more the 
lack of subtlety manifested by the positivists’ concern with formality and procedure to 
the exclusion of less formal sources of social pressure often of equal if not greater 
practical significance. Once more, then, the possibility opens up of a real movement 
of cooption whereby the developmental logic of industrial society, which had initially 
thrown up blunt instmments of formal state regulation were inevitably given greater 
sensitivity and, therefore, effectiveness in relation to the social realities with which it 
was faced. This transformational potential was recognised with increasing explicitness 
in the later schools of sociological jurisprudence and legal realism, which continued 
and extended the insights of their historical forebears. Typical of these disciplines was 
the approach outlined by Jhering who saw law merely as an instmment the purpose of 
which was to “further and protect the interests of society.”289 Moreover, since the tme 
interests of ‘man’ were frequently at variance with his individual and selfish desires, 
the major problem faced by the society was “to reconcile selfish purposes with social 
purposes, or to suppress social purposes when they clash dangerously with social 
purposes.”290 For this reason, the state was required to “employ devices to encourage 
the social purposes”291 which were in the tme interests of the individual. One of the 
chief methods of doing so “is to identify his own selfish interest with some larger
709social interest. This is done by the two principles of Reward and Coercion.” The
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echoes of Adam Smith here are palpable and the emphasis placed upon the utilisation 
of law as a means of achieving social purposes bear a strong resemblance to the later 
legal realist interventions of Pound, Holmes and Lewellyn in the United States of
f J Q 'i
America and of Hagerstrom and Olivecrona in Scandinavia.
When turning, particularly, to the more recent schools of anthropological 
jurisprudence, the situation is slightly more complex.294 A significant amount of work 
has been concerned with bringing to light the sophisticated nature of traditional 
societies as a way of emphasising their inherent cultural value and encouraging 
respect for the subtle interactions upon which they are based. Here again, however, 
although much anthropological work has been concerned to protect traditional 
societies from the coercive encroachments of colonisation and the alien structures of 
the modem industrialising state, this has not always been so,295 and in fact the more 
sensitive understanding of such societies and the complex normative stmctures which 
underpin them has actually performed the function of high-level surveillance which 
enables these stmctures etc., in the longer mn, to be more effectively co-opted and 
then subsequently conclusively undermined. In this regard Richard Abel pertinently 
pointed, some time ago, to the way in which “the capitalist state actively seeks to 
undermine, displace and co-opt other forms of social control.”296
It is in this spirit that certain Marxist inspired thinkers have been pertinacious in 
highlighting the dangers of the various forms of relativism that have often come to be 
associated with many anthropological schools of thinking and this critique has 
extended most bitingly to take in post-modernist or post-structuralist schools of 
thought. As indicated earlier in the suggestive quotation from Carty, these stand 
accused of complicity in the pathologies of the capitalist system by adopting the 
posture of radicalism whilst neutering any potential it might have for sustainable 
resistance through adherence to a hyper-voluntarist ontology. In this context it might 
come as a surprise that even the determinedly realist and objectivist schools of 
Marxist jurisprudence have been capable of undergoing subtle forms of cooption by a 
capitalist logic of development. The former, in particular, began, and through its
293 Some major works in this tradition include: Holmes,1897; Hagerstrom, 1933; Llewellyn, 1940,1962; MacCormack,1970; 
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9Q7successors in the Critical Legal Studies movement, continued, to highlight the 
complex ways in which individuals and communities were subject to social and 
economic inequalities which helped to box them into suboptimal functional roles 
when viewed from a mass market perspective. In this way, the emancipatory though 
materialist critique with which Marxist schools were, and are, infused, have served 
very well the purposes of increasing the productive/consumptive efficiencies of the 
developing mass-market economy. Thus the grievance mechanisms and protective 
political and legislative counter-movements which such critiques have helped, and 
continue to help, ground “may be seen as ... [being at the] service of a constantly 
expanding welfare state, which thereby [helps] socialize... the costs of reproducing 
capitalism.”298 Indeed, it is precisely because “advanced capitalism requires the 
planning of consumption as well as production” not only that “[c]onsumer grievances 
must be satisfied so that consumers continue buying”,299 but also that individuals 
capable of performing the very role of ‘consumer’ are materially placed in a position 
in which they are capable of doing so. And it is for these reasons — so that the 
individual is kept passive and complicit as regards the basic structural and fimctional 
premises of the market society, but active as regards the role that such a society 
requires them to perform -  that “it is necessary to generalise to relations of 
consumption those mechanisms that have been developed to control relations of 
production.”300
C: Regional Contexts
Having focussed upon the development of the ideological underpinnings of the 
industrial and post-industrial state legal cultures where they emerged first, namely in 
Western Europe and North America, attention now turns to the reactive and 
transformative impact that the coercive spreading of these ideologically programmed 
state structures has had upon the traditional legal cultures of China and India. Again, 
reflecting the overall shape of their wider historical reconfigurations, this dynamic is 
best analysed according to a very broad common framework. This is particularly so in
297 Kennedy, 1976; Unger, 1986,1996.
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respect of the third major phase of legal transformation which closely mirrors in its 
complex dynamic the third major phase of historical transfomation.
1. China 
a. Pre-agrarian
The dearth of available evidence means that very little that is not of an essentially 
speculative character can be said about the forms of normative pressure extant in 
China prior to the Neolithic revolution and the emergence sometime thereafter of 
various forms of nascent state structure. What does seem to be clear from various 
archaeological finds centring around early turtle shell and oracle bone inscriptions is 
that the earliest forms of Chinese pictograph seem to be heavily bound up with 
religious rites and sacrifices. This seems to anticipate not only later practices during 
the Shang and Chou dynasties where a distinctive class of religious functionary 
emerged to monopolise the written form and thus in its turn anticipate the subsequent 
emergence of a uniquely powerful scholarly class, but also, given the various nature 
related pictographic motifs, the religious significance of the natural world for 
subsequent Chinese religious development.
b. The Traditional System
The traditional Chinese legal practice, of which there is much greater evidence, built 
upon an unprecedented period of almost 2,400 years of legal activity which, whilst 
undergoing significant internal development, displayed a remarkable degree of 
continuity. Much of this continuity was based upon the rigorously cultivated religious, 
philosophical and ideological bases of social interaction with which the various levels 
of Chinese society were imbued. The two principal threads with which that 
conceptual fabric was woven were, first, the semi-religious practice of ancestor 
worship, which had been part of Chinese culture since earliest times, and, secondly, 
the philosophical precepts developed by the itinerant sage Confucius in the fourth 
century B.C.301
301 See generally; Bodde & Morris, 1967:3-51; Dawson, 1978; de Groot, 1894; Fung, 1948; Hsiao, 1979; and, MacCormack, 
1996:1-17.
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The core principle of ancestor worship was the continuity of the partroline. This was 
premised on the notion that the human community comprised both living and dead 
members. When members of the basic communal institution -  the family -  died, it 
was thought that they continued to live on in Heaven with similar needs to those they 
had on earth, though now, owing to their altered state, without the capacity to satisfy 
them. Instead they were possessed of new and supernatural powers to intercede on 
behalf of their living descendants thereby to secure their families protection and good 
fortune.302 This system of mutual rights and obligations depended heavily upon the 
continuity of the male line because only males were able efficaciously to carry out the 
ceremonies on earth that were necessary to propitiate their ancestors in Heaven. 
Moreover, only males were remembered beyond the third or fourth generations in the 
ancestral line. Consequently, it was of crucial importance that the male line be 
secured, both for the sake of the familial continuity and for fear that the ancestral host, 
being starved of the ceremonial attention it required, would turn into a series of 
embittered spirits or ‘hungry ghosts’ wondering the earth and causing disruption and 
exacting vengeance.303
The filial piety manifested in the practice of ancestor worship did not, of course, 
commence upon death. It was a central premise of Chinese society that an individual 
should show respect to their family elders and particularly to their parents throughout 
their earthly existence.304 Moreover, since descendents were required to provide 
support to both the living and the dead, the most filial act was to marry and to 
procreate: particularly to produce a son. Conversely, the most un-filial act was to fail 
to do so. The attitudes inherent in the notion of filial piety infused the functioning of 
the entire legal system, from justifying the grounds of divorce, to specifying the 
degrees of capital punishment the most serious violations of the criminal law should 
attract.305 It was also manifested in a more general way in the development during the 
Song dynasty of a system of landholding designed to ensure that ancestors were 
provided for in perpetuity. Under this system, special ancestral trusts were established 
endowing property in the name of an ancestor so that the income from that
302 Dawson, 1978:153-157,143-145.
303 Ibid: 147-149,151-157.
304 Ibid: 89-90,137-143,149-151.
305 MacCormack, 1996: 65-88,223.
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endowment could be used to provide on-going support for the sacrifices his line 
required. So popular did this practice become that in some parts of southern China 
almost ninety percent of the land came to be held in ancestral trusts, with the 
descendants of common ancestors living together in order to enjoy trust benefits. In 
due course, these communities developed into linear villages in which groups of 
agnates claiming common descent lived together in one community with their wives 
and daughters, invariably governed by a system of gradually developed customary 
law written down in the periodically revised official genealogies, together with the 
names, titles, deeds and writings of their lineal ancestors. These clans, along the 
commercial and trades guilds in the cities and other local collectivites thus came to 
represent extremely important sources of informal rules and dispute settlement, 
distinct from, though complementary to, the system of imperial law administered by 
the imperial bureaucracy.306
If individual families were governed by the requirements of filial piety and ancestor 
worship, so too was Chinese society as a whole. Above all, it was believed that this 
wider society was held together by the person and practices of its most important 
living figure, the Emperor.307 The Emperor was a vital link between Heaven and 
earth, worshiping both his own ancestors and Heaven itself, in order to secure good 
fortune for the Empire as a whole. The Emperor was the ‘Son of Heaven’ and the 
mandate he was granted by heaven legitimised his rule on earth, but it also placed 
upon him a special responsibility to maintain cosmic harmony and thereby avoid 
calamities such floods, draughts and internal disorders.308 Indeed, the occurrence of 
calamities such as these in too great a number would indicate loss of the heavenly 
mandate and provide justification for rebellion.309 The idea of the Emperor 
embodying the connection between Heaven and earth acted as a central tenet in the 
traditional conceptualisation of a universe in which nature and society were so 
intimately conjoined that any disorder within society could effect a disorder within the 
natural world. This of course, has strong associations with Daoist notions of natural 
harmony according to which human beings should practice non-action in order to 
remain in accord with the rhythms of the natural world. It was, in particular,
306 Ibid: 18-20,23-27; Dawson, 1978:3,10-11; Hsiao, 1960:454-462: Freedman, 1958: Lui, 1959: Yang, 1945. On guilds, see: 
Burgess, 1948; Fried, 1983 and, MacGowan, 1886.
307 Dawson, 1978:7.
308 Ibid: 17.
309 Ibid; MacCormack, 1996: 22. See also: Hucker, 1966; Turner, 1990.
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associated with the dualist concept of yin and yang (originally meaning the dark side 
of the hill and the light or sunny side of the hill) connoting the positive and negative 
elements in nature that was applied to many aspect of natural and social life.310 It was 
essential that the yin -  used to characterise things that were dark, wet, female, passive, 
or of the earth as well as the autumn and winter months -  should be kept in balance 
with the yang — applying to things that were light, dry, masculine, active, of Heaven 
and also the spring and summer months. Indeed, any significant imbalance could lead 
to a fundamental disturbance of the cosmos.311
The implications of this theory of the cosmos for the legal order were numerous,312 
there was strict adherence to the principle that the punishment should fit the crime 
since any criminal act disturbed the balance of nature and therefore had to be re­
balanced by an equivalent punishment.313 For this reason great emphasis was placed 
in the Imperial Code upon determining exactly the correct punishment -  no more, no 
less -  since doing so was a question of no merely individual but of cosmic 
importance. Moreover, any magistrate discovered to have imposed an incorrect 
punishment would himself be punished, particularly if his error had led to the 
punishment of an innocent person.314 Secondly, great emphasis was placed upon the 
merits of voluntary surrender, stressing, in particular, the importance of an offender 
surrendering himself before the offence had even been discovered. A culprit’s 
willingness to admit their mistake an offer some reparation had the effect of more 
quickly rebalancing any natural disturbance caused and therefore attracted an 
appropriate discount on the standard punishment. A third implication was the 
emphasis placed upon performing legal acts at the most appropriate and propitious 
times. Thus executions had to be carried out, wherever possible, in the autumn when 
the yin principle predominated and things were dying. For this reason, there were 
many days during the year upon which magistrates were prohibited from hearing 
cases. Occasionally, also the Emperor would see fit to order general amnesties in the 
face of some natural calamity with an eye to rebalancing natural harmony.316 Fourthly 
and finally, there were implications in terms of legal responsibility. Since Heaven
310 Dawson, 1978: 55-57,75-76. MacCormack, 1996:70-71.
311 See generally, de Groot, 1894; and, Legge, 1867.
312 See generally, MacCormack, 1985,1989, 1990, 1991; Liu, 1993; and, Wu, 1967.
313 MacCormack, 1996: 48-50,1990.
314 MacCormack, 1996: 164-165,199,210. See also, Metzenger, 1973.
315 MacCormack, 1996: 9-10,138-140,158-159,209-210.
316 MacCormack, 1996:13,45-51,210-212.
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delegated to the Emperor the authority to rule as well as the duty to maintain natural 
and social harmony, so the Emperor too delegated these responsibilities to his 
subordinates, and this process delegation reached right down to the heads of 
individual households.317 For this reason the dual notions of authority and 
responsibility operated as extraordinarily pervasive justifications for the enforcement 
of strict obedience of subordinates to their superiors, thereby intimately intermingling 
ethics and law.318 At the same time, since disturbance in the social order was seen as a 
failure on the part of those to whom the responsibility to maintain it had been 
delegated, there was also strong pressure to conceal problems and avoid all forms of
Q I Q
public querellousness.
Coupled to the strong tradition of ancestor worship and the cosmic vision it embodied 
was and equally powerful influence of Confucianism as moderated from the mid third 
century BC by certain significant principles of legalist philosophy. The great debate 
between the Confucianists and the Legalists took place between the fifth and third 
centuries BC. It essentially concerned what might today be termed issues of political 
philosophy, with Confucianism emphasising a more consensual approach to social 
control in the face of the Legalist emphasis upon a more coercive approach. The 
central concept of Confucianism was adherence to the //, which can roughly translated 
as ‘right-conduct’; it was by such adherence, rather than by force, that the virtuous 
ruler’s example should be come the basis of society’s government. According to 
Confucius society manifested a natural and inherent hierarchy, in which people were 
unequally endowed, both in terms of ability and in terms of inclination.320 
Consequently, important divisions emerged which meant that people in society could 
not be given the same roles or treated as equals. In particular, a distinction was made 
between the ‘great men’ and the ‘small men’, corresponding to the two types of work 
which individuals engaged in within society -  the mental and the physical. The ‘small 
men’ engaged in physical work: they were the farmers, the artisans and the merchants, 
concerning themselves with production of goods and services. The ‘great men’ in 
contrast, particularly the scholar-officials, focussed upon study and the acquisition of 
virtue. ‘Small men’ were expected to serve ‘great men’ who were considered to be
317 MacCormack, 1996:73-74,80,83-84. For a very interesting dimension o f  this cascading network of rights, responsibilities and 
liabilities, see Dutton, 1992.
318 See: Guangwu, ed., 1991; Ho, 1964; Hsiao, 1979; and, Schwartz, 1987: 1-10.
319 See: Shapiro, 1981.
320 Dawson, 1978: 6-8,15-17,51-53; MacCormack, 1996: xv,3,6-11,52-56,62-68.
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essential to the correct functioning of society.321 Within this wider framework of 
superiority and inferiority, social relations were structured further with reference to 
the ‘five human relationships’ arranged in order of priority as a way of more precisely 
specifying the principles underlying correct behaviour, which if observed would avoid 
conflict and enable society to function as it should. These were, first, the relationship 
between ruler and subject; secondly, that between father and son; thirdly, that between 
husband and wife; fourthly, that between elder brother and younger brother; and 
finally, that between friend and friend.322 Embodying, as already mentioned, at its 
heart an essentially consensual approach to government, the Confucian ethic placed a 
great value upon compromise wherever disputes arose. Consequently, if one felt 
wronged, it was better to suffer the wrong stoically than to cause further disturbance 
by insisting upon redress, or to reflect critically upon one’s own conduct to see if 
there was anything in one’s own behaviour that could be improved in order to remove 
the source of disturbance which was leading the other party to behave in an apparently 
inappropriate way. As such, a virtuous man did not insist upon his rights, but strove to 
settle disputes through mutual concessions which enabled each party to maintain their 
dignity and to save face.323 Indeed, the pressing of a lawsuit involved a significant 
loss of face, since it implies either that the person themselves was too obstinate or 
lacking in virtue to avoid going to court, or that he was insufficiently respected by 
other members of the community for them to make concessions and thereby avoid 
litigation. It is for this reason that a great deal of emphasis was placed upon achieving 
compromise, and upon the role of various forms of intermediary in helping to do
 324so.
In the wider context, this led to an attitude within Confucian ideology which 
considered both law and punishment to be profoundly inferior methods of social 
control particularly in comparison with a correct observance of li. The former relied 
upon the existence of the threat of external violence, whereas the latter depended upon 
the cultivation of internal self-discipline. As a result, on the Confucian view, law was 
at best a regrettable necessity and lawsuits represented a disturbance in the natural 
harmony that should exist within society. A much better way to resolve disputes was
321 MacCormack, 1996: 111-120.
322 The first three o f these were considered o f  particular importance and were referred to as the ‘three bonds’. Ibid: 8,56,73- 
74,83-84.
323 Ibid: 6-11. See esp: Shapiro, 1981: 157-161, 181.
324 Ibid. Also: Cohen, 1966: 1201.
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through moral suasion. Punishment, then, was seen as a mere supplement to moral 
discipline. Moreover, punishment without education was considered to constitute a 
form of tyranny.
The Confucianist approach contrasted with of its great rival the fa  jia  or legalist 
school. Much more coercive in its approach, according to the legalist thinking good 
government should be founded upon a strong and centralised state administration in 
which the ruler governed by strict rules and heavy punishment applied equally to all 
ranks.325 Virtuous example, lauded by the Confucianists, was considered to be 
completely without use by the legalists. It was this legalist approach which found 
general employment during the Third century B.C in the state of Chin both before and 
after it achieved the unification through conquest of all China. Amongst other things, 
the Chin dynasty compiled a code of punishment,326 divided the country into districts 
administered by local magistrates and imposed collective responsibility for crimes,327 
with families grouped into units of ten under a head responsible for the conduct of all 
those individuals within his jurisdiction.328
Despite the great power this form of government afforded to the Chin in terms of 
military expansion, once that expansion had ended it proved in the longer term to be 
altogether too harsh a basis upon which to construct an enduring political 
settlement.329 In consequence, it was not long before the Chin found itself deposed by 
the Han dynasty which determined to re-establish a Confucian based approach to 
government, beginning a period in which it was entrenched as the essential state 
orthodoxy which was to last right up until the revolution of 1911.33° Whilst 
Confucianism returned to a place of central importance in imperial governmental 
thinking, however, the influence of the legalist did not altogether disappear. Instead, 
the Han rulers produced a sort of syncretic mix of Confucianist and legalist thinking 
which meant that both traditions found some expression in subsequent Chinese legal 
operations.331 In particular, legalist institutions such as the publication and re-
125 Dawson, 1978: 12; MacCormack, 1996:4-6,21,52-53,190-192,195-196.
326 MacCormack, 1996:211-212.
327 Hulsewe, 1987; Liu, 1993; and, MacCormack, 1990.
328 Dutton, 1992; and, Hsiao, 1960.
329 Liu, 1993; and, MacCormack, 1990.
330 See generally: Bodde & Morris, 1967; Dawson, 1978; de Groot, 1894; Fung, 1948.
331 MacCormack, 1996: 62-68,192-193,198. See also: Hulswe, 1987.
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publication of legal codes, the penal emphasis of the legal system, and the 
practice of dividing the empire into counties presided over by imperially appointed 
magistrates,334 continued to be of enduring significance alongside the distinctively 
Confucian practices of recognising in law differing status groups and their special 
entitlements,335 the characterisation of criminal acts according the hierarchy implied 
in the five human relationships, and the process of selecting administrative officials 
on the basis of successful performance in imperial examinations the substance of 
which tested examinees familiarity with the Confucian classics.337
c. The Impact of European Expansion
i. Treaty-Ports and Reaction
By the late nineteenth century traditional values and structures in China were facing 
powerful challenge. The emergence of an internal commodity economy and rebellious 
unrest mixed together with powerful foreign military, political and ideological 
pressures to result in the armed extraction of a series of humiliating colonial
' I ' l Q
concessions. The Treaty of Nanjing (1942), which ended the first Opium War, set 
the standard for the subsequent ‘unequal treaties’, and was followed in 1844 by a 
treaty with the United States that, in addition to securing trading privileges, 
established the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This meant that foreign 
nationals residing in China would be governed by the laws of their native countries.
As such, a foothold was established in China for the legal systems, not just of the 
United Kingdom, but also of France, Russia, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Belgium 
and eventually Japan also. In addition to the self-questioning that these humiliating 
concessions, together with the enormous unrest manifested in the Taiping rebellion, 
caused among the traditional Chinese Confucian elites, they also provided a powerful 
and permanent conduit through which western jurisprudential ideas could enter China. 
Moreover, even in the initial ‘conservative’ response to these challenges embodied in 
the Tonghzhi Restoration, the Imperial bureaucracy under Prince Kung was forced to
332 MacCormack, 1996: 211-212.
333 MacCormack, 1990: 91-95,138-143; Shapiro, 1981: 165-166.
334 Dawson, 1978: 6; and, Watt, 1972.
335 MacCormack, 1996: 48-50.
336 Ibid: 13,48-50,54-56; Guangwu, ed., 1991; and, Schwartz, 1987.
337 Myasaki, 1976.
338 For a useful summary see the relevant chapters of: Chen, 1999. More specifically, see, Fairbank, 1978.
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engage in unprecedented institutional innovation with the establishment of a nascent 
department for foreign affairs in the guise of the Tsungli Yamen (1861) to supplement 
to the work of the Six Boards. Eventually, with the ultimate failure of this attempted 
restoration, the further devastating humiliation of the Sino Japanese War in 1895 and 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and the debacle surrounding the ‘Hundred Days Reform’, 
the palace coup and the Boxer Rebellion, more extensive reform became inevitable. 
Indeed, the failure of the Boxer Rebellion finally caused the Empress Dowager to 
issue an edict calling for suggestions from high officials as to the revision of China’s 
laws along western lines and ordered ambassadors residing abroad to examine and 
report upon the laws in the jurisdictions to which they were accredited.339 In May 
1902 two senior officials were ordered to re-edit all the laws then in force to bring 
them into line with international commercial obligations,340 and in May 1904 a Law 
Codification Commission was appointed.341 The establishment of this commission 
marked a serious and significant institutional commitment to long-term legal 
transformation and it soon initiated a comprehensive two-stage programme of reform. 
During the first of these stages it swiftly revised the old law to respond to western 
criticism. During the second, codes were drafted to provide the basis for entirely new 
systems of judicature, criminal justice, criminal and civil procedure and economic 
law.342
At the same time, an equally important process of constitutional reform was begun 
with the dispatch of a separate commission to 1905 to Japan, Europe and the United 
States to study the operation of their various constitutional arrangements.343 Upon its 
return in 1906 it recommended that the Japanese model be adopted, and an imperial 
decree was issued ordering high officials to ready themselves for constitutional 
government.344 The choice of Japan as a model for these reforms was no accident. In 
view of Japan’s success in reversing extra-territoriality and asserting herself as an 
industrial power, numerous young Chinese scholars had long since travelled to her 
shores to study the implementation of her legal codes, many of which had been 
rendered into Chinese. This provided a ready made pool of experience and material
339 Cameron, 1963:57-58.
340 Meijer, 1967: 10.
341 Cheng, 1948: 179.
342 Chen, 1999: 20. Also: Meijer, 1967: 14-15.
343 Woodhead, ed., 1926:615.
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upon which those in charge of China’s reform process could easily draw.345 More 
importantly, Japan’s laws were themselves modelled on those of continental Europe, 
offering an example of European jurisprudence already successfully transplanted to 
the orient and showing very clearly that, of the two great European legal traditions, 
that of the Roman civil law, with its emphasis upon the authority of the state and of 
the family, was much the better suited to East Asian conditions.346 Thus armed with a 
body of precedents tried and tested in contexts, historically, ideologically and 
linguistically similar to China’s own, a Committee for Investigating and Drawing up 
Regulations of Constitutional Government was established in 1907.347 By the time of 
the revolution in 1911, it had promulgated a series of edicts and constitutional 
documents covering a wide variety of subjects.348
ii. The Nationalist Legal System
With that revolution and the establishment of the Republic, existing laws were 
allowed to continue in force insofar as they were not modified by new legislation or 
found to be in conflict with the principles of the Republic.349 The Provisional Code of 
1912 abolished torture, ended collective responsibility for crimes of family members 
and removed the principle of crime by analogy, and there was a sustained effort to 
intensify the reform programmes initiated under the Qing. These continued during the 
vicissitudes of the early Republic, and were greatly accelerated after the establishment 
of the Nanking government in 1927. Accordingly, “an extensive programme of 
legislation by the KMT government was carried out, in which draft codes prepared 
during the Qing reform were re-examined, revised and in some cases promulgated 
after re-evaluation in accordance with KMT guiding ideologies.”350 This ultimately 
resulted in the famous “Six Codes” of the Republic and the elaboration of an entirely 
new judicial system based ostensibly upon the European continental model.
Importantly, though there were continuities between late Qing and Republican 
programmes of law reform, KMT ideology made a number of distinctive
345 Hao, 1997, quoted in Chen, 1999: 21.
346 Cheung, 1948: 285; and, Ping-Shueng, 1930.
347 Meijer, 1967:40-41.
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contributions.351 This ideology was summed up in the San Min Zhu Yi of Sun Yat Sen 
-  the “Three Principles of the People” -  Nationalism, Democracy and People’s 
livelihood. Nationalism was the principle of recasting “China into a unified state 
internally and a strong country.. .externally; Democracy was the practice of western 
democratic ideas within a Chinese context; and people’s livelihood was the 
establishment of a welfare system.. .and an improvement in the livelihood of the 
masses.. .by means of equalisation of land ownership and control of capital.”352 These 
principles, both authoritarian and instrumentalist in nature, were based upon a clearly 
hierarchical conception of mankind which Sun divided into those to guide, those to 
follow and those to be guided.353 In place of the traditional Chinese focus upon family 
and clan and the western emphasis upon the rights and freedoms of the individual,
San Min Zhu I  legislation assigned central importance to the interests of the Nation as 
a whole. Thus though it attempted to breakdown the traditional family system by 
instituting equality of the sexes, freedom of marriage and spousal property, it did not 
allow these newly guaranteed freedoms to challenge the integrity of the state which 
always enjoyed absolute precedence.354 Instead, in providing for tight party control of 
the legislative process through its Central Political Council and Central Executive 
Committee, San Min Chu I  ideology laid down a marker for subsequent legal 
developments by ensuring highly centralised ideological control.
iii. The Communist Legal System
1. Pre-1949
In the decades prior to the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party 
operated a considerable range of governmental, judicial and extra-judicial 
mechanisms. As with Chinese communist ideology in general, the legislative 
policies implemented during this period had two main influences. The first of these 
derived from Chinese cadres trained in Moscow and sent back to China by Stalin to 
foment Bolshevik-style urban revolution; the second stemmed from rural cadres with 
experience mobilising the peasantry in the countryside. Upon the death of Sun-Yat
351 See generally, Ibid: 24-28.
352 Sun Yat-sen, undated. See also: Chu-Yuen, ed., 1989; Escarra, 1936: 152-346; Linebarger, 1937; and, Powd, 1948.
353 Chen, 1999: 24-25.
354 Escarra, 1936: 165.
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Sen and the shift in Chinese communist activity to the countryside, these influences 
were embodied in a number of substantive legislative experiments.
The first of these experiments began in 1931 with the CPC’s adoption of the General 
Principles of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi.356 The 
Principles were subsequently augmented with laws and regulations -  the Land Law, 
Labour Law, Marriage Law and Regulations for Punishing Counterrevolutionaries — 
specifying more precisely the methods for effecting socialist transition.357 Under these 
arrangements ideologically driven socio-economic discrimination became ubiquitous. 
Red Army members, workers and peasants were granted the exclusive right to an 
education, to vote and to stand for election. Courts applied variable punishments 
depending upon class background. The rural community was sub-divided to facilitate 
a radical policy of land confiscation and redistribution. Counterrevolutionary 
suppression committees were allowed to arrest, try and execute criminals and 
administrative punishment and re-education through labour was widespread. Finally, 
the idea of ‘mass mobilisation’ or the ‘mass line’ was utilised.358
With the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 CPC policy became more moderate.
This was consequent upon the formation of the second United Front and reflected the 
Leninist approach to law which characterised it as a political tool that could be 
moulded according to the needs of the moment.359 After 1937 these needs were 
defined as being either the encouragement or the punishment of all those respectively 
who either aided or opposed the anti-Japanese struggle. As such, the Programme o f 
Administration o f the Border Regions promised to ensure respect for the democratic 
rights of all opposed to the Japanese forces. It stressed the principle of equality before 
the law and included within an expanded category of ‘the people’: landlords, rich 
peasants, capitalists and the military personnel of the Nationalists.360 Regulations 
issued during 1940-41 further protected private property rights and ceased to 
emphasise land redistribution. Moreover, although real law during this period 
continued essentially to derive from CPC issued decrees and judicial departments
356 Hazard, 1983.
357 Simons, 1983.
358 Ibid.
359 Mao Zedong, 1975:315.
360 The text o f  the Program m e  can be found in South West Institute o f Political Science and Law, ed., 1982: 8-10 quoted in Chen, 
1999: 33n.l3.
96
were often merged with and dominated by the executive, nevertheless, areas under 
CPC control theoretically became part of the Guomindang government and in some 
cases Guomindang legal codes were simply adopted wholesale for application in the 
communist areas.361
A third period began in 1946 and lasted until the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949. Victory over the Japanese forces in 1946 marked the end 
of the second United Front and a return to the bitter fighting between the communists 
and nationalists which saw each more determined than ever to take control of the 
nation. As such, the Constitutional Principles o f the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area of 
1946, the third constitutional document issued by the Communist Party, reflected a 
clear return to soviet style government, with a renewed emphasis upon violence, terror 
and class discrimination in the implementation of Party policy and the widespread 
proliferation of torture and on the spot executions.362
2. Post-1949
Upon the establishment of the PRC in October, 1949, the first step taken by the CPC 
in extending socialist legality across China was to dismantle the pre-existing legal 
system of the Guomindang, In contrast to the arrangements put in place by the 
Guomindang itself after the fall of the Qing in 1911, the revolutionary thrust of CPC 
ideology made the continuation of the nationalist legal machinery both theoretically 
problematic and practically inexpedient. Accordingly, ‘The Instruction on the 
Abolition of the Collection of the Six Laws of the Guomindang’ and the 
‘Confirmation of the Judicial Principles of the Liberated Areas’363 issued by the 
Central Committee of the CPC in February, 1949, declared the abolition of all 
existing laws of the Guomindang regime. This action was confirmed in the Common 
Programme o f the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in September, 
1949, a document, jointly produced by the CPC and the ‘democratic parties’, which 
served as a provisional constitution until 1954.
361 Ibid: 34.
362 Zhong, ed,, 1982.
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Between the years 1949 and 1953, the urgency to fill out, in all but the most general 
of terms, the legal vacuum left by these acts of abolition was little felt by the 
Communist leadership. Instead, the period was regarded as a time for the 
consolidation of newly gained power, and one which would benefit from a certain 
amount of juridical flux.364 Such institutional uncertainty, it was felt, would aid in 
rooting out class enemies and in effecting the ‘transition from New Democracy to 
Socialism’. To this end, it was also a period characterised by numerous mass 
campaigns. These campaigns, which included the Land Reform Movement (1949-51), 
the Movement to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries (1950), the Movements against 
the Three and against the Five Evils (1952), and the Judicial Reform Movement 
(1952-53) were each initiated by the top Party leadership to stir ‘the masses’ into 
giving effect to policies designed to break down the old social order and to reconstruct 
society in the image of the revolution.365 For the same reason, ad hoc ‘people’s 
tribunals’ were set up to conduct ‘mass trials’ across the country with the power 
physically to mistreat defendants and to sentence them to death with the minimum of 
procedural safeguards.366 Whilst a number of these movements did gradually come to 
be given formal legal expression prior to 1953, this remained of an essentially 
programmatic and provisional nature, with the correct application of legal rules being 
a priority clearly subordinate to the implementation of wider policy objectives.
Not until the end of 1952 did the Party begin indicating that this period of power 
consolidation was drawing to a close and that it was soon to be replaced by one of 
full-scale economic construction. The latter policy was initially adopted in 1953 along 
with the First Five Year Plan and was then incorporated into the first full Constitution 
of the PRC in the following year.367 It was accompanied by official recognition of 
China’s need to establish a proper socialist legal system and of the inadequacy of pre- 
1949 CPC legal experience as a model for doing so.368
Along with the 1954 Constitution, Organic Laws for the People’s Courts, the People’s 
Procuratorates, the National People’s Congress, the State Council and the institutions 
of local government had also been adopted, as had Regulations on Arrest and
364 Chen, 1999: 36.
365 Brady, 1982; Brugger, 1981: 50-88.
366 Chen, 1998:24-25.
367 Mao Zedong, 1982: 407, quoted in Chen, 1999: 37.
368 Chen, 1999: 38.
98
Detention. And together with the passage of a number of other interim laws, 
regulations and decrees, the following three years saw the initiation of an extensive 
drafting program to prepare the major codes needed to form the backbone of an 
entirely revamped legal system.369
This effort was abruptly ended with the inception of the Anti-Rightist Movement in 
1957. Hundreds of thousands of people were designated as ‘rightists’ and sent for ‘re­
education through labour’, in a process that admitted neither of formal court 
procedure nor subsequent right of appeal.370 Amongst those acted against were 
thousands of jurists, lawyers and judges who were accused of using the law to oppose 
the Party by stressing the independent administration of justice. The prestige of legal 
institutions consequently fell sharply after 1957 and many lower level courts were 
merged with their corresponding public security organs and procuratorates. In 1959 
the Ministry of Justice was itself abolished, and the formal trial system virtually came 
to an end.
There was a change of policy direction again in the early 1960s after the debacle of 
the Great Leap Forward. In February, 1962 the Central Committee explicitly 
recognised the need for the development of a commodity economy, and work was 
once again begun on the drafting of basic legal codes in areas of the criminal and civil
'X'J 1law. This renewed program was, however, destined to last for only a short period. 
First, it was partially suspended during the Four Clean Ups or Socialist Education 
Movement of 1963-65,372 and then it was completely and comprehensively reversed 
during the decade long Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, during which time the entire 
legal system was specifically targeted as a bourgeois construct and virtually 
destroyed. Indeed, such was the extent of the breakdown in normal legal functioning 
that the only real source of authoritative guidance came to be the day to day 
pronouncements of Mao and his closest circle of advisors.373
369 Ibid: 39.
370 Brugger, 1981: 174-206. See also Suinian & Qingan, eds., 1986.
371 Hazard, 1975.
372 Brugger, 1981:21-42.
373 Tay, 1976:417-423.
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3. Post- Mao
Indications that the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution had begun to pass came 
with the adoption of a new Constitution in 1975. Though this Constitution was much 
more programmatic and abbreviated than its 1954 predecessor, given thee almost 
complete breakdown in law and order which had immediately preceded it, the fact that 
it was promulgated at all was significant of a least some intention to return to the 
barest minimum of legality. Nevertheless, the radicals’ hold on power was not 
conclusively broken until after the death of Mao in September, 1976. In the following 
month the notorious ‘Gang of Four’, led by Mao’s wife -  Jiang Qing —, were arrested 
and a process of fundamental policy change begun. Thus, at the first session of the 
Fifth National People’s Congress, CPC Chairman, Hua Goufeng, and NPC Standing 
Committee Chairman, Ye Jianying, both spoke of the need to strengthen the socialist 
legal system. And in the preparatory meeting of the December, 1978 Third Plenum of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC, which marked the replacement of Hua 
Guofeng by Deng Xiaoping as paramount leader and the decisive victory of the 
pragmatists. Thus, the final communique of the Third Plenum declared that since, in 
the words of Albert Chen, “the exploiting class in China had basically been 
eliminated, class contradiction was no longer the dominant contradiction in Chinese 
society; that economic construction instead of class struggle was now to be 
emphasised...; that the past practice of mass political campaigns was to be 
abandoned; and that socialist democracy and a socialist legal system ought to be 
developed.”374
This then, marked a new and enduring departure in CPC policy towards law and the 
legal system, one intimately linked to the need to revive China’s sagging economic 
fortunes and Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of gradually re-engaging the world economy. 
As will be seen more clearly in the following chapter, this policy has become more 
and more explicit as the reform period has progressed and as this has happened so 
legal reforms have grown at an astonishing pace. In particular, the sheer volume of 
new legislation on all manner of issues has expanded exponentially. This is just the 
most obvious sign of China’s concerted effort to rebuild its legal system and to fit it
374 Chen, 1998:33-34. See, Communique o f  the Third P len ary Session o f  the Eleventh Central Com m ittee o f  the Chinese 
Com m unist P arty  o f  China. See also, Resolution on Questions o f  P arty  H istory Since the E stablishm ent o f  the PRC. adopted at 
the Sixth Plenary Session o f the Eleventh Central Committee o f  the CPC in 1981.
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out in the service of an increasingly pervasive market economy. However, as reform 
has unfolded, these legislative initiatives have had to be joined by fundamental 
attitudinal changes within the every level of the Chinese Party-state and indeed of 
Chinese society more generally. Much the most severe difficulties encountered by the 
reforming elites have been in trying to effect these attitudinal changes in practice, and 
the struggle to do so has formed the substance and drama of contemporary Chinese 
politics.
2. India
a. Pre-agrarian
As with the earliest signs of Chinese normative social ordering, the evidence from the 
from pre-neolithic South Asian communities is extremely patchy. Once more, all that 
can be attempted is to try to detect the seeds of the fundamental, largely religious, 
principles and postulates that take on obvious co-ordinative importance only much 
later in the historical record. To this end, there are a number of very tentative signs 
very early on which point to some of the constants in South Asian society. Once more 
these are largely religious in nature and range from indications in the form of 
figurines of an early attachment to some form of mother goddess, to humped bull and 
stone phalluses which carry distant echoes of Shiva worship.
b. The Traditional System
i. Hindu Law
Although the rich body of sanskritic literature dating from Vedic times furnishes little 
in the way of detailed anthropological description, it does offer a unique insight into 
the mindset of pre-classical Aryan culture and, as part of that, into the precepts which 
informed attitudes to interpersonal disputes and their resolution. In particular, it offers 
insight into contemporary views about the individual’s place in the universe, 
emphasising time and again what came to be the fundamental Hindu 
conceptualisation of social life, namely, the relationship between macrocosmic order
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“  rita -  and microcosmic order -  dharma?15 In this way, the Vedas, as sacrificial 
hymns which invoked a pantheon of Vedic gods, rather than laying down rules or 
codes of law to be followed, expressed in grand mythological terms the overall world 
view of Aryan society. At the heart of this world view was the idea that the universe 
constituted an ordered and symbiotic whole in which every component part, including 
every conscious being, had a determinate role to play. In the concrete life of human 
society failures to harmonise with this whole led to a constant struggle, both 
individually and collectively, to repair ruptures in the universal order by developing 
greater adherence to the path of duty as a way of bringing individual expectations into 
greater conformity with concern for the common good. Thus, “Hindu law is from the 
start based on a continuous complex dialectic process.” 376At the heart of this process 
was an understanding of the notion of rita which represented cosmic order or truth 
which emerged form hidden or uncreated origins and which was given expression 
through the regularities of nature. The invisible mechanisms maintaining this order 
involved both gods and men alike and it was through this idea that solemn sacrifices 
were originally elaborated to ensure the benign nature of the divine influences 
believed to be so essential to social flourishing in the context of a profoundly 
interlinked universal whole.
Although it seems that only a certain portion of the community (the Brahmin priests) 
took an active part in these sacrificial rituals, it appears that they were meant to 
represent particular sections of mankind.377 Eventually, these rituals came to involve 
more or less powerful rulers but the continuing fragmentation of the subcontinent 
prevented these ‘kings’ as a class from becoming important regulators of religious
* O 'TO t
ritual. In terms of the regulation of Vedic society there is little evidence of rules 
being imposed by a sovereign. Instead, law seems to have developed more or less 
informally from the bottom up and consequently manifested a great deal of local 
diversity and specificity, and this diversity persisted despite the fact of an overall bias 
towards the principles of patriarchy and in some instances matriarchy. The diverse 
origins of Vedic social organization were manifest in the variegated nature of the 
Vedic literature itself, designated as sruti “what was heard” and therefore seen as
375 Miller, 1985. See also: Day, T., 1982.
376 Menski, 1997: 7.
377 Ibid.
378 Kosambi, 1992.
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divinely revealed knowledge, nonetheless emerged from an unknown number of 
ancient sages rather than one identifiable source.379 It is clear that Vedic 
understanding of ordering gave less importance to the individual than to non-human 
or super-human elements, and that the Vedas as sacrificial manuals were primarily 
premised upon the idea of meticulously performed rituals yielding desired cosmic
o on
results. Quite soon however it appears that many of these rituals fell into disuse as 
it became clear that reliance upon sacrifice alone was inadequate. Consequently, it is 
possible to discern a gradual shift to greater emphasis upon the actions of the 
individual and the concomitant development of a system of norms reinforcing their 
importance. This shift from ritual action to good action emphasized increasingly the 
importance of appropriate action or behaviour, with dharma or the individual’s duty 
requiring the correct disposition in each situation. Thus whilst “the basic concept of 
interrelatedness between man and universe remained [the core element] in 
Hinduism...[it becomes elaborated].”381 This is manifested in the gradual emergence 
of appropriate mechanisms for marriage solemnisation etc. In this way, family 
relationships increasingly became the principle arena in which the dharma was 
cultivated.
Building upon the conceptual foundations of the Vedic period, new classes of Hindu 
literature began to emerge between about 800 BC and 200 AD. The mass of originally 
oral literature had neither fixed dates nor identified authors, but from about 500 BC it 
came to be consolidated into identifiable texts. Indeed, the huge body of literature 
elaborated in this period by the small, literate, Brahminical elite became so diverse 
that specialization became inevitable and individual texts came to further consolidated 
or grouped into combinations such as the dharmasustras, dharmasastras, and 
grihyasutras, each of offering guidance on specific areas of life and behaviour.382 
Overall, this body of knowledge referred to as smriti or ‘remembered truth’, whilst 
possessing great authority, was nevertheless somewhat ill-defined. At its heart lay the 
central concept of dharma “what is conducive to ordering”, “appropriateness”.
Dharma refers to the obligation of every individual to act correctly in each given 
circumstance. Thus it is both universalist in its conception but also highly sensitive to
379 Derrett, 1979: 21-36 and 1966: 67-74.
380 Kane, 1968: 1269;Menski, 1997:9.
381 Menski, 1997: 9.
382 Menski, 1984. See also: Derrett, 1968; and, Pandey, 1969.
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specific contexts. In the past understanding of dharma which is an extremely complex 
concept has tended to be distorted by an over-emphasis on notions such as ahisma or 
non-violence when in fact it only truthfully proscribes unjustified violence. To really 
understand the concept of dharma one has to understand its origins in the larger 
concept of rita which falls during this period into disuse as a somewhat technical 
term.
Dharma, which came during this period to refer to the eternal order of the universe 
comprising all levels of existence from the largest to smallest, ensconced in this 
context all human activity, including inaction, which came to have the most 
significant consequences. It was during this period also that the notion of karma that 
is “retribution as a result of action” emerged alongside dharma to form “a complex 
system of moral demands and retributional threats and promises.”383 From these 
linked tenets, the science of dharmasastra developed, defining the other principal 
objectives of human living: worldly possessions (<artha), sensual gratification (kama) 
and ultimately salvation (m oha). These more specialised dharmas included 
stridharma, or women’s duty, and varnasranadharma, an all encompassing notion 
with application to the effect that “each individual’s caste status and their stage of life 
have a bearing on dharma.”384
As with the Vedic records of the sruti, smriti texts did not elaborate detailed legal 
provisions, instead they proposed ideal models and thus served a function quite 
different from that of straight-forward legal textbooks, but a function which is 
nonetheless of great importance for an understanding of classical Hindu law 
concepts.385 A few of these smriti texts concerned themselves with the position of the 
Hindu ruler, which indicates a significant conceptual shift towards the end of this 
period, away from an emphasis on the individual’s self-control toward the idea that 
self-control needed, in the reality of day to day living, to be supplemented by 
punishment in order for dharma to preserved at the societal level.386 Consequently, 
whilst an individual Hindu continues to bear the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of dharma, its transgression remaining a sin which requires personal
383 Lingat, 1973; Menski, 1997: 13-14
384 Ibid.
385 Hoadley & Hooker, 1981; Lariverie, 1993. Also, Derrett,1968: 148ff.
386 See generally: Day, 1982; and, Menski, 1992.
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penance and attracts post-mortal consequences, at the same time some violations of 
dharma also turn into a variety of crime attracting punishment inflicted by his ruler or 
representative who now grows in prominence as the guardian of dharma. This arose 
in what came to be known as rajadharma which represents according to some the 
development of just another specialised branch of the science of duties, but on 
reflection its particular significance lies in the cognate emergence of functionally 
distinct state apparatus. According to the smriti texts the ideal Hindu ruler fulfils the 
function and takes on the characteristics of varum, the divine Vedic version of n’ta.387 
(And although the epic sanscritic and pancritic literature provides much evidence of 
the increasing involvement of rulers and their judicial functionaries in litigation 
situations and of the rajadhama’s emergence as an important subject in its own right, 
the ruler’s main role continues to be not to enforce his own purely man-made positive 
law but enable each individual to follow their own dharma. In this way “the Hindu 
rule acts as a justice facilitator, not the creator of legal rules.” “He makes no law, he 
administers what his people see to be their law, seeking to ensure thereby that 
morality is not disregarded and that individual perceptions of law remain within the 
overriding ambit of dharma in its macro and micro cosmic dimensions.”388 Thus it is 
clear that the rule became an important arbiter in cases of competing claims and thus 
helped contribute to the development of more formal litigation practices, A great deal 
of evidence exists to show that local notions of ‘appropriateness’ and customary 
norms continued to remain the major source of law in day to day practice.389 The rules 
foimd in the sastric literature apply, insofar as they did to particular cases, not as 
binding legal prescriptions, but rather as rules of guidance in no way gainsaying the 
need to take account of the particular situational context in question.390 Thus although 
during this period we begin to see, within the overall theoretical context of pre­
existing universal order, a gradual shift of emphasis towards the greater external 
supervision of dispute settlements, the emphasis upon individual conscience and self- 
determination continues to remain dominant.391 As such, despite indications to the 
contrary in certain written materials such as the Manusmriti, the primary source 
during this period remained that of sadacara or ‘model behaviour’ which derives 
from the process by which an individual internalises those standards considered to be
387 Manusmriti 9.245.in Buhler, 1975.
388 Menski, 1997: 16.
389 Nikam & Keown, 1962.
390 Derrett, 1968: 156-157.
391 Derrett, 1979: 32-37.
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right and proper within the local group within which they lives.392 The fact that justice 
nyaya or yukti is sought from the situational context rather than through the 
application of more abstract rules clearly created a situation in which custom and 
smriti came into conflict.
Custom was put under pressure to conform to the ideals of good behaviour laid down 
in smriti texts, yet at the same time there was a strong counter-pressure to maintain 
differential statuses and different dharmas from within the classical customary 
context. Thus, it remained the fact that it was only in the last resort, when no other 
guidance was possible, that a classical Hindu would look to the scriptural sources: the 
smriti first and then the sruti. The continuing primacy of sadacara and localised
self-regulation is apparent even in the more coercive developments of classical Hindu 
law. Ideally, of course, the idea of dharma was that everybody should monitors 
themselves and adjust their inner inclinations in harmony with the wider cosmic 
order. The limitations of human selfishness, however, meant that there was increasing 
evidence of external forces such as danda, the ruler’s power to punish being used to 
supplement self-regulation with a measure of supervision to help strengthen and 
support individual and local self-governing processes in a manner very similar to that 
developed in the early part of the Chinese empire. Importantly, even here, however, 
though the temptation to lay down fixed rules would no doubt have increased 
significantly, even these coercive state interventions remained of an essentially 
supplementary nature: a fact reinforced by the absence of a strong political centre for 
most of Indian history. The ruler’s function thus remained throughout, limited to 
ensuring that, “the equilibrium of relativities was not unduly tilted in favour of the 
more powerful.”394
From about 200 AD to 1100 AD, there is a gradual shift towards increasingly tightly 
supervised self-control, and towards the assumption that formal litigational processes 
yyavahara are necessary as means to uphold order, with the increasing involvement of 
the agents of the formal law that this involved. It was, of course, largely a question of
393 The Mimamsa school o f Hindu philosophy did attempt to develop a theory that the Vedic texts were binding law. However, 
this school never gained the upper hand owing to the continuing awareness o f the practical demands o f  real life. Derrett, 1979: 
32-37.
394 This was visualised in the image of the ‘rule o f the fish’ matsya-nyaya, where the big fish devour all o f the small fish, which is 
ultimately not even to the benefit o f the big fish. Menski, 1997: 23, See also, Derrett, 1968: 148ff; and, Jolly, 1977.
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a change in degree and individual reliance upon situation specific self-control 
remained pervasive. As an expression of this transformation, it is possible to see the 
development in later smriti texts, such as the Narada, the Brihaspati and the 
Katyayana, of earlier classical concepts and the variety of sources.395 Numerous 
debates within this period illustrate this gradual undermining of the mechanisms of 
self-control in favour of more formalised intervention in the resolution of disputes. 
First, there is the development of the theory of the progressive deterioration of 
standards within society, declaring older and now unacceptable practices as 
Kalivariya; that is, prohibited in the currently immoral and corrupted era of human 
existence, the Kaliyuga. This enabled older texts to be updated and used as guiding 
models in new settings. Similarly, there emerged a distinction between vidhi, or 
binding injunction, and arthavada, or a descriptive account of how a problem may be 
solved, which enabled the authors of new smriti material to develop rules according to 
their own priorities as a way of reducing the gap between theory and practice. 
Moreover, unlike earlier smriti texts which were largely anonymous, these 
commentaries came to be associated with particular authors.
Increasingly, rulers appear to have been called upon to punish criminals and settle 
disputes, though they were unlikely to have “come to know of most disputes unless 
they affected [their]... rule, or occurred in the [their] .. .capital, where access to the 
ruler’s court was less difficult.”396 In this context, the textual material reflects an 
increasing concern with formal processes in the administration of justice. Thus, as 
already mentioned, alongside the ruler’s role as maintainer of dharma and utiliser of 
danda, there was an increased perception of the need for formal litigation or 
yyavahara along with the involvement of the state that it necessarily presupposed.397 
Clearly, then, these texts reflect the strengthening role of feudal rulers as 
administrators of justice and experts in the sastra were increasingly being employed 
as legal advisors and judges. Moreover, as this emphasis upon formal dispute 
settlement as a supplement to community based self-control so a distinctive body of 
procedural rules began also to emerge, the texts coming to elaborate four stages of 
plaint, answer, examination of evidence and judgment. This was accompanied by the
395 These included: new independent works,, commentaries upon older ones, dramas, epic tales, and from the 7lh century onwards 
travellers’ reports and other historical records. See: Kane, 1968; and, Lingat, 1973:107ff.
396 Menski, 1997:25.
397 Ibid: 26.
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increasing sub-division of texts under distinctive subject titles as a way of making as a 
way of making their formal utilisation practicable. It was around this time also that a 
more structured hierarchy of the sources of law was elaborated.398
ii. Islamic Law
With the fragmentation of medieval India and the emergence of a unified central state 
under Muslim rule, Hindu law continued to operate at the level of the rural village and 
immediately above. Whilst the new Islamic rulers upheld the ostensible authority of 
Islamic law for themselves and their courts, the implementation of the sharia rarely 
extended beyond the precincts of the major cities where most of their Muslim subjects 
lived. Very quickly these rulers satisfied themselves with applying a more secular 
approach to the majority Hindu population, being chiefly concerned with the 
collection taxes and the administration of the criminal law, and being prepared, even 
in these areas, to allow Hindu chiefs and rulers to remain in place administering local 
justice so long as they paid the appropriate tribute. Accordingly, both Hindu 
customary law and the compilation of Hindu texts continued to develop under Islamic 
rule very much as before. In particular, well-trained pandits exercised an increasing 
monopoly of knowledge over the ancient s as trie texts and of the power which accrued 
through their authentic interpretation. In rural India, village Brahmins or 
“neighbourhood pandits” acting as self-appointed advisers on dharma and smriti 
became increasingly common, having the effect of insinuating sastric notions in a 
manner much akin to a sort of communal form of sadacara.
Though it is important to qualify the influence and reach of Muslim law at this time, it 
nevertheless remains true that it became not only the official law of the land but also 
the second most important personal law, applying Sunni Hanafi jurisprudence to some 
of the most intimate dealings of the rapidly expanding Muslim population. At the 
same time, it is also important to realise that the Islamic law operative prior to the 
coming of the Raj was far from being ‘pure’ sharia, incorporating as it did in many 
parts of India a significant amount of pre-Islamic customary law.399 This was the case, 
for example, with, amongst others, the south Indain Moplas, with the Khojas and with
398 Derrett, 1968: 183.
399 Hai, 1973: 77; Mahmood, 1986: 49-94; and Pearl, 1979: 21.
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the Mamas, all of which communities applied variants of Hindu based property and 
succession law. Moreover, given the traditional reluctance to approach the official 
court system and the somewhat sporadic nature of the pronouncements delivered by 
the qadis/magistrates, official Islamic law took time properly to ‘bed-down’. Indeed, 
even when two authoritative juristic texts — the Hidaya and the Fatwa-i-Alamgiri ~ 
did receive a degree of official recognition they were used, somewhat like the Hindu 
sastric sources, more as sets of persuasive guidelines than as strictly binding legal 
rules.400
Eventually, with the decline in authority of the Muslim rulers in Delhi, so the 
application of Islamic law became increasingly the province of local landholding 
elites such as the Zamindari who came more and more to exercise authority in their 
particular localities. The law that these elites applied in practice also increasingly 
recognised the differential statuses of litigants in violation of the basic principle of 
equality which theoretically lay at the heart of Islamic jurisprudence.401
c. The Colonial System
With the coming of the British to India a new phase of formal legal construction 
began. Initially, this concentrated upon the development of mechanisms for the 
adjudication of civil and criminal matters arising between members of the colonial 
staff who were unwilling to submit themselves to the subcontinent’s pre-existing legal 
systems.402 Soon, however, attempts were made to extend these mechanisms to cover 
relations between colonial staff members and their Indian subjects. To this end, and 
after about 1600, a number of Royal Charters were issued conferring power on the 
British East India Company to establish courts within the territories it had come to 
exercise control over and, after a period of some uncertainty, it was required to begin 
the creation of an entirely new legal system “to enact laws ‘consonant to reason and 
not repugnant or contrary to’ and ‘as near as may be agreeable to English law.’”403
400 Pearl, 1979: 22. See Also: Fisch, 1983.
401 Banerjee, 1962: 133ff.
401 Banetjee, 1984: 1-27.
403 Pearl, 1979: 23.
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This continued to be the official approach with the creation by charter in 1726 of the 
Mayors Courts in the presidency towns of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta.404
In due course, however, practical experience across India demonstrated that the 
application of English law without modification was entirely unsuitable to local 
conditions. In consequence, custom and customary authorities gradually received an 
increasing degree of recognition such that it is possible to here perceive the beginning 
of the co-existence of English and Indian law, at least in the regulation of intimate 
inter-personal relations.405 As time went on calls for restrictions in the application of 
English law grew increasingly loud, particularly after the East India Company 
obtained the Diwani rights over parts of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1765. Finally, in 
1772, the Governor of Bengal, Warren Hastings, issued his famous regulation in 
recognition of the need to develop more suitable juridical protocols.
Not only did this declaration signal a final acceptance of the fact that English law 
would not extend to all areas of Indian life and that a series of so called ‘listed 
subjects’ would remain as the exclusive domain of the existing personal laws, it also 
signalled that the imperial power intended to extend its control over public law 
matters, according a particular priority to its administration of the criminal law. The 
great landmark in the development of this approach was the adoption in 1793 of the 
Cornwallis Code, which brought with it a number of innovations and operated in 
effect as a general code of laws and regulations 406 From the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, and influenced by the powerful utilitarian streak in British legal 
theory at the time, codification became an increasingly popular mechanism for the 
administration of justice. Thus an Indian Law Commission, which first began work in 
1835, was instituted and tasked under the leadership of Thomas Babbington Macaulay 
with the preparation of a Draft Penal Code, followed shortly thereafter by a Draft 
Code o f Civil Procedure and Draft Law o f Limitations 407 The major purpose of this 
process of codification was, of course, to achieve greater uniformity and certainty 
than was to be had from the mass of existing laws which hitherto had operated in the
404 Banerjee, 1984: 11.
405 Ibid: 9.
406 Jain, 1981: 137ff.
407 Ibid: 137ff., 41 Iff.
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subcontinent.408 For the sake of expediency, the new codes took as their model the 
relevant law then extant in England, though they also drew, where appropriate, upon 
codified law utilised in other parts of the western world.409
For various reasons Macaulay’s draft Penal Code provoke considerable opposition 
among the British in India leading to its substantial revision and a delay in its 
introduction as the Indian Penal Code, 1860 until 1862.410 In contrast, there seems to 
have been little effective opposition to its introduction from the native Indian 
population, though it is doubtful quite how widely it was known of, let alone resorted 
to, by the wider population. Whatever the case, after 1860 the process of codification 
expanded rapidly and, in derogation of Warren Hastings’ Declaration of 1772, it 
increasingly encroached upon the area of ‘listed subjects’ also. Despite considerable 
criticism about the speed and volume of Indian legislation, this process continued 
right up until the end of the nineteenth century when vigorous opposition to certain 
proposed amendments of the Indian Penal Code finally led to a cooling of imperial 
legislative enthusiasm. Thereafter, the imperial legislature interfered in Indian affair 
on only a piecemeal and sporadic basis.
i. Anglo-Hindu Law
Hastings’ 1772 scheme recognised the need for the proper regulation and 
administration of indigenous laws. In the process it raised questions both as to the role 
that the sastras should play as a source of law under British rule and as to the relative 
influence English and Hindu jurisprudential principles should play in the actual 
administration of Hindu personal law in practice. With respect to the first of these 
questions, whilst the British demonstrated a genuine concern to discover what Hindu 
law had been up to that point, this concern was conditioned by a tendency to view all 
‘proper’ law as necessarily being reducible to written form. Indeed, to this end they 
sought to appoint traditional sastric experts, -  the pandits -  who were consulted on 
legal matters in traditional Hindu society, to all levels of the official court hierarchy as 
authoritative advisers.411 Demanding specific answers to complex problems, and not
408 Banerjee, 1984: 171.
409 Ibid: 173,177,182. Also: Jain, 1981:430ff.
410 Ibid: 187. See also: Anagol-McGinn, 1992; and, Heismath, 1962.
411 Derrett, 1968: 235,268.
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appreciating the inherently provisional nature of the pandits opinions, which Hindu’s 
had previously felt free to accept or reject, what actually resulted from the system was 
a series of contradictory opinions based upon a variety of textual sources depending 
upon the particular expertise, taste and philosophical commitments of the pandit in 
question. Thus, by the time this system of advisers had been abolished in 1864, a new 
and distinctive variety of Anglo-Indian law had emerged.
The primary reason for this was not only an initial misunderstanding of the role of the 
indigenous legal experts themselves, but also of the sastric materials, the complex and 
multi-layered nature of which they failed almost entirely to appreciate. The British 
had, in fact, determined to restrict the freedom of the pandits by effecting the greater 
codification of Hindu law in a number of jurisprudential digests. The first of these -  
the Vivadarnava-setu or Vivadarnava-bhanjana — was compiled in 1775.412 Compiled 
under standard English law headings, it was intended that these would be followed by 
all court pandits, but what actually seems to have happened is that the pandits simply 
treated them as merely another source to add to their pre-existing repertoire available 
to them in reaching their decisions. A number of other attempts at codification 
followed of which Jaganatha Tarkapancanana’s Vivada-bhangarnava (‘Ocean of 
Resolution of Disputes’) is only the most well known, all of which had the effect 
merely of magnifying the initial violence done by British misunderstanding of the 
nature of the sastra and creating what Derrett saw fit to label a “hybrid 
monstrosity.”413 Indeed, the utlisation of such codified texts in the colonial court 
system meant that “parts of certain texts.. .gained a authority which they would never 
have had in the indigenous system”,414 and the development of case-law as a new 
Hindu law source,415 embodying the principle of stare decisis “went fundamentally 
against the most elementary Hindu principles of justice, where.. .consideration of the 
facts of every case was paramount.”416
With the development of the Anglo-Hindu case law, the British gradually abandoned 
their attempts to restate traditional Hindu law and, from about 1850, displayed an 
increasing willingness to interfere via statute in the ‘listed subjects’. Moreover, from
412 Ibid: 239. See also: Bhattacharyya-Panda, 1995.
413 Ibid: 298.
414 Ibid: 301; Menski, 1997:40. Also: Banetjee, 1984: 43.
415 Sarkar, 1940: 37.
416 Menski, 1997:40.
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1864 increasing reliance was placed upon the principles of ‘justice, equity and good 
conscience’ as a residual source of law which had originally been made available via 
the Administration o f Justice Regulation of the 5th July 1781 and the use of which 
implied the increasing introduction into the subcontinent of the rules of English 
law.417 Importantly, of course, this rather sporadic introduction of foreign law into the 
newly emergent official south Asian judicial system left many aspects of the 
customary law actually governing Hindu communities in practice whilst not 
untouched, then at least with a relatively discrete developmental logic of its own, such 
that it was increasingly found to be incompatible with the official legal system 418 It is 
true that the “importance of custom was recognised and administratively regulated in 
some places” and that it was “judicially fortified in the important early case of 
Mootoo Ramalinga,Al9 which enabled any Hindu, in principle, to establish that he/she 
a not governed by Anglo-Hindu law in a particular instance. In practice, however, it 
remained extremely difficult to invoke customary norms in the Anglo-Indian courts.
ii. Anglo-Mohammedan Law
Turning to the development of Islamic law under British rule, it is clear that starting 
from a position of relative strength as the legal system of the then ruling classes, it 
suffered a significant loss of status.420 Under the 1772 scheme, Islamic law, like 
Hindu law, was to apply only to the ‘listed subjects’ which related primarily to the 
inter-personal relations of the Muslim community. Initially characterised as the Taws 
of the Koran’, in 1793 the wording of the scheme was changed to read ‘Mohammedan 
law’ and this reflected an increased appreciation of the real complexity of Islamic law 
and its sources, which were now recognised to include no only the Qu’ran, but also 
the Sunna, the ijma and the qiyas. Moreover, already under the Mughal emperor 
Aurangzeb a digest of mainly Hanafi statements of the law -  the Fatwa-i-Alagiri -  
had been commissioned by as an aid to the administration of Islamic law 421 Owing to 
the internal structure of Islamic law, the Maulvis, who acted as legal advisers to the 
colonial courts between 1772 and 1864 enjoyed a higher degree of authority vis-a-vis 
the British judges than did their Hindu counter-parts. This was because, under Islamic
417 Derrett, 1968:68,289,311.
418 Ibid: 252,279,286. See also: Dirks, 1987; and, Price, 1979.
419 Menski, 1997:42. On the details o f this case, see: Desai, 1982.
420 Mahmood, 1986: 49-94.
421 Banetjee, 1984: 35; and, Mahmood. 1982: 16.
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law, the status of the two primary Islamic judicial offices, those of the mufti and the 
qazi, were such that only a qazi could legitimately reject a mufti’s opinion. As such, 
British judicial officers, as unqualified infidels, were closely bound to the opinions of 
these Islamic officials which, moreover, operating within a long and venerable juristic 
tradition, argued that the textual authorities upon which they relied, provided 
ascertainable rules for most, if not all, situations and thereby circumscribed the scope 
for appeal to residual sources of law such as ‘justice, equity and good conscience’ to a 
much greater extent that was the case with Hindu law.422 It was on this basis that a 
body of authoritative Anglo-Mohammedan case law built up which was in substance a 
“judicial restatement of the principles of Islamic laws as considered applicable in 
south Asia.”423 Moreover, in subsequent cases the courts relied rather formulaically 
on these precedents, imbibing the doctrine of the ‘closing of the gates of ijtihad’ and 
the principle of taqlid or imitation to forestall attempts to re-interpret earlier 
authorities.424 In addition to this system of precedent, and in harmony with it, there 
also arose the practice of academic juristic compilations or textbooks which extended 
the tradition of digestion by collecting legal opinions and both paraphrasing and 
systematising them for use in future cases.425
Perhaps one of the most controversial areas in the development of Anglo-Muslim 
jurisprudence was the area of customary law. Pointing to the way in which the British 
seriously misunderstood the position of custom and usage in Islamic jurisprudence, 
Tahir Mahmood has highlighted two cases in particular decided in 1874 by the 
Supreme Court of Bombay relating to Muslim women claiming a share in their 
father’s estate which had been denied them by male relatives relying upon customary 
laws that excluded daughters from inheritance.426 On the basis that the women in 
question belonged to former Hindu communities which had continued to follow 
Hindu customary law in certain matters, the court held that these customs, being 
proved, prevailed over the more usual Islamic law provisions. The controversy and 
unrest that this sparked off and the protracted tensions it gave rise to over several 
decades finally resulted in the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1937
422 Ibid: 31.
423 Menski, 1997:44, Also Mahmood, 1982: 14ff.
424 Wilson, 1921:44.
425 Ibid: 45.
426 Mahmood, 1977: 19-20.
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which purported to significantly limit the role of custom in the further development of
4 9 7south Asian Muslim law.
An interesting further reform in a somewhat more liberal direction can be found two 
years later in the Dissolution o f Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 which gave Muslim 
women the right to ask for a divorce on the basis of none specific grounds. This, 
interestingly, drew upon a similar logic of justification to that which had underpinned 
the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1937 by explicitly relying upon 
earlier authoritative sources which had preceded the pronouncements of later Islamic 
jurists. Beyond the sphere of intimate interpersonal relations which have traditionally 
fallen within the ambit of the personal law, the development of India’s general law, 
not surprisingly, saw much more intrusive interference with traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence; Islamic criminal law being modified and then altogether superseded 
with the promulgation of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1859 and the Criminal 
Penal Code in 1860, and the Islamic law of evidence being replaced by the Indian 
Law o f Evidence in 1972.428
d. The Modern Indian Legal System
Upon independence in August, 1947 India inherited a complex legal system which 
superficially looked increasingly like that of a western secularised state but, in fact, 
retained many of its pre-modem conceptual roots which continued to infuse legal 
practice and to underpin a plurality of legal norms as they interacted and reacted with 
a large and growing nucleus of secular, general law. Institutionally, as has been seen, 
this body of general law had been under construction since the eighteenth century, 
though latterly it came to place increasing emphasis upon autonomous and 
bureaucratic power at the expense of privatised economic interests. The shift towards 
the gradual separation of powers that this disclosed preserved, at least in form, the 
dominance of the imperial power, but it also reflected a general transformation of 
state legal structures that had been taking place in Europe since the sixteenth century 
and which had grow rapidly in application after the French Revolution as the 
apparently perfect constitutional midwife for commercial and then industrial capitalist
427 Wilson, 1921: 34-39. See also; Hindayatullah, ed., 1982: 22ff.; and, Pearl, 1979: 35.
428 Banerjee, 1962: 58,68-180; and, Derrett, 1968: 318. See also: Fisch, 1983; and Malik, 1994.
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development. In the subcontinent, after the First World War, this process continued to 
receive growing expression, but it was now coupled with significant moves towards 
self-government. Consequently, under the terms of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms 
and the Government o f Indian Act, 1919, a system o f ‘Dyarchy’ was established 
whereby limited provincial responsibilities were transferred to Indian ministers under 
a national parliamentary government run along Westminster lines. These moves were 
extended from 1937 when, under the terms of the Government o f India Act, 1935, 
responsible government by Indian ministers was fully established in the provinces of 
British India. Plans for the further establishment of a comprehensive All-India federal 
structure and Federal Court were interrupted both by the Second World War and by 
India/Pakistan partition, but they were preserved, in part, in the Constitution of the 
Indian Republic promulgated in 1950.
These aspects of the constitutional division of powers,429 the regionalised and 
federational structure,430 communal differentiation, and the specific mechanisms for 
lower caste uplift,431 not only formed the basis and parameters for the constitutional 
settlement of post-Independence India, but also more profoundly reflected the deep 
diversities within Indian society which simply could not be ignored by any sustainable 
governmental structure. Consequently, unlike China there was no wholly 
revolutionary rupture between pre and post-Independence Indian law. Instead, upon 
Independence in 1947 India thus inherited a complex legal system that manifested an 
extreme plurality of differing types and levels of legal norm.432 In theory at least, 
these were built around a large and growing body of secular and general law, to which 
was added in 1950 the Constitution of India, itself subsequently to be amended with 
great frequency in order to keep it in line with the changing realities of post-
A '1 '1
independence India’s political climate. Embodied in the Constitution was an 
ambitious programme of political, social and economic development. This was largely 
set down in the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy sections 
of the Constitution, the development and interaction of which has placed them at the
429 Constitution o f  India, Articles 66, 67 ,74  ,75 , 79, 80, 89, 168(1),194, 124-147 , and 214-273.
430 Ibid., Articles 1, 168(1), 194, 308 and the Seventh Schedule. Also the provisions for the preservation o f  linguistic diversity in 
Articles 29, 350 and 350A.
431 Special Rights under Section III o f  the Constitution, Articles 15, 23, 24, 29 and 131. Also the 
Directive Principles o f  State Policy, under Section IV o f the Constitution, esp., Articles 40, 42, 43,
46 and 45.
432 Most obviously within the Constitution itself, but also beyond and especially within the various personal laws both formal and 
personal. Constitution o f  India. Articles, 89(1) and 368(a)-(e).
433 Under the amending provisions o f the Constitution: Articles, 89(1) and 368 (a)-(e).
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heart of post-Independence legal development. Essentially, they represent a balance 
between the secular and Western instinct for uniform legal regulation and the 
pluralistic necessity of differential communal regulation, such that, immediate 
guarantees of individual rights are matched and supplemented by a programme of 
future state mandated governmental objectives. In this way, the constitutional 
settlement as a whole was infused with an inherently dynamic logic designed 
gradually to overcome what were perceived as traditional societal tensions and 
contradictions, to reduce inequality and caste discrimination and to alleviate material 
poverty. Thus, the rights to equality, to the freedom of religion and conscience and 
against exploitation authoritatively laid down the Bill of Rights, or Section III of the 
Constitution, were supplemented in Section IV, the Directive Principles section of the 
Constitution, by a programme for the future which included Directives for the 
securing of the more equitable and balanced livelihoods of all Indian citizens, the 
establishment of an effective bottom-up democracy and, most controversially, the 
abolition of separate personal laws and the substitution of a Uniform Civil Code. They 
were also supplemented by a series of positive discrimination provisions ensuring 
reservation of a minimum level of legislative representation, education and 
government employment for traditionally the poorest and most discriminated against 
sections of society -  the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and Other Backward Classes.434
In order to begin realising the ultimate aim of a standardised secular legal system 
which the Directive Principle in Article 44 embodied, a strategy was adopted whereby 
attempts would be made first to codify and reform the majority Hindu personal law, 
and to enact what amounted to an optional Uniform Civil Code which was embodied 
in the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and under the terms of which individuals could opt 
to have their relationships regulated by an entirely secular legal scheme.435 
(Guha,2007:226-241), It was determined that these two laws should then gradually be 
brought substantially in line with one another. Once this was accomplished, it was 
planned gradually to bring the minority personal laws under statutory frameworks 
substantially in line with the reformed Hindu and secular laws. Finally, these would 
be replaced by a fully-fledged Uniform Civil Code.
434 Galanter, 1984.
435 For the political background to this compromise see Guha, 2007: Chap 11.
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As it turned out there was considerable and sustained opposition to the plan even to 
impose a unified Hindu code. And it proved impossible to enact the unified 
statutory scheme originally drafted and put forward by the then law minister, B.R. 
Ambedkar. In consequence, it was not until after the 1952 general election and the 
return to power of Nehru with a much increased majority and much greater personal 
control over the Congress party itself that reform of the Hindu Personal Law was 
finally enacted, not in one comprehensive code as previously been proposed, but in a 
series of separate statutes -  the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; the Hindu Succession Act, 
1956; the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956; and the Hindu Minority and 
Guardianship Act, 1956.431 Moreover, in each of these statutes, despite the 
modernising agenda they laid down, provision was made for the continued operation 
of customary practices where their existence could be sufficiently well established.438
During the period of Nehruvian consensus when the emphasis was upon ‘modem’ 
centralised and secular state-building, the approach to constitutional 
operationalisation was noticeably positivist in its orientation, as will be explained 
more fully in chapter four. Despite the inevitable limitations that the realities of Indian 
life placed upon any development strategy, the Nehruvian strategy was a marked 
attempt to bolster the military-industrial power of the nation state as a way of 
asserting the strength of its political and economic independence and this required in 
its legal aspect that there be a positivist assertion that state law enjoy jurisprudential 
supremacy. With the death of Nehru and the rise to power of Indira Gandhi, 
frustration at the slow rate of socio-economic uplift that this strategy was supposed to 
effect provided an opportunity to create a populist power base outside the normal 
mechanisms of state power. This led to a noticeable de-juridification of Indian politics 
which reached its high point in the emergency of 1975-1977 and which, though 
notably less marked than the like phase taking place in China at the same time was 
nonetheless both notable and powerful 439 Moreover, as with China, the failure of this 
experiment in hyper-centralised, personal mle, not only led to a reengagement with 
the normal mechanisms of legal functioning but also to a gradual and growing 
engagement with the world economy; though once more to a much less marked
43(5 Derrett, 1957.
437 Ibid.
438 See, for example, Sontheimer, 1977.
439 See: Dhagamwar, 1989: 76. And generally: Mahmood, 1982: 5; Menski, 1990; and, Parashar, 1992.
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degree than in China. In India, given its much deeper diversities, what this process has 
involved in legal terms is a much greater sensitisation of its jurisprudential structures 
to the realities of Indian life, both in terms of the more effective operationalisation of 
the programme of socio-economic uplift embedded in the Constitution itself and in 
terms of the extant indigenous norm-system upon which any programme of 
transformation is forced to work. As a result, in the post-emergency period, an 
apparently paradoxical re-indigenisation of the overall legal system has taken place 
alongside the opening of India’s international market forces, but this, as will be seen, 
is an entirely coherent though complex propadeutic development by which society is 
increasingly prepared for much deeper transformation.
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Part 2 
Contemporary
In Part 2 the study narrows somewhat in order to focus upon legal developments 
which have taken place in China and India over the past three decades. This grounds 
the study in a sufficiently robust empirical base which nonetheless does not obscure 
the deeper lying theoretical precepts it is being employed to verify. The developments 
covered in this section occur during a period of gradual and apparently conclusive 
engagement with the international economic system that has lain at the heart of 
emerging industrial and post-industrial society. As has been seen in Part 1, this 
engagement embodied an acceptance of the ultimate failure of each society to resist 
the deeper logic of that system’s apparently insatiable expansion. Thus, though they 
have handled this transitional acceptance in different ways, ways that have undoubted 
and important things to say about the nature and levels of resistance which may be 
offered to marketisation by different cultural forms, they nonetheless each manifest 
decentralization and functional specialization consistent with the gradual process of 
marketisation.
In detailing the manner in which this has taken place in practice, Chapter Four, by 
examining, at their broadest constitutional levels, the differing legal strategies 
employed by each country, shows how a tension between attempts at government 
control, on the one hand, and deeper currents of economic development, on the other, 
have structured in both countries a comparatively more ordered and staged integration 
into the world economy than would otherwise have been the case -  though with 
noticeably more effect in China than in India. Chapters Five and Six examine in 
greater detail, beyond the enormous though relatively uncontroversial developments 
in those areas touching directly upon the China and India’s transforming economies, 
how the logic of those transformations have come gradually to reconfigure areas that 
have traditionally operated either outside or in a way super-ordinate to the economic. 
Thus Chapter Five details the incremental cooption of the state and its role in the 
incremental insinuation of a battery of procedural norms functionally consistent with 
market expansion, whilst Chapter Six explores how these norms are gradually 
expanding even into the most intimate areas of family and social life.
120
Chapter 4: Constitutional Strategies
In the period of reform China and India have moved towards greater economic 
liberalisation and increased marketisation in an attempt to kick-start their waning 
developmental strategies. This has not only meant the gradual retreat, in both states, 
from a micro-managerial to an ownership and then eventually to an essentially 
regulatory involvement in the economy, but also to an increasing juridification 
through the principled application of governmental power. As the state has delegated 
more and more economic decision-making to non-state enterprises and entrepreneurs, 
so it has inevitably become more specialised, if not always more disciplined, in the 
activities it continues to perform. Indeed, in gradually ceasing those of its activities 
that most obviously inhibit the operation of a market economy, so simultaneously it 
has been steadily co-opted as a mechanism for the reconfiguration of those factors 
that might frustrate the market’s further growth. This ever-finer division of labour and 
specialisation has manifested itself, both in terms of subject matter and in terms of 
geography, with state involvement being redefined first in those areas of life most 
likely spontaneously to find co-ordination within the market dynamic and in those 
regions enjoying a natural comparative market advantage.
In each of these areas significant differentials open up between China and India when 
examined in greater detail, with the ostensibly autocratic China exemplifying the 
trends pointed to, and thus the overall transformative effect of increasing 
marketisation, to a much greater extent than does the ostensibly democratic India. 
Once more this is linked to the relative capacity of each society to engage in 
collective action or, more specifically, the capacity of their respective governments to 
mobilise such action. Even at the very broadest level, the formal constitutional 
arrangements which historically operated within either jurisdiction have manifested 
this contrast. In China the major changes in policy direction since 1949 have resulted 
in a series of entirely new constitutions signifying a greater capacity of its 
government/leaders to mobilise society in the particular manner it sees fit at a given 
point in time, in India similar changes in policy have had to be accommodated within 
one continuously functioning constitutional framework, which, though subject to 
important changes in its internal structural dynamic, has expressed a fundamental
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socio-political compromise the essential content of which it has not been possible to 
renegotiate. One very significant consequence of this contrast, has been the fact that 
whilst the turn to populism in China during the Cultural Revolution led to the almost 
complete breakdown of the legal order, in India, similar attempts to by-pass the 
normal mechanisms of government were ultimately much less successful. 
Consequently, whilst in India there was, after the Emergency, a noticeable reassertion 
of judicial and parliamentary power, this took place firmly within the parameters of 
the pre-exiting constitutional order which had survived the several attacks upon it. In 
China, on the other hand, since the assaults on the legal and governmental orders had 
been so much more destructive, the attempts to reverse the worst excesses of the 
Cultural Revolution, required the almost complete reconstruction of the entire legal 
system.
A: China
1. General
Over the past two decades the Chinese leadership has succeeded in ensuring economic 
growth while implementing policies engineered to allow gradual integration into the 
world economy in a more or less managed fashion. Economic liberalisation, it was 
felt, was the only way that China could regain the material vigour it had so clearly 
forfeited through the autarkic and anarchic policies of the Cultural Revolution, and, in 
the process, close the alarming resource mobilisation gap that had opened between it 
and its East Asian competitors. At the same time, it was feared that too abrupt and 
comprehensive a transformation, as was later attempted in Russia and other CIS 
countries, would threaten the political and ideological integrity and control of the 
Party-State. Consequently what was initially sought was a form of measured and 
controlled engagement with the market, which would act as a supplement to the 
planned economy. As it has increasingly been appreciated that the market represents 
the most effective mechanism for the provisioning and expansion of the Chinese 
economy, so market forces have gradually been allowed a greater and greater role by 
China’s policy makers.
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A proper understanding of these developments requires them to be set within the 
context of the gradual institutionalisation of power which has been increasingly 
apparent throughout the reform period.440 This institutionalisation has been 
characterised not just by the growing elaboration of explicit normative structures, but 
also by the de-concentration of personal power through a process of growing 
functional differentiation. The gradual nature of this process has been the result of a 
bottom up pressure by which the successes of initial and tentatively experimental 
reforms have propelled greater and more general acceptance of the expansive logic 
upon which they have been based.441 In this way, the full structural implications of 
this logic have only been realised and accepted by degrees. As this has happened, so, 
according to the assessment of one commentator:
.. .the Party has.. .turned over -  or, perhaps more accurately, been 
forced to turn over -  much of daily governance to the usual state 
actors: the legislature, executive, and judiciary.
As such:
The retreat of the Party has resulted in the transfer of power from the 
Party both to the state and to society. Furthermore, just as there has 
been a retreat of the Party, so has there been a retreat of the 
state...[With power devolving from] the government at all levels to
• . 442society.
In fact, the sequence outlined here, whilst quite accurate in its identification of the 
major bases of structural change, is probably the reverse of what has happened in 
practice. What has actually tended to propel the gradual differentiation of Party from 
State has been the prior differentiation of Party-State from society or, more 
particularly, from the economy. Moreover, as this horizontal relocation of power has 
taken place, so it has been accompanied, within the structure of the state itself, by a 
complementary vertical relocation of power from higher to lower levels of 
government and administration in order better to sensitise the state to the 
developmental potentialities and challenges of differing geographical regions. Along 
both axes, as these potentialities have been released so the further decentralisation and 
institutionalisation of governmental competences have been propelled by the
440 For the specifically legal aspects o f  this process see, in general: Chen, 2004; Clarke, 2003, 2008; Gellhom, 1987; Keith & 
Lam, 2001; Lubman, 1999: 1-10; Orts, 2001; Peerenboom, 2002; Potter, 2008; Qin, 2008; and, Saich, 2000.
441 Fewsmith, 2006.
442 Peerenboom, 2002:188-189
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functional requirements of increasingly powerful market forces, which have, in their 
turn, gradually secured for themselves an increasingly determinative role over the 
direction of China’s economic, social and political make-up. The fact that this process 
has been an incremental rather than a sudden one is attributable, in part, to the fact 
that the power of the Party-State, though transforming both in form and extent, has 
continued to factor as an independent variable. It has also been crucial in allowing for 
the gradual overcoming of political and ideological resistance both to reform and to 
the market per se, and thus also to introducing reforms, despite the considerable 
difficulties encountered along the way, in an apparently sustainable manner.
2. De-Centralisation
a. State, Economy and Society
Economic reform began upon a somewhat piecemeal basis. Thus, as initial 
experiments revealed their worth, they were subsequently widened and made more 
systematic. It started by focusing upon the Agricultural sphere which, during the late 
Seventies, witnessed the experimental introduction of a Household Responsibility 
System in selected localities and then, a little later, nationally.443 After dramatic initial 
successes, the size of household plots were gradually increased and greater autonomy 
granted to producers such that by 1984 the Responsibility System had emerged as by 
far the dominant agricultural arrangement.444
At the same time as the agricultural system was being restructured, restrictions on 
non-agricultural activities in rural areas were gradually relaxed, permitting enterprises 
to sell their products at market prices 445 This very rapidly led to a precipitate rise in 
the number of individually or collectively owned enterprises in China’s townships and 
villages. Not only did these township and village enterprises (TVEs) absorb a 
significant percentage of the surplus labour created by the increasing efficiency of the 
agricultural sector,446 they also constituted a rapidly growing and flexible non-state 
sector subject to much tougher market constraints than their government managed
443 Qian, 1999.
444 Central Com m ittee C ircular on A gricultural Work, January l sl 1984.
445 Qian, 1999: 11-12.
446 Lin, et.al, 1996.
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counter-parts thereby creating an ideal environment for the development of 
entrepreneurial expertise and competition. Consequently, by the early 1990s there 
were more than 19 million xVEs employing more than 100 million workers out of a 
total rural workforce of 430 million and contributing almost a third of China’s overall
Q £ j p  447
In the state sector, reform proved to be slower and significantly more complicated, but 
in the longer term came to be equally, if  not more, dramatic. Reforms began by 
focussing upon the gradual expansion of managers’ decision-making powers and 
enterprises resources in order to give them greater responsibility for their own profits 
and losses.448 This led, in 1987, to the eventual introduction throughout the country of 
an industrial ‘contract responsibility system’ under which enterprises were leased to 
their management for three to four year periods.449 After a brief hiatus following the 
events of Tiananmen Square in 1989, Deng Xiaoping reinvigorated the reform process 
with his famous southern tour in 1992 and, later that year, the Fourteenth National 
Congress of the CPC laid down for the first time the goal of creating a ‘Socialist 
Market Economy’.450 This resulted, over the following decade, in a process of 
incremental privatization, which built upon a series of preparatory legislative acts in 
the 1980s and early 1990s.
The final area of reform fell under the rubric of trade liberalisation and the policy of 
open door. Up until 1979, foreign trade was monopolised by the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade through 12 state owned Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs). Reform involved 
the separation of government administration from enterprise management by 
progressively replacing the national FTCs by many smaller enterprises with foreign 
trade power. It also involved the comprehensive devolution of the authority of the 
import and export corporations to provincial and municipal authorities and a 
precipitate reduction in the number of items under state quota or licensing control. It 
also involved after 1991, as China began to push for resumption of its GATT
447 Peerenboom, 2002: 192-193.
448 Chen, 1995: 80; Chow, 2000:49. See also Hua & Du, 1990: 75.
449 Zhao, 1987, quoted in Chen, 1995: 83-84. Entitled: ‘Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, 
R eport D e livered  to the Thirteenth N ational Congress o f  the Communist P arty  o f  China on October 25th, 1987. See also: 
Chamberlain, 1987; and, Xi, 2005.
450 See Jaing, 1992: 1-3. Entitled: ‘Accelerating the Reform, the Opening to the Outside World and the Drive for Modernisation, 
so as to Achieve Great Successes in Building Socialism withZho Chinese Characteristics’ P olitica l R eport delivered  to the  
Fourteenth N ational Congress o f  the Com m unist P a rty  o f  China, 21s' October, 1992.
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membership, publication of internal regulations, abolition of mandatory trade plans, 
unification of foreign trade policy and regulation in line with international standards 
and the restructuring of FTC internal governance systems. Lastly, foreign trade 
liberalisation was accompanied by increasingly comprehensive reform in the area of 
direct foreign investment, as this was allowing an ever growing role in the 
development of China’s post-Mao economy, leading to a growing uniformity as 
between domestic and foreign investment enterprises, whilst continuing to allow 
certain special concessions for foreign investment as a way of attracting foreign 
technologies and capital.
Despite the extraordinary economic transformation to which reform has given rise, as 
the incentive structures of Chinese society have changed so numerous problems have 
arisen, resulting both in social disorder and in various forms of economic 
dislocation.451 In part his has resulted from the speed with which the new policies 
have taken hold coupled with the failure of Chinese society to keep pace, but it has 
also resulted from the re-emergence of more traditional social practices. In particular, 
familial values and clientelist relationships suppressed under Mao have regrouped and 
taken on even greater importance in the context of the growing market economy. The 
uncertainties resulting from the implementation of reform have been particularly 
potent in causing ordinary people to feel unsure about which public ideas to invoke 
and to rely increasingly upon trusted personal contacts as a way of compensating for 
their growing insecurity. At the same time, the numerous opportunities for corruption, 
for short-term exploitation, and for unjust discrimination that these newly revived 
systems of patronage offer have been a continuing source of systemic inefficiency.452
Underlying these various difficulties has, of course, been the extraordinary increase in 
income inequality both within the general population and as between China’s various 
regional units 453 Acceptance that some had to get rich first to act as a developmental 
motor for the rest the nation marked a sharp departure from the policies implemented 
during the 30 years of Maoist rule. Income inequality has led to the conspicuous 
growth in social unrest, resulting in violent social clashes as the traditional support
451 See, among other works: Aubert & Xiande, 2002; Cannon, ed., 2000; Chan & Zhang, 1999; Chen & Alexander, 2004; Guo, 
2001; He, 2003; Hiroshi, 2003; and, Pils, 2005;
452 See: Chamberlain, 1987; Froissart, 2005; Hsing, 2 0 0 6 ,2006a; Kolenda,1990; Lu, 1999; and, Seymour,1988.
453 Among the many relevant works, see: Aziz & Duenwald, 2001; Breslin, 1999; Cannon, ed., 2000; Fan, 2001; Goodman, 2004; 
Jian, et.al., 1996; Lin, 2003; Lyons, 1991; Marton, 2000; Ravaillon & Chen, 2004; and, Tian,1999.
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structures of the Maoist state has been gradually rolled back.454 This has led to an 
extraordinary increase in the population of impoverished, insecure footloose labour 
which, having migrated from the countryside, floats in search of seasonal occupation 
with no entitlement to the already limited welfare benefits.455 As a compounding 
factor, these challenges have been met by a government apparatus that is itself 
increasingly disjointed and enfeebled by the proliferation and divergence of the 
interests generated by economic change.456 In particular, attempts by the national 
leadership to devise and implement effective overall strategies have been hampered 
by local and provincial governments rent by conflicting personal and regional 
loyalties, as well as, in a worrying number of cases, by systemic corruption 457 
Perhaps the most important reason for this has been the fact that reform has 
transformed a significant number of local officials into ‘cadre-entrepreneurs’ as they 
seek simultaneously to maintain their personal authority within the local community 
by minimizing local hardship and to enable themselves, their families and their 
friends to capitalize upon the new opportunities offered by the changing economic 
environment 458 Clearly, it has been particularly difficult effectively to balance these 
various interests whilst operating within the policy directives of the central 
government. Overall, this situation has resulted in a tendency towards the half-hearted 
implementation or only partial implementation of central directives that has often 
seriously hampered the national leadership’s attempts at macro-policy management.
Yet, whilst it is, of course, important not to under-estimate the difficulties that have 
been encountered in this process and indeed in the reform process more generally,459 
when understood properly, they do not appear to negate the clear longer-term trend 
outlined above. Precisely how this trend is being driven in practice is an important 
question to which Michael Dowdle has recently provided a sophisticated and, to this 
author’s mind, broadly convincing answer.460 For Dowdle, despite the ostensibly non- 
democratic nature of the Chinese government, the organisation and articulation of 
discrete social interests -  women’s rights, environmental protection,
454 Guo, 2001; Hsing, 2006a; He, 2003; Oi, 2003; Li & O’Brien, 2002; and, O’Brien, 1996.
455 A  great deal o f richly layered and sophisticated research exist in this area. See: CECC, 2005; Chan & Alexander; Froissart, 
2005; He, 2003; James, 2007; Solinger, 1991, 1996; Stein, 2006; and Zhu, 2003.
456 Breslin, 1996; Howell, 2004; Chen, et.al., 2002; Choate, 1997; He, 2003, and Schram, 1985.
457 Fu, 2005; Fu & Cho, 2004; Lubman, 1999: 160-172; and, Zhang, 1996.
458 Guo. 2001; and, Zhang, 2004.
459 On the gradual emergence of a nascent Chinese civil society, see, for example: Zhang, 2004; Zhang, 2003; and, Ling, 2001. 
See also on developing local democracy: Choate, 1997; Horsley, 2003; Howell, ed., 2004; and, Jakobson, 2004.
460 Dowdle, 2002.
127
professional/regional/labour interests -  have nonetheless found ways effectively to 
express themselves within the socio-political set-up.461 A number of factors have 
contributed to this “growing fragmentation of interest’s within China’s socio-political 
environment” 462 The first of these, Dowdle identifies is that of stabilisation over time. 
As the social set-up stabilises, “distinct social interests gradually overcome collective 
action problems”,463 facilitating the growing articulation of diverse social interests. 
Secondly, he identifies the importance of the growing privatisation of the Chinese 
economy. As different segments of the economy open up to private exploitation, 
economic interests increasingly challenge “collective action problems”: in sum, 
economic diversity translates into articulated social diversity. Further, this articulated 
social diversity prompts a fragmentation in the political sphere. The diversification of 
social interests widens the range of interests influencing political behaviour as a result 
of which China’s dominant political structure, namely the CPC, exhibits increased 
internal competition and “institutional stress”.464
To understand precisely how this ‘institutional stress’ has resulted in growing political 
diversity, it is necessary to recognize the fundamental role played in CPC rule by 
“reciprocal patterns of loyalty” as manifest in a highly complex monocratic web of 
patron-client relations 465 The fragmentation of China’s social and political 
environments foments division and dispute between the clients within this network of 
relationships. Resolving such disputes forces patrons to choose among clients, with 
the disfavoured client perceiving a breach of the whole patron-client system. This has 
two important consequences. First, it diminishes clients’ incentives to loyalty. 
Secondly, it weakens the institutional capacity of the party to discipline its members.
A highly significant response to this dilemma is for patrons to locate the settlement of 
inter-client disputes in an independent forum, which (vitally) is visibly out of the 
patron’s control (but, also, does not impinge upon the patron’s private political 
interests). The resolution of disputes in this way lessens the tendency for losing clients 
to attribute their losses in disputes to a lack of patronal support. Thereby, Dowdle 
implies, an independent forum for dispute resolution address the issues of diminishing 
loyalty and weakened disciplinary capacity outlined above. Thus, it is precisely in
461 Ibid; 53.
462 Ibid: 55.
463 Ibid: 55.
464 Ibid: 58.
465 Ibid.
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order to maintain a “hegemony over the political environment as a whole” that the 
CCP imparts dispute-settlement power to an independent arbitrator of disputes.466 It is 
in this context that Chinese constitutional development -  providing non-party 
apparatus with which widening political discourse and debates can be arbitrated -  
should be seen. Given the function of the constitutional apparatus in terms of this 
widening discourse, its normative and structural aspects are given increasing social 
weight, and this, in turn, results in “an ever growing constitutionalisation of the 
political environment.”467
b. Party and State
Gradual redefinition of the role of the Chinese Party-State with respect to wider 
Chinese society has been accompanied by cognate attempts to redefine the 
relationship between the state and the Communist Party (CPC) and in particular to 
move away from the mass populist politics of the Cultural Revolution 468 This has 
been seen as a necessary accompaniment to disciplined and meaningful reform. An 
important component of this strategy has been attempts to effect a clearer separation 
between the party and the state. The importance of these attempts has already been 
noted in connection to the question of enterprise management and the need to prevent 
unfocussed ideological and discretionary interventions which might inhibit functional 
and productive efficiency. Similar considerations have factored strongly in the area of 
China’s governmental machinery.469
Perhaps the principal way in which policymakers have sought to effect such a 
separation in practice has been through the reinstitution of a functioning legal system 
together with a strong emphasis, at least in official pronouncements, upon the need for 
laws, once made, to be obeyed 470 Likewise Party leaders frequently emphasised the 
role of law in creating a social order conducive to economic development; so much so 
that Deng Xiaoping early on called for a “Two-Hand” policy, with the economy being 
strengthened, on the one hand, and the legal system, on the other 471 This commitment
466 Ibid: 60.
467 Ibid: 75.
4(58 Brookings Institution, 2008.
469 Chamberlain, 1987; Deng, 1984; Schram, 1984; Seymour, 1988; Stavis, ed., 1987; Von Senger, 1985. Also: Yang, 1984.
470 See especially, Clarke, 1985; Deng, 1984, Schram, 1984; Seymour, 1988. See also: Von Senger, 1985.
471 Zhao, ed., 1990: 574.
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was subsequently confirmed both by the extensive programme of law-making 
embarked upon in the four years prior to the drafting of the 1982 State Constitution,
4 79and by the terms of reference for the Constitution itself.
The result was a Constitution considerably more detailed than its predecessors and 
one which contained significant statements as to it own status and as to that of law in 
general. These statements were found in the preamble, which declared that the 
Constitution was “the fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal force”, and 
that “the people of all nationalities, all state organs, the armed forces, all political 
parties, all social organisations, enterprises and institutional units” were required to 
“uphold the dignity of the Constitution and ensure its implementation.” They were 
also found in Article 5, which affirmed “the uniformity and dignity of the socialist 
legal system” and declared that “no organisation or individual may enjoy the privilege 
of being above the Constitution and the law”. Additionally, Article 33 guaranteed, for 
the first time, the right of citizens to equality under the law, signalling a notable 
departure from earlier practices of categorising the population according to historic 
family and class associations. Likewise, the CPC Constitution, also adopted in 1982, 
affirmed in its General Programme that, “The Party must conduct its activities within 
the framework of the Constitution and other laws”. Nevertheless, these many 
statements were balanced by equally strong, if not stronger, affirmations of the Four 
Basic Principles and the role of the CPC as the guiding force of the PRC.
Moreover, there was no doubt that the PRC remained essentially a one party state, 
with other parties, and indeed the policies of the state government, being permitted to 
exist only in a manner which was complementary to the priorities of the CPC and 
firmly under its control.473 The ideological leadership of CPC was, and is, recognised 
in the State Constitution not only through its avowed adherence to the Four Basic 
Principles, but also its reflection of the periodic developments in CPC ideology and in 
the Preamble’s explicit proclamation of the CPC as the “vanguard of the Chinese 
working class, the faithful representative of people of all nationalities in China, and 
the force at the core leading China’s cause of socialism”. In particular, this was given 
effect by interlocking state and party structures at every level, by control of state
472 See Deng Xiaoping’s speech to the Politburo in August, 1980, in Deng, 1984; 322, Also: Barrett, 1983; Kwan, 1984; Saich, 
1983; and, Weng, 1982.
473 Lin, 2000; and, Lu, 1990.
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appointments through the nomenklatura and electoral systems, by leading Party 
member and primary party organisations and by political-legal committees. In this 
context, China’s jurisprudence continued to be dominated by an essentially 
instrumentalist approach to law which was seen simply as a peculiarly effective tool 
for the implementation of party policy, or as a mature form of policy, rather than as an 
end in itself. This was further seen in the speed with which legislation was mshed 
through in the initial years of reform in order simply to create an effective policy 
implementation machine as soon as possible without showing any real concern with 
deeper philosophical issues of fostering a culture of respect for the law and its 
authority.
Despite this enduring attachment to the instrumental and pragmatic role of law, there 
is nonetheless a clear sense that the inherent authority of law and the overall need 
fully to legalise and institutionalise the exercise of power in the PRC, independent of 
its shorter-term expedient value, has gradually received greater and greater operative 
and ideological sanction. Moreover, this has taken place just as there has been an 
increasingly sophisticated development, some would say fundamental alteration, of 
traditional Marxist thinking in order to accommodate the reform programme.474 In 
both respects, this has, of course, been particularly notable since the inauguration of 
“package reform” and the goal of creating a “socialist market economy” during Deng 
Xiaoping’s 1992 southern tour. Thus, references to “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” and “Deng Xiaoping Theory” have been given formal Party and 
Constitutional sanction, as has the redefinition of the time-scale for transition to a 
fully socialist society. Likewise, more recently, Jiang Zemin’s idea of “Three 
Represents”,475 which he had been elaborating since the fiftieth anniversary 
celebrations of the founding of the PRC in 2001, has further loosened the Party- 
State’s links with traditional class ideology, introducing into the state Constitution the 
idea that the CPC now represents the vast majority of the Chinese population. Such 
notions of political equality are an important component in western ‘rule of law’ 
ideology and with good functional and economic reason. Since early 1996, this along 
with its other aspects has been increasingly highlighted as Jiang Zemin and other top 
leaders have engaged in an officially sponsored discourse on “ruling the country
474 See here especially, the excellent analysis in Chen, 1996.
475 Fewsmith, 2003; Killion, 2005; and, Lam, 2004, 2007.
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according to law”, creating a “legal system state” and finally “creating a rule of law 
state”. It has been on this basis that the “rule of law” finally found its way by 
constitutional amendment into Article 5 of the PRC Constitution in 1999.
The clearest and most important example of this trend in practice has been the 
growing assertiveness of the National and Local People’s Congresses.476 Under the 
terms of the state Constitution the NPC -  as the PRC’s official legislature -  has 
always technically been the most important decision and law making body in China, 
followed by its Standing Committee and then the State Council, bodies which are 
replicated, along with their hierarchical inter-relationship, at every subordinate level 
of the state structure.477 However, until relatively recently it had generally been 
accepted that, in the actual exercise of power,478 this order operated in reverse. 
Consequently, the State Council acted as the real nexus of central state power, with 
the NPC and, to a lesser extent, the NPC Standing Committee, performing purely 
affirmatory or ‘rubber-stamp’ functions at its behest. In particular, the State Council 
drafted a very large number of the laws that were placed before the two other bodies 
with the expectation that they would be approved with little difficulty, having been 
initiated by, and received prior approval from the central apparatus of the Party. As 
the reform programme has unfolded, however, this situation has begun to change, so 
that now the NPC and its subordinates, as part of the overall trend towards greater 
institutionalisation, have come to exercise in practice more and more of the power 
allotted to them by the Constitution in theory.479
3. Devolution
a. Explicit Constitutional and Administrative Models
With its embarkation upon the process of economic reform, transition to a market 
economy, and the winning of foreign trade and investment, China has also 
increasingly given rise to a multitude of relatively discrete regional economies 480 
Under the Maoist regime, such regional differences had been suppressed by
476 Cho, 2002; Dowdle, 2002-3, 2005. See also, the earlier work o f  Murray Scott Tanner: Tanner, 1994.
477 Cheng, 1983-84; Gasper, 1982; Lin, 2000; Keller, 2000 and, Wu, 1990.
478 Weng, 1983-84.
479 Dowdle, 1997: 6,9,32-33; 2002:3-4.
480 Lyons, 2004: 3-4.
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preferential investments in the least advantaged areas. With the adoption of the open 
door policy, this approach has been reversed and measures implemented in order to 
exploit inherent regional differences and to drive the coastal strip ahead of other 
regions so that it can act as an “engine of growth” for China as a whole. Accordingly, 
since 1st July 1997, the PRC has divided into four constitutionally specified 
administrative zones -  National Autonomous Areas (especially in the west of the 
country), the area of normal regional and local state government, Special Economic 
Zones and Special Administrative Regions -  each governed according to a specific set 
of provisions, and each corresponding very broadly to a different level of economic 
development and loosely identifying a different stage of integration with the world 
economy.481
Under the principle of the ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ the Chinese state is 
organised according to a hierarchically structured system which is divided vertically 
into five different levels. First, at the highest level operate its central institutions: the 
National People’s Congress,482 the President of the PRC 483 the State Council,484 the 
Central Military Commission,485 the Supreme People’s Court486 and the Supreme 
People’s Procuracy.487 Secondly, below these, at the provincial level, are 23 
provincial governments, 4 municipalities directly under the central government, 5 
autonomous regions and the two Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and 
Macau. Thirdly, below the provincial level are 265 cities of prefectural rank, 32 
prefectures, 30 autonomous prefectures and five ‘unions’(all of which are situated 
within the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region). Fourthly, below the prefectural 
level operate 2,861 county equivalent units, including 393 cities of county rank and 
808 city districts. Finally, below the county level, exists the level of towns and 
townships which comprises considerably more than 46,000 separate units.488
481 Yang, 1997: 29.
482 Chapter III, Section I ., P R C  Constitution, esp. Articles 57 and 65.
483 Ibid: Chapter III, Section 2.
484 Ibid: Chapter III, Section 3.
485 Ibid: Chapter III, Section 4.
486 Ibid: Articles 124 and 127.
487 Ibid: Articles 130 and 132.
488 Chen, 1998: 52.
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i. Regional and Local State Organs
At the heart of this hierarchy is the system of people’s congresses. Article 2 of the 
Constitution stipulates: “All the power in the PRC belongs to the people. The organs 
through which the people exercise state power are the National People’s Congress and 
the local people’s congresses at various levels.” The people’s congresses, or ‘organs 
of state power’,489 are distinguished from the ‘organs of state administration’ (the 
State Council and the people’s governments at various subordinate levels),490 the 
‘adjudicative organs’ (the people’s courts)491 and the ‘organs of legal supervision’
(the people’s procuratorates) 492 All other state organs are created and supervised by 
and are responsible to the people’s congresses at their corresponding levels 493 At 
those levels below the centre, they are also accountable to their own hierarchical 
superiors.494 This allows for a degree of functional differentiation, that nonetheless 
falls well short of a fully-blown inter-institutional separation of powers.
This structure, which stretches across the country, incorporates a hierarchy of 
legislation and governmental power which decreases in breadth the further down one 
moves. Devolution here consists in the delegation of legislative, appointment, and 
economic development powers to the various regional and local state organs. Firstly, 
legislative autonomy enables the formulation and promulgation of local regulations by 
the People’s Congresses of provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly 
under the central government, provincial capitals and relatively large cities . .in the 
light of the specific conditions and actual needs of their respective administrative 
areas” 495 It also allows for local people’s governments at the same levels to 
“formulate rules” of an administrative nature 496 With respect to powers of 
appointment of officials, in addition to the right of People’s Congresses at every level 
to make senior appointments,497 a measure of direct electoral democracy is in place at 
the village level, where triennial elections are now held for over 3 million village
489 Article, 85, P R C  Constitution.
490 Ibid: Article 105.
491 Ibid: Article 123.
492 Ibid: Article 129.
493 Ibid:Article 3.
494 Chen, 1998:51.
495 Article 6, P R C  Constitution, and Article 7, Organisational Law  o f  the L oca l P eop le 's  Congresses and Local Governments o f  
the PRC, 1979, (as amended in 1986). See also: Articles 8(l)-(4) and 27, P R C  Constitution.
496 Articles 35 and 36, P R C  Constitution, and Article 60, O rganisational L aw  o f  the L ocal P eop le 's  Congresses and Local 
Governments o f  the PRC, 1979  (as amended in 1995).
497 Articles 7(4)-(8) and 28(7)-(9), P R C  Constitution.
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leaders.498 More recently, officials have started to experiment with grassroots direct 
elections in urban areas, and, on a more limited scale, with polls for township chiefs. 
By giving people an institutionalised way of expressing their potential dissatisfaction 
with cadres, the government intends to defuse less orthodox -  and more destabilising 
-  political protests. Finally, in terms of economic development, conspicuous resource 
mobilisation powers and spending responsibilities have been devolved to local 
governments.499 Local governments have also increasingly become entrepreneurs and 
major stakeholders in local enterprises, seeking to maximise employment and 
revenue-raising opportunities in the areas under their jurisdiction,
ii. National Autonomous Areas
In addition to the normal or standard bases there exist two further special bases for 
delegation of local power. The first special basis is ‘national’ or ethnic in character 
and operates primarily through the five National Autonomous Areas (NAAs), 
principal home to China’s 55 officially recognised ethnic minorities. The regional 
autonomous governments are designed to recognise the pre-revolutionary 
predominance of non-Han ethnic groups. They represent an attempt by the central 
authorities to both stave off potential ‘splittisf upsurges and at the same time promote 
economic growth and development.500 To this end, Chapter III, Section VI of the 
Constitution and the 1984 Law on National Regional Autonomy (LRNA) jointly 
proceed to elaborate a detailed system of autonomous rule for concentrated national 
minority communities.501 This allows National Autonomous Areas devolved 
legislative and administrative power over a number of specified subjects,502 in 
addition to a limited power to disapply higher level policies and legislation.503 Yet, in 
practice, this represents an essentially paper autonomy.504 Thus, at the same time as 
they are permitted to exercise considerable independence over ‘non-essential’ issues, 
on matters considered of greater interest to the Party-State this autonomy is heavily 
circumscribed. Powers granted over subjects concerning cultural, ethnic or religious
498 O rganic L aw  o f  V illages' Com m ittees, 1998. See Also: E lectoral L aw  o f  the N PC  and LPCs, 1979  (as amended 1982, 1986 
and 1995) and O rganic L aw  o f  Urban R esidents ’ Committees, 1989.
499 Articles 7(l)-(3), 8(l)-(4) and 28 (l)-(4), P R C  Constitution.
508 See: Bovingdon, 2002; Pahn, 1996; and, Potter, 2005.
50lSee also: The S tate C ou n c il’s  C ircular on Im plem enting the 1984 L aw  o f  the P R C  on N ational Autonom ous Regions (1991).
502 Chapter 3, L aw  on N ational R egional Autonom y (LRNA) 1984. With respect to the secondary literature, see: Pei, 1995; Potter, 
2005; Sautman, 1999; and, Schram, 1986.
503 Ibid: Article. 20.
504 Danspeckgruber, ed., 2002.
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identity constitute instead an attempt to placate minority sentiment and thereby 
tranquillise any ill-feeling that might result in challenges to the unified state.
Similarly, the slightly expanded powers touching upon economic development505 
likewise serve central state priorities and are explained by the relatively backward 
condition of most NAAs, and the consequently more delicate socio-economic balance 
which needs to be appreciated if economic instability is to be avoided. The state thus 
co-opts autonomous organs to sensitise its overall strategy to those conditions and 
thereby make it more effective. At the same time, it ensures that this sensitised 
version follows the broad parameters of market decentralisation and subsumes it 
“under the guidance of state plans”.506
iii. Special Economic Zones
The second special basis for the delegation of local power is economic. This operates 
through the device of the Special Economic Zone. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
first originated from a proposal put forward by the Guangdong province, which was 
approved by central authorities in 1979. Soon afterwards four SEZs were established 
in Guangdong (Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou) and Fujian (Xiamen). In 1988, Hainan 
island was also conferred SEZ status, having first been separated off to form a 
province in its own right.507 At the same time other areas were being established on a 
slightly less formal basis: by 1995 China had designated a total of 260 “coastal open 
areas”, 14 “coastal open cities”, 30 “economic and technological development zones”, 
18 “open provincial capitals”, 13 “bonded zones”, 52 high-tech “industrial 
development zones”, 6 “riverine open cities”, and 13 “border open cities”, all of 
which were permitted various preferential policies designed to promote foreign trade 
and to attract overseas investment. Initially, SEZs were provided for by a regulation 
of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress devolving regulative 
power to the appropriate provincial congress.508 In the early 1990s this power was 
further devolved to city governments and county level standing committees.509
505Articles, 6 (3) 33, 34 and 35, LRNA.
506 Ibid: Article. 6 (3).
507 Yang, 1997: 57
508 D ecision o f  Standing C om m ittee o f  NPC: 2 Ist meeting, November 6th 1981.
509 D ecisions o f  Standing C om m ittee o f  NPC: 26th meeting, 1st July 1992 (Shenzen); 22nd meeting, 2nd conference, NPC, 1994 
(Xiamen); 8th NPC, 4th Annual Conference, 17th March 1996 (Shatou/Zhuhai).
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Situated within the context of the more general move towards decentralising the 
economy, SEZs thus emerged as selected areas which were allowed to take control of 
their own economic policies outside of the state plan and which were actively 
encouraged to pursue the path of marketisation. In particular, they reflected the 
strategy of prompting the coastal economy to forge ahead so that it could “radiate 
both inward and outward”, becoming a pivot in the development of the country as 
whole.510 This strategy envisaged that the coast would channel foreign investment and 
capital into obtaining advanced technology and equipment. This would form the basis 
for transforming China into a global economic power, which in turn would channel 
yet more investment into the economy, thus creating an upward spiral.511
In order to boost local incentives, the SEZs were permitted to retain 100 per cent of 
earnings generated through export during 1982-90, vis-a-vis the 25 per cent granted to 
normal provinces. SEZs have since steadily grown to identify a geographically 
relatively coherent area characterized by its advanced marketisation and by the 
increasingly limited scope of central and local government. While the former is 
progressively disengaging itself in a move towards consistent market-friendly 
decentralization, the latter is reduced by the adoption (by local party officials) of the 
philosophy of small government.512 Overall, the SEZs have provided the PRC with a 
valuable institutional device not only to regulate the geographical pace of China’s 
integration into the world economy, but also to identify and anticipate in a controlled 
manner the emergence of market-driven social tensions.
iv. Special Administrative Regions
The final model of devolution, which exists wholly outside the normal structures of 
the state, was originally put forward as an example of Deng Xioaping thought in the 
late 1970s to solve the Taiwan issue.513 In order to enable re-unification of Taiwan 
with mainland China without threatening the former’s economy, it was decided to 
grant Taiwan special status within China as a whole. Later this idea was transplanted 
to solve the problems of Hong Kong and Macao and crystallised in the form of
510 Yang, 1997: 27.
511 Park, 1997: 3-7.
512 Yang, 2001:26.
513 Chen, 2003, 2002; and, Danspeckgruber, ed., 2002.
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Special Administrative Regions.514 The basic idea is that two systems should be 
allowed to exist within the confines of one unified and sovereign country. The 
constitutional basis for this regime is found in Article 31 of the 1982 Constitution.
In both cases, the “systems to be instituted” were agreed and broadly defined in two 
international treaties between China and the countries relinquishing control.515 
Furthermore, a drafting committee was established in each case to draw up a Basic 
Law, in effect akin to a mini-Constitutional instrument, laying down the form of 
government -  legislative, executive and judicial -  according to which each territory 
was to operate.516 In practice, this has resulted in a “high degree of autonomy”517 for 
the populations of both territories, whereby basic rights and political freedoms have 
been assured, the pre-existing legal systems of each preserved, and the power to 
legislate on most matters other than defence and foreign affairs guaranteed.518 
Importantly, it has also meant that the principal offices of state have been occupied by 
members of the local population, rather than by appointees from the mainland.519
The benefits that a properly managed re-incorporation of these territories, especially 
of Hong Kong, would bring to China in terms of national prestige and of economic 
strengthening was clear from the beginning. The constitutional provision for the 
establishment of special administrative regions was conceived to facilitate this 
process. Nevertheless, it was also conceived to preserve the Beijing government’s 
ultimate control both in form and in practice. Consequently, in the case of Hong 
Kong, Beijing retains the crucial power to issue final interpretations of the Basic 
Law: a form of ‘apex control’ which has already been used to contradict a ruling of
the Final Court of Appeal on a point that was perceived as threatening the strict 
control of immigration from the mainland.521 Here again, whilst there has been a 
determination to tie these territories to the mainland and reap the rewards they might
514 See: Clark, 1991 and Fifoot, 1994.
515 Join t D eclaration  o f  the G overnm ent o f  the U nited K ingdom  o f  G reat Britain and Northern Ireland an d  the P e o p le ’s  Republic  
o f  China on the Question o f  H ong Kong, 1984\ Joint D eclaration  o f  the Governm ent o f  the P e o p le ’s Republic o f  China and  the 
Governm ent o f  the R epublic o f  P ortugal on the question o f  M acao, 1987. See also: Chen, 2003; and, Ghai, 1997.
516 B asic L aw  o f  H ong K ong Specia l A dm inistrative Region o f  the PRC, 1990 (BLHKSAR). See also: Goodstadt, 2000; and, Xiao, 
2001 .
517 Ibid: Articles. 2 & 12.
518 Ibid: Article. 17.
519 Wang, 2004:213.
520 See: Article 158, BLHKSAR. See also: Elliot & Forsyth, 2000; Morris, 1991; Li, 2000; Lin, 2000: Chap 6; and, Lo, 2000.
521 N g K a Ling  v. D irec to r  O f  Im m igration  et.al.
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bring, there has also been a determination that this should not occur on terms that 
undermine the fundamental authority of the PRC leadership in Beijing.522
b. The Slowing Effect of Constitutional and Administrative 
Devolution
Despite the fact that each of these models has been cast in terms of strengthening and 
unifying the Chinese nation state, it is clear that they have reflected and recognised a 
deeper drive towards international integration. In this way, each one broadly reflects a 
different level of economic development. Moreover, since different levels of 
economic development correspond to different regions, each model also displays a 
certain regional specificity in its operation. This is because each level has required a 
distinct strategy of economic advancement since each has posed different challenges 
to its realisation. As such, the various models of devolution loosely signify different 
stages of enmeshment within the global economy. These devolutionary 
correspondences have been extremely significant in allowing China to integrate with 
the global economy in a relatively controlled and gradual manner. This has been 
achieved by using the state’s power to regulate and discipline its overall advance.
Here it is important to recognise the extent to which the Chinese state retains power of 
its own to balance, and even to counter-act, market forces. Although the track of 
economic development involves the gradual diminution of that power, at any stage 
prior to the market’s complete dominance, it continues to factor. Accordingly, as long 
as the effect of China’s policies is not fundamentally to confute the thrust to market 
integration, it retains power enough to structure and pace its advance. This is precisely 
what the policies of China’s leadership have been doing during the reform period. In 
choosing to incorporate and implement what amounts to a programme of staged 
marketisation within its developmental strategy, the Chinese State has trodden the 
path of international economic integration in a slow and controlled way.
This has been achieved by the state’s insistence on introducing marketisation, where 
possible, according to its own timetable. As a result, economic liberalisation was first 
implemented in a limited, experimental, and geographically defined manner. Only
522 Fu, 2005; Hong Kong Law Journal, 2007; Lau & Kuan; and, Pepper.
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later was it introduced in a staged manner more generally. This enabled the market’s 
initial infiltrations to take place in a risk-averse fashion and prevented its disorderly 
advance. It also led to the separating out of the various levels of integration and 
allotting to them relatively clear, controllable, geographical parameters. In this way, 
the market has not had a free hand. Instead, what has emerged in China is a 
governmental grid, instituted by law, which allows and encourages variable rates of 
economic development, but insists that they all cohere under its discipline. 
Furthermore, it is a grid that has a real impact on the specific geographic patterns of 
economic integration.
The gradualism that has resulted from this control means that the government has the 
time to use its power to restructure China in a way that prepares it for an ever- 
increasing degree of marketisation. What the framework of devolution has done, is to 
distinguish between different levels of resistance to such a process. By delineating the 
extent and contours of resistance at the macro-level, this has resulted in targeting the 
state’s restructuring power in a much more effective manner. Whilst in strategising 
for social and national control it may not be clear to state functionaries that they are 
serving the priorities of the market, what in fact is being instituted is an ingenious 
continuum.
B: India
1. General
Owing to its contrasting social and political makeup, the juridico-developmental 
issues in the last decades of the twentieth century were quite different in the Indian 
sub-continent to those in China. For one thing, it has not been necessary for the India 
to undergo the same substantial process of legal construction and re-construction as it 
has been for China since the experiment in India with mass populist politics in the late 
1970s was able to run much less deep than was the parallel experiment in China under 
Chairman Mao. The endurance in India of the basic constitutional governmental and 
legal structures not only spoke of the inability of even the most determined and 
charismatic of leaders to disregard the socio-political settlement they embodied, but 
also meant that the return to more conventional forms of government involved the re­
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engagement of a pre-existing developmental framework which necessarily 
conditioned the nonetheless significant innovations of the reform period. Chief among 
those innovations was, of course, the shift away from detailed state control of 
economic decision-making through extensive public ownership, detailed state 
regulation and protective national tariff walls towards a less interventionist, 
deregulated and market-centred approach. Ultimately, this shift resulted in the 
inauguration of a full-scale New Economic Policy by Narashima Rao’s government in 
1991.
Accompanying this de-regulative and devolutionary shift within the economic sphere 
was an increasingly apparent indigenisation of the governmental and legal structures, 
particularly through the activation of the higher judiciary in terms of taking much 
greater account of the traditional normative systems operating within wider Indian 
society. This phenomenon, which was accompanied by a similar and marked growth 
in regional disparities, should be seen in terms of the increasingly effective activation 
of India’s basic developmental strategy which, as a prelude to systematic 
transformation, require more subtle account to be taken of the social and political 
realities upon which it was necessary for it to work. In this sense, the growing 
processes of indigenisation and regionalisation are quite compatible with that of 
marketisation; they being a form of structural decentralisation the functional role of 
which is to surveil extant power relations more closely and thereby to increase the 
capacity for their more efficient and effective co-option.
Consistent with this analysis is the fact that, not only has greater recognition of social 
diversities been coupled with subtly strategic attempts to adduce and then undermine 
them, but also that these regional diversities and disparities have very gradually been 
shifting their emphasis from cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious bases, to purely 
economic and material bases.523 The framers of the national constitution in 1950 
clearly already appreciated the need to recognise the deep diversities within Indian 
society even whilst negotiating a longer-term programme to overcome them. As such, 
“the entire national political structure after independence was, in fact, built upon 
accommodation of these linguistic, religious and caste sentiments and structures as the
523 In general see: Austin, 1999.
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only way to accelerate national integration, enhance the legitimacy of the political 
system, and maximise the peaceful adjustment of social conflicts that arise during the 
development process.”524 Consequently, the constitutional settlement which found 
expression in what remains the largest national constitution in the world was premised 
upon a complex recognition of a number of forms of diversity inherent in Indian life.
2. Post-Independence Settlement
a. Linguistic and Geographic
The first form of diversity was essentially geographic and linguistic, being reflected in 
the federal or quasi-federal nature of the Constitution. Substantially modelled on the 
pre-independence Government o f India Act, 1935, Article 1 of the 1950 Constitution 
provides for a “Union of States” whose component sub-national units are afforded 
their own legislatures separate from those of the Union525 and exercising their own set 
of powers.526 Moreover, in the Union legislature, in addition to the directly elected 
lower house (the House of the People or Lok Sabha),527 the states’ interests are 
represented through an upper house (Council of States or Rajya Sabha),528 composed 
largely of states’ representatives elected by their respective legislature529 and chaired 
by the Union Vice-President.530 Moreover, whilst the Constitution can itself on most 
matters be amended by a special majority of the Union legislature,531 amendments to 
those provisions touching upon the role, structure and functioning of the States 
require, in addition, the consent of at least half of the states’ legislatures.532
Overall division of legislative power as between the States and the Union legislatures 
is laid down in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution in three lists: the Union list, 
specifying those matters which fall exclusively within the competence of the Union 
legislature, the States’ list, specifying those matters falling solely within the 
competence of the states’ legislatures, and the Concurrent list, over which both Union
524 Frankel, 1978: 20. See also: Singh &Deva, 2005.
525 Article 168(1), Constitution o f  India.
526 Ibid: Article 194
521 Ibid: Article 79
528 Ibid: Article 80
529 Ibid: Article 80(1 )(b), (4) and (5)
530 Ibid: Article 89(1)
531 Ibid: Article 368(1)
532 Ibid: Article 368(2)(a)-(e)
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and states’ legislatures exercise jurisdiction. Mirroring these structural and substantive 
divisions in legislative power, provision is further made for separate states and Union 
executives.533 The nominal head of the latter, the President of India, is elected every 
five years by an electoral college comprising members of the both the Union and 
states legislatures,534 whilst the Vice-President is elected solely by the Union 
legislature.535 Real power resides, beneath the President, in the Union Council of 
Ministers or cabinet, according to whose advice the President is normally bound to 
act.536 This is headed by the Prime-Minister who is usually the leader of the largest 
political party in the Lok Sabha.537 The Union government is divided into a number of 
ministries or departments headed by a minister who sits in the Council of Ministers538 
who is assisted by a large number of competitively appointed civil servants 
comprising what are collectively known as the Central Services. This arrangement is 
largely replicated at the state level, with the executive power of each state being 
vested in the state Governor appointed by the President of India on the advice of the 
Union Council of Ministers for a term of five years,539 but acting on the advice of the 
state Council of Ministers headed by the state Chief Minister who him/herself is 
normally the leader of the majority party in the lower or only house of the relevant 
state legislature.540
Reflecting the strong post-independence pressure for greater recognition of linguistic 
diversity, and also the importance of greater linguistic homogeneity to administrative 
efficiency at the state and regional level, the States Reorganisation Commission, 
recommended in its 1955 report that state boundaries be redrawn to mirror the 
linguistic divisions of the country more closely.541 As a result, fourteen states and six 
territories were created in 1956, each of whose boundaries corresponded to a 
dominant regional linguistic grouping. Subsequently this number was periodically 
added to in response to rebellion, agitation and sometimes even mere expediency.542 
Whilst there is no doubt that the “impact of linguistic federalism has been an
533 Ibid; Article 52-79 (Union) and Articles 153-167 (States)
534 Ibid: Articles 5 2 ,54(a) and (b), 55 and 56
535 Ibid: Articles 66 and 67
536 Ibid: Article 74 as amended by the Constitution (F orty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976  s. 13
537 Ibid: Article 74(1), (2), (3) and (5)
538 Ibid: Articles 74 and 75
539 Ibid: Articles 153, 154(1), 155 and 156(3)
540 Ibid: Articles 163(1) andl64(l) and (4)
541 Tremblay, 1997: 164.
542 Ibid: 163.
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increased sense of regional identity of which the leaders of the dominant language 
groups have been able to take advantage”,543 and that the reorganisation of states’ 
boundaries along linguistic lines afforded such identities a direct channel into national 
politics, it is not clear that anything less would have avoided the wholesale 
disintegration of the country. From this perspective, “...the survival of the Indian 
federation [has] largely [been] the result of the national leadership’s accommodation 
of the influential regional groups in the national political structure.”544 Indeed, it is 
precisely by avoiding confrontation that the central government was able to adopt “a 
posture of mediation and arbitration between contending linguistic cultural forces” as 
long as they did not fundamentally threaten territorial integrity.545
Two factors have ensured that the regional variations recognized in the executive and 
legislative structures are nonetheless prevented from becoming too strong. The first is 
the fact that under certain circumstances the Union can, and on several occasions has, 
dissolved the executives and legislatures of individual states, imposing governor’s 
rule under the direction of the Union Government and the President.546 Secondly, 
there is the more permanent feature of a unitary judicial and court structure which, 
though administered separately through the Supreme Court at the centre547 and the 
High courts together with their subordinates in each state,548 is nonetheless fused into 
a unitary hierarchy with no distinctively federal structure. Consequently, the Supreme 
Court acts as the final tribunal of review in all areas of law, not just those falling 
within the subject areas of the Union List or impinging upon the Constitution, as well 
as exercising its own original jurisdiction in disputes between the Union and the states 
or between the states inter se, and having the power to issue writs in the nature of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto for the 
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights.549 Likewise, the state High Courts, which 
mirror the structure of the Supreme Court in being themselves composed of a Chief 
Justice and a number of Puisne Judges,550 not only hear appeals and act as courts of 
revision for the subordinate courts and tribunals within their particular state
543 Ibid.
544 Ibid: 164.
545 Brass, 1994: 151.
546 Article 356, Constitution o f  India.
547 Ibid: Articles 124-147
548 Ibid: Articles 214-237
549 Ibid: Article 32
550 Ibid: Article 216
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territories,551 but also have the power themselves to ensure the enforcement of 
Fundamental Rights of their state citizens, through the issuing of the various writs,552 
as well as exercising original jurisdiction in certain civil matters and in admiralty 
cases.553 Finally, below the level of the High Courts, the subordinate courts are 
divided according to whether they exercise civil or criminal jurisdiction. The civil 
courts consist of District Courts to whom an initial appeal lies from lower munsif 
courts and courts of subordinate judges.554 The criminal courts consist of courts of 
session to which initial appeals lie from the magistrates’ courts of first and second 
class.555 Finally, specialised tribunals, such as Income Tax Appellate Tribunals, 
Company Law Review Boards, Sales Tax Tribunals, Consumer Forums, Central and 
State Administrative Tribunals and Debt Recovery Tribunals operate within particular 
states territories under the superintendent of the relevant High Court.556
b. Personal Laws
The second major way in which the diversity of Indian society was taken account of 
in the 1950 constitutional settlement was in the continuance of the pre-existing system 
of personal laws which governed those areas of a primarily familiar nature, which 
were apt to touch upon particularly deep seated and especially strongly held religious 
and communal convictions. Importantly, building upon the practices of the Raj before 
it, not all self-identifying religious communities were allowed their own separate 
personal laws; only those with the most divergent of religious practices so that both 
the Sikh and Buddhist communities to name only the most prominent examples, were 
assimilated under Hindu personal law. Moreover, Hindu law, being the law of the 
majority community, it was felt could be brought under statutory regulation without 
too much political agitation as a way of imposing upon it greater uniformity and 
regularity. This was achieved not in the Constitution itself, but soon after its 
institution in a series of Parliamentary Acts often collectively referred to as the 
‘Hindu Code’.557 These, read together with Article 44 of the Constitution specifying
551 Ibid: Articles 225-231
552 Ibid: Article 226
553 Ibid: Article 225.
554 Ibid: Articles 233-237 and Section 100, C ivil Procedure Code,
555 Sections 374, 376 and 376G, Crim inal Procedure Code, 1973,
556 Article 227, Constitution o f  India
557 Hindu M arriage Act, 1955', H indu Succession Act, 1956; Hindu Adoption and M aintenance Act, 1956; and Hindu M inority  
an d  Guardianship Act, 1956.
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as a Directive Principle of State Policy that “the state shall endeavour to secure for the 
citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India”, indicate the dynamic 
nature of the settlement in this area which, though finding it necessary to recognize 
the personal and religious diversities of the Indian population at the time of its 
negotiation, nevertheless, clearly determined to effect the ultimate undermining of 
those diversities through in the longer term, through a process of uniformization. 
Importantly, however, even in the various provisions of the ‘Hindu Code’, there 
remained embodied a realism as to the limits of what could be achieved in practice 
even within the law of the majority community, so that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 
in particular contained a number of provisions preserving customary forms of 
marriage and divorce.558
c. Socio-Economic
The third and final major area in which the Constitution recognized diversity was in 
the area of socio-economic positioning. The huge economic disparities that existed 
within the polity of India were clearly appreciated by nearly all the major ideological 
factions represented within the Constitutional Assembly. Moreover, there is little 
doubt that the vast majority were committed, not only to reducing the inequalities 
within India that had traditionally been endemic, but also to raising the overall 
prosperity of the nation for the purposes both of increasing its material strength in the 
face of potential external threat and, more importantly, in order to raise the vast 
majority of the Indian population out of the grinding hand to mouth agricultural 
existence to which they had hitherto been subjected. In order to achieve these goals, 
the Constitution embodies in effect a three pronged program of socio-economic uplift. 
The first prong was found in the catalogue of Fundamental Rights guaranteed in 
Section III of the Constitution. These were conferred upon all citizens and took 
precedence over all other extant law. They included the standard political rights to 
equality559 and to freedom,560 including to the right of the freedom of religion and 
conscience, and associated practices, which represented the common core of most 
liberal democracies. At the same time they also included rights specifically designed 
for the Indian context, and aimed at expunging or remedying forms of social
558 Section 29(2)
559 Articles 14,15 and 16, Constitution o f  India.
560 Ibid: Articles 19,20, 2 land 25-28.
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exploitation such as untouchability,561 caste discrimination,562 traffic in human 
beings,563 and forced labour564 which had been endemic in parts of the Raj in pre­
independence India. Finally, they also added to the standard liberal and democratic 
rights of western democracies by protecting the rights of minorities to utilize their 
own distinctive languages, preserve their cultural identities, and establish and 
administer their own educational institutions.565
The second prong of the constitutional development program was found in the 
Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Section VI of the Constitution, which 
were to be read together with the Fundamental Rights in Section III. Although the 
Directive Principles were not directly enforceable, they were nevertheless stated to be 
“fundamental to the governance of the country”566 and were meant to operate as long 
term programmatic guidelines for creating the type of social order of liberty, equality, 
fraternity and political and economic justice which was enunciated in the Preamble to 
the Constitution. These principles were of variable specificity: they included 
stipulations that the state should “direct its policies towards securing.. .that the 
ownership and control of the material resources of the community is so distributed as 
to sub-serve the common good”,567 that it should encourage the provision of just and 
humane conditions of work,568 that it should promote the social and economic 
interests of scheduled castes, tribes and other disadvantaged groups,569 that it should 
try to ensure all citizens work at a living wage,570 and that it should attempt to provide 
for free and compulsory education for all children up to the age of fourteen.571 More 
contentiously, as has already been seen, it was directed that the state should 
endeavour to secure a uniform civil code for all citizens of the country, and under 
Article 44, partly as a concession to the Gandhian sentiment at the time of the 
Constitution’s negotiation, it was provided that village Panchayats should be
561 Ibid: Article 29
562 Ibid: Article 15
553 Ibid: Article 23
564 Ibid. See also Article 24 (abolition o f  child labour).
565 Ibid: Articles 29, 350, 350A, and 30.
566 Ibid: Article 37
567 Ibid: Article 39
568 Ibid: Article 42
569 Ibid; Article 46
570 Ibid: Article 43
571 Ibid; Article 45 now amended by the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2002.
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organized as a way of giving effect to a form of bottom up rural democracy and self- 
government.572
Intersecting with the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy 
the third prong of the Constitutions’ development programme focused upon the 
preferential treatment of a number of hitherto disadvantaged groups within Indian 
society, in order to construct a sophisticated system of affirmative action. Working 
upon the principle that to treat like situated groups similarly conduced to social and 
economic justice but to treat dissimilarly situated groups similarly militated against it, 
the constitution identified those disadvantaged groups requiring state assistance under 
two broad categories. The first was designated the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and 
the second was given the broad title of ‘Other Backward Classes’. In the case of the 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, responsibility for a enumerating and updating the 
groups to be so scheduled was conferred upon the President and the state 
Governors,573 with the groups falling within the category of ‘Other Backward Classes’ 
to be decided upon in conjunction with periodic investigative commissions appointed 
by the President to enquire into their conditions.574 It was also provided that a 
Presidentially appointed officer for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes should 
have the power, “to investigate all matters relating to the safeguards provided” for 
them,575 Specifically, in Part XVI of the Constitution, a series of “special provisions 
relating to certain classes” were laid down, including the reservation of seats in the 
Lok Sabha and the state legislatures for members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and 
for government appointments insofar as they did not interfere with administrative 
efficiency. Overall then, the constitutional settlement of 1950, in seeking to guarantee 
equality, recognised the inevitable need to take account of the huge diversities of 
Indian life in order to create a dynamic that would progressively realise that objective 
in practice whilst raising the overall level of material prosperity.
572 Ibid: Article 40
573 Ibid: Articles 341 and 342
574 Ibid: Article 340
575 Ibid: Article 338. See also the Constitution (Sixty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1990
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3. The Emergency: Reassertion and Recalibration
Between 1950 and the 1970s, the strategy adopted by the government of India for the 
operation of this constitutional programme, embodied in the Nehruvian consensus, 
and despite the various minority guarantees was, wherever possible, a fundamentally 
centralising one which concentrated upon heavy state-led economic intervention, self- 
reliance and centralised planning. The ultimate failure of this strategy to fulfil the 
promises contained within the Constitution of greater and more balanced material 
progress, eventually precipitated a crisis in the Indian Polity as Mrs Gandhi sort to 
bypass the normal mechanisms of government, first, by increasingly populist appeals 
to the masses and, then, by a whole-sale suspension of those mechanisms during the 
Emergency of 1975-77. This crisis precipitated a fundamental redirection in the legal 
and constitutional system. At one level, this redirection entailed the greater 
indigenisation of India’s developmental state and thus a greater manifestation of its 
numerous latent socio-cultural diversities. At another level, however, this growing 
indigenisation can actually be seen as a necessary and prerequisite sensitisation of the 
developmental state as prelude to the much more effective and sustainable 
transformation of Indian society. From this angle, a proper perspective on post- 
Emergency Indian legal, governmental and constitutional development can only be 
secured if the numerous indigenising tendencies are read together with the gradual 
shift in India’s political economy from a commitment to a mixed, heavily planned 
model towards commitment to an increasingly marketised one. In this way, it is 
possible to see that, just as in matters pertaining to the modem, industrialised sectors 
of the Indian economy there has been a controlled and limited devolution of power 
into the hands of entrepreneurs, producers and consumers in a manner that 
increasingly co-opts them in the service of more efficient economic development, so 
too the processes of indigenisation can be seen as a prelude not only to the 
developmental state’s more subtle and therefore more effective transformation of 
Indian society, but also to the strategic co-option of certain portions of traditional 
society where functionally appropriate to the particular stage of development reached 
in the overall and longer term service of that transformation.
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a. Constitutional Amendment
Outside of the specific reforms in economic policy, there were four major areas of in 
which the fundamental redirection and much greater developmental activation of the 
post-Emergency legal system has been exhibited.576 The first was represented by the 
Forty-Second and Forty-Fourth Constitution (Amendment) Acts of 1976 and 1978.
The first of these -  the Forty-Second (Amendment) A c t-  passed during the course of 
the Emergency itself by Mrs Gandhi, sought to change the functional dynamic of the 
Constitution by protecting laws which purported either to implement any of the 
Directive Principles of State Policy or to prohibited anti-national activity or the 
formation of anti-national associations from being declared un-constitutional on the 
grounds that they violated Fundamental Rights. And it added an entirely new section 
to the Constitution specifying Fundamental Duties which sought “to promote 
harmony in the spirit of common brotherhood among the people of India, 
transcending religious, linguistic, regional or sectional diversities.” Moreover, 
although after March 1977, when the first election after the Emergency returned a 
new Janata dominated Parliament, the Forty-Third and Forty-Fourth (Amendment) 
Acts revoked some of the more draconian aspects of the Forty-Second (Amendment) 
Act, thereby reasserting the authority of normal constitutional government, significant 
portions of the Forty-Second Amendment programme were nonetheless retained. In 
particular, the Forty-Third and Forty-Fourth Amendments retained the Forty-Second 
Amendment’s re-emphasis upon the Constitution’s fundamentally ‘socialist’ nature, 
by which was meant its inherent developmental logic in support of social uplift. 
Indeed, significantly, this re-emphasis was taken even further in the Forty-Fourth 
(Amendment) Act, which — the Janata government having reasserted the precedence of 
Fundamental Rights over the Directive Principles of State Policy — nonetheless 
determined to abolish or at least qualify the fundamental right to property by 
stipulating that: “no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of 
law”.
Whilst superficially these developments could be viewed as marking an advance, or at 
least a reconsideration, of the old Nehruvian state socialist agenda, given the
576 The author is indebted to Professor Werner Menski for the suggestion o f this four-fold division.
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particular composition of the Janata leadership and the fact that the Emergency itself 
represented part of a populist by-passing of the normal state structures, they are better 
understood as part of the much wider process of post-Emergency indigenisation. As 
such, the Forty-Second, Forty-Third and Forty-Fourth (Amendment) Acts marked a 
signal departure in Indian constitutional jurisprudence. In this context, it has been 
pointed out by a number of scholars that the redefinition of property as being held on 
trust not just for the individual but for the benefit of the public in general, the 
introduction of stronger Directive Principles on equal distribution, legal aid and 
environmental protection, and in particular the constitutional specification of 
Fundamental Duties, clearly reflect indigenous and traditional Hindu concepts of 
interlinkedness, Dharma and the promotion of the public interest harmoniously with 
that of the individual as the basis for proper communal living. Moreover, in the early 
1990s, these trends were given important further institutional expression under the 
terms of the Seventy-Third and Seventy-Fourth Constitution (Amendment) Acts which 
instituted, in conformity with the Directive Principle embodied in Article 40 of the 
Constitution, a third tier of government -  in addition to those of the Centre and the 
states -  in the form of elected rural and urban bodies.577 Building upon the Gandhian 
ideal of a network of self-governing ‘village republics’, and in states with a 
population of more than two million, these bodies comprise three levels: the village 
panchayats at the lowest level, the block panchayats at the intermediate level and 
district panchayats at the uppermost level. Three types of municipality were also 
instituted in urban areas (again depending upon population size): municipal 
corporations, municipal councils, and Nagar panchayats. These bodies were all 
brought under Part IX of the Constitution, “to ensure in the Constitution certain basic 
and essential features of Panchayati Raj Institutions to impart certainty, continuity and 
strength.”578 Consequently, the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules, added to the 
Constitution along with the Seventy-Third and Seventy-Fourth Amendments, indicate 
the transfer of a total of twenty nine subjects to the panchayats and eighteen subjects 
to the municipalities.579
577 Matthew, 1997: 105.
578 Venkatas wamy, 1991
579 Matthew, 2000: 108.
151
b. Legislation
In addition to, and wholly in line with, these radical constitutional reformulations, 
there were, from as early as 1973, a number of legislative interventions designed to 
tackle specific social justice issues such as to render the legal system as a whole more 
‘emancipatory’ or ‘people oriented’. These included: extending the secular 
maintenance provision, via sections 125 and 127 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
1973, to cover all divorced wives until death or remarriage regardless of their 
communal affiliation; several acts to effect the prohibition of dowry payments;580 the
» CQ1 <prohibition of child labour; the explicit prohibition of bonded labour together with
criminal sanctions and institutional provisions to ensure its implementation;582 and the
r o i
passage of consumer and environmental protection laws. Finally, m the early 
1990s, it also involved controversial attempts to operationalise a system of affirmative 
action in favour of the materially disadvantaged ‘backward classes’ as recommended 
by a commission appointed within the terms of Article 340 of the Constitution under 
the chairmanship of B.P.Mandal (Indra Sawney v. India).
c. Judicial Activism
The third major area in which this post-Emergency redirection manifested itself was 
in the activation of the higher judiciary. Prior to the Emergency, the jurisprudence of 
both the High Courts and the Supreme Court tended to be conservative in nature, and 
its interpretation of constitutional provisions somewhat restrictive. On those occasions 
when it did show signs of activism, this tended to be limited to smoothing the way for 
the implementation of the Nehruvian strategy of heavy industrialization. The collapse 
of the Supreme Court’s power during the worst excesses of the Emergency together 
with the prospect of its long-term impotence in the face of the executive, shocked it as 
a body into action after normal constitutional government was restored in 1977, and it 
developed a number of strategies to shore up its somewhat precarious position. First, 
it determined both firmly to reassert its right and responsibility to review legislative 
and executive acts where these threatened to violate the “basic features” of the
580 Crim inal L aw  (Second Amendment) Act, 1983; D ow ry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984; M aintenance o f  List o f  Presents to 
the B ride and B ridegroom  Rules, 1985; D o w ry  Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986; D ow ry Prohibition Rules (Kerala), 1992.
581 C hild L abour (Prohibition an d  Regulation) Act, 1986
582 B onded Labour System  (Abolition) Act, 1976
583 Consum er P rotection  Act, 1986
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Constitution and to institute procedures to protect the independence of the higher 
judiciary from being interfered with under the guise of administrative convenience. 
Secondly, it determined gradually to institute a series of systemic innovations in order 
to enable the more effective implementation of Section III rights, taking account, in 
particular, of the social and economic conditions in which the large majority of Indian 
citizens found themselves. This involved both the loosening of procedural rules for 
access to the Supreme and High Courts where it was alleged that citizens’ 
fundamental rights had been violated and the considerable expansion of locus standi 
requirements so that public interest cases could be more easily taken up by public 
spirited individual on behalf of the downtrodden. Finally, it determined to adopt an 
altogether more purposive approach to the interpretation of Section III of the 
Constitution itself. In addition to a transformation in the reading of Fundamental 
Rights individually, this manifested itself, in particular, in the expansion of the area 
over which they were operative and in a more holistic interpretation of their 
relationship with the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Section IV.
Underlying these various strategies, was a more conventional determination on the 
part of the judiciary to reassert its constitutionally mandated role as the state’s final 
interpretative authority against the excessive incursions of an over-mighty executive, 
but also a growing appreciation of the fact that its power ultimately depended upon 
the support of the Indian population itself. Consequently, these developments have 
exampled an increasing determination creatively to activate the Constitution as a 
mechanism of social uplift so that the Court is better able to be seen as an ally rather 
than an enemy of the downtrodden and thus better able to build a constituency of 
support among the masses which elected politicians can no longer ignore.
The subtle and sensitising role of the judiciary has been of crucial importance also in 
the fourth and final area of post-Emergency jurisprudential transformation; namely, in 
the gradual realignment of India’s heterogeneous personal law system. Here too it is 
possible to see powerful evidence of the increasingly effective cooption of traditional 
structures and communities into the wider developmental process and into the overall 
logic which underpins it. As such, after a strong initial impulse to impose legal 
uniformity top down via incremental legislative reform, it became increasingly clear 
to the higher judiciary, particularly given its newly activated mindset, that any
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straight-forward application of such provisions in particular cases would result, at 
best, in injustice, and, at worst, in wholesale, even violent, rejection of the project of 
legal uniformity. Consequently, what has begun to emerge from the late 1970s/early 
to mid-1980s has been a much more sophisticated strategy whereby the Supreme and 
High Courts have worked to implement various extant statutory provisions in a 
manner and at a rate that prove socially sustainable. In particular, this has involved 
gradually eschewing somewhat grandiloquent, even damaging, demands for the 
implementation of a comprehensive Uniform Civil Code as mandated under Article 
44 of the Constitution, and redirecting energies towards ensuring that substantive 
justice is done in particular cases, taking full account of the specific contexts within 
which disputes have arisen. Importantly, this has increasingly involved judges 
drawing upon, though also subtly changing and extending, indigenous notions of 
‘right order’ and ‘appropriateness’. This has not led to a fundamental reversal of the 
overall trend towards legal uniformity and the dual principles of equality and 
individuation presupposed in the institution of a market sympathetic morality. Rather 
it has made that process more insidious and effective because it has rendered it 
simultaneously more gradual and more subtle. In consequence, following a path of 
gradual case-based incrementalism, it has proved less and less possible for the forces 
of tradition to offer wholesale and effective resistance.
4. Geographic Disparities
As with China the process of liberalization and economic opening in India has led to 
the emergence or exacerbation of a number of regional disparities, the most noticeable 
of which have been between those states in the north and the east of the coimtry, 
which have tended to become economically more backward, on the one hand, and 
those states in the south and the west of the country which have tended to become 
economically more forward, on the other. At once, however, it must be noted that this 
process has been much less clear cut in India than in China. Indeed, the fact that 
India’s constitutional and federal structure has increasingly been forced to take 
account of latent linguistic and ethnic diversities is indicative of the fact that they 
have been much more disruptive of, and resistant to, the emergence of a purely 
economic logic than their less extensive counter-parts in China. Almost paradoxically, 
however, it seems that the very factors which have tended to inhibit competency and
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consistency of approach and thus to make overall collective action at the national 
level more difficult, have also made any really concerted and unified resistance to 
central level reform initiatives almost impossible. In particular, they have acted to 
quarantine and localise disaffection in a manner that makes longer term interregional 
alliances extremely difficult to sustain. Consequently, whilst accepting that India 
suffers greater resistance to the emergence of an autonomous and purely economic 
logic of development than does China, which has been able to engage the market in an 
altogether more disciplined and determined fashion, it is, at the very same time, also 
true that India’s “federal political structure has been an extremely important 
ingredient in helping to make its economic reform programme politically 
sustainable”. This has particularly been the case in the way it has helped to reduce 
“pressure on political decision-makers in the central government to abandon 
reforms.”584 What this has meant in practice is that, as liberalisation policies have 
been introduced at the centre, states have been less and less able, even if they have so 
wished, to protect themselves against the disciplining effects of a market and 
investment dynamic which has increasingly favoured those environments most 
conducive to its propagation.
It is important to recognise that what is new is not the fact of interstate competition 
per se. Prior to reform there was already a great deal of such competition, but it was a 
form of competition channelled and mediated through the central government such 
that most “strategies were formulated with a view to getting crucial resources from 
the centre, whether in the form of the location of private sector factories or public
r o c
sector resources.” With the abandonment of the location policy in 1991, states have 
now been enabled, even indeed obliged, to “bypass the centre and go directly to the 
business houses and foreign investors.” This has caused a transformation in the nature 
of interstate competition “from a vertical to a horizontal one” which has meant that, 
“even if only some states do better than the rest in the race, there is a change in the 
way all states conceive (or can potentially conceive) of their role in shaping economic
z  OfZ
policy.” In this way, states have been subjected to the disciplining effects of the 
market to an unprecedented degree and this has forced them to pay a growing
584 Jenks, 1998: 8.
585 Sinha, 2004: 35.
586 Ibid.
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economic price for allegiances and commitments which are not in line with, or which 
serve to frustrate, the operation of the market.
Put a slightly different way, the new centre-level policies have enabled Indian and 
foreign capital freely to identify those locations likely to provide the best investment 
returns, and, for this reason, the amenability or otherwise of the local policy 
environment has become an increasingly important factor in India’s regional politics. 
The fact that “state governments have become a crucial point of contact for 
entrepreneurs” has set off an “intense competition among state governments to attract 
investment, resulting in a proliferation of tax incentive schemes and promises of 
speedy administrative procedures, the expedition of land acquisition for industrial 
uses, and efforts to maintain a conducive industrial relations climate.”587 Whilst it has 
clearly not been the case that sub-national ethnic, linguistic and religious tensions and 
identities inhibitory of a fully functioning market dynamic have ceased to factor 
strongly as determinants in India’s investment environment, states have increasingly 
been forced to pay the economic price for their persistence. Thus, in a 2001 joint 
study by the World Bank and the Confederation of Indian Industry, it was found that 
the cross-state variation in investment environment was clearly reflected in the 
disproportionate share of investment -  especially foreign investment -  attracted by 
more ‘investor-friendly’ states (Mahrastra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu) to the detriment of the more ‘investor-hostile’ states (Uttar Pradesh, 
Bihar, West Bengal). Moreover, this situation has led to an increase in the variation of 
state growth rates and has even seen a deceleration in the less advantaged states as 
compared to the 1980s.588 In addition to provoking considerable unrest, this has meant 
that even very stubborn state governments are likely more and more to be coerced into 
streamlining their activities according to the contours and priorities of the market.
Tellingly, this is also a situation which has found expression in the differential 
functioning of the sub-state decentralisation policies introduced by the Seventy-Third
c o n  t
and Seventy-Fourth Constitution (Amendment) Acts. Underlying these amendments 
was:
587 ibid.
588 Ibid..
589 Sapovadi, 2003.
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the premise that effective decentralization of the authority and 
responsibility along with resources, for local development to elected 
representative local bodies will help ensure that programmes are better 
adapted to local needs, that stronger pressures will be generated to 
ensure that the works are completed, maintained and managed properly, 
and that the have-nots and underprivileged can exert effective 
democratic pressure on the local government to assess their needs.590
And it does indeed seem that, where these reforms have been effectively implemented 
and have begun to bed-down, so to speak, greater transparency has indeed been 
“forced on the functioning of the locally elected representatives and bureaucrats” such 
that it has become easier for “local people to identify and expose corruption.” This 
has consequently meant that “the proportion of intended benefits reaching target 
groups has increased substantially ever since they have been channelled through 
decentralised local self-governments.” In this way, these new policies of sub-state 
decentralisation have been shown to be an “an effective means of involving people in 
improving the local delivery system of local public goods,”591 as well as achieving 
greater allocative efficiency in their provision.
590 Sathe, 2002: 54-55.
591 Thimmaiah, 1977: 112-113, in Matthew, 1997.
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Chapter 5: The State
As the market has been allowed greater scope, and decision-making powers have 
devolved on to individual entrepreneurs, enterprises and consumers, so also there has 
been an inevitable transformation in the activities of the Chinese and Indian states.
The tightening division of labour spurred by reform has had an effect well beyond the 
conventional spheres of direct economic concern for government. In both jurisdictions 
there has been a growing use of the state to constrain the state in a manner that 
attempts to reduce the discretionary and arbitrary exercise of power over the 
population and to secure its more focused exercise according to a philosophy both of 
more efficient bureaucratic functioning and personal autonomy which is increasingly 
in harmony with the functional requirements of the market. It is, of course, important 
to recognise that these are tendencies that are evolving within a prolonged transitional 
phase and thus the situation, when taken at any given point over the past three 
decades, far from approximates to the purported ideal type of a full-blown market 
society. Further, what is to be particularly noted in what follows is the gradual and 
growing shift in the direction of such a type and what that reveals about the dynamic 
socio-economic forces reconfiguring each jurisdiction. Once more, it will also be seen 
that these tendencies have manifested themselves in China and India in quite different 
ways. In China, they have involved both the elaboration of an increasingly 
comprehensive and detailed administrative and criminal law system based upon a 
growing recognition of individual rights and, to a limited extent, even freedoms and 
also, as part of this process, the gradual de-politicisation of the normal mechanisms of 
state power. In India, much of the apparatus for the control of state power have 
existed since the beginning of the Republic and certainly there were a comprehensive 
set of personal freedoms and closely delimited governmental structures laid down in 
the Constitution. Rather than having to fundamentally re-institutionalise the exercise 
of state power in the way that China has had to, then, in India it has been much more a 
question of engaging and activating more effectively mechanisms which already 
existed, and in this the focus has very much been on the operationalisation of the 
Fundamental Rights section of the Constitution followed by the substantially 
expanded public interest basis by the higher judiciary.
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A: China
1. Administrative Law
In China the idea of controlling the activities of Party-State operatives within a tight 
normative framework ran counter to both the traditional ideological understandings of 
the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and leadership of the Communist Party and to the 
decades of pre-reform practice in which state structures, insofar as they were 
respected at all, were utilised as tools in the service of mobilisational drives under the
C Q O
direction of ideologically primed Party cadres. Realisation of the inimical nature of 
this situation to sustainable long-term economic development was of course part of 
the comprehensive overall reaction against Maoist rule, but owing to the weight of 
ingrained expectations and habits, both legislative and institutional requirements for a 
systematic reversal of this situation have only gradually and by stages been accepted 
and realised in practice as the reform process has unfolded. As early as the 1982 
Constitution, Article 41 stated that: “Citizens who have suffered loses through 
infringement of their civil rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to 
compensation in accordance with the law” and this principle was reaffirmed in Article 
121 of the General Principles o f the Civil Law (GPCL) 1986.593 In the intervening 
years a number of laws and regulations in the rapidly developing Chinese legislative 
environment had purported to provide individuals offended by administrative 
decisions the right to appeal to the People’s Courts and some attempt had been made 
to provide for such appeals, first, by bringing them under the general scope of civil 
procedure and, second, by experimenting on a limited basis in the early 1980s with 
specialised administrative chambers in some local courts.594 In this way, nascent 
forms of administrative litigation began to supplement and then gradually to 
supersede traditional “letters and visits work” on the part of governmental bodies, 
which had been the more informal and personal way by which aggrieved Chinese 
citizens registered their objections to administrative activities which affected them 
adversely.595
592
593 Chen, 2004; Lubman, 1999.
594 Article 3, L aw  o f  C ivil P rocedu re (provisional) 1982.
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a. Litigation and Review
A major event in the development of China’s administrative law system was the 
passage in 1986 of Security Administration Punishment Regulations (SAPR) 
governing the extra-judicial punishment of citizens by the police and public security 
agencies. The regulations purported to provide penalised persons with the right of 
review by the courts of decisions made under their terms,596 and led almost 
immediately to a steep increase in administrative cases being dealt with buy the 
People’s Courts. Relatively soon afterwards, in October 1987 at the Thirteenth 
National People’s Congress of the CPC, it was decided to strengthen the system of 
administrative law congruent with recognition in the Seventh Five Year Plan of 1986 
to 1990 of the need for greater legal regulation of administrative management, and in 
so doing, it was determined that further laws on the organisation, powers and 
liabilities of administrative organs should be passed along with procedures to deal 
with their violations.597 Consequently, in addition to the establishment of permanent 
administrative divisions in most courts, a revised version of a draft administrative 
procedure law published in late 1988 was adopted by the National People’s Congress
f Q O
in April 1989 as the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL). This law was of 
considerable importance in laying down procedures for challenging administrative 
acts in the People’s Courts,599 and thus for beginning to realise the promises of redress 
for administrative abuses laid down in the Constitution. In particular, it conferred on 
the courts the right to quash illegal orders, modify unfair administrative sanctions and 
compel action where state functionaries were failing in their duties.600 Thus, in theory 
at least, the courts for the first time enjoyed a general power to control the acts over 
subjects ranging from personal liberty to licensing and property rights. Moreover, the 
law placed the burden of proving that the action being challenged before it was lawful 
upon the agency whose action it was, rather than upon the complainant,601 and notably
596 SAPR, Article 39.
597 Chen, 2004: 256.
598 See: Potter, 1994. More generally, see: Finder, 1989; and, Lin, 1996, 1999. For the situation prior to 1988 see: Liu, 1988.
599 ALL, Articles 2, 5, and 11.
600 Ibid: Article 54.
601 Ibid: Article 32.
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excluded the possibility of administrative litigation being settled by means of 
mediation.602
Although the Litigation Law permitted aggrieved citizens to institute suites in the 
People’s Courts, it continued to subject the right of review to a number of important 
limitations.603 Perhaps the most notable of these was the restriction of the courts to 
investigating the legitimacy of “concrete administrative acts” as opposed to “abstract 
administrative acts” such as the legislative enactments of administrative organs.604 
These remained subject only to the system of invalidation by the NPC Standing 
Committee, the State Council and their subordinates.605 The courts were also 
prevented from reviewing acts of state relating to matters of defence and foreign 
affairs,606 the appointment, removal or disciplining of administrative organ 
personnel,607 and also to administrative acts that the law provided should be final.608 
Lastly, from a procedural point of view, administrative actions were not permitted to 
be suspended unless public interest would have suffered irreparable harm had they 
been allowed to stand and it was open to administrative agencies to declare 
documents relating to the decisions in question as internal and thereby to place those 
decisions beyond the scope of public judicial investigation.609 Nevertheless, the 
Administrative Litigation Law has been crucial in opening up the courts to an 
apparently ever increasing volume of administrative law cases in the years subsequent 
to its enactment and this has further propelled the more systematic elaboration of 
administrative law structures.610
Important examples of this were both the formalisation of the administrative 
reconsideration or review system as a complement to administrative litigation law, 
and the revival and then growth in importance of the administrative supervision 
system through the State Council’s Ministry of Supervision. Administrative review 
was initially subject to regulations of the State Council adopted in 1990,611 but
602 Ibid: Article 50.
603 See here: O’Brien & Li, 1995.
604 ALL, Articles 11 and 12. See also, O pinions o f  the Suprem e P e o p le ’s  Court on Som e Issues R elating to the Implementation o f  
the Adm inistrative Litigation L aw  (For Trial Implementation).
605 Chen, 2004: 227.
m  ALL, Article 12
607 Ibid.
608 Ibid.
609 Lubman, 1999: 207.
610 Ibid: 209. Also: O’Brien & Li, 2003; and, Michelson, 2006.
611 State Council R egulations on A dm inistrative R eview  1990. See also: Chen, 2004: 228.
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subsequently came to be developed further when these were superseded by the Law o f  
Administrative Review in 1999. Prior to 1990, administrative reconsideration 
provisions existed only in a dispersed fashion throughout numerous pieces of 
individual legislation without any overall procedural or jurisdictional framework. 
Although the 1990 regulations permitted aggrieved parties to seek review of 
reconsideration only of specific acts of an administrative organ and excluded the 
review of “abstract administrative acts”,612 the 1999 Law extended this right to cover 
rules issued by departments of the State Council, of local governments above the 
county level, and of village and township governments.613 This in itself represented a 
significant extension of the administrative law system. Finally, in addition to 
provisions on how to identify the correct reviewing authority,614 the 1999 Law also 
lays down the procedures to be used and provides that an administrative decision may 
be revoked, varied, or declared unlawful if based upon insufficient evidence, the 
wrong application of the law, or if it is manifestly inappropriate and unreasonable.615
b. Supervision and Compensation
Alongside the mechanisms for administrative reconsideration and review has been the 
growth of a complementary system of administrative supervision exercised by state 
administrative supervisory organs led by the Ministry of Supervision. The ministry, 
after having been abolished in the Cultural Revolution, was re-established in 1986 by 
a Decision of the NPC Standing Committee,616 and it subsequently established 
thousands of subordinate supervisory organs throughout the country at the county 
level and above. The basic principles and procedures governing its work were laid 
down in State Council Regulations on Administrative Supervision in 1990. The 
Ministry of Supervision and it subordinates were tasked with investigating violations 
of laws, regulations and policies as well as complaints of official misbehaviour617 and 
were empowered to recommend both the rectification of deficient administrative acts 
and the disciplining of errant officials.618 In 1997, with the passage of the Law o f 
Administrative Supervision (LAS), this power of recommendation was transformed
612 Chen, 2004: 257
613 LAR, Article 6. See: O ‘Brien & Li, 1995,2003; and, Michelson, 2006.
614 LAR, Articles 12-15.
615 LAR, Chapters 4 and 5 esp. Article 28.
616 Chen, 2004: 259.
617 Now, L aw  o f  A dm inistrative Supervision, 1997, Articles 6 and 18.
6,8 LAS, Article 23.
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into a power of imposition619 in spite of the fact that the Ministry of Supervision had 
been merged in 1993 with the Central Commission of Discipline and Inspection of the 
CPC. Whilst this merger led some commentators to complain of a “further blurring of 
the lines between state and party”620 an alternate interpretation might be that this is 
evidence of a process by which the Party itself, in so far as it wields de facto power, is 
gradually being brought within the scope of state regulation. Certainly, with the 
passage of time, there is evidence that the growing trend towards differentiation and 
specialisation seen in society and the legal system more generally has begun 
manifesting itself in the administrative law system. Indeed, as its litigational and 
procedural frameworks have been laid down, there has been a growing shift towards 
the elaboration of more subject specific norms. This can be seen most notably in 
adoption of the Administrative Punishment Law by the NPC in 1996 and the Law o f  
Administrative Licensing in 2003 which will be dealt with more fully in the following 
section. There is evidence that more and more areas of Party-State power are, at least 
notionally, being brought within the ambit of the system of a whole.
The final major component of that system, embodied in a promise of compensation 
for abuses of administrative power laid down in the Constitution, was sought to be put 
in place by the enactment in May 1994 of the State Compensation Law (SCL). This 
provided that organs of the State were liable for injuries caused by their illegal use of 
administrative power621 and it even allowed for the personal liability of individual 
officials if they “intentionally committed errors or committed grave errors.”622 
Moreover, it extended cover beyond administrative acts to include acts such as 
assault, battery and torture and also went well beyond the Law o f Administrative 
Litigation to include within its competence unlawful acts done by judges and 
procurators.623 Accordingly, it provided for two types of state compensation: 
administrative compensation and criminal procedure compensation,624 these being 
related either to violations of the rights of the body or violations of citizens property 
rights.
619 LAS, Article 24.
620 Lubman, 1999:213.
621 SCL, Article 2.
622 Lubman, 1999:211.
623 Chen, 2004:216.
624 Ibid: 260-261.
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c. Punishment
As with all jurisdictions, those activities of the state which had the greatest 
consequence for its individual members’ personal integrity and freedom fall in China 
under the criminal law and are regulated by the criminal justice system. Importantly, 
as will be seen a little later, this fact has not meant, and still does not mean, that 
punishment of its citizens by the state, or even punishment involving the deprivation 
of personal liberty, falls exclusively within the province of the criminal law.625 
Rather, it embodies the judgment that whereas the more minor sanctions of the state 
can be adequately governed by the administrative law system and procedure, beyond 
a certain level of severity more extensive and carefully regulated procedural 
mechanisms are required. In both cases, that of punishment and sanctioning of 
citizens by administrative organs and by the criminal justice system, there has been an 
extensive development of official apparatus and institutions. Perhaps more than in 
other areas of post-Mao Chinese law, the history of this development is significant of 
the turn away from mobilisational and mass-based politics.626
Throughout the pre-reform, and especially the cultural revolutionary, period the mass 
political campaigns that were characteristic of China focused particularly upon the 
restriction of individual liberties and the confiscation of personal property among 
those elements considered ‘enemies of the state’, ‘counter-revolutionaries’ and 
‘capitalist-roaders’.627 It is an inheritance from the attitudes that these activities 
embodied that public security organs in particular continue to retain the power to 
impose extra-judicial punishments as a way by which the Party-State could continue 
to exercise a degree of flexibility in dealing with potentially subversive elements.628 
Nevertheless, even if it continues to be the case that not all of the Party-State’s 
punitive sanctioning powers can at present be subsumed under the normal 
mechanisms of the criminal law, there is some evidence of a gradual move in the 
direction of greater juridification. Just as the criminal justice system and its 
procedural norms have concurrently undergone extensive legislative development and 
regulation, connoting a shift in emphasis from an exclusive concern with social and
625 As such, see: Biddulph, 2007. More generally, see: Keith & Lin, 2001: 178-231; Lo, 1995; and, Lubman, 1999: 160-172.
626 Bejesky, 2002-3; and, Lubman, 1999: 160-172.
627 Leng, 1967; and, Mao, 1957. See also: Shih, 1996.
528 Clarke & Feinerman, 1996; Hung, 2002; Novak, 2005, 2006; Qi, 2005; and, Tanner & Green, 2002.
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political control, so the various forms of extra-judicial sanctioning have also been 
subjected to purportedly greater regulation and normative discipline.629 Perhaps most 
notable in this respect has been Law o f Administrative Punishment (LAP) passed in 
1996 by the NPC which states that: “administrative punishment is invalid if there does 
not exist a legal basis for it or the procedure prescribed by law has not been complied 
with.”630 It goes on to lay down procedural rules to be applied in all cases of 
administrative punishment,631 to specify rights of appeal to administrative authorities 
and on occasion even to the courts, and to specify certain rights to be enjoyed by the 
defendant to be notified of the punishment and its basis and to be heard in their own 
defence.632 It also provides for detailed investigation of cases before the appropriate 
authority decides on the question of administrative punishment,633 stipulates that such 
punishment must be subject to the principles of justice and openness,634 and that it 
should be proportionate to the circumstances and nature of the illegal behaviour.635 
Finally, as well as providing for a hierarchy in the forms of administrative punishment 
it also requires that the most severe forms of sanction, especially those involving the 
deprivation of personal liberty, must be authorised by norms of greater authority in 
the legislative hierarchy.636
Specifically concerning those forms of administrative punishment involving detention 
or the taking into custody, additional legislative instruments which often anticipate 
more fully developed administrative laws had been promulgated as the reform period 
has progressed, touching upon issues both of procedure and of substance. In addition 
to the pivotal Security and Punishment Administrative Regulations of 1986, which 
were amended in 1994, these included the 1979 Supplementary Provisions on Re­
education Through Labour, the 1982 Provisional Measures on Re-education Through 
Labour, the 1990 NPC Standing Committee Decision on Drug Control, the 1995 State 
Council Measures on the Compulsory Rehabilitation o f Drug Addicts, the 1991 NPC 
Standing Committee Decision on the Strict Prohibition o f Prostitution followed by the
629 However, see, in respect o f  the on-going problems of corruption: Fu, 2005,2007; and Fu & Choy, 2004. Also, in relation to 
the ongoing abuse whereby ‘problematic’ individuals continue to be subjected to informal or ‘non-criminal’ forms o f punishment 
and or psychiatric detention/treatment, see: Biddulph, 2007; Du, 2004; and, especially Munro’s remarkable work in: Munro, 
2000, 2002, 2006.
630 LAP, Article 3.
631 Ibid: Article 4.
632 Ibid: Articles 6, 31 and 32.
533 Ibid: Articles 36-41.
634 Ibid: Articles 4 and 42.
635 Ibid.
636 Ibid: Articles 9-13, Chen, 1999: 263.
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1993 State Council Measure on Custody and Education o f Prostitutes and their 
Customers, the 2000 Ministry o f Public Security Management Measures on Centres o f 
Custody and Re-education, and the 1982 Measures on the Custody and Repatriation 
o f Vagrants in Cities.631
2. Criminal Law
a. Substantive
Turning to the Criminal Justice system itself, since 1979 it has, at least in theory, been 
regulated by two comprehensive legal codes -  the Criminal Law and the Criminal 
Procedure Law. This alone is significant given the fact that they were the first such 
laws since the abrogation of the Nationalist codes in 1949, and to this extent, their 
passage marked a signal break from the previous reluctance to lay down substantive 
definitions and specific protocols.638 Moreover, their promulgation also marked an 
end to the practice of classifying the population according to socio-economic class 
categories and, on this basis, to designating whole sections of the population as 
political outcasts deserving of more severe punishment merely because of their 
familial ties.639 Despite these not inconsiderable concessions to legality, however, the 
1979 Laws continued to bear strong traces of the past. The Criminal Law, in 
particular, was characterised by a relatively simplistic, moralistic and programmatic 
style, it gave the politically charged category of “counter-revolutionary” crime a place 
of central prominence, and left considerable scope for judicial innovation by explicitly 
allowing that defendants could be punished by ‘analogical application’ where there 
had been no specific breach of an existing law.640
Almost immediately after the Code was promulgated, numerous other laws, 
regulations, provisions and interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court began to 
appear supplementing and amending the primary statute, and, over time, these were 
joined by an increasingly large number of offences created by other laws determining
637 For some interesting reflections on the whole area of prison reform see: Dikotter, 2002; and Peerenboom, 2004.
638 In general, see again: Bejesky, 2002-3; Clarke & Feinerman, 1996; and, Lubman, 1999: 160-172.
639 Thus one o f  the basic principles o f  the Crim inal L aw  1997, Article 4, is that any one who violates the criminal law shall be 
treated equally in the application of the law. It thereby incorporated into the Crim inal L aw  a principle already found in the Law  o f  
Crim inal P rocedu re  Axticle 4 (1979) and Article 6 (1996) and the L aw  o f  C ivil P rocedure 1991  Article 8. See: Leng & Chiu, 
1985: 123-167; and Shih, 1996.
640 Berman, et.al., 1982: 257. See also: Clarke & Feinerman, 1996; and Fu, 2005.
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to impose criminal liability for activities whose significance, or anti-social character, 
had not been appreciated in the earliest years of reform. Especially, note-worthy was 
the growing number of activities which were seen to constitute a threat to the efficient 
functioning of the economy as reform in this area led, as has already been seen, to a 
veritable explosion of regulatory legislation.641 For this reason, consideration of a 
comprehensive amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law and the Criminal Law had 
already progressed quite some way by the time of the Tiananmen incident in 1989 
only to be put on hold until renewed once more in 1993. It was not finally, however, 
until 1996 that a new Criminal Procedure Law (Cr.PL) was adopted, to be joined in 
March of the following year by a new Criminal Law (CL).642
Perhaps it was unsurprising given the wider trajectory of reform that the new 
Criminal Law in particular was marked strongly by a further apparent drive towards 
overall de-politicisation, but it should always be remembered that the reform process 
has frequently had a much more provisional look to those most intimately involved in 
its unfolding than to those gifted with the advantage of hindsight. There is certainly 
no doubt that these amendments, taken as a whole, signalled the culmination of a 
significant development in the attitude of China’s governing elites.643 The most 
notable feature of this de-politicisation was the much greater attention given in the 
“Special Provisions” section of the new law to the elaboration and indeed 
enumeration of non-political crimes. The numerous new economic crimes that had 
emerged in the previous two decades already referred to constituted a large proportion 
of these additions.644 They included the new crimes of smuggling, counterfeiting, 
insider trading, defrauding investors, market manipulation and making false 
statements in corporate or financial documentation reported to government 
departments or to the public.645 Additionally, the list of crimes against social order 
underwent significant expansion and tighter definition, with the former somewhat 
vague crime of ‘hooliganism’ being replaced by four specific crimes relating to 
fighting in public and the mistreatment of women. Finally, in line with wider attempts
641 Chu, 1996; Townsend, 1989; Kolenda, 1990; and, Zhang, 1996.
642 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1998; Finder & Fu, 1997.
643 Clarke & Feinerman, 1996; Dutton, 1997; and, Dobinson, 2002,
644 Surpa., note 50.
645 See Chapter 3 o f  Part II o f  the amended Code (CL‘97) now entitled, ‘Crimes Damaging the Socialist Market Economic Order’ 
-  with a new division o f this chapter into eight sections each with its own sub-category o f  crimes.
167
better to discipline the activities of state bodies, liability for state personnel was added 
in relation to a number of offences.646
In many ways, of course, the amendments represented a consolidation and 
incorporation into the code of the many new crimes that had emerged in the various 
supplementary regulations and other associated laws since its initial promulgation. 
Nevertheless, they also extended beyond this to cover significant amendments to the 
‘General Principles’ section of the Law. Most importantly, these have included the 
prohibition of analogical reasoning by the Courts as an acceptable manner of 
extending criminal liability, so that in Article 3 of the new Law the principle is now 
clearly laid down that an act will not be criminal unless defined as such by law. 
Similarly, the category of “counter-revolutionary” crime has been abolished and 
replaced by “crimes endangering national security”.647 Admittedly, this new category 
includes many crimes that were formerly classified as “counter-revolutionary”,648 but, 
in a jurisdiction such as the PRC where official terminology is considered to be of 
such importance, the change in terminology is by no means insignificant, and the list 
of such offences is in any case considerably shorter than it was under the 1979 Law. 
Similarly, though it is undoubtedly true that the PRC continues to punish activity it 
characterises as criminal with extreme harshness,649 reflecting a continuation of the 
pre-reform attitude that severe and exemplary sanctions are indispensable for their 
deterrent function to be effective, and though mobilisational and campaigning tactics 
continue to be used as a way of implementing the criminal law,650 it is once more 
important to remember that recent developments are part of an overall process of 
transition which has still very far from run its course.
646 Lubman, 1999: 161.
647 C V  97, Chapter 1 o f  Part II. See also: Fu, 2005.
648 See esp. CL‘97 Articles 102-110. See: Hu, 2002; Lu & Zhang, 2005; and, Palmer, 1996. See also: Novak, 2006.
649 The amended Code provides for four types o f ‘Principal Punishment’ (Article 33) namely: ‘Control and Supervision’ (Articles 
38-4), ‘Criminal Detention’ (Articles 42-44), ‘Fixed-Term Imprisonment’ (Article 46) and the death penalty (Articles 48-51). 
Additionally, it provides for three types o f ‘Supplementary Punishment’: fines (Articles 52-53), ‘Deprivation of Political Rights’ 
(Articles 54-58) and confiscation o f  property (Articles 59-60), Prior to the 1997 amendments, it had been argued by a number 
Chinese scholars that the should be a reduction in the number o f capital offences. Whilst the 1979 Code had provided for 28 such 
offences, more than 60 additional capital offences were introduced by separate enactments prior to 1997. The 1997 amendments 
incorporated these into the Criminal Code without engaging in the hoped for review and reduction. (Chen,2004:240-241)
650 Chen, 2004: 240. See also: Bejesky, 2004.
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b. Procedural
If this is true of the criminal law proper, it is equally, if not more, true of the 
institutional system which has been elaborated for its application. As such, the 
Criminal Procedure Law of 1979 continued to reflect the basic processual divisions 
which emerged during the years immediately after the 1949 revolution. To the Public 
Security organs it assigned the tasks of criminal investigation, detention and arrest;651 
to the Procuracy, the supervision of arrests, the process of investigation leading to 
formal charges and prosecution;652 and to the courts, the role of conducting the trial, 
the passing of sentence and the hearing of appeals.653 At the same time, however, it 
also sought substantially to alter the practice of these institutions, not only by formally 
setting down the parameters of their operation, but also by laying down a relatively 
detailed time-frame according to which each phase of the criminal process -  
particularly in relation to the period prior to the trial itself -  was obliged to abide. The 
gradual and difficult nature of this alteration, may be seen by its somewhat jagged 
progression.654 Placing controls on the Public Security Organs in particular was a 
novel and, in many quarters, unwelcome departure, which it was felt potentially 
compromised the ability of the Party-state to deal effectively with the many anti­
social currents that economic reform threatened to throw up.655 It was on account of 
precisely these sort of concerns that soon after the promulgation of the Criminal 
Procedure Law in 1979 and in apparent contradiction of its rationalising drive,
China’s leadership determined to expand the powers of its Public Security apparatus. 
This was done via a series of legislative interventions by the NPC Standing 
Committee between 1980 and 1984 providing for the extension of the new time-limits 
and a dilution of the rights of those accused of certain violent crimes.656 These 
alterations were, moreover, an important prelude to the implementation of a series of 
‘strike-hard’ campaigns in the mid to late 1980s designed to stem a worrying rise in 
the overall level of crime.657 Nevertheless, that these developments, when viewed in a 
broader context, were more in the nature of systemic recalibrations than of full-scale
651 Now the C ode o f  Crim inal Procedure, 1996 (Cr.PL ’96) Articles 18, 50-57 and 59-61.
652 Ibid: Articles 59, 66, 67,69, 71, 129, 135,145 and 237. Also see the Supreme People’s Procuracy Rules o f  Crim inal 
Procedure, 1999.
652 Ibid: Articles 150-205.
654 In general, see: Clarke & Feinerman, 1996; and, Keith & Lin, 2001: 160-172.
655 Clarke & Feinerman, 1996; He, 2008; and, Tanner & Green, 2008.
656 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1998a.
657 Supplem entary P rovisions o f  the Standing C om m ittee o f  the N ational P e o p le ’s  Congress Concerning Time Lim its f o r  the 
H andling o f  Crim inal Cases. Adopted, July, 7th 1984.
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reversals is clearly demonstrated by the fact that they only ever purported to operate 
as exceptions within the wider scheme of the 1979 Law:; they never sought to abolish 
it.
This being said, there is no doubt that the actual functioning of the law prior to 1996 
was far from what might have been expected by one furnished solely with the 
statutory texts.658 In practice, a great deal of what took place on the ground operated 
outside of the written law and was based merely upon accepted practice. This was 
certainly true of the form of detention used by the police called “shelter and 
investigation” which enabled them to incarcerate a suspect almost indefinitely under 
the pretext of preliminary inquiries,659 it was also true of the unlimited power the 
Procuracy enjoyed to request the “supplementary investigation” of a case by the 
police.660 Additionally, with respect to minor criminal offences, the Procuracy 
frequently announced a decision not to prosecute in such a way so as to convey a clear 
determination of guilt without allowing for any come-back from the suspect in 
question.661
Quite apart form these examples, the pre-1996 Criminal Procedure Law continued to 
be marked by a strong bias in favour of the prosecution during the trial process itself. 
There was no right to counsel until the point at which a defendant’s case was handed 
over by the Procuracy to the court for trial, and it was, in any case, only required that 
the defendant be given seven days notice of the date of the trial.662 Moreover, it was 
extremely rare for a court to find a defendant not guilty. The role of the trial continued 
to be that of demonstrating guilt rather than of freely inquiring into guilt or innocence. 
If important questions were raised about the evidence during the course of the trial, 
the trial was normally adjourned so that the bench could continue its considerations 
privately. In practice, this meant that a case was rarely transferred to the court until a 
determination of guilt had been made and that access to a lawyer was more for the 
purposes of preparing a plea in mitigation than of constructing a defence against 
substantive charges.663 This situation was well summed up by the popular dictum
658 On this subject see: Lubman, 2006.
659 Here, see again the tactics employed in relation to psychiatric incaceration charted by Munro: Munro, 2002.
660 Wong, 1996.
661 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,1998a: 45.
662 Lubman, 1999: 164.
663 In general, see: Alford, 1996; and, China News Analysis, 1994.
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“decision first, trial later” and it was further exacerbated by the limitations to which 
the defendant’s right of appeal, though clearly laid down in law, was subjected in 
practice. These included, most significantly, the power of the appellant court, to send 
a case back to a lower court for retrial where it considered the facts unclear, with the 
potential consequence that the sentence could be increased, as well as the power to 
retry the case itself.664
Against this background, the 1996 reforms to the Criminal Procedure Law, at least on 
their face, seemed to mark a considerable step in the direction of greater systemic 
integration and rationalisation, expressing “a concern for defendants’ rights” that went 
“beyond all previous PRC legislation,”665 The practice of “shelter and investigation” 
was completely done away with and the number of times the Procuracy could request 
“supplementary investigation” was limited to two.666 The minimum period of notice 
the defendant facing trial was obliged to receive was increased from seven to ten days 
and his/her right to counsel was significantly expanded. A defendant is now entitled 
to representation by a lawyer as soon as his/her case has been sent to the Procuracy 
and, moreover, must be told of this right.668 It is also permitted now for lawyers to 
begin assisting a suspect while his/her case is still under investigation by the police as 
soon as the suspect has been formally questioned or detained, though the suspect need 
not be told of this right.669 In certain circumstances, where “state secrets” are 
involved, the police are permitted to deny access to a lawyer, but the passage of a 
joint regulation by the Ministries of Justice, Public Security, and State Security 
together with the Legal Work Committee of the NPC, the Procuracy and the Supreme 
People’s Court has had a significant impact in ensuring the proper exercise of this 
power.670 Finally, the 1996 revisions considerably restrict the power of the Procuracy 
to forgo prosecutions in which it nonetheless indicates that the accused is guilty.671
664 Lubman, 1999: 165.
665 Ibid: 168. Bejesky, 2002-3; Fu, 1997 and 1997a.
666 c p L  ,96f 40 and 61(6) and (7-) See aiso: FUj 2005.
667 Ibid: Article 151.
668 Ibid: Article 96. Nonetheless, on the limitations o f  these reforms in practice, see: Fu, 2005; Fu & Choy, 2004; and, Human 
Rights Watch, 2006.
669 Ibid: Article 96
670 Chen, 2004: 206. See also: He, 2008; and, Tanner & Green, 2008.
671 Cr.PL '96, Articles 142(2), 144 and 146.
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With respect to the trial process itself,672 there were important moves to limit the 
degree to which trial judges might consult with more senior judges forming a court’s 
Adjudication Committee and not directly involved in the hearing of a case. This 
power is now supposedly restricted to “difficult, complicated, or important cases” and 
must be at the initiative of the trial bench itself.673 The court has also been forbidden 
from reviewing criminal cases before proceeding to trial and from sending cases of 
doubtful evidential quality back to the Procuracy for further investigation.674 Lastly, 
the burden of arguing a case has explicitly been placed upon the prosecution and 
defence counsel and Article 12 seems to go some way towards enshrining the 
presumption of innocence by stating that: “In the absence of a lawful verdict of the 
people’s court, no person shall be determined to be guilty.”
Not all of the revisions, it must be admitted, were in the same direction. Pre-trial 
detention, for example, was in certain circumstances actually increased. Thus the 
police were authorised to hold suspects, with the Procuracy’s consent, for up to thirty 
days where they were thought to have committed crimes in different places, 
repeatedly, or jointly with others.675 Similarly, in “major, complicated cases where 
the scope of the crime is broad and gathering evidence is difficult,” a two-month 
extension of the detention limits is permitted, with the possibility of a further two- 
month extension if the crimes in question are punishable with a sentence of ten-years 
or longer.676 Moreover, it is unclear how effective provisions such as those purporting 
to secure the independence of trial-benches are in practice.677 Nevertheless, these 
apparent counter- examples do not confute the overall thrust of the revisions and are 
even more insufficient to confute the longer term developmental trajectory of reform 
in this area since 1979, the true nature of which has become clearer and clearer as the 
period has progressed.678
672 In general, see: Liebman, 2008; Liu, 2008; Lubman, 2008; Shen, 2008; and, Zhou, 2002.
673 Lubman, 1999: 166.
674 Cr.PL ’96, Article 150
675 Cr.PL ’96, Article 69(2).
676 Ibid: Article 60.
677 Fu, 2003.
678 Alford, 1996,2003; and Bejesky, 2002-3.
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B: India
Unlike China, a sophisticated system of public, constitutional and administrative law 
had been in place in India since well before it gained its independence in 1949. 
Deficient though this system was in many respects, it had provided the subcontinent 
with significant and continuous experience of judicial oversight and control of the 
nascent executive and legislative bodies which had emerged with the growth of self- 
government. With the passage of the Constitution of India by the Constituent 
Assembly, the ambit of this oversight and control was invested with much greater 
potential scope. Drawing upon constitutions from across the western world, it firmly 
entrenched the Montesquiean principle of the separation of powers, with the Supreme 
and High Courts as the principal interpretative guardians of its provisions. Moreover, 
these bodies were also assigned the primary role in interpreting, protecting and 
applying the Fundamental Rights section of the Constitution. Despite the fact, 
however, that India did not have to undergo quite the same degree of legal and 
institutional construction during the reform period as its East Asian neighbour, it did 
have to undergo very considerable transformation in the manner in which its enduring 
constitutional structures were operationalised in practice. In this regard it is possible 
to delineate three broad phases within the post-Independence period. These 
correspond very broadly to the years of Nehruvian consensus and Congress 
dominance, the years of Indira Gandhi’s ascendancy along with her increasing 
popularisation and deinstitutionalisation of politics culminating in the Emergency of 
1975-77 and the post-Emergency period of heightened judicial activism.
1. Stages of Development
In the first of these phases, with the exception of its jurisprudence regarding the right 
to property, the judiciary adopted a posture of maximum deference to, and 
cooperation with, the legislative and executive branches of government. Steeped in 
the black-letter and positivist traditions of English and colonial jurisprudence, this 
posture was most clearly exemplified in the case of A. K. Gopolan v. State o f Madras 
which held that the requirement in Article 21 of the Constitution that no one be 
deprived of their liberty except in accordance with a “procedure proscribed by law” 
would be satisfied by a procedure laid down in a normal statute, such that Article 21
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rights were entitled to no additional or ‘special’ protection. Whilst, on matters of 
personal liberty, the Supreme Court was prepared, on occasion, creatively to deploy 
the more conventional tools of administrative law and even to legislate interstitially, 
whenever it thought that the “executive should not be embarrassed, particularly where 
issues of national security were involved, it trod cautiously.”679 Moreover, although 
the courts did adopt a less positivist, more activist approach in relation to the rights of 
labour, this was fully in line with the dominant welfare state philosophy of the 
Nehruvain government, and even here they felt bound by the text of the Constitution 
to remain within certain limits. With respect to the right to property, the one area 
where there was a serious clash between the Supreme Court and the other branches of 
government, Parliament was nevertheless left with the last word and the legalism with 
which the issue was approached, since it presupposed a “narrow role for the 
Court.. .did not anger the political establishment.”680
During the second phase, the occasions for conflict multiplied. This was due more to a 
change in the tempo and nature of Indian politics than it was to a change in attitude of 
the higher level judiciary. From at least as early as the 1967 general election, Indira 
Gandhi began actively to popularise and de-institutionalise national-level politics in 
an attempt to assert her independence from the traditional elites which had hitherto 
controlled the Congress party by bypassing its leadership to appeal in increasingly 
radical terms directly to the electorate. Not only did this threaten established interests 
within Congress, increasingly it was felt also to represent an implicit threat to the 
constitutional order itself. Indeed, the more effective Mrs Gandhi became in 
exercising her personal power on the back of carefully cultivated popular 
enthusiasms, the greater the danger was that she would see her way clear to bypassing 
the normal mechanisms of constitutional government. It was in the context of its 
growing unease at a de facto change in the terms of India’s overall post-independence 
settlement, that the Supreme Court felt it necessary, from the late 1960s onwards, to 
assert its authority with increasing force in the face of repeated attempts to extend 
executive power through Constitutional amendment.681 Most significantly, in the case 
of I. C. Golaknath v. State o f Punjab, the Court overruled its earlier decision in 
Shankari Prasad Singh v. Union o f India, and held that Parliament had no power to
679 Sathe, 2002: 61.
680 Ibid: 62.
681 Ibid.
174
curtail any of the Fundamental Rights laid down in Section III of the Constitution.682 
By changing the distribution of power between Court and Parliament, Golaknath had 
profoundly political implications,683 and with the resignation and unsuccessful 
Presidential bid of the then Chief Justice, Subba Rao, together with the judicial 
invalidation of Mrs Gandhi’s attempts to nationalise fourteen of the country’s major 
banks and to abolish the privy purses of the Indian princes,684 it was followed soon 
after by further apparent evidence of the Court’s apparent politicisation.
The fact that these developments took place at the same time as Congress had split 
and Mrs Gandhi’s more radical faction had barely survived in government with the 
support of the Communist Party meant that the Court seemed not just to be supporting 
Mrs Gandhi’s opponents but, in so doing, to be backing the forces of reaction against 
those of progress and social responsibility.685 Consequently, when Mrs Gandhi won a 
landslide victory in the election of 1971 partly on the basis of making changes in the 
Constitution and then subsequently went on to pass the Constitution (Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment) (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) and (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Acts which 
determined respectively to restore to Parliament the unqualified power of 
constitutional amendment, to further restrict the right to property and to abolish the 
privy purses, the stage was set for a major constitutional collision. The response of the 
Supreme Court came from a bench of thirteen judges in the case of Kesavananda 
Bharati v. State o f Kerala in which challenges to the above amendments were heard. 
By a majority of seven to six, it was held that whilst Golaknath was wrong to have 
ruled that the fundamental rights were per se un-amendable, there were, nevertheless, 
certain portions of the Constitution which could never be subject to amendment for 
fear that such amendment would violate its ‘basic structure’.
Although Kesavananda was to have significant longer-term jurisprudential 
consequences, it was less than successful in meeting the immediate challenge to the 
Court’s authority. Indeed, within only a few days of the judgment having been 
rendered, the executive made a bid to punish the Kesavananda majority by taking the 
unprecedented step of appointing Justice A. N. Ray as Chief Justice to replace the
fi82 Ibid: 65.
fi83 Ibid: 67.
684 R .C .C ooper v.India; M adhavrao v.India.
685 Ibid: 68.
175
retiring Chief Justice Sikri in preference to three judges senior to him -  Shelat, Hegde 
and Grover -  all of whom had voted against the government in Kesavananda and all 
of whom resigned in protest. This left the Court severely weakened and subsequently 
precipitated its near collapse in the face of Mrs Gandhi’s 1975 declaration of 
emergency government. This collapse manifested itself, in particular, in two 
judgments: Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain and A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant ShuJda. 
The first concerned a pre-emergency decision of the Allahabad High Court by which 
Mrs Gandhi’s own election to the Lok Sabha was set aside on the ground that she had 
engaged in corrupt practice. On appeal to the Supreme Court the execution of the 
High Court’s decree had been stayed subject to certain conditions, but before a final 
appeal could be heard, the emergency was declared and the Constitution (Thirty-Ninth 
Amendment) Act, 1975 was passed as a way of preventing the Court’s further scrutiny 
of Mrs Gandhi’s case.686 The legitimacy of this amendment was itself challenged 
before the Supreme Court but, though the amendment was struck down as violative of 
the basic structure of the Constitution, the Court clearly demonstrated its inability to 
sustain a head on confrontation with the executive by nonetheless upholding the 
validity of Mrs Gandhi’s election on the facts. Still more seriously, in the second case, 
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla, the Court upheld the validity of a presidential 
order issued under Article 359 of the Constitution and after the declaration of 
emergency which purported to suspend the right to move any court for the 
enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the 
Constitution.687
The third phase of post-independence jurisprudential development, which began after 
the shock of the emergency and the restoration to normality of the legal system, saw 
the Supreme Court take a lead in the re-establishment both of its own authority and 
that of the Constitution. This took the form, in particular, of a much greater awareness 
of its need to cultivate respect and support amongst the large majority of the Indian 
population and to play its part in realising the promises of social uplift embodied in 
the Constitution itself.
Clause (4) o f Article 329-A inserted by the Constitution (Thirty-Ninth Amendment)Act, 1975.
687 Sathe, 2002: 73-77. See also: Kalhan, 2009.
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2. Judicial Strategies of Defence and Reassertion
To this end, the Court developed three major strategies to shore up its previously 
precarious position. The first was the more conventional one of firmly reasserting its 
constitutionally mandated role as the final interpretative authority of the state in clear 
response to the attempted curtailments of such authority in the Constitution (Thirty- 
Ninth Amendment) and (Forty-Second Amendment) Acts. Thus, in the highly 
significant case of Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union o f India, building upon and expanding 
the principles laid down in Kesavananda Bharati v. State o f Kerala, and to a lesser 
extent in The Prime Minister’s Election Case, judicial review was finally and 
unequivocally declared a ‘basic feature’ of the Constitution and the higher courts the 
principal guardians of the fundamental rights it purported to guarantee. Specifically, 
the Supreme Court invalidated Article 31-C as amended by Section 4 of the 
Constitution (Forty-Second) Amendment Act, 1976 which provided that no law 
enacted in pursuance of any of the Directive Principles of State Policy could be 
challenged on the grounds that they violated the rights guaranteed by Articles 14,19 
and 31.688
In addition, the Court also felt it necessary to protect the independence of the higher 
judiciary from being undermined by extra-legal or administrative means, especially in 
light of the supersession scandal in which it was embroiled after its judgment in 
Kesavananda. Consequently, in a series of cases, beginning in 1977 with Union o f 
India v. Shankalchand H. Sheth, and after attempts were made by the executive to 
transfer a justice of the Gujarat High Court to the Andra Pradesh High Court without 
consulting the Chief Justice of India in apparent derogation of the requirement for 
such consultation under Article 222 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court became 
increasingly pertinacious in its supervision of the terms of judicial employment. In 
particular, it held that all transfers of the higher judiciary required deliberation 
between the Chief Justice of India and the President on the basis of full and identical 
facts. Indeed, further to confirming these basic requirements, the so-called Second and 
Third Judges cases, building upon S.P. Gupta v. Union o f India (or the First Judges 
Case), asserted that in the transfer of judges of the High Court the opinion of the
688 Sathe, 2002: 87. See also: Andhyarujina, 1992,
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Chief Justice of India not only has primacy over that of the President, but is also 
determinative, and they have elaborated a number of additional procedural 
requirements, involving at least four other members of the Supreme Court, by which 
the Chief Justice’s opinion is to be arrived at in practice.689
Once the initial objectives of securing its independence and judicial functions had 
been achieved, from the late 1980s there was a shift of emphasis in the constitutional 
role played by the Court. The growth in the power of regional parties and the 
inception of a prolonged era of minority governments at the centre meant that 
amendments of a deeply controversial nature became increasingly difficult to get 
passed the relevant legislative hurdles. As conventional party-political restrictions 
became more powerful, so there seems to have been less need for the Court to act as a 
counter-majoritarian bulwark.690 Instead, the focus of court based constitutional 
struggle shifted away from challenging legislative towards challenging executive acts, 
and, in particular, to reviewing exercise by the President of his power under Article 
356 to suspend state governments. In the past Article 356 had been overused and 
many state governments had been suspended for reasons that clearly went beyond is 
intended scope. It was an index not only of the changing political scenario, but also of 
the new and strengthened position that that scenario presupposed for the Court, that 
political disputes surrounding the utilisation of Article 536, and indeed a whole host 
of other issues, became more common and more significant and that the Court was 
increasingly resorted to as a mechanism for their settlement. In the past such disputes 
had had limited significance owing to the extraordinarily dominant hold the Congress 
Party had on government, and the judgments of the Court itself had been perceived to 
pose a much greater threat to those in power. Now the more immediate danger came 
from other quarters and it became expedient to utilise the Court as an independent 
arbitral body, first, to confer legitimacy upon government actions in general and, 
secondly, as a forum for taking decisions on highly controversial subjects the 
settlement of which by government itself threatened to undermine popular support for 
the ruling party of the day. All of this necessarily presupposed an acceptance of the 
Court’s decisions in such matters as final, together with a renewed interest in the 
maintenance of its authority.
689 Also, on the appointment o f  the Chief Justice, see: Sharma, 2009.
690 See the relevant section in: Austin, 1999. However, also see: Albert, 2009.
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With respect specifically to Article 356, it had already been held in State o f Rajasthan 
v. Union o f India that the exercise of such a power was reviewable and capable of 
being invalidated if found to be ultra vires or male fide. Moreover, a commission 
appointed under Justice Shakaria on Centre-state relations, reporting in 1988, had 
strongly criticised the practice of union governments taking victory in elections to the 
Lok Sabha as an excuse to use Article 356 to dismiss their opponents from 
government at the state level. However, the Court did not really come into its own on 
the issue until the case of S.R.Bommai v. India which dealt with dismissals of BJP 
state governments in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himarchal Pradesh pursuant to 
controversy surrounding the alleged connivance by the Uttar Pradesh state 
government in the demolition of the Babri masjid in December, 1992. Displaying a 
considerable degree of political shrewdness, the Court dealt, in the same case, with 
earlier dismissals for different reasons under Article 356 of the state governments of 
Karnataka, Meghalaya, and Nagaland. Whilst it held -  by a majority of six judges to 
three -  that the dismissal of the governments of Karnataka, Meghalaya and Nagaland 
was unconstitutional and void,691 it held that the dismissal of the governments of 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himarchal Pradesh were valid since the demolition 
of the Babri masjid and other acts that followed upon it were a threat of secularism 
which constituted part of the basic structure of the Constitution and that these 
governments were unlikely to carry out consequential bans by the central government 
on several communal organisations. In other words, it was held that “the Presidential 
action in furtherance of the protection of secularism was justified.”692 This continued 
the Court’s practice of elaborating the list of those aspects of the Constitution which it 
considered to be part of its basic structure in a suggestive rather than mandatory 
manner through obiter statements as a way of making its mind known in as non- 
confrontational a manner as possible. This gave the relevant authorities the 
opportunity to avoid situations in which they were likely to risk loosing face, and it is 
further evidence of growth in the Court’s de facto influence. At the same time, the 
Bommai judgment cleverly backed government action in such a way and in such a 
manner that strengthened its own power at a time when the government required the 
Court’s support to maintain its own credibility.
691 Sathe, 2002: 151-152.
692 Ibid: 97.
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The Court’s manner of operation as instanced in the Bommai case clearly 
demonstrates a heightened political self-awareness and whilst it has been willing to 
continue to deal with controversial issues in a firm and even forceful way, it also 
seems to have become much more aware of the limitations of its new found power in 
the area of Constitutional jurisprudence. Thus it has, on occasion, also found it 
necessary to demonstrate a prudent caution especially with respect to issues of a 
highly charged political or communal nature where the government of the day has 
sought to use the Court as a way of avoiding taking controversial or unpopular 
decisions itself. Indeed, it was in just such a context, namely the controversy 
surrounding the demolition of the Babri masjid, that the Court, for the first time, 
refused to give an opinion in response to a query made by the President through his
/ rq o
power of presidential reference under Article 143 of the Constitution. What is clear
is that, even in instances of such caution, the Court demonstrated that it had become, 
by the early 1990s, a key and increasingly secure player at the heart of the Indian 
polity, which could no longer be bullied or ignored by the political establishment.694
3. Procedural Innovation
The second major strategy that the Courts developed in the post-emergency period 
was gradually to institute a series of procedural innovations as a method of more 
effectively implementing Section III rights in practice, taking account, in particular, of 
the social and economic conditions in which the majority of Indian citizens found 
themselves.695 In the first instance, this involved the loosening of procedural 
requirements for access to the Supreme and High Courts under Articles 32 and 226 of 
the Constitution where it was alleged the citizen’s fundamental rights had been 
violated. Clarifying what were to be considered ‘appropriate proceedings’ in the 
former of these two articles, the Supreme Court had stated in its 1961 case Daryao v. 
State o f U.P.:
693 Ism ail Faruqui v. India,
694 This has led to problems o f  over-extension: Kirpal, et.al., 2000; Singh, 2005; and, Robinson, 2009. It has also led to criticisms 
of constitutional imbalance: Dam, 2005,2007.
595 In general, see: Ahuja, 1996; Atwood, 2002; Austin, 1999; and, Kappur, 1998. Most recently, see: Deva, 2009.
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The appropriateness of the proceedings would depend upon the particular 
writ or order which he claims and it is in that sense that the right has been 
conferred on the citizen to move this Court by ‘appropriate proceedings’.
In the 1980s, this early concentration upon the form and nature of the order etc. being 
sought, was conclusively superseded by an altogether more purposive approach 
Indeed, when those proceedings related to the enforcement of the fundamental rights 
of the poor, the illiterate, the weak, or the otherwise disadvantaged, a simple “letter 
addressed by... [an individual to the Court could]... legitimately be regarded as an 
‘appropriate proceeding.’”696 Such a letter did not even need to be in any particular 
form, nor even addressed to the Court or its justices: post cards, faxes and telegrams 
were all treated as ‘appropriate proceedings.’697 Establishing a special Public Interest 
Litigation cell to deal with the burgeoning ‘epistolary jurisdiction’ that resulted, the 
Supreme Court determined to exercise a very wide discretion in framing writs or other 
measures.698 to protect the fundamental rights of its petitioners, refusing to dismiss 
petitions simply because they were vague or because they prayed for the wrong 
remedy.699 Moreover, it clearly took advantage of the fact that, in its own words, its 
“power.. .is not only injunctive in ambit.. .preventing the infringement of a 
fundamental right, but.. .is also remedial in scope and provides relief against a 
breach., .already committed.”700 Similarly, whilst by no means dismissive of the 
normal canons of judicial procedure, it has, under Article 32(2), seen fit to exercise a 
degree of creativity in devising appropriate procedures in its enforcement of citizens 
fundamental rights, holding that, beyond the normal adversarial procedures utilised in 
standard court proceedings, inquisitorial or other procedures may, on occasion be 
suitable to achieve the overall objectives of Article 32. For this reason the Court: “has 
evolved the practice of appointing commissions for the purpose of gathering facts and 
data in regard to a complaint of breach of a fundamental right made on behalf of the 
weaker sections of the society.”701
Still more striking has been the Court’s increasing use of judicial directions as a form 
of remedial relief, which it has extended considerably through its power under Article 
141 of the Constitution to declare the law of the land, in the course of hearing cases
695 Bandhua M ukti M orcha v. Union o f  India.
697 M ohan L ai Sharma v. State o fU .P ; P ratu l Kum ar Sinha v. State o f  Orissa.
698 Safai M azdoor Sangh v. M unicipal Corpn.
699 C hiranjit Lai Chow dhury v. Union o f  India. In general, see: Galanter & Krishnan, 2004; and, Rao, 2004.
m  M .C. M ehta  v. Union o f  India, (1987).
701 Bandhua M ukti M orcha v. Union o f  India.
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brought before it. Initially, of course, this was designed to give constitutional 
recognition to the doctrine of stare decisis which was traditionally premised upon a 
distinction between a cases’s ratio decidendi and its obiter dicta, with only the former 
enjoying the status of binding precedent. As the reform period has progressed, this 
distinction has -  at least in relation to Public Interest suites -  been rendered otiose,702 
with the Supreme Court showing its willingness to lay down increasingly 
comprehensive directions in cases with prospective legislative effect in a whole host 
of areas.703 Thus, amongst other things, it has given directions concerning the 
procedure to be followed in relation to inter-country adoptions;704 for the effective 
implementation of gender equality in the work place;705 for the better tackling of the 
problem of child labour;706 as to how the children of prostitutes should be educated;
707 for the protection of the environment against pollution and citizens against road 
traffic accidents;708 on what the fee structure should be for private medical and 
engineering colleges;709 on how the CBI should be protected from inappropriate 
influences whilst investigating those holding high office;710 for the prevention of
711deaths owing to starvation; as to how blood should be collected, stored and given in
717transfusion; and even as to how a bank should operate a loan scheme in favour of 
rickshaw pullers.713 Finally, this more than expansive attitude led to an acceptance in 
the case of Rudul v State o f Bihar of the principle that Articles 32 and 226 impliedly 
permit the courts to award monetary compensation to citizens who suffer damage as a 
result of breaches of their fundamental rights. As such, it was recognised that one of 
the best ways to prevent such breaches was “to mulct violatore...” since this might act 
as “.. .some palliative to the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name 
of the public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as 
a shield.”714
702 Jain, 1978:143.
703 Vineet N arain v. India.
704 Laxm ikant P an dey  v. India.
705 Visaka v. Rajasthan.
706 M .C. M ehta  v. State o f  Tam il Nadu.
707 G auravJain  v. India.
708 M .C. M ehta  v. India  (1998).
709 TMA P a i Foundation  v. Karnataka.
710 Vineet N arain  v. India.
711 Kishen  v. Orissa.
7,2 Common Cause v. India  (1996).
713 A za d  R ickshaw  P u ller's  Case.
714 See here: Singh, 2008
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4. Locus Standi
In addition to freeing up of procedural requirements for the protection of Fundamental 
Rights, the Supreme and High Courts also began greatly to expand the locus standi 
requirements so that public interest cases could be taken on behalf of the downtrodden 
by public-spirited individuals.715 Specifically, the Court has stated that whilst it would 
not “intervene at the instance of a meddlesome interloper or busybody and would 
ordinarily insist that only a person whose fundamental right is violated should be 
allowed to activise the Court,”716 such reasoning would break down in:
the case of a person or class of persons whose fundamental right is violated 
but who cannot have resort the Court on account of their poverty or 
disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position and in such a 
case, therefore, the Court can and must allow any member of the public 
acting bona fide to espouse the cause of such a person or class of persons.
Thus the Court has allowed various individuals and organisations to bring petitions on
T I T  T 1 R *71Qbehalf of under-trial prisoners, prison inmates, bonded-labourers, pavement-
*700 T 0 1 TOOdwellers, children of prostitutes, those suffering exploitation in the sex trade,
TOT TOd. TO ^women in protective custody, raped nuns, stone quarry workers, mental
TOrt  TO Thospital patients, and asbestos industry workers, as well as individuals
TOR TOQblinded, tortured and killed, as a result of police action or in police custody. 
Moreover, on some occasions, it has even ordered payment of costs to the litigant in 
appreciation of their services.730 Additionally, in the case of Municipal Council, 
Ratlam v. Verdichand, locus standi was for the first time extended to petitioners 
seeking to vindicate their collective or group rights where these had been violated and 
where the injury fell upon a diffuse class of people. Lastly, beyond the scope of the 
enforcement of fundamental rights, standing has also been granted to individuals and
715 Baxi, 1982; Epp, 1998; and, Krishnan, 2006
716 Rudul v  S tate o f  Bihar,
717 H ussainara Khatoon v. Bihar.
718 Sunil B atra  v. D elh i A dm inistration.
719 Banda M ukti M orcha v. Union o f  India.
720 O lga Tellis v. B om bay M unicipal Corporation.
721 G uarav Jain v. India.
722 V ish alJeet v. India.
723 U pendra Baxi v. U.P.
724 Gudalure M.J. Cherin v. India.
715 Banda M ukti M orcha  v. Union o f  India.
726 Supreme Court Legal A id  Com m ittee  v. M .P.
727 C.E.R.C. v. India.
728 K atri and O thers v. Bihar.
729 D ilip  K. Bastt v. W est Bengal.
730 Sheela B arse  v. Secretary, Children A id  Society.
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groups seeking to litigate questions of larger public importance more generally, 
particularly those questions which might touch upon aspects of the ‘basic structure’ of 
the Constitution, or which concern its proper functioning.731 In this way the Court has 
sought, once more, to co-opt the citizens of India not only in aiding it in the 
implementation of its own programme for the better enforcement and functioning of 
the Constitution, but also in actually suggesting where the bounds of that programme 
should lie given the real problems and challenges with which they, as citizens, are 
actually being faced.
The final component in the newly developed ‘procedural’ matrix of the post­
emergency period has been a huge increase in the scope of justiciability both in 
relation to the matters subject to review and in relation to organisations falling under 
the discipline of the High and Supreme Courts’ Articles 32 and 226 writ jurisdictions. 
With respect to the latter, there has been a precipitate expansion in the scope of 
mandamus beyond its traditional and somewhat tentative function of ensuring that 
bodies charged with positive public duties carry them out, towards a much more 
intensive and directive superintendence of how public duties should be carried out in 
practice, which has involved an increasing intrusion into areas previously thought to 
be subject to administrative or executive discretion. Thus numerous orders have been 
made to the CBI concerning what should be investigated and how such investigations 
should be conducted. Orders have been made as to, amongst other things: medical 
treatment and equipment in hospitals; public health and public safety; safe and 
tolerable working conditions; the proper education of children as well as the equitable 
running of educational institutions; the proper functioning and administration of the 
judicial system; and as to the mandatory investigation of corruption cases, including 
the novel procedural device of continuing mandamus.
With respect to the former, there has been a similarly noticeable increase in the scope 
of “other authorities” under Article 12 of the Constitution. Thus in the course of time 
the Supreme Court has developed the thesis that “any body, statutory, non-statutory, 
administrative, quasi-judicial, which can be characterised as an ‘instrumentality’ of 
the government, can be regarded as an ‘authority’ imder article 12.”732 And that
731 See also: Atwood, 2002.
732 Jain, 2001:58.
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carrying on its business “through statutory corporations, government companies and 
other bodies with legal personality... [would] not.. .liberate the State from its basic 
obligation” to respect its citizens’ fundamental rights. The factum of whether or not 
a body constituted a government ‘instrumentality’ was to be determined by the dual 
questions of funding and control, and in due course a whole host of bodies have come 
to be characterised an ‘authority’ for the purposes of Article 12.734
5. Purposive Interpretation
The third and final major post-emergency strategy for the activation of the 
Constitution was to adopt an altogether more purposive approach to the interpretation 
of Section III rights themselves. In addition to a transformation in the reading of 
Fundamental Rights individually, this manifested itself, in particular, in the expansion 
of the subject areas over which they were operative and in a more holistic 
interpretation of their relationship with the Directive Principles of State Policy 
contained in Section IV. In particular, the Court has moved away from its pre­
emergency practice of reading them as being in conflict with, as well as being 
subordinate to, the Fundamental rights.735 Indeed, it has been precisely this tendency 
to read Sections III and VI of the Constitution together and in harmony with one 
another that has led to the dramatic increase in the scope, depth and number of rights 
falling under the protection of the Court’s writ jurisdiction.736
A particularly crucial component in this overall process has been the retrieval and 
extraordinarily dramatic activation of Article 21. As has already been seen, Gopalan, 
a very much criticized decision, held the field for over twenty-five years, during 
which period the ‘right to life’ did not have much security. The judicial attitude, 
however, underwent a metamorphosis after the traumatic experiences under the 
internal emergency imposed in 1975 which was lifted in 1977.” In particular, the 
pivotal case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union o f India, held that the ‘procedure’ in article 
21 must not be “arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure 
at all, and the requirement of article 21 would not be satisfied”, and the Court went on
733 Som Prakash v. Union o f  India.
734 Sheeia B arse  v. Secretary, Children A id  Society.
735 Unni Krishan v. S tate o f  A ndra Pradesh .
736 Alston & Bhuta, 2005; Kumar, 2007. See also on the development o f free speech: Chima, 2008.
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to hold that the concept of reasonableness must be protected by such a procedure 
owing to the link between Articles 21,19 and 14. As such, Maneka Gandhi 
conclusively overruled the reasoning in Gopalan, precipitating a completely new 
departure in the interpretation of Article 21, and the emergence, thereafter, of an 
increasing emphasis upon procedural propriety and safeguards similar to that 
embodied in the American constitutional jurisprudence surrounding the ‘due process’ 
clause in the Fifth Amendment.737 This has been particularly important in the area of 
Criminal justice,738 but it has also been used by the Supreme Court as a tool for 
improving the population’s quality of life. In the process, the Court has inferred from 
Article 21a number of rights concerned not just with the preservation of life, but with 
ensuring that life can be lived with a minimum level of human dignity.739 Lastly, it 
has also been held to include the right to honest and efficient government, and this has 
led to a number of cases concerning the proper functioning both of the administration 
and of the Constitution itself.740
717 A bdul Rehman A ntulay v. R.S. Naik.
738 Baxi, 1980. On security laws more generally, see: Kalhan, 2007, 2009.
739 Francis C oralie  v. Adm inistrator, Union Terri to iy  o f  D elh i. See: Crossman & Kapur, 2008; Rao, 2006; Razzaque, 2007; 
Rosencranz & Jackson, 2003; Singh, 2005; Sharma, 2008; and, Vempalli, 2006. See also, on gender justice: Sood, 2008.
740 D. C. Wadwha v. Sta te  o f  Bihar; S.P. G upta  v. Presiden t o f  India; Sri K um ar Padm a P ra sa d  v. India.
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Chapter 6: Family
One of the essential components of the market economy, if it is to function 
effectively, is the existence of consumers and producers who are not inhibited from 
acting in an essentially self-interested manner, according to the relevant market 
signals. At the heart of such a society is a world-view that is reluctant to place any 
extra-economic constraints upon the satisfaction of material want. This represents a 
fundamental difference between it and a non-market or pre-capitalist society.741 The 
distinctive morality which applies in this situation has been described by Erich 
Fromm of the Frankfurt School as an ethic of fairness according to which each 
individual is given a fair chance to compete with his fellows and is not fundamentally 
frustrated from utilising his capacities in the process. For this to be the case, each 
individual must be treated as of equal initial value and be free to act upon his 
decisions as long as his action do not interfere with the capacity of others to do the 
same.742 Given the basic principles upon which this ethic of fairness is based, namely, 
material equality and social individuation, the extent to which each of these have 
found expression in a society’s principal institutions of reproduction and socialisation 
is one measure of how far that society has been transformed in a way which is 
fundamentally sympathetic to the functioning of a market economy. In this regard, the 
development of family law constitutes a particularly powerful indicator of the manner 
in which the societies of China and India have been, and are being, transformed by 
their respective reform processes. Family law purports to govern and to reflect some 
of the most intimate relationships of an individual’s life and thus some of the most 
cherished of a society’s values. Given this, such values also often prove to be some of 
the most resistant to change. It is in this socio-structural context that the development 
of post-reform/post-emergency family law reflects the resisted progression of 
marketisation that has underpinned the gradual integration of both China and India 
into the international economy.
741 Fanfani, 2003: 59.
742 Fromm, 2002: 168.
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A: China
In examining how this has logic played itself out in the context of post-Mao China, it 
is important to note that Post-Mao reforms in family law mark only the latest stage in 
a longer-term drive by the modem state to reconfigure traditional Chinese family life 
according to its changing economic and developmental priorities. This began as early 
as the nineteenth century with the influence of western missionaries and the 
experimental social institutions set up in the Taiping rebel kingdoms. It continued 
through the fall of the Chinese empire into the Republican regimes of the nationalist 
Guomingdang government, which not only embodied the principle of sexual equality 
in its law codes but also that of mutual consent. In the Communist base areas too, 
these principles were developed in line with traditional Marxist ideology and there 
was a keen attempt at least initially to drive out all forms of “feudal superstition” and 
social hierarchy. Whilst it is tme that the various campaigns for social transformation 
depended in terms of their intensity at any given time upon the exigencies of political 
expediency and therefore frequently had to be tempered in light of male peasant 
resistance, they nevertheless formed an important basis for the later family policies of 
the PRC. In this way, many of the priorities of the base areas in relation to the family 
were reflected in the 1950 Marriage Law which was in force throughout the pre­
reform period.743 Despite there being formal legislative continuity in relation to the 
framework governing the Chinese family prior to 1979, in reality there were a number 
of attempts by Chairman Mao fundamentally to interfere with its terms of operation.
In the most extreme cases this manifested itself in an effort effectively to abolish the 
family altogether and to replace it with forms of communal care and living. More 
generally, it involved reducing the role of the family as much as was possible to make 
way for alternative institutions which could be more effectively controlled by the 
central Party-State. The failure of this policy was essentially the failure of wider 
policies of central control and autarky and its replacement was likewise linked to a 
more extensive strategy of reform and decentralisation. This involved the revival of 
long-neglected institutions and a change of attitude to the traditional bases of Chinese 
society from one of contempt to one of recognition, intelligent engagement and of co­
option: hence the host of laws, regulations, decisions and judicial opinions designed to
743 In general see: Diamant, 2000; Meijer, 1971; Jamieson, 1921; and, Shiga, 1978.
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re-establish the Chinese family as a primary unit of production, socialisation and
744care.
1. Marriage and Divorce
As the primary institutional locus of reproduction, the PRC has long been keen to 
procure the widespread registration of marriage.745 It has seen registration as one of 
the principal ways for it to monitor the population’s most intimate personal dealings. 
This represents a significant departure from traditional practice, which, even down to 
the present, has tended to characterise the validity of marriage in terms of celebratory 
rituals such as betrothal, presentation of the bride to the groom’s family and ancestors 
and public banquets.746 Given this background, the Party-State’s desire for 
surveillance has not always been successfully realised. With the inception of the 
reform period such practical difficulties have multiplied, resulting in frequent 
attempts to realign law and policy.
The starting point was the provision laid down in the 1980 Marriage Law (ML ‘80) 
that marriage was only completed once a certificate had been issued.747 This was 
strengthened significantly in the 1980 and 1986 Marriage Registration Regulations 
(MMR ’80, ‘86) which added, in particular, the requirement that a couple intending to 
marry appear in person at the Registry. Moreover, the 1986 Regulations stipulated 
that those who register their marriage would have their lawful rights and interests
haqprotected by law, which by implication meant that those who did not register risked 
their rights going unrecognised. Despite the fact of clear requirements for the 
registration of a valid marriage there has been continuing tension within the Chinese 
judiciary between the strict application of the registration requirements and the real 
potential for injustice that could result from a failure to recognize de facto unions. 
Consequently, de facto unions continued to be treated as valid in a large number of 
circumstances throughout the 1980s.
The desire to reassert control over this most fundamental of social institutions,
744 Palmer, 2005: 176-177.
745 As early as 1931 the requirement o f  marriage registration had been laid down in article 8 o f the Chinese Soviet Republic  
M arriage Regulations. This was followed after 1949 by its subsequent legislative reaffirmation and reinforcement both in the 
1950 M arriage L aw  and in the 1955 M arriage Registration Regulations.
746 See: Diamant, 2000; and, Meijer, 1971.
747 ML ’80: Article 7.
748 M M R ’86: Article 2.
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resulted in the Supreme People’s Court issuing an important series of Opinions on the 
Determination o f Cases Involving Co-habitation in the name o f Husband and Wife 
without Registration o f Marriage. Article 1 of these Opinions stated that if the couple 
in question had commenced their co-habitation before March the 15th 1986, when the 
revised marriage registration regulations had come into force and if at the time of the 
hearing they met the essential conditions of marriage specially those of age they 
would be recognised to have a legally protected husband and wife relationship. 
However, under Article 2 if on the other hand they commenced their cohabitation on 
or after the 15th of March 1986 or did not at commencement of cohabitation meet the 
essential conditions of marriage then the court would consider their relationship one 
of unlawful cohabitation and the provisions for both property division and custody 
would therefore be less favourable to the interest of the women. This position was 
reaffirmed in the 1994 Regulations on the Administration o f Marriage, {RAM ’94) 
which confirmed that cohabiting couples who failed to register their union would not 
be allowed to characterise them as matrimonial in nature. Since the primary intention 
of these moves had been to enhance the Party-State’s control over family life, 
particularly, as will be seen later, with a view to enforcing its birth limitation and 
eugenics policy, it is a clear example of the priorities of gender equality in this 
instance being trumped by the more pressing priority of state control.
The likelihood of this more rigorous approach proving sustainable in the long run, 
however, was always open to question since the logic, particularly of family farming 
under the Household Responsibility System in the countryside and the widespread 
desire of China’s peasantry to avoid the reproductive restrictions, exerted an 
“apparently unrelenting downward pressure on marriage ages in rural areas.”749 It is 
noteworthy, therefore, that by the turn of the millennium policy makers were prepared 
to countenance some relaxation in the application of registration provisions. Thus in a
HZf)major amendment to the 1980 Marriage Law in April 2001 {ML ’01), in addition to 
introducing significantly clearer statutory rules on invalid marriage, Article 8 now 
allows for retrospective registration for a hitherto de facto marriage, stating th a t: “In 
the absence of marriage registration, the man and woman should go through 
registration procedures.” At first blush, Articles 10, which declares a marriage invalid
749 Palmer, 1996: 121.
750 In general, see: Ogletree & Alwis, 2003-04.
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if “the minimum legal ages of marriage have not been attained” and 12, which states 
that a void marriage is invalid from its inception, seem, when taken together, to 
exclude underage marriage from the possibility of retrospective recognition.751 To 
understand their implications properly, however, they need instead to be read in 
conjunction with the first of two subsequent interpretations of the Supreme People’s 
Court expanding upon the provisions of the revised Marriage Law and passed very 
soon after the latter’s enactment in 2001.752 Under Article 4 of that interpretation it 
was stipulated that, in the case of underage and unregistered unions, the relationship 
should be characterised as marital from such time as the substantive conditions for 
legal marriage were satisfied by both parties. Consequently, although it is indeed the 
case under the new regime that underage unions will not subsequently be registered, 
they will nevertheless be recognised as valid de facto marriages by the courts. More 
generally, under Article 5 of the 2001 Interpretation, registered couples seeking 
divorce will be considered de facto married if both parties satisfied the substantive 
conditions for marriage prior to the 1st of February 1994 (when the 1994 Regulations 
on the Administration o f Marriage Registration were promulgated). If they only 
satisfied the conditions subsequent to that date, then their union is required to be 
registered before the court will allow any further progress in matrimonial proceedings.
In light of all this, it is clear that towards the end of the 1990s there occurred a shift of 
policy, “in favour of some degree of recognition of de facto marriages,” and that this 
occurred, “primarily in recognition of the fact that wedding celebration without 
marriage registration remains the predominant social practice in rural areas.”753 On 
one interpretation, this represents a shift towards greater tolerance of more diverse as 
well as of more traditional forms of family formation. On another interpretation, it 
represents a significant and continuing failure on the part of the state to implement 
one of the key components in its strategy for effective social surveillance. Perhaps 
more accurate, however, is the view that it constitutes a recalibration of official policy 
to take account of the clear realities of Chinese society. On this view, it represents an 
acceptance that traditional unions continue to be formed contrary to the explicit 
preferences of the state, but also an attempt to construct mechanisms that will both
751 Ding, 2003.
752 The two interpretations are: the 2001 Interpretation o f  the Supreme P e o p le ’s Court on Several Problem s Concerning the 
A pplication o f  the M arriage L aw  o f  the P R C  (1) and the 2003 Interpretation o f  the Supreme P eop le 's  Court on Several Problem s  
Concerning the A pplication o f  the M arriage L aw  o f  the P R C  (2).
753 Palmer, 2005: 180.
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mitigate the consequences of the breakdown of such unions and make it easier for 
them to be brought back within the ambit of the preferred official framework. In 
respect of this last point, it is particularly noteworthy that one of the principal 
components of the 2003 Marriage Registration Regulations (.MRR ‘03), which 
replaced the 1994 Regulations on the Administration o f Marriage Registration, was 
the concept of remedial marriage registration laid down in Article 8 which reinforced 
and elaborated upon the provisions of the 2001 law.
Whilst the issue of registration has been of central importance in China’s post Mao 
marital law regime it has been accompanied by continuing efforts to emphasise both 
sexual equality and consent. Communist ideology has, of course, always been critical 
of traditional customary marriage practices which violated these dual principles. Thus, 
for example, the 1950 Marriage Law not only affirmed the principle of consent but 
also outlawed concubinage, bigamy, child betrothal and interference in the remarriage 
of widows. In post-Mao China, however, the attack on customary inequality and 
forms of social constraint has taken on a new significance in light of the increasing 
desire to shift the country towards a more market-friendly society and the perceived 
need to compliment attempts to rebalance Chinese population disequilibria with a 
revaluation of the role of women. Not surprisingly then, in Articles in 2, 3 and 4 of the 
1980 Marriage Law, the principle of consent is reasserted with some force and any 
interference in a decision to marry is strictly prohibited. Likewise, throughout the 80s 
and 90s, attempts were made by various government agencies to ensure that 
interference in the remarriage of elderly parents was prohibited. Moreover it is 
noticeable that, building upon provisions of the 1996 Elderly Persons Law, the 2001 
revised Marriage Law at Article 30 explicitly requires children to refrain from 
interfering in parental remarriage, stating that “The children’s duty to maintain their 
parents shall not terminate with a change in their parents’ matrimonial 
relationship.”754 It also supplemented the prohibition on forced marriage by rendering 
such a marriage under Article 11 of the voidable at the request of the compelled party 
for dissolution of the marriage contract within one year of the date of marriage 
registration or within a year of his or her freedom being restored.
754 See: Foster, 1999.
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Notably the provisions relating to interference in freedom of marriage built upon a 
number of Decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in 
the early 1990s specifically designed to apply more effective criminal sanctions to 
practices which degrade and tend to lead to the coercion of both women and children 
such as those forbidding prostitution, the patronage of prostitutes and for the strict 
punishment of people dealing in women or children. Tellingly, the revised Marriage 
Law and subsequent Supreme Court interpretations indicate a further extension of 
these concerns in the context of domestic violence and other forms of abuse as they 
tend to move emphasis away from dealing with these matters through conciliation and 
mediation towards regarding them increasingly as infringements of the social order 
and sometimes of the criminal law which require punishment.
Finally, with the growth of a more economically unequal society, especially with the 
rise of a class of rich entrepreneurs, combined with the endurance of ‘traditional’ 
notions of concubinage, the late 1990s saw an undermining of the principle of 
monogamous marriage. Consequently, the 2001 revised marriage law also has 
provisions designed to combat both bigamy and concubinage. First it allows for the 
possibility under Article 10 of the revised Marriage Law and Article 7 of the 2001 
Interpretation, for the possibility that grassroots organisations who become aware of 
bigamous or similarly irregular marital unions can request as “interested persons” that 
the People’s Courts declare that a particular marriage is void. Secondly, it effectively 
makes concubinage a ground for divorce under Article 32 of the revised law and 
allows for compensation to be awarded to the wronged party in divorce cases 
involving bigamy and concubinage under article 46.
Turning to the question of divorce itself, the figures show that there has been a 
considerable increase in its occurrence since 1979 when the annual ratio of divorce to 
marriage was just 3 percent whilst in 1997 it had reached 13 percent and in some 
areas as high as 20 percent.755 This it has been suggested has resulted not only from 
the gradual easing of the requirements in contested divorce cases but also from a more 
restless youth which is growing acclimatised to the freedoms of an increasingly 
marketised society as well as a younger, more professional judiciary.756
755 Palmer, 2005: 185.
756 Ibid.
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The basis for the law governing divorce is found in Articles 24 and 25 and the 1980 
law. The first of these Articles reaffirmed the provision of divorce by mutual consent. 
Divorce by mutual consent is a direct hangover from traditional Chinese law and was 
therefore recognised earlier not only in Article 17 of the 1950 Marriage Law but also 
in the law of Republican China. In the context of the post-reform period, this 
relatively relaxed attitude to this form of divorce embodies the judgement that where 
parties to a marriage are agreed, and provided, first, that provision has been made for 
their offspring, its custody and upbringing, and second, that an agreement has been 
reached as to the equitable division of the marital property, it would be more 
destructive to social harmony were dissolution of the marriage to be refused than were 
it to be allowed.
It is important not to overlook this form of divorce, since it is one of the few areas in 
contemporary PRC family law where the Party-State treads with a relatively light 
foot. Given what is known about the social dynamics of a developing market society, 
it has been, and is likely to continue to be, an area of significant growth. This is 
primarily because the more intangible forces of social pressure are reducing tolerance 
of familial tension among younger generations of Chinese citizens at the same time as 
there is an increase in exogenous strains on family life as society becomes more 
competitive multiplying the instances of economic insecurity and flux.
In the area of contested divorce, which is regulated under Article 25 of the 1980 
Marriage Law, it appears at first sight that official attitudes there represented were 
slightly more liberal than those represented in the 1950 Marriage Law since, unlike its 
predecessor, the 1980 Marriage Law introduced a single but specific ground, namely 
“breakdown of mutual affection”.757 In practice, however, whilst Article 25 appears 
to recognise the principle of freedom of divorce, in continuation of the almost 
mandatory requirement for mediation which operated in the pre-reform period, there 
was strong evidence of judicial conservatism throughout the 1980s.758 This was 
clearly resistant to the concept of no fault divorce and insisted upon several rounds of
757 Article 25 reads, “If one party alone desires a divorce, the organisation concerned may carry out mediation or the party may 
appeal directly to a people’s court to start divorce proceedings. In dealing with a divorce case, the people’s court shall carry out 
mediation; divorce shall be granted if  mediation fails because mutual affection no longer exists.”
758 Bailey, 1995; and, He, 2006.
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mediation before entertaining a petition. It was in part for this reason that in 1989 the 
Supreme People’s Court issued its Opinions on the Determination o f Breakdown o f  
Mutual Affection Between Husbands and Wives in Divorce Proceedings in an effort to 
press judges to adopt a less obstructive approach in contested divorce cases. In 
particular, it laid down a number of specific grounds, in the presence of which 
marriage should automatically be dissolved. Under a number of these grounds, the 
court was required further to examine whether the mutual affection of the couples 
could not in fact be maintained or whether there was a possibility of reconciliation 
quite apart from the couple’s assertion of those facts. Thus, though these clarificatory 
Opinions undoubtedly made the securing of a contested divorce easier to obtain, they 
gave rise to a situation in which, “the judges [we]re expected to prevent “rash 
divorces” and thus place considerable emphasis on the need to reconcile the 
parties. ..[and in which] more conservative judges [continued] generally [to be] 
unsympathetic to divorce suits.”759
With the passage of the revised Marriage Law 2001, there has been a significant 
extension of the right to divorce in contested cases but one which, nonetheless, 
continues to reflect the moralistic policy that was evident in the earlier 1989 Supreme 
People’s Court Opinions. Furthermore, these had themselves continued to reflect the 
earlier conservative reluctance to make the granting of divorce easier, especially upon 
the application of a “guilty party”. The fact that under Article 47 of the revised law 
there are attempts to put in place a more explicit system for the definition and 
determination of fault, and for the awarding of damages in the context of marital 
breakdown, shows that this attitude is far from being a thing of the past.
Nevertheless, the fact that the requirement under Article 7 of the 1989 Opinions, 
namely “a separation of three full years with no prospect of reconciliation”, has been 
reduced so that now, where incompatibility of a couple is cited as the ground for 
divorce, the couple need only have lived apart for a minimum of two years, means 
that the amended Marriage Law has in fact made it significantly easier to obtain a 
divorce in contested cases. Moreover, it is quite certain that this reflects the gradual 
easing of the more inflexible attitudes to marital breakdown that existed in the earlier
759 Palmer, 1988-9: 75. See also: Huang, 2005.
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reform period when an older and thus more traditionally minded generation of 
Communist leaders were in power.
It is clear when looking back upon the developments in marriage and divorce law that 
subtle but nevertheless very significant changes have been taking place within the 
People’s Republic of China since 1979. In particular, these seem to reflect in social 
relations, though perhaps after some time delay, what is taking place in economic 
relations. That is, they reflect a gradual though noticeable freeing up of China’s 
citizenry from frameworks, which were not designed to give expression to their 
individually felt needs but rather prioritised in the specific case the needs of the social 
collective. Plainly, of course, this shift represents the progression towards a 
significant devolution of decision-making from the collective to the individual. In 
economic terms, such devolution, contrary to Maoist conceptions, is not only not 
incompatible with the interests of the collective as a whole but actually necessary to 
their more efficient realisation. As this attitude has gained currency and influence 
within the Chinese economy, it is clearly possible to see from the foregoing analysis 
that it has gradually broken out into other areas of Chinese life.
2. Population and Birth-Planning
The most infamous way in which the post-Mao State has attempted to influence the 
functioning of the Chinese family has been through its comprehensive policy of birth 
limitation.760 In order to achieve its economic goals and to attain GDP levels 
comparable to those of its advanced western competitors within the defined 60 or 70 
year timeframe it was calculated that population growth needed to be kept below 1 
billion by the year 2000. On this basis Deng Xiaoping sanctioned in 1979 a policy of 
encouraging all couples to restrict themselves to one child.761 Accordingly, when the 
1980 Marriage Law was passed, in addition to changes to the procedures governing 
marriage and divorce, it also set down a number of provisions designed to curb 
population growth. Most notably, under article 5 of the 1980 law the minimum legal 
age for marriage was increased significantly to 22 years for men and 20 years for
760 For earlier approaches to population, see: Aird, 1972,1978, 1990; Tien, 1973,19801991; Fraser, 1987; and, Goldstein & 
Wang, 1996. On its intellectual history, see: White, 1994, 1994a.
761 This was announced in an unusual Open Letter issued in September 1980. Greenhalgh, 2001: 43.
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women and under a large number of provincial family planning regulations these were 
set still higher. Under article 6 it prohibited first cousin and other forms of close kin 
marriage, as well as the marriage of anybody suffering from incurable leprosy or “any 
other disease which is regarded by medical science as rendering a person unfit for 
marriage”. Articles 8 and 16 sought to encourage uxorilocal marriage as part of the 
wider strategy to enhance the status of female children. Finally and most significantly, 
whereas the 1978 Constitution had stated in Article 53 merely that, “[t]he state 
advocates and encourages family planning,” Articles 2 and 12 of the 1980 Marriage 
Law specified that the practice of family planning should be mandatory with Article 
49 of the 1982 Constitution subsequently repeating the precise terms of Article 12 that 
“both husband and wife have the duty to practice family planning.”
Thus, throughout the 80s and 90s a primary goal of PRC family law has been to 
restrict each family to the bearing of one child with only rare exceptions being made 
in specifically defined and extraordinary circumstances. It has also been concerned to 
ensure that, where births do take place, they are of the highest productive quality. The 
fact that these goals remain of central and continuing importance in official thinking 
and that they are framed primarily in terms of demographics rather than in terms of 
the rights of the individual is clearly shown with the promulgation in 2001 of the first 
national Law on Population and Birth Planning.162 This not only reaffirms the dual 
objectives of the population policy but also provides for the first time a systematic 
guiding framework within which the various provincial regulations should operate.
From its inception the birth limitation policy has gone through a number of phases. 
Initially, provincial regulations, which until 2001, were the manner in which 
Constitutional and Marriage Law injunctions for family planning were implemented, 
tended to concentrate on rewards to encourage conformity with the policy. However, 
it soon became clear that, as a result of inflation, rapid enrichment of families under 
the Household Responsibility System and local cadre corruption, this approach was 
not having its desired effect. Consequently, as the 1980s progressed, new sets of 
provincial regulations were introduced across China which were more detailed and 
which coupled rewards with often quite draconian punishments for non-compliance
762 Hampton, 2003-4.
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with family planning rules. Although efforts were made to relax birth limitation 
policies in the late 80s and early 90s, the huge mushrooming of economic migration 
and the consequent floating population, as well as high rates of population increase in 
economically backward areas unwittingly promoted by direct state assistance, led to 
its considerable tightening.763 In particular, it augmented new measures governing the 
migrant population introduced by the State Planning Commission in 1991 and a much 
more activist approach by the State Council from 1989 in terms of linking state relief 
with birth limitation work. With the passage of the 2001 Law on Population and Birth 
Planning (LPBP’01) many of the specific policy strategies developed in the 
provincial regulations have been brought together and updated. In particular the 2001 
law codifies the system of rewards and punishments developed in the mid-80s. Thus 
under Article 26 of the new law rewards continue to accrue to individuals who 
undergo specific procedures such as sterilisation and abortion. Likewise, families who 
undertake a general and public commitment not to have more than one child and to 
use birth control, thereby qualifying for the award of a single child family certificate, 
may qualify for: monthly subsidies, free healthcare, remission of school fees, 
preferential housing allocation, extended leave and more generous old age schemes. 
For those who marry and give birth later in life significant one off leave bonuses are 
granted.
On the negative side, penalties for breaking birth limitation rules include most 
significantly the payment of a social compensation fee which amounts to a fine often 
being equivalent of 50 percent of a poor family’s annual income and which is 
according to Palmer, “officially seen as ‘compensation’ to society for the burden 
placed on it by a birth not permitted by the Plan.”764 Secondly, where a family, having 
being awarded a single child family certificate, gives birth to a second child is 
required to return all funds and subsidies awarded to it and is debarred from getting 
any further benefits. Finally, there are punishments for people who transgress birth
763 In the early 1980s, attempts had been made to enforce the One Child Policy with a series o f draconian campaigns. This 
produced a backlash especially in the rural areas. See here: Greenhalgh, 1994; Greenhalgh & Li, 1995; Rosenthal, 2000. See 
also: Croll, 1994; Wassestrom, 1984; and, Zhang, 1999. In 1984, the policy was therefore liberalised to a degree, allowing those 
in rural areas to have a second child, and cadres were forbidden from using coercion. In the event, both cadres and the rural 
population ‘over-responded’. See: Greenhalgh, 1994. Fertility rates rose considerably in 1986-7, in reaction, it was decided to 
‘stabilise’ the policy in respect o f allowing for a second child in certain specified circumstances, but coupled with this an 
insistence on strengthening the policy’s enforcement. It is this re-enforcement which sparked the tightening reforms o f  the early- 
mid 1990s. Greenhalgh, 2001: 43. On the 1980s in general, see: Banister, 1984; Hardee-Cleaveland & Banister, 1988; 
Greenhalgh, 1986,1990,1994; and Tyrene, 1991,1994.
764 Palmer, 2005: 199.
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planning regulations in other ways such as the removal of IUD loops, assaulting 
family planning workers and either giving or receiving bribes in relation to family 
planning work.
Importantly, the eugenic concept of population quality continues to receive close 
attention in the 2001 law carrying on the themes found in earlier legislation. As will 
be recalled, Article 6 of the 1980 Marriage Law prohibits persons with common 
paternal and maternal grandparents from marrying each other as a way of reducing of 
congenital defects. In 1990 such prohibitions were joined by the growth of 
compulsory medical examination prior to marriage registration and in 1994 the 
mother and child health care law was introduced containing a number of important 
provisions on population quality. Nearly all of these measures have been brought in to 
the ambit of the 2001 Law.765 Whilst individual instances can be pointed to where 
particular provisions of more recent population regulations, such as those adopted by 
the Beijing Municipality in 2003, are less stringent than those of earlier regulations 
they nevertheless remain profoundly eugenic in nature. Whilst it should be noted that 
one child per couple is the norm, Article 18 of the 2001 Law continues the policy 
developed during the 1980s of allowing provision for a second child in certain 
circumstances where a couple have applied for permission in accordance with the 
relevant regulations. The circumstances include: where the first child has developed a 
nonhereditary disability that will make it difficult for it to support either itself or its 
parents in later life and also where families living in the remote countryside, and 
whose main source of living is agriculture, are likely to experience real difficulties 
without more than one offspring. Lastly, exceptions to the single child rule continue 
to be permitted in respect of some certain minority nationalities for historical, cultural, 
ethnic and religious reasons.
Finally, concern at the population’s ongoing gender imbalance is seen in the 
codification of a number of pre-existing provincial bans on foetal testing and selective 
abortions in Article 35 of the 2001 Law as well as a number of other provisions 
attempting to raise the status of women and to combat discrimination against them.766
765 L P B P ’01: Article 11
766 There is a raft o f evidence concerning the sex imbalance and gender discrimination that has resulted form the One Child 
Policy. In general, see: Li & Xizhe, 2000. For earlier years and sub-regional break-downs, see: Yuan & Skinner, 2000. For more 
on discrimination against infant girls, see Human rights in China, 1995; Johnson, 1996; and, Johnson, et.al., 1998. Added to this
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Despite the fact of ongoing and renewed emphasis upon the necessity of all sectors of 
society taking responsibility for population control and the implementation of birth 
limitation policies, there is much evidence to suggest that strong resistance continues 
to be encountered in China’s rural areas where welfare and economic policies are 
“themselves creating powerful pressures for large patrilocally based families.”767 At 
first sight, of course, the entire apparatus of population control and eugenics, not to 
mention the thrust of the one child policy itself, seems quite incompatible with the 
principles of individual autonomy and decision making which are the usual 
concomitants of the increasing marketisation of society. In fact, however, two things 
need to be borne in mind in order to gain a correct perspective on the true functional 
efficacy of the Party-State strategy in this area. Firstly, whilst it may be true that what 
applies to economic decision-making in terms of allowing individual producers and 
consumers to make their own decisions should in the last analysis apply also, for 
purposes of maximal efficiency, to questions of reproduction, China is still a society 
in transition and decisions which might be most rational in the context of a more 
developed market society may be inhibited by incompatible social and cultural 
attitudes at this stage of its development. The judgement embodied in the population 
policy therefore need not necessarily be at all incompatible with functional 
requirements of a developing rather than a developed market society, and in fact may 
constitute a strategic use of state power which, in attempting to create more rapidly 
the conditions favourable to the establishment of a market society, may be entirely 
rational. Secondly, the fact that China has now for almost thirty years implemented a 
policy, the effect of which has been substantially to nuclearise the family, means that 
in the long run it may actually have served very well the socio-structural requirements 
of a market society, which, it has been argued throughout this paper, depends upon 
the formation of equal and therefore essentially transferable productive and 
consumptive units. Thus objections that the one child policy has produced several 
generations of “little emperors”, whilst possibly not an attractive prospect from a
has been a whole host o f  other consequential social and health problems. For the effect on women’s health, see: Kaufman, 
et.al.,1992; Li,1999; and Ni & Rossignol. On the plight o f ‘black’ (unregistered) children who have, under the terms o f  the 
policy, been illicitly conceived, see: Fan & Yuan, 1989; and, Chan & Zhang, 1999 For more on the related operation and 
significance o f the household registration system, see: Cheng & Selden, 1994; Mallee, 1995; and Chan & Zhang, 1999. Finally, 
on other, more general long-term difficulties resulting from the policy, see: Watson, ed., 1997; Du &Tu, 2000; Jing, ed., 2000; 
and, Tulijapurkar, et.al., 1994.
767 Greenhalgh, 1994; Greenhalgh & Li, 1995; Rosenthal, 2000. See also: Croll, 1994; Wassestrom, 1984; and, Zhang, 1999.
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human point of view, may point to a phenomenon which ultimately proves to be
H£LQ
functionally quite apposite.
3. The Post-Reform Family as a Provider of Socialisation and Care
In addition to natural means of expanding the family unit through procreation,
Chinese society also has a long tradition of adoption, particularly, where a couple has 
proved infertile or incapable of giving birth to a son, such tradition being the adoption 
of a male child for the purposes of continuing the patroline and ensuring provision for 
themselves both in old age and in the life hereafter.769 Originally, the Chinese 
Communist Party was keen to condemn such practices as manifestations of ‘feudal 
superstition’. However, within the reform period, as the state has increasingly pulled 
back from Maoist ideas of total central control and instant revolutionary 
transformation, and as the family has increasingly been co-opted and made a major 
unit of production, so it has also been co-opted as a means of social welfare and 
security. In this context, the institution of adoption has not only come to be tolerated 
but also actively promoted as part of a battery of services providing family care of the 
very young and very old. Consequently, from the beginning of the reform period the 
right of adoption has been revived and periodically reaffirmed. Thus both Section 14 
of the 1979 Supreme People’s Court Opinions Concerning the Implementation o f  
Enforcement o f Civil Affairs, Policy, Cases and Law and Article 20 of the 1980 
Marriage Law enjoined, amongst other things: the protection of “lawful adoptive 
relations”, the safeguarding of the rights and interests of parties stemming therefrom, 
and the need for free consent.770 Subsequently, these principles have been reinforced 
both in the 1991 Adoption Law (.AL ‘91) and in the 1998 amended Adoption Law 
(AL’98).m
One of the most significant features of both adoption laws is the protection that they 
give to the rights both of the adopted child and of the adopting parents, and although 
relations must benefit the adopted minor they must also follow the principle of
768 Jing, ed., 2000; and, Watson, ed., 1997.
769 See here: Chikusa, 1978; Johnson, 1921; Van der Sperenkel, 1962: 15-17; Waltner, 1984; Watson, 1975; and, W olf & Huang, 
1980.
770 Palmer, 1987, 1988.
771 Gate, 1999-2000.
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equality.772 Consequently, the adoption regime is premised upon the principle of 
mutuality in which the rights of the adopter are held to be almost as important as the 
rights of the adoptee. Article 4 stipulates that a child being adopted must be under 14 
years of age and disadvantaged either because the child is: an orphan, or a foundling, 
or in circumstances where its natural parents cannot rear it because they are burdened 
with unusual hardship. In this context, it is interesting that there is no right of 
anonymity since the state has been keen to encourage as much as possible that not 
only should an adopted child know his natural parents but also that it should continue 
to maintain moral bonds of support and affection with them. Moreover, the adopting 
parents should be childless and capable of rearing and providing an education for the 
adoptive child. Initially, it was required that the adopters must be at least 35 years old 
but this has been amended downwards to 30 years of age. This is a significant 
concession to make the formation of adoptive relations easier but it still reflects the 
desire to delay adoption until it is clear that a couple cannot have children of their 
own. This ensures that children requiring adoption are more effectively targeted at 
those couples who are themselves most in need of the security that comes in old age 
from having a productive child. The one exception to this rule under amended Article 
8 is the allowance of couples with their own children or who have already adopted, to 
adopt an orphan, foundling or handicapped child in the care of a social welfare 
organisation thereby helping to alleviate the state of responsibility for the care, 
upbringing and welfare which wherever possible is in all these provisions delegated to 
the individual family unit. Another concession which continues to be permitted in the 
revised law is recognition given to the customary practice of the adoption of an 
agnatic nephew for the purpose of continuing a patroline which would otherwise be 
extinguished. In many ways this represents an “acknowledgement of the fact that 
there are limits to the state’s ability to control the family in rural areas”,774 and the 
judgment that it is better to recognise and regulate practices that would continue to 
take place regardless rather than not to regulate them at all.
Interesting here, is the renewed emphasis in the 1998 Law upon formalities. In the 
1991 Law under Article 15, these were limited to the requirement of a written 
agreement between the parties unless one party required the services of a notary
772 A L ’91: Article 2.
773 Bouman, 2000.
774 Palmer, 1996: 130.
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public. Under the amended law it is stipulated that “adoptions should be registered 
with civil affairs departments at county level or above” with adoptive relations 
commencing from the date of registration. Whilst this does not make registration 
compulsory it does suggest a trend which in the future will lead to a system which 
does. In the adoption law regime that there is a clear emphasis upon unilising the 
family not only as the primary institution of socialisation but also of care and social 
security which whilst, closely regulated by the state which will relieve it as much as 
possible of the considerable burdens which the provision of such services which 
would inevitably place upon it, and in this sense it is consistent with the drive of the 
entire reform period to both controlled decentralisation and efficiency.
In relation to the responsibility for the socialization and care of children generally,775 
Article 15 of the 1980 Marriage Law specifies that “parents have the duty to educate 
their children” as well as prohibiting the causing of children harm. Article 17 enjoins 
parents both to discipline and requires them to compensate those who have suffered 
economic loss in consequence of their children’s behaviour. The 1991 Law for the 
protection of minors specifies in greater detail how the interest of minors should be 
protected and their development as “successors to the socialist cause (article 1) 
promoted and the 1992 law for the protection of women’s rights and interest provides 
additional protection and support -  especially under Articles 16 and 17 (education 
rights), Article 22 (prohibition of employment of girls under the age of 16) and 
Article 35 (prohibition of infanticide) -  for the position of young girls.776 Finally in 
Articles 21, 22 and 23 of the 1980 Marriage Law stepparents, grandparents and elder 
brothers and sisters are each required to provide care for children where the need 
arises, thereby further utilizing traditional lines of family responsibility to ensure that 
the state is not burdened in times of crisis with additional responsibilities.
Turning to the care of the elderly, the 1996 Law for the Protection o f the Rights and 
Interests o f the Elderly (60 years and above) augments and develops provisions in the 
marriage, criminal and inheritance laws and is similarly “constructed so that the 
principal substantive burdens continue to fall on the household rather than the
775 See: Palmer, 1993
776 On the problem o f  female infanticide, see: Horn, 1991-2,
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state.”777 It built upon the principle of mutuality of rights and obligations in an 
attempt to ensure that the status of this traditionally most respected section of Chinese 
society is not undermined. The basis for the approach, which was clearly enunciated 
in the third paragraph of Article 49 in the 1982 Constitution, states “parents have the 
duty to rear and educate children and minors and children also who have come of age 
have the duty to support and assist their parents.” Already in Article 3 of the 1980 
Marriage Law it was stated that “maltreatment, desertion of one family member by 
another shall be prohibited,” and both the Marriage Law at Article 15 and the 1979 
Criminal Law at Article 183 make it an offence for a child to fail to perform his duties 
to support an aged parent, as well as in Article 182, to abuse a family member more 
generally. This was supplemented by Article 35 of the Women's Protection Law 1992 
which makes it an offence to “abuse or forsake elderly women.” The Inheritance Law 
of 1985 at Article 7 additionally allows for disinheritance of an heir who has 
committed “a serious act of abandoning or maltreating the deceased”,778 whilst at the 
same time providing under Article 13 that those who have provided care and support 
for the deceased be allowed the largest shares in the deceased’s estate rather than 
those who “had the ability and were in a position to maintain the deceased but failed 
to fulfill their duties”. In the 1996 Elderly Persons Law, Article 10 reaffirms primary 
responsibility of the family for providing support to the elderly and at Article 11 
reaffirms the particular obligations of their children. Article 16 extends these 
obligations explicitly to the spouse of an elderly person and to younger siblings when 
brought up by their older brothers and sisters. At article 15 it also states that such 
duties cannot be excused an obligated individual simply by him renouncing his or her 
rights of inheritance. In altogether more exhortatory terms Article 35 provides 
“traditions of mutual assistance between neighbours shall be promoted and voluntary 
social work for the elderly shall be encouraged and supported”. Finally, Article 31 of 
the 1985 Inheritance Law provides explicitly for the formation of inheritance-care 
agreements whereby individuals who may be unrelated to elderly persons, can 
nevertheless agree to look after them in their old age in return for rights of inheritance 
upon their death.779 In all of these areas, the concern to provide as much as possible 
for the support of the elderly in the community is clearly manifest. In some ways this
777 Palmer, 2000: 104.
778 See: Davis, 1999; and Foster, 1999.
779 See: Foster, 1999; and, Palmer, 1988. On the norms o f  inheritance embodied in traditional Chinese law and for a sense o f how 
they are reflected here see: Jamieson, 1921; and, Shiga, 1978. For the situation during the early years o f  the PRC, see: Meijer, 
1971: 251-264 and for a little later on, see: Foster-Simons, 1985.
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runs counter to the marketising dynamic since it aims to re-bolster the position of an 
unproductive sector of society which, unlike in the case of children, has little prospect 
of becoming more productive with time. However, apart from the obvious 
requirement already noted not overly to burden the state with the expense involved in 
elderly care, there is also a sense in which these provisions are defensive in nature, 
thereby reflecting how far market forces have already cut away at the traditional 
social fabric.
The final area in which the state manifests its concern to encourage equality but also 
to avoid potential destitution is that of post-divorce maintenance and custody rights. 
Under Articles 29 and 30 of the 1980 Marriage Law, basic principles were laid down 
for the post-divorce custody of children resulting from a marriage and for the 
reasonable division for provision of its living and educational expenses. This was 
supplemented in 1993 by Opinions o f the Supreme People’s Court in Determination 
and Support o f  Children in Divorce Cases, and Article 48 of The Revised Marriage 
Law, 2001 has reaffirmed the duty of the court to make judgments in such cases and 
also in the areas of maintenance and division of property.
Under Article 33 of the 1980 Law either party to a divorce is enjoined to provide for 
the other whenever they are facing financial difficulties, preferably by agreement but 
if that fails, by petition of the People’s Court. Some Specific Suggestions Concerning 
Problems Encountered by the People’s Court when Hearing Divorce Cases also 
provided guidance for the more general division of property under Article 31 of the
HO{\
1980 Law. Despite these provisions, however, the rapid social and economic 
developments taking place during the 1980s and 90s soon rendered them inadequate. 
Consequently, the 2001 Revised Marriage Law together with the 2003 Supreme 
People \s Court Interpretation has now laid down an altogether more sophisticated 
framework for the division of the marital estate distinguishing different types of 
property both for the purposes of continuing entitlement and liability and also 
providing for more sophisticated guidance as to what types of property should form 
part of the matrimonial estate and which that of the individual spouse.781 First, taking 
account of the increasing complexity of negotiations between parties for the division
780 Palmer, 1995.
78‘Palmer, 2007
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of the matrimonial estate, it has been provided in Article 47 of the Revised Law that a 
party discovered to have concealed or alienated the relevant property, or to have 
created false debts, will be penalized by, among other things, receiving a smaller 
share of the estate. Secondly, in relation to the newly significant category of 
intellectual property, and in order to strike a balance between monetary 
incentivisation and the principle of spousal equality, it has been stipulated in Article 
17 of the Revised Law that whereas earning from intellectual property rights will be 
categorized as spousal property, ownership of the property rights will remain the 
property of the inventive spouse. Thirdly, much clearer guidance has been given to 
judges concerning the separation of individual and matrimonial property more 
generally, specifying, amongst other things, that the matrimonial estate is to include 
investment income, endowment insurance, and other property and benefits acquired 
during the marriage.782 Explicit guidance is also given in relation to the issue of 
betrothal gifts. Fourthly, a number of guidelines have been laid down in connection 
with spousal property relations arising out of property that concerns such normally 
extra-familial areas as business dealings, equity, debt and partnerships which have 
come, in one way or another, to be entangled in the martial estate.783 Finally, and 
reflecting the general shift from housing provided by the work unit to that owned 
privately, it is provided that a home rented before marriage by one spouse, but 
thereafter purchased together is to be treated as joint property even if registered in 
only one name. Moreover, if  the property is not sold, the people’s court may award 
occupation to one of the spouses depending upon the circumstances of the case.784 
Article 42 of the Revised Law, confirmed by Article 27 of the 2001 Supreme People’s 
Court Interpretation, encourages a husband whose work unit has provided 
accommodation for a married couple to assist in continuing to provide such 
accommodation to his estranged wife. In all of these matters, Article 17 states that 
husband and wife should enjoy equal division of the matrimonial estate and it 
continues to encourage negotiated settlement wherever possible. Nevertheless it is 
appreciated that significant imbalances, particularly gender imbalances, continue and 
so the 2003 Supreme People’s Court interpretation provides for the right of the 
parties to bring an action in the People’s Courts if disputes arise over either custody or
782 Article 18. R evised  L aw  (see also Article 13) and Article 11, 2003 Interpretation.
783 Thus Article 17 o f  the 2003 Interpretation  specifies the several options open when one o f the divorcing spouses is a partner in 
a partnership, and Article 23 concerns itself questions relating to the incurring o f a family debt.
784Articles 20 and 21, R evised  Law.
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property settlements.
B: India
As with China, the development of family and personal law in India is a good 
indicator of the manner in which Indian society as a whole is gradually being 
reconstructed in accordance with the functional requirements of a market economy. 
Unlike post-Mao China, however, the transformations which have been taking place 
in India since the Emergency have been more protracted, more subtle and less explicit 
owing to the considerably greater degree of diversity, the larger number of sectional, 
communal and localised identities and the more participatory, less determinedly state- 
directed, nature of Indian society. Connected with this fact is that whilst in China 
communist ideology of a fundamentally totalising kind sought to undermine the 
traditional family structure in favour of the collective, and thereby had to be subject to 
a radical reversal during the reform period, in India, whilst the socialistic philosophy 
of the Nehruvian consensus undoubtedly had a certain equalising influence upon 
interpersonal relations, it was limited not just by the ubiquitous structural 
impediments to reform already mentioned, but also by its own continued ideological 
commitments to basic political liberties and democratic institutions. Just as the Indian 
state found it comparatively more difficult to reconfigure the family to suit a 
centralised, state-led development strategy prior to the late 1970s, so, thereafter, it has 
also found it comparatively more difficult to render the Indian family amenable to the 
various stages of its new, post-Emergency, development strategy. Despite this fact, 
however, there is clear evidence that significant transformations have nonetheless 
been taking place which represent notable shifts in the terms of India’s familial and 
interpersonal relations.
1. The Question of Uniformity.
In particular, it is clear that the developments taking place in the realm of Indian 
family law since the late 1970s have involved what amounts to a strategic 
recalibration of the way in which the goals of the Constitutional settlement are to be
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realised in practice.785 Just as in the economic sphere there have been growing efforts 
to recognise and co-opt local and individual energies in the service of more effective 
material uplift, so there has also been a reappraisal of family and personal law policy 
involving the higher judiciary determining to do what it sees as justice in the 
individual cases brought before it. This case by case strategy supplemented by very 
cautious occasional legislative interventions, has, in functional terms, involved the 
growing recognition by the state of the differences within Indian society as a prelude 
to their much more effective transformation.
It was, of course, never possible for the state to ignore India’s diversities, nor indeed, 
to fail to recognise these in its formal constitutional and legislative mechanisms. Thus, 
particularly with respect to the Indian family, the pre-Emergency constitutional and 
legislative strategy undoubtedly bore the hall-marks of compromise. Specifically, it 
had long been appreciated by the varying governments of the subcontinent that legal 
uniformity in this sphere could only be achieved, if at all, on an incremental basis. 
Colonial legislative interventions consequently tended to be both piecemeal and 
sporadic in nature, focusing upon removing those aspects of the various communal 
regimes that posed an immediate threat to the smooth functioning of law, order and 
commerce. Whilst the essentials of this gradualist approach continued after 
independence, the newly ensconced nationalist elite determined to effect an altogether 
more proactive policy designed comprehensively to transform India’s personal laws 
by stages into fully a uniform system. For this reason, whilst preserving, under 
Articles 13 and 327 of the Constitution, the variety of pre-existing community 
specific personal laws until subsequently superseded by Act of Parliament, it also 
determined to lay down very clearly -  as a Directive Principle of State Policy -  the 
longer-term goal of complete legal uniformity.
Within this framework, it is possible to identify at least four broad stages in post­
independence attempts to move closer to the objective of legal uniformity. The first 
stage involved the institution of a secular personal law -  under the auspices of the 
Special Marriage Act 1954 -  according to which marital relations could be governed 
on the basis of consent and which was thus, in effect, to operate as an optional
785 Menski, 2001: Chap 6.
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uniform civil code.786 It also involved the passage of a series of Parliamentary Acts in 
relation to the majority Hindu law, often collectively referred to a the ‘Hindu 
Code’.787 These represented an attempt to unify and standardise the law of the 
majority community and also to subsume under its terms, where possible, those 
closely related minority groups -  Jains, Buddhists, Sikhs etc. -  which, it was judged, 
would be least likely to resist such a move with violence. The second stage of the 
uniformisation strategy was the statutory reform of the majority law to bring it more 
in line with the secular law. This was in large part achieved under the terms of the 
Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act 1964 and the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act 
1976. This was followed by a third stage, in which the judiciary began to call, in the 
context of cases of patent injustice being brought before it and at a time when it was 
minded to adopt an altogether more activist approach, for the introduction of a 
Uniform Civil Code as envisaged by Article 44 of the Constitution.
In the famous case of Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, for example, which 
dealt with Muslim post-divorce maintenance law under the general law framework 
provided for in Sections 125 and 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure according to 
which a husband had an ongoing responsibility to maintain his divorced wife, 
Chandrachud C .J. called for the implementation of a UCC in the following strident 
and uncompromising terms:
It is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of our Constitution has 
remained dead letter... There is no evidence of any official activity for 
framing a UCC for the Country...A common Civil Code will help the 
cause of national integration by removing disperate loyalties to laws 
which have conflicting ideologies...It is the State which is charged 
with the duty of securing a uniform civil code for the citizens of the 
country and, unquestionably, it has legislative competence to do so...
We understand the difficulties involved in bringing persons of 
different faiths and persuasions on a common platform. But a 
beginning has to be made if the Constitution is to have any meaning.788
Similarly, in the case of Jor den Diengdeh v. S. S. Chopra, decided less than three 
weeks after the Shah Bano case, and involving the application of the provisions of the 
Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, Chinappa Reddy J was move to write:
786 Bagga, ed., 1978; and, Bhattacharjee 1996.
787 Bhattacharjee, 1994.
788 Paras. 32-33. On the controversy surrounding this call, see: Mahmood, 1976, 1986, 1993.
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The present case is yet another which focuses attention on the 
immediate and compulsive need for a uniform civil code. The totally 
unsatisfactory state of affairs consequent on the lack of a uniform civil 
code is exposed by the facts of the present case.. ,[T]he law relating to 
judicial separation, divorce and nullity of marriage is far, far from 
uniform. Surely the time has now come for a complete reform of the 
law of marriage and [to] make a uniform law applicable to all people 
irrespective of religion or caste. It appears to be necessary to introduce 
irretrievable breakdown of marriage and mutual consent as grounds of 
divorce in all cases....We suggest that the time has come for the 
intervention of the legislature in these matters to provide for a uniform 
code of marriage and divorce and to provide by law for a way out of 
the unhappy situations in which couples like the present have found 
themselves.789
Some ten years later, these calls for action was renewed once more, this time in the 
context of a case -  Sarla Mudgal -  concerning problems caused for women and 
children when a Hindu Husband decides to convert to Islam in order to be able to 
contract a polygamous marriage. There Kuldip Singh J. cited the need for a UCC as a 
decisive step towards national consolidation:
When more than 80% of the citizens have already been brought under the 
codified personal law there is no justification whatsoever to keep in 
abeyance, any more, the introduction of “uniform civil code” for all citizens 
in the territory of India.790
He went on to state:
Article 44 is based on the concept that there is no necessary connection 
between religion and personal law in a civilised society. Article 25 
guarantees religious freedom whereas Article 44 seeks to divest religion 
from social relations and personal law.791
and to criticise “successive governments” which have been, “wholly remiss in their 
duty of implementing the constitutional mandate under Article 44 of the Constitution 
oflndia.”792
The fourth and final stage, which originally arose alongside the third stage, but 
became increasingly dominant from the mid 1980s onwards, has seen a greater 
recognition and utilisation of the self-regulating mechanisms subsisting within Indian 
society. In part, this has been consequent upon a growing appreciation of the
789 At pp. 935-936 and 940
790 At para. 1532.
791 At para. 1538.
792 At para. 1539. See also the comments o f R.M.Sahai J. at para 1540.
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injustices to women and children that result from a more formalistic approach 
whereby they may be left with little or no support from men willing to use the law to 
escape from spousal and parental responsibilities apparently freely entered into.793 In 
part, it has been consequent upon the wider strategy of ensuring that the already 
overburdened Indian State is not needlessly hampered in its overall programme of 
material uplift by being burdened with destitute women and children thrown on its 
mercy by dysfunctional social support mechanisms.
2. Marriage Formation
With respect to marriage formation and solemnisation, this trend has been expressed 
with particular clarity in the majority Hindu law.794 Here the courts have been 
increasingly willing to recognise the validity of marriages when solemnised according 
to ‘unorthodox’, unusual or even nonexistent ceremonial formalities where such 
recognition appears to resonate with local practice. Since 1955, the formation of 
Hindu marriages has purportedly been regulated by section 7 of the Hindu Marriage 
Act. In line with the pluralistic strategy forced upon the post-independence 
government, subsection (1) clearly shows that the legal validity of Hindu marriage is 
not to be determined according to statutory procedures laid down by the State, but 
according to Hindu custom itself. For this reason, the role of custom has been 
explicitly recognised in section 3 (a).795
An early attempt to impose top-down uniformity in this area related to the Tamil 
community of ‘self-respecters’ who devised their own less elaborate and costly forms 
of marriage solemnisation which required no recourse to the high caste Brahmins. In 
the case of Deivaini Achi v. Chitambaram Chettiar, and in the face of evidence 
establishing the extensive employment of these simplified practices, the Madras High 
Court held that, in order to be valid, a fully fledged sastric marriage ceremony was 
required, thereby instantly rendering thousands of marriages void. A similar approach 
was likewise adopted in relation to Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 under
793 On earlier calls for a code, see: Dhagamwar, 1989; Diwan, 1972, 1985. On the debate in general, see: Deshta, 1995; Khan, 
1996; Khodie, ed., 1975; Kumar, 2000, 2003; Patro, 1994; Pereira, 2002. See now, especially: Fisher, 2002; Kishwar, 1995; 
Mathew, 1995; Menski, 1 9 9 0 ,1990a; Omer, 1995. Nevertheless, see continuing calls in: Deolekar, 1995; and, Ratnaparkhi,
1997.
794 In general, see: Jain, 1996; Kapoor, 2002; Mathew, et.al., 1994; Rathnaswamy, 1995; Roy, 2000; and, Saha, 1996.
795 On customary forms o f  Hindu marriage in general, see: Banerjee, 1896; Bhandari, 1989; Derrett, 1976; Madan, 1973; Mishra, 
1994; Menski, 1983, 1984, 1985,1987; and, Uberoi, 1995.
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the leading case of Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State o f Maharastra, which held 
that ‘custom’ required the performance of sapatapadi.796
Congruent with the overall shape of post-emergency reconstruction and judicial 
sensitisation, this approach began to undergo substantial modification in the middle of 
the 1980s. This is at first easily missed unless two different categories of 
solemnisation case are not carefully distinguished. The first category relates to Hindu 
husbands seeking to avoid prosecution for contracting bigamous or polygamous 
unions; the second category relates to women claiming marital and post-marital 
maintenance entitlements. In the first line of cases it has been consistently held that 
only marriages conducted according to a fully ritualised rubric will receive complete 
legal recognition. In the second line of cases it came to be held that such rituals were 
not always essential for full recognition. This line of cases began to emerge at about 
the same time as the overall growth of injudicial activism and was consequent upon 
the increasing realisation that in cases concerning the financial entitlements of women 
and children, a more formalistic approach would, in the context of Indian society, lead 
to their widespread dispossession and even destitution which the post-colonial state 
simply could not afford to deal with. Importantly, however, rather than effecting a 
dramatic departure form Bhaurao Shankar by explicitly overruling it, the Supreme 
Court simply began to resile from demanding strict proof in the cases of this kind 
which came before it, applying instead a widely drawn presumption of marriage. In 
this regard the key turning point appears to have been the case of Sumitra Devi v. 
Bhikan Choudhary.
Subsequent to Sumitra Devi, numerous differing customary forms of marriage 
solemnisation, involving occasionally even entirely un-ritualised unions, have been 
held legally valid. It would, of course, be wrong to pretend that the development of 
this second line of cases has been entirely smooth, as can be seen, in particular, from 
the 1994 case of SurjitKaur v.Garja Singh and Others ~ concerning a Sikh widow’s 
claim to share in her deceased husband’s property a -  which seemed to mark a 
dramatic return to a more formalistic approach to Hindu marriage solemnisation. 
When seen in the a wider context, however, this seems to have been a somewhat
796 On Bhaurao Shankar, see: Majumdar, 1966; and Mathur, 1962. More generally, see: Diwan, 1984.
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anomalous decision, and is counter-balanced by a continuing flow of cases -  
including Supreme Court cases -  holding to the more substantivist approach.797
Just as the growing indigenisation of solemnisation cases directly concerning the 
material well-being of women and children indicates a co-optive strategy by which 
society is made to bare the financial burden of marital breakdown etc., so too, despite 
criticisms that it reflects pro-male bias, does the continuing formalist approach 
demonstrated by judges in solemnisation cases related to bigamy and polygamy 
prosecutions.798 Indeed, it is clear after a moment’s reflection that the capacity of a 
convicted (and very possibly imprisoned) bigamist to support his marital and post- 
marital dependents is severely compromised. Therefore, it is entirely coherent that 
whilst the formation of a marriage should be more easily established in maintenance 
cases, it should, at the same time, be harder to establish where criminal punishment is 
at issue; and this is, indeed, what has come to be the case.
3. Divorce
Marriage dissolution has been another area of controversy over lack of uniformity 
within the personal law system. In fact, here too it is possible to detect a very clear 
longer-term trend towards convergence, but always at a rate and in a manner that is 
thought to be sustainable. Consequently, whilst there has been a recent freeing up of 
the restrictions on divorce in those communities (notably the Christian community) 
where it had previously proved extremely difficult to obtain,799 there have also been 
parallel attempts in other areas, and in the face of concerns that the process of 
liberalisation has gone too far, to ensure that divorce is not granted too easily.800
As with marriage formation, the provisions governing Hindu marriage dissolution 
included a comprehensive saving provision -  under Section 29(2) of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 -  which allowed for the continuance of customary forms of 
divorce and which needs to be read along side the numerous statutory grounds for 
divorce introduced by Section 13. Importantly, the existence of Section 29(2) gives
797 See especially in this regard; S.P.S. Balasubram anyam  v. Sutturayan. See also and in general; Jain, 1996
798 Agnes, 2000; Diwan & Diwan, 1997; Jain, 1996; Joshi, 1995; Menski, 2001, 2003; and, Shah, 1998. On child marriage, see 
especially: Menski, 2003: Chap 9. See also: Chandra, 1998; Sagade, 1981.
799 Champappilly, 1994; Singh, 1993; and, Tilak, 1995.
800 Derrett, 1978, 1981; and, Menski, 2001.
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the lie to the contention that traditional Hindu law did not recognise divorce, and it is 
therefore wrong to see Hindu divorce as in any way an invention of the Hindu 
Marriage Act.801 Rather Section 29(2) was further recognition of the practical 
limitations of state power. It was a failure, or indeed an unwillingness, to appreciate 
the full extent of these limitations that lay behind initial post-independence attempts 
to extend the grounds for divorce in imitation of the models operating in more 
‘advanced’ western nations. These grounds were significantly enlarged, first, by the 
Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act of 1964 and then again by the Marriages Laws 
(Amendment) Act of 1976. This latter act was a complex reform designed not only to 
provide extra grounds for divorce, but also, more generally, to harmonise the Hindu 
Marriage Act with the Special Marriage Act. In particular, in addition to significantly 
reducing the waiting period for petitions to just one year, it also made mutual consent 
a ground for divorce under a Section 13-B, thereby signalling a movement towards 
recognition of the breakdown principle.
In due course the interpretation of Section 13-B became a point of considerable 
contention centring on the question of whether or not an initial giving of consent was 
sufficient to fulfil its requirements, or whether consent had to be ongoing up until the 
point at which the divorce decree was granted. In a by now familiar pattern, whilst 
earlier cases on the issue tended to hold that consent once given was irrevocable, 
thereby exemplifying judicial willingness to move towards de facto introduction of 
the breakdown principle, from about 1988 much greater weight was given to the 
argument that mutual consent -  to be effective -  should be ongoing. Finally, after 
significant dispute at the High Court level, the Supreme Court gave authoritative 
sanction to this latter interpretation in the case of Surestra Devi v. Om Prakash.
The second major ground introduced by the 1976 Act was that of cruelty. Prior to 
1976 cruelty had been a ground for separation under Section 10 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955, but not for divorce.802 This was now changed under Section 
13(l)(ia), and it rapidly became a surrogate for the considerable liberalisation of 
Hindu divorce law in general. Indeed, by the early 1980s it had become possible to
801 Beckwith, 1988; Chawla, 1983; Derrett, 1963 On alternative remedial resources in classical Hindu law, see: Lariviere, 1991.
802 On the complex o f  interrelation ships between dowry claims/violence and the cruelty grounds, see: Bhatnagar, 1996; Dewan, 
2000; Dhagamwar, 1987; Dhar, 1988 ; Diwan & Diwan, 1991,1995; Jain, 1996; Kumar, 1986, ed., 2000; Kusum, 1993; 
Mathew, 2000; Menski, 2001: Chap 1, 2003: Chap 8; Mohite, 1993; Nawaz, 1989; and, Trivedi, 1998
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secure a divorce under this ground on the basis of even the slightest fault, from the 
burning of a husband’s PhD thesis to enforced ‘desertion’ of the family home. As 
with divorce by mutual consent, however, by the end of the 1980s judges began to 
adopt an altogether more restrictive approach, conscious of the fact that further 
movement towards the effective introduction of no fault divorce would accentuate 
worrying and destructive trends within wider Indian society: trends that more often 
than not redounded primarily to the disadvantage of its weakest members. Indeed, 
whilst earlier cases such as Ms. Jorden Diengdeh v. SS Chopra had unabashedly 
called for irretrievable breakdown to be made a separate and standard ground for 
divorce, by the 1990s the Court increasingly adopted the more nuanced position of 
dissolving marriages on the basis of irretrievable breakdown under its Constitutional 
Article 142 jurisdiction only in exceptional cases where it felt it necessary to cut the 
Gordian knot of intractable litigation and only in such cases as the parties would not 
subsequently prove a financial burden to wider society. Thus in the important case of 
Bhagat v. Bhagat, a year after it had exercised its Article 142 jurisdiction in 
Chanderkala Trivedi v. Dr SP Trivedi, the Court acted to end a marriage which it 
considered bore absolutely no chance of retrieval.803
The lead given in Bhagat v. Bhagat has been followed in a number of subsequent 
cases, each of which have emphasised the exceptional nature of the jurisdiction 
exercised, and each of which have been careful not to set a general precedent for the 
dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. From the Court’s 
point of view, this decidedly more flexible approach has had the benefit of allowing it 
to dispose of cases that were bogging down the judicial system, whilst at the same 
time protecting society from having to bear the burden of spouses rendered severely 
straightened by un-requested divorce. It also allowed it the discretion to protect a 
wronged spouse — normally a wife -  from being unfairly forced into a situation which 
was not of her own making. To this end, the Court has been clear that it will not 
exercise its special jurisdiction in cases where the petitioner seeks to rely on his or her 
own wrong, a position that was forcefully reiterated in the case of Chetan Das v. 
Kamla Devi.
803 Diwan & Diwan, 1991; Menski, 2001; and, Pant, 1996.
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Despite more recent attempts to regulate and indeed slow the rate of change in a way 
that will be more socially sustainable, there can, nevertheless, be little doubt as to the 
overall direction and longer-term significance of that change. In this respect, despite 
repeated claims from certain quarters that Muslims have failed to submit themselves 
to uniform family law regulation, there is a strong sense in which Indian secular and 
Hindu laws have been gradually adjusted to approximate more and more closely to 
Muslim law.804 Thus whilst it continues to be the case that Muslim men, in virtue of 
their powers of Talaq and their capacity to negotiate Mubarat (or divorce by mutual
O rtC
consent), remain outside any real framework of statutory regulation, in substance, 
this position is not so different from the position in which the recognition of 
customary forms of Hindu divorce places the Hindu male. Moreover, it is balanced 
against both the customary capacity of Muslim women to negotiate for themselves a 
Talaq-r-Tafwid (a form of delegated divorce) or Khula divorce and, more importantly, 
their capacity to bring themselves under the terms of the Dissolution o f Muslim 
Marriages Act, 1939, which, among other things, allows for divorce on the basis of 
cruelty and/or the failure of a Muslim husband to perform his marital obligations. 
Likewise, if there are difficulties in Muslim women bringing themselves under these 
provisions and of availing themselves of these options in practice, then there is ample 
evidence that they are difficulties the substance of which is shared by their Hindu 
counterparts. Finally, when all of the above is read together with the increasing 
disincentives placed upon too easy exploitation of the traditional mechanisms for 
Muslim divorce, the evidence of convergence is striking.
It seemed, then, that by the mid-1990s both the secular law and the two main personal 
laws allowed divorce on a large and growing number of grounds, even if  the rate at 
which those grounds had been introduced underwent significant moderation by the 
various apparatus of the post-colonial state in order to ensure their ultimate social 
sustainability.806 Moreover, by that time the Parsi law on divorce had also been 
brought into line with these other laws under the terms of the Parsi Marriage and 
Divorce (Amendment) Act, 1988, such that only the Christian divorce law continued to 
remain substantially out of step. The sticking point, in this regard, had been the terms 
of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, which had codified Christian divorce law “at a time
804 In general, see: Pearl & Menski, 1998.
805 See: Ahmad, 1994; Carroll, 1985; and, Pirzada, 1996.
806 Rathnaswamy, 1995.
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when divorce was granted with the utmost reluctance and only in the most exceptional
R07circumstances.” Here again, rather than utilising the blunt and potentially 
destabilising instrument of primary legislation which, unlike, the earlier reforms to the 
Parsi law, would have had to have been effected in the face of strong opposition of the 
leaders of the Christian community, the initiative for change was left instead to the 
courts; in particular, to the Kerala High Court.808 Thus after several attempts to loosen 
up the provisions of the 1869 Act, a full Keralite bench took the dramatic step, in the 
1995 case of Mary Sonia Zachariah v. Union o f India, of judicially redrafting the 
offending statutory provisions on its own authority so as to enable Christian wives to 
seek divorce on grounds of cruelty like every other Indian wife. The broad, though 
reluctant, acceptance of this development as a fait accompli amongst the Indian 
Christian community seems to have meant that by 2001 the Union Parliament was 
finally willing to take back the reform initiative. Consequently, on the 24th November, 
2001 it passed the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, providing ten grounds for 
the dissolution of a Christian marriage, plus an eleventh for wives who proved that 
their husband had “also since the solemnisation of the marriage, been guilty of rape, 
sodomy or bestiality”, thereby finally bringing Christian divorce provision in line with 
the secular law and that of the other Indian communities.
4. Maintenance
Of particular importance in the emergence of India’s post-emergency family law 
strategy have been the various developments in the area of post-divorce 
maintenance.809 This is because it is in this area that the courts have had to deal with 
the results of the final and conclusive breakdown of the normal mechanisms of 
socialisation and mutual support, and also the area in which they have had to 
undertake the very difficult and subtle task of balancing both the interests of 
substantive justice, on the one hand, and the realistic capacities of the Indian state. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the actual implementation of this strategy has had to be 
accompanied by a dramatic rise injudicial activism in the whole area of maintenance 
law. With respect specifically to Hindu maintenance law this manifested itself in the 
growing context sensitive operationalisation of pre-existing statutory maintenance
807 Menski, 2006.
808 Bhattacharjee, 1994; Champappilly, 1994; and, Menski, 2001.
809 In general see: Agnes, 1992; Menski, 2001: Chap 4,2003: Chap 12; and, Pearl & Menski, 1998: Chap 7.
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provisions contained within the major Hindu law Acts of the mid-1950s. These 
provisions primarily focused upon four areas: the traditional entitlement of a Hindu 
wife to maintenance during the subsistence of her marriage, which was recognised 
and strengthened in Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; 
the right of a Hindu widow to share in joint family property, laid down in Section 14 
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; the entitlement of Hindu wives to receive support 
during the pendency of litigation, which was secured under Section 24 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955; and, finally, the right of a divorced Hindu wife to permanent 
alimony, recognised under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Initially, the 
case-law on these sections either adopted a restrictive interpretation or interpreted 
then in a way which was contrary to the interests of Hindu women. This was 
particularly evident in cases such as Akasam China Babu v. Akasam Prabati Banldm 
and Chandra Roy v. Anjali Roy which were proved to be totally inadequate to the 
social context within which they were decided.
From the late 1970s, however, and particularly from the early 1980s, the courts began 
to deliver judgements that were much more concerned with the substantive goals of 
protecting Hindu women and their children from destitution than with the somewhat 
blunt application of statutory formulations which, it was increasingly appreciated, 
could not be adequately operationalised unless proper account was taken of the 
inherent inequalities and complexities of Indian life. Consequently, husbands’ 
attempts to escape maintenance liability were increasingly met with judicial 
presumptions of validity, forcing them to pay maintenance either on the basis either of 
subsisting unions or as divorcees. With respect to Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955, this strategy of judicial presumption has already been seen in connection 
with the post Sumitra Devi marriage solemnisation jurisprudence, but it has also been 
adopted, to a limited extent, in relation to the general law provisions contained within 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Thus in the 1981 case of Boli Narajan Pawye 
v. Shiddheswari Morang the Gauhati High Court held that strict proof of marriage is 
not necessary to establish the status of ‘wife’ under section 125(l)(a) of the 1973 
Code, and consequently that a void or voidable marriage does not debar a woman 
from receiving maintenance in the absence of a final declaration from a competent 
court. More particularly, with respect to polygamous and bigamous unions, it had 
been held in C. Obula Konda Reddy that the expression ‘Hindu Wife’ within the
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terms of section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 meant “a 
Hindu wife whose marriage had been solemnised” and therefore included a Hindu 
wife who found herself party to a polygamous union.810 Likewise, in Shantaram 
Tukaram Patil v. Dagubai Tukaram Patil it was declared that “section 25, Hindu 
Marriage Act, confers upon a woman whose marriage is void or is declared void, a 
right of maintenance against her husband” and in Rudramma v H.R. 
Pattaveerabhadrappa, the High Court of Kerala held that a court could not, in the 
course of hearing a maintenance petition, go into the validity of a marriage even if it 
was obvious on the facts of the case that the union to which the petition related was a 
p olygamous one.811
With respect property of the joint family, after a number of decisions to the contrary, 
it was held in the 1977 case of Vaddeboyina Tulasamma v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi 
that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in fact, afforded a Hindu widow an 
absolute estate in her deceased husbands coparcenary property, since such property 
was “merely in recognition of her right to maintenance which was.. .pre-existing...”. 
And it was also firmly established that a Hindu wife enjoys absolute ownership over 
property given to her at or about the time of her marriage.812 Likewise, in relation to 
the payment of maintenance itself, it has been held both that Section 24 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 offers the Court a wide discretion in fixing the amount of interim 
assistance to be awarded813 and that, what matters in calculating an award, is not so 
much whether the person liable to pay maintenance actually has sufficient property to 
discharge his obligations, but rather whether he has sufficient earning capacity to do 
so.814 Finally, it has been held that, as in China, responsibility for indigent family 
members extends beyond the limited bounds of marriage, child care and post marriage 
maintenance to embrace that of children -  of both sexes -  for their parents. Thus in 
Vijaya Manohar Arhat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai a married daughter found herself 
liable for the maintenance of her aged father and his second wife.815
Turing to the Muslim maintenance law, the new activism has been altogether more
1 Menski, 2001: Chap 4; and, Sagade, 1996.
811 Ibid.
812 Ibid.
813 A nil K um ar  v. Laxm i D evi.
814 Durga Singh Lodhi v. Prem bai.
815 Ibid.
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controversial -  even at times explosive -  but in the final analysis no less marked.816 It 
has centred, in particular, around the interpretation of Section 125 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973 which, being part of the general law, applies to all Indians 
regardless of communal affiliation. The crucial innovation contained within Section 
125, which was a reform of Section 488 of the earlier Criminal Procedure Code,
1898, was to redefine the term ‘wife’ to include a divorced wife,817 thereby clearly 
leaving it open for Muslim wives to claim maintenance from their ex-husbands 
beyond the three month post-divorce iddat period laid down in traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence.818 Although always simmering beneath the surface, the issue did not 
really come to a head until the famous Shah Bano case of 1985. Well before that 
decision, the Supreme Court had established in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Chotha that 
a Muslim ex-husband had an on-going obligation under Section 125 to make 
sufficient maintenance provision to his former wife to enable her “to keep body and 
soul together” and that until such a requirement was satisfied he would not be exempt 
from further payments. However, this was not enough conclusively to undermine 
opposition to the new law. The peculiarly incendiary nature of the Shah Bano case 
consisted in the fact that in it the Supreme Court, sitting as a bench of five Hindu 
judges, purported conclusively to put pay to ongoing Muslim demands for exemption 
from the terms of Section 125, granting Shah Bano -  who had been divorced by her 
husband of forty years — the right to claim full maintenance entitlement until death or 
remarriage.819 In doing so, it made the controversial exegetical claim that India’s 
secular law on post-divorce maintenance and Islamic law as found in the Qu’ran did 
not conflict. It went on to say that, even if they did so conflict, that the secular law 
would take precedence over the communal law; and it added that, to avoid such 
disputes in the future, India urgently required the imposition of a Uniform Civil Code 
as mandated in Article 44 of the Constitution.
The severe national unrest that the Shah Bano decision sparked was widely regarded 
as having given rise to its comprehensive statutory reversal under the terms of the 
hastily enacted Muslim Women (Protection o f Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.820 That
816 Menski, 1994.
817 Das, 1987; and, Diwan, 1985
818 Wani, 1995, 1996.
819 Mahmood, 1985.
820 For the heated controversy surrounding this statute, see: Abdulkaher, 1986; Ali, 1986; Carroll, 1986; Chandra, 1986; Kaur, 
1990; Iyer, 1987; Sewlani, 1992; Subzwari, 1996; Tonapi, 1995; and, Vijayan, 1987.
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the Rajiv Gandhi government was keen to present the Act in this light, there can be 
little doubt, and it certainly had the effect of quietening down the immediate 
communal tensions, even if it did so at the price of considerable longer term rancour. 
To appreciate the true effect of the Act, however, it is necessary to pay close attention 
both to its precise wording and to case-law according to which it was subsequently 
applied. When this is done, it becomes clear that, despite a (prudent) fifteen year 
silence on the part of the Supreme Court, form as early as 1988 the more activist state 
High Courts, exploiting an ambiguity in the wording of Section 3 of the 1986 Act, 
actually began interpreting it in line with a general standard according to which Indian 
husbands of all communities were required to provide for their ex-wives until death or 
re-marriage. Specifically, it was held that, according to Section 3, not only did a 
Muslim ex-husband have to maintain his ex-wife during the traditional iddat period, 
he also had to “make and pay”, during the iddat period, sufficient provision to his ex- 
wife for her life thereafter. Consequently, once the iddat period had come to an end, it 
was open to a divorced Muslim woman to make further claims against her ex- 
husband. Paradoxically, this actually placed Muslim men in a worse position that their 
non-Muslim counterparts, since whilst the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 placed an 
upper limit of Rs. 500/- (subsequently raised to Rs. 1500/-) on an ex-wife’s 
maintenance entitlement, the 1986 Act specified no such limit.821
Having allowed such an interpretation to gain a foot-hold at the High Court level and 
in the absence of a repeat of the widespread unrest that greeted the Shah Bano 
decision, the Supreme Court felt able tentatively to revisit the subject of post divorce 
Muslim maintenance law obiter dicta in the case of Noor Saba Khatoon, and in the 
2001 case of Danial Latifi v. Union o f India, it finally recognised a Muslim ex-wife’s 
entitlement to post-divorce maintenance beyond the iddat period under the 1986 Act. 
Moreover, two days after the Danial Latifi was handed down, on 24th November 
2001, the Union legislature passed the Code o f Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 
2001. This did three things. First, it removed the earlier maintenance ceiling of Rs. 
1500/- in Section 125(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 placing all Indian 
husbands in same position as their Muslim counter-parts. Secondly, it introduced new 
provision for maintenance pendente lite or interim maintenance on the model
821 Menski, 2001: Chap 4.
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provided for under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in recognition of the 
routine difficulty encountered in implementing the law in this area. Finally, it also 
provided for the more speedy disposal of such cases by laying down a time-limit of 
sixty days from the date of the service of notice by which they were to be disposed.822
822 See now: Shukkur, 2003. More generally, see: Mullaly, 2009; Raj, 2001.
222
Part 3
Theoretical
In Part 2 a broad picture emerged with respect to the dramatic transformations that 
have been taking place in China and India over the past three decades, whereby, 
despite their apparently quite different speeds and trajectories, and despite some initial 
more detailed appearances to the contrary, they are indeed being reconfigured by a set 
of common processes which are very gradually but very powerfully acting to 
undermine their differences. Part 3 now attempts to articulate a deeper theoretical 
framework which, it will be argued, is latent in these developments and, indeed, in the 
longer-term developments outlined in Part 1. It will thus serve to explain the mutually 
illuminating fit between the two previous parts, whilst at the same time, receiving a 
degree of empirical verification from them.
In particular, it elaborates an understanding of human society and human 
transformation in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, premised upon the 
irreducibly material and immaterial nature of the human person. In so doing, it makes 
the central point that it is only when the basic norms proper to human 
functioning/flourishing -  precisely those which find expression in the basic precepts 
of the natural law -  are fully adhered to, that maximal human freedom, and thus 
diversity, results and that, in so far as these norms are departed from, such freedom 
and diversity is undermined. In the first place, this serves to emphasize that individual 
and collective diversity is indeed an undeniable indication of human flourishing upon 
a natural law understand of the variety being forwarded. Secondly, it furnished the 
basis for a coherent account of how that diversity arises and what are its 
preconditions. Thirdly, it also furnishes the basis for an explanation, not only of how 
that diversity can be, and is, undermined, but also of the longer-term consequences of 
that process. In the first instance then, Chapter 7 offers a Natural Law based account 
of the inextricable link between law, defined as normative social pressure, language 
and society. Thereafter, Chapter 8, building upon but also extending the insights 
developed in Chapter 7 by setting them within a wider metaphysical framework, 
presents a more completely developed Natural Law based understanding of historical 
transformation.
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Chapter 7: Nature, Language and Law
Discussion to this point has presupposed the possibility of speaking intelligibly about 
the subjects under review. Such a presupposition is, of course, indispensable for any 
form of philosophical or sociological analysis. Nevertheless, it carries with it certain 
implicit epistemological claims. It is the purpose of this chapter to render these claims 
a little more explicit and also to explain how, within the context of an 
Aristotelian/Thomistic account of human nature, it is possible to speak of human 
action and the social realities to which it gives rise over time. In order to so, an 
account is offered, first, of how the human mind is able to attain basic cognitions of 
the objects in the world to which it finds itself directed. Secondly, a further 
explanation is given as to how these basic cognitions are gradually built into 
altogether more systematic, scientific, understandings. Thirdly, on this basis, a still 
further analysis is developed as to how scientific knowledge acquisition operates 
specifically in relation to the human action-system, and as to how it exposes the 
inherently surface/depth character of that system consequent upon it being that of an 
embodied intellect. Fourthly, it is shown why a comprehensive account of human 
action requires elaboration not only of normative systems underlying possession of 
the mere capacity to engage in rational action, but also of the norms that govern or 
specify the correct use of that capacity -  namely, the precepts of the natural law -  
together with their mutual inter-relation. Fifthly, and finally, these various 
considerations form the basis for an explanation of why and in what manner the 
varieties of ‘human law’ -  defined broadly, as the norms of social pressure -  afford an 
effective means of indicating and analysing social change as well as disclosing the 
fundamental forces that are driving it. The execution of first two stages in this 
programme are likely to appear all too compressed, but they are necessary 
preliminaries for what follows.
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A: Cognitive Underpinnings
Knowledge, for both Aristotle and Aquinas, is the cognitive conformity of a knowing 
subject to the reality that is known.823 It refers to the state in which the human form is 
enriched or expanded by becoming, or in some way being assimilated to, the thing of 
which it has cognition. The basis for understanding this is the Aristotelian theory of 
hylomorphic composition. This theory holds that there is in each living being, a form 
or soul - a vital principle — which animates, organises and gives life to the body of that 
being, and which consequently causes it to be the type of being it is. The human 
being, since it is an embodied substance, has as its primary objects of cognition 
individual material substances. These it accesses through its five senses by means of 
sense perception. Sense perception is a highly complex process,824 but in facilitating 
sense cognition, it confers access only to an individual cognate as an individual and 
not as an individual falling within a general category or under a general description. 
For this, a more eminent form of cognition needs to take place, requiring that the 
distinctively human powers of the intellect be engaged.825 With both types of 
cognition, a certain degree of formal assimilation between cognising subject and the 
object of cognition takes place. It is on this basis that the object is said to become 
actually (and really) present in the subject. By formal assimilation is obviously not 
meant here that an individual ‘parcel’ of informed matter is brought into the cognising 
subject precisely as that individual ‘parcel’ of matter. Instead, the type of assimilation 
involved in cognition -  standardly referred to as intentional assimilation; its resulting 
assimilates as intentions -  by contrast to that involved in, for example, eating and 
drinking, results in no loss either to the subject or to the object.826 Whilst the same 
form comes to exist in the knower as exists in the known, it does so according to a 
different mode. This modal difference “results from difference in recipients: the form 
of colour exists naturally in the wall, but intentionally in the eye, because wall and 
eye are different kind of recipient.. ,”827 In the first instance, the ‘form’ of the object is 
made bodily present in the cognising subject by means of a sense-impression, or a
823 In general see: Haldane, 1993; Jenkins, 1991; Kenny, 1993; Owens, 1992; Ollivant, 2002; and, Perler, 2000. This clearly 
represents a ‘direct realist’ epistemology. For reasons for rejecting alternative nominalist and idealist epistemologies, see the 
important works by the founding o f  the Critical Realist school o f  thought: Bhaskar, 1997,1998; as well as the classic work, 
Gilson, 1983.
824 For relevant recent research on sensory processes, see, for example: Noe, 2004. See also, for this section in general the more 
comprehensive review o f recent reseach by Paul Vitz, in: Vitz, 2006.
825 Aquinas, SummaTheologiae[ST]la.. 12.4c; Kretzmann, 1993: 139.
826 Wallace, 1996: 18. On intentionality more generally, see: Crane, 1998; Deely, 1968, 1972; Haldane, 1996, 1998; Kenny,
1984; Sheehan, 1969.
827 Kretzmann, 1993: 150.
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series of sense-impressions. “The extra-mental object causally affects the medium 
between that object and the sense it affects; the medium in turn makes an impression
R9 oon the senses...” The senses, being here in a state of potency, are essentially
829passive or receptive.
In this way, sense-impressions come to embody the form of the cognised object by
n o n
way of wholly sensory processes. They constitute a sort of vital reflection of the 
cognised object whereby its form is re-particularised in the matter of the cognising 
subject.831 It is for precisely this reason that, as with animals, human beings are 
possessed of sensitive cognitive powers that give them access to the particular 
corporeal substances and accidents that inhabit the material world. For this process to 
be fully realised, it is necessary to postulate, in addition to the five external senses of 
sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch, four ‘internal’ senses. The external senses are 
distinguished from one another by the objects or qualities -  normally referred to as 
‘proper sensibles’ -  capable of affecting or stimulating them. Owing to their highly 
specific and necessarily aspectival nature, the outer senses are incapable, by 
themselves, of producing a complete representation of the sensed object as it subsists 
in the extra-mental world. For this to be achieved, the raw sense data to which they 
provide access, have in some way to be combined. This is the function of the internal 
senses, characterised as such because, unlike external senses, they “have no end 
organs that face out on to the world.” They are normally taken to be four in 
number: the common or central sense, the imagination, the estimative sense and 
sense-memory.
Over and above these sensory capabilities, and in order for them to cognise universals 
proper, human beings possess further, intellective powers “by which they are able to 
transform the en-mattered, particularised forms existing in sensible objects, 
into... intelligible species.”833 Apprehension of these ‘intelligible species’ is a 
necessary precondition for the cognition of the nature, essence or ‘quiddity’ of a given 
substance, since “forms existing in matter are not actually [but only potentially]
828 Stump, 2003: 263.
829 Aristotle, D eA n im a ., II 23.547. in Kretzmann, 1993: 139.
830 Gibson, 1966, 1986.
831 Frede, 2001; and, King, 2006.
832 Wallace, 1996:123
833 MacDonald, 1993: 161. See also, and especially: Deely, 1971 Lonergan, 1993. Further important works here include: Spruit, 
1994, 1995; and, Klima, 1996..
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intelligible.”834 A ‘quiddity’ is that within a substance which constitutes its 
fundamental definition. It is this more complete mode of cognition that is the proper 
object of the intellect. Thus, just as sense cognition consists in the subject actually 
having formed within itself material impressions of the object being cognised, so 
intellective cognition, consists in the subject’s intellect being assimilated to that which 
is intelligible in the object by being informed by its intelligible species.835 The 
abstractive processes by which intelligible species are made actually rather than 
merely potentially intelligible, build upon the Aristotelian principle that “[tjhings 
have to do with the intellect to the extent to which they can be separated from 
matter.”836 Thus Aquinas is frequently at pains to point out that the intellect is not the 
form of any organ.
To have cognition that depends upon “abstracting.. .form.. .from individuating 
matter,.. .is to have cognition of that which is in individuating matter, but not as it is 
in such matter.”837 This is to reverse the order of causation found in sensation. In 
sense cognition, it is the sense perceptible object that acts upon the sense organ to 
produce within the subject an impression of the thing sensed. In intellectual cognition, 
by contrast, it is the intellect that must first act upon the sense-impression in order to 
bring to light the basic constituents of intelligible reality virtually contained within it. 
This reflects the fact that whilst material objects are actually sensible because sense 
has to do with that which is individual and it is precisely as individuals that material 
objects actually exist in the external world, they are only potentially intelligible, since 
that which is intelligible has to do rather with that which is universal.838
In accounting for this capacity to bring the mind into contact with the basic 
constituents of intelligible reality, both Aristotle and Aquinas further distinguished 
two powers within the structure of the intellect itself: the ‘agent’ or active intellect 
that acts upon sense-impressions to produce intelligible species, and the ‘possible’, 
passive or receptive intellect, upon which intelligible species are ‘impressed’.839 
Whereas the ‘agent’ intellect constitutes as sort of natural intellectual Tight’ which,
834 CTa.79.3.
835 .S7Ia85.2, ad.l., in Kretzmann, 1993: 138.
836 Aristotle, D e Anima.1114,429 b. 21., in Kretzmann, 1993: 140.
837 STLa.85.1c., in Kretzmann, 1993: 140.
838 For a sophisticated and much fUller analysis o f  why this must be so according to Aquinas see, in general: O’Callaghan, 2003. 
See also: Pannacio, 2001.
839 See here especially: Braine, 2002. Additionally see: Adler, 1993; Barzan, 1981; and, Davidson, 1992.
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by its own power, brings out that implicit within a sense-impression which is formal 
or potentially universal, the ‘possible’ or receptive intellect constitutes a type of 
intellectual memory, in which the formal or universal reflections, once produced, are 
stored.840 The reason why both active and passive functions of the intellect are 
required in this process is because the intellect contains no innate ideas. As such its 
initial state is one of mere potency,841 and it is, therefore, “necessary to postulate a 
[further] power belonging to the intellect, to create actually thinkable objects by 
abstracting ideas (species) from their individual conditions”, namely the power know 
simply as intellectual abstraction.
Cognising one thing without simultaneously cognising another — abstracting by 
simple consideration -  is properly done only insofar as the first thing can be 
understood without the other entering into its definition.843 This can be achieved 
either by apprehending a whole/universal independent of its parts/ particulars (total 
abstraction) or by apprehending form independent of sensible matter (formal 
abstraction).844 The former method involves the apprehension of “a universal nature, 
while signifying the concrete individual subject in a potential and indeterminate 
way.”845 It is the type of abstraction that forms concepts such as ‘man’ or ‘animal’: 
concrete concepts referred to by concrete nouns. The latter method, by contrast, 
involves considering a “universal nature as though [it] were something concrete in 
itself “ and thus “prescinds from the individual subject” altogether. It involves 
considering some formal aspect of a subject independent of that subject’s other 
aspects, and thus gives rise to concepts such as ‘humanity’ or ‘animality’: abstract 
concepts referred to by abstract nouns.846 Neither alternative requires that the two 
things under consideration be actually independent of one another. In fact, the process 
by which one thing is imderstood as being actually independent of another is not 
strictly to be taken as a type of abstraction (abstractio) but of separation 
(.separatio),847 since it involves an additional mental determination (a judgment).848 
This further mental determination can be simply that that one thing is capable of
840 O’Callaghan, 2003:219.
841 Aristotle, D e  Anima, 429a 20-25
842 £na.84.1c.,in Kenny, 1993:46; S7Ta..85.U.; Kretzmann, 1993: 141.
843 See especially here: Sokolowski, 1979, 1998.
844 Aquinas, Super Boetium D e  trinitate, Q.5,a.3,, in Mclnemy, 1982: 19. See also: Barzan, 1981.
845 Sanguineti, 1992: 30.
846 Ibid.
847 Mclnemy, 1982: 88.
848 Martin, 2006.
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existing separately from another -  a judgment of entitative independence. It can also 
be judged that one thing in fact does exist independently of another -  a judgment of 
existential independence. Strictly speaking, whilst a judgment of entitative 
independence is a negative judgment, which separates one entity from another, a 
judgment of existential independence couples such a negative judgment to an 
additional positive judgment which joins the thing in question to existence.
Two further points should be noted here. First, the abstractive process engaged in by 
the agent intellect does not require that it posses some pre-existing criteria according 
to which a selective discrimination can be made.849 Instead, Aquinas “speaks of 
‘turning to’ sense experience simply, not to look at some aspects of it and not others, 
but to use sense experience as an instrumental cause.” The material aspects of 
sense-experience are not taken into the intellect because, strictly speaking, they are 
not intelligible at all, and can be known by the intellect only indirectly or by 
inference. Cognition is always of the entire subsisting reality to which the mind is 
directed. In so far as intelligible distinctions are attended to within a given object, they 
are real, intelligible distinctions within that object itself and not imposed somehow by 
the intellect from without. It is the object that regulates the subject and not the other 
way around. Abstraction is thus best characterised as a process of ‘developmental 
growth’ whereby the mind moves “from understanding the same thing generally and 
without distinction at first to understanding it just as generally but now distinctly.”851 
It is a process by which the mind is made to register real intelligible distinctions with 
increasing clarity.
Secondly, since the human intellect is an embodied intellect, its proper objects are the 
quiddities or natures of material substances, and these, by definition, exist in 
corporeal individuals. True cognition of a stone thus requires knowledge that it is a 
particular stone. Yet, since the particular is apprehended only by the senses and the 
imagination, it follows that the intellect must “examine the universal nature existing 
in the particular” by turning to sense-impressions.852 This it must do not only in the 
initial process of coming to know, but also in the utilisation of knowledge once
849 O’Callaghan, 2003: 220-221.
850 Ibid: 221
851 Ibid: 222.
852 iSTla.84.7.
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attained. Even after abstracting the intelligible species from an object, the intellect can 
exercise its knowing activity only by turning its attention to sense-impressions. Being 
proportioned to its natural object, the intellect simply does not think without the 
presence of sense-impressions.853 Its essential and permanent orientation requires 
them to act as instrumental causes of its cognition. It is precisely for this reason that 
“when someone is struggling to understand something, he provides for himself certain 
sense experiences in the manner of examples, in which he may examine as it were 
what he is striving to understand.” It is also for this reason that the intellect is enabled 
to attain real though indirect knowledge of particulars, even though their very 
particularity would seem to take them outside the order of intellectuality.854 Thus, 
whilst true that the intellect cognises directly only that within a thing which is 
universal, by linking universal ideas with sensory experience the mind can 
nevertheless come to know individuals and form singular propositions.
B: Scientific Systematisation
In moving from the mind’s initial contact with reality to build a more substantial body 
of knowledge, the first, or apprehensive, operation of the intellect differs from, but 
also works in harmony, with the second operation of the intellect, namely, the making 
of affirmative and negative judgments.855 Taken in itself, the first or apprehensive 
operation of the intellect does not admit of truth or falsity since it is concerned with 
the production of simple apprehensions which neither affirm nor deny anything. Yet 
although true that the intellect cannot be deceived about what it actually does 
apprehend, it can fail by simply not turning its attention to a given portion of reality in 
the first place. Strictly speaking, this is not an error since “in such cases [the intellect] 
hasn’t said anything false about the object, because it hasn’t conceived of the object at 
all.”856 In contrast, the second operation of the intellect, judging, “consists in uniting 
or separating simple apprehensions by means of a copula, namely, the verb is. A  
judgment is true when what it affirms, or denies, adequately agrees with reality.” As 
indicated above, affirmative judgments the intellect makes by joining together or 
‘compounding’ concepts acquired by means of its first operation, whilst negative
853 STIa.85.1, ad.5„ in Kretzmann, 1993: 141.
854 S71a.86.fc.
855 In general, see: Martin, 2006,
836 Pasnau, 2002: 325.
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judgements it makes by ‘dividing’ them. In this manner, the intellect determines, 
through judgment, to affirm “that things are, when they are, or that they are not when 
they are not.. .”857 It employs “universal concepts in declaring how things stand in 
reality, whether actually or potentially, whether in general or in the particular case,
Q fO
and whether in the past, the present, or the future.” In so doing, the judgments the 
intellect makes are themselves rendered either true or false. Finally, a third operation 
of the intellect functions to compound and divide the judgments produced by the 
second operation, thereby forming ever-more complex analytical chains and making 
possible the emergence of scientific understanding in the full sense.
In all of this, a crucial distinction needs to be drawn between superficial or 
commonsense knowledge and deep or truly scientific knowledge. Whereas “someone 
who cognises certain things perfectly can distinguish, up to the finest details, their 
acts, powers, and natures”, someone who cognises them imperfectly “can distinguish 
only at the level of universal.”859 This is to employ a definition of scientific 
knowledge as “the systematic and mediate knowledge of beings and their properties, 
by means of [their] causes,”860 which extends well beyond its usual contemporary 
characterisation as applying exclusively to empirical phenomena.861 To start with the 
intellect possesses only an imperfect grasp of the objects to which it is directed, at 
which point the knowledge it gives rise to is indistinct or, to use Aquinas’s term, “sub 
confusione”. To grasp things “sub confusione is to grasp them indiscriminately [and] 
to lump objects together at the expense of their salient differences.”862 Only gradually 
is this confused grasp of the various aspects of an object transformed into the more 
ordered, explicit, and internally coherent knowledge, characteristic of the sciences.863
In moving from relative ignorance to this richer type of knowledge the human 
intellect thus proceeds only incrementally and in a rather piece-meal fashion. Whilst 
the mind may, upon first contact with a given object, automatically generate a
857 Gilson, 1955: 378.
858 Carlson, 2008: 122.
859 OTa. 108.3c, in Pasnau, 2002: 321.
860 Sanguined, 1992: 178.
861 Barnes, 1969; and, Falcon, 2005. See especially, Maritian’s classic and foundational study on the different types or ‘degrees’ 
o f knowledge according to a Thomistic understanding: Maritain, 1995. See here also, on the ‘New Essentialist’ approach that has 
recently grown in popularity with some o f  the leading contemporary philosophers o f science such as Nancy Cartwright: 
Cartwright, 1992, 1999, 2007; Ellis, 2002; Elder, 2004; and Molnar, 2003. More recently still, this has come to be accompanied 
by an increasingly determined and sophisticated defence o f  Aristotelian/Thomistic essentialism per se: Klima, 2002; and, 
Oderberg, 2007.
862 Pasnau, 2002: 320; 571a.85.3c.
863 Aquinas, Super Librum D ionysii D e  d ivinis nomumibus[In D D N \\ l l .2 .1 13., in Pasnau, 2002: 324,
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universal idea sufficient to enable the attachment of a word to it for the purposes of 
speech, the initial content of that idea is of a nonetheless thin and attenuated nature. 
The mind’s real effort consists in working upon its initial apprehensions, through the 
processes of composition and division, to assemble complex propositions and, 
through the process of reasoning, to infer one proposition from another. In this way, 
and with the constant assistance of impressions furnished it by the internal senses,864 
it ‘thickens up’ its initial ideas by exercising its distinctive capacity to “weave many 
things into one.”865 In so doing, it determines to take highly universal, confused ideas 
and to reach as distinct a grasp of the discrete content of those ideas as is possible, 
employing, in the process, its various operations in ways that are both complex and 
inherently interactive.866
The production of what Aquinas terms the ‘mental word’ represents a final stage in 
the cognitional ‘circuit’, being a formed concept in the full sense.867 It differs from the 
‘thin’ ideas of the intellect’s first operation, both in terms of the depth and scope of 
the penetration it facilitates and in terms of the extent of entailments it discloses, but 
no less than with the products of that first operation, it is proper to the mind in a state 
of simple, contemplative apprehension. Thus, Aquinas states: “the inquiry of reason 
ends with a simple understanding of the truth, just as it begins with a simple 
understanding of the truth considered in first principles”,868 since comprising “a kind 
of interweaving”, it “begins with one thing, works through many, and ends with 
one.”869 Moreover, even once this point has been reached, there remains more to do. 
The full implications of thing’s nature are never understood completely, and it is this 
that furnishes the scientific endeavour with its inexhaustible fecundity.
Far from being random, the processes involved in acquiring truly scientific knowledge 
operate with precise objects in view. A given science, insofar as it is scientific, will 
“single.. .out a concrete portion of reality for its research, and leave.. .aside the 
rest.”870 It is the specific kind of being a science studies that distinguishes it from
864 Pasnau & Shields, 2004: 192.
865 In DDAVII.2.713., in Pasnau, 2002: 325.
866 Aquinas, Super Evangelium  S. Iaonnis [InJoh] L ecture 1.1.26 in Pasnau, 2002: 327-328.
867 Pasnau, 2002: 321 -322. See here, especially, the old study by Rabeau, 1938, and that by Deely, 1971. Also see the relevant 
section in Kenny, 1993.
868 In D D N  VII.2.713., in Pasnau, 2002: 325.
869 Ibid; O’Callaghan, 2003: 223-224.
870 Sanguieti, 1992: 183.
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other sciences and constitutes its special object. In so far as objects of cognition are 
differently freed from the constraints of matter, so they constitute the proper objects 
of different categories of science. Moreover, in distinguishing these categories, 
Aquinas specifies as particularly, though not exclusively, appropriate to each the three 
methods of ‘removing’ (remotio) from matter outlined above: ‘total abstraction’, 
‘formal abstraction’ and ‘separation’. ‘Total abstraction’ -  which is the abstraction of 
the whole essence of a natural thing from the matter that individuates it -  yields 
objects sufficiently free of matter to be intelligible, but objects into whose definition 
matter nonetheless enters, and which require instantiation in matter for their real 
existence (flesh, bones etc.). These are the proper objects of the natural sciences 
(including the psychological and social sciences). ‘Formal abstraction’ -  the 
abstraction of form from matter — when specifically concerned with the form of 
quantity, yields objects into whose definition matter does not enter, but which do 
nevertheless depend upon matter for their real existence (lines, numbers, shapes etc.). 
These are the proper objects of the mathematical sciences. Finally, the negative 
judgment involved in separatio yields objects abstracted from all matter such that 
matter neither enters into their definition nor is required for their real existence 
(substance, being, potency etc.). These objects are the proper objects of
R 7 1metaphysics.
Importantly, although the three groups of sciences -  natural, mathematical and 
metaphysical -  can be distinguished in this way, their division should not be 
understood too rigidly. In practice, not only are all three levels of ‘abstraction’ 
employed in the spontaneous acquisition of pre-scientific knowledge, within the 
particular sciences themselves, they are frequently found to imply one another. 
Moreover, it has long been recognised that many modem scientific disciplines are 
properly characterised as what Aristotle called ‘mixed sciences’: that is, as sciences 
whose proper objects are physical, but whose mode of treating those objects is 
mathematical.872 Finally, even within the first level of abstraction, that appropriate to 
the proper objects of the natural sciences, there exists abstractive hierarchies both
871 Super Boetium D e trin itate..5,a..l.,in Mclnemy, 1982.
872 Aquinas, In octo libros Physicorum  exposito[In  //,P/iys.]lect.3.in Sanguiteti, 1992: 200.
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between and within particular sciences whereby two objects are properly studied in 
the same manner, but the more general before the more specific.873
An indispensable role in building up systematic knowledge is played by the 
formulation of norms and principles. In relation to the physical sciences these are 
usually referred to simply as ‘scientific laws’. Although there has been a great deal of 
discussion over the precise status of these ‘laws’, a growing number of contemporary 
philosophers are minded to account for them in more or less Aristotelian terms. 
According to those terms, such laws are universal propositions expressing the 
common properties of sensible things. In explicating regularities or patterns 
underlying the behaviour of observable phenomena, they express the inclinations of 
natural bodies to give rise to certain specific activities.874 Thus, a law in this sense is 
taken to connote “the active potency of a body by virtue of which it is the constant 
and universal cause of certain effects.”875 As a science progresses and an increasing 
number of these regularities are translated into propositional form, so they too provide 
material for the elaboration of further, more abstract, and therefore more universally 
valid, propositions. This results in a propositional net of growing complexity and 
integration that draws the richness of reality into explicit communal consciousness to 
an ever-increasing degree.
C: Human Sciences
Whilst there is significant epistemic and methodological continuity among different 
types of science, a crucial distinction opens up, on an Aristotelian-Thornistic account 
no less than on its alternatives, between the physical sciences and those standardly 
referred to as the ‘human’ sciences. Human sciences, in this sense, are sciences 
specifically related to the human person and the communities to which human persons 
give rise. They study the many different dimensions of human being — social, 
psychological, and historical -  but although each enjoys its own legitimate province, 
in order not to have a distorting effect on reality, each must also be set within the
873 In general, see here: Maritain, 1995.
874 In particular, Cartwright and others have argued that even the practice o f  modem scientists, despite frequent claims to the 
contrary, are concerned with cataloguing observed  regularities. Instead, more in line with the picture painted by Aristotle, they 
are principally concerned with uncovering hidden natures/ powers on the basis o f a few specialised experiments on the basis 
conducted under highly artificial conditions. Supra., note 43.
875 Sanguined, 1992: 232.
876 Ashley, 2006: 309-310; Aristotle, PhysiscsII, chap5,196bl0ff.
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overall context of a correct and philosophically grounded anthropology. In particular, 
each must allow for the primitive and indispensable fact of human freedom; not, 
indeed, a completely unlimited freedom, but a freedom which, even when heavily 
constrained by specific individual or communal circumstances, nonetheless continues 
to remain — precisely because ontologically primitive — of at least some explanatory 
importance.877 Moreover, as set within this wider anthropological context, the various 
human sciences are also distinctive in that they each concern the powers of, or the 
products of the powers of, the very beings whose cognitive expansion, as sciences, it 
is their purpose to facilitate. In other words, unlike the physical sciences, they are not 
merely concerned with understanding the external, material world, but are concerned 
with understanding it precisely as it reflects back upon, or manifests indispensable 
regularities underlying the products of, personal and inter-personal activity. In this 
sense, they are sciences in which the knowing mind studies its own operations and 
operational prerequisites.
According to an Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysic, of course, it is only ever possible 
to know a being -  any being -  by becoming aware of its action in the world since it is 
only owing to the palpability of such action that an observer is enabled to conclude 
there exists an underlying substantial and abiding centre or activity at all.878 
Nevertheless, whereas in the non-human sciences the mind’s primary objects are 
(external) material beings, in the human sciences, the objects of the mind’s special 
study are the acts it engages in itself.879 Indeed, precisely because “it is connatural for 
our intellect.. .to look to material things...it follows that our intellect understands itself 
according as it is made actual by species abstracted form sensible realities.”880 Just as 
in the process of cognising (external) material substances so too in the cognition of 
itself the mind proceeds from that which is more extrinsic. Thus it is said that objects 
are understood before acts, acts before powers, and powers before “the essence of the 
soul.”881 Yet, it is different from the cognition of (external) material substances since 
it implies something more, namely, that the act by which “the intellect understands a
877 Artigas, 1990: 63.
878 Norris-Clarke, 2001: 34-35.
879 .STla.87.1 .in O’Callaghan, 2003:226.
880 Ibid.
881 O’Callaghan, 2003: 227.
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stone is other than (and additional to) the act by which the intellect understands itself 
understanding a stone.”882
As an embodied being, the actions of the human mind are ordered to finding 
expression in bodily behaviour the results of which are observable in the same way 
that all other external phenomena are observable. From observation of this bodily 
behaviour “which is the extemalisation of the mind’s interior operations,” it becomes 
possible to infer the existence of these operations.883 Importantly, it follows from this 
that the mind learns about its operations, not only from reflecting upon the 
consequences of its own activity, but also by observing and reflecting upon the 
activity of other minds with which it forms a knowing and acting community. This in 
no way reduces the significance of its distinctively capacity for properly reflexive 
knowledge, because it is only possible to draw self-referential conclusions from the 
actions of others in so far as the mind is aware that it shares with them a common 
nature and this itself implies a precedent reflexive, epistemologically foundational, 
judgement. What it does point to, however, is both the inherently communal nature of 
human knowledge acquisition, and the fact that all forms of human self-knowledge 
inescapably presuppose a stable underlying ontological reality from which that 
knowledge derives.
This reflexive capacity goes a long way to explaining the persuasiveness of Jurgen 
Habermas’s suggestion that the human/social sciences are properly understood as 
‘reconstructive’ in nature. With the term ‘reconstructive’ Habermas means to point to 
those sciences whose proper function it is to ‘reconstruct’ generative systems of rules/ 
norms from the kaleidoscope of particular human actions.884 It is these generative 
systems, he suggests, that help account for the non-determined yet thoroughly ordered 
nature of such actions, affirming both their real freedom and meaningful content. 
Setting these suggestions within the context of an Aristotelian/Thomistic account of 
reflexivity, offers a basis for their creative completion by preserving the unique value 
they undoubtedly offer for a truly adequate social epistemology, whilst prescinding 
from the limitations of Habermas’s wider post-Kantian, anti-metaphysical 
commitments.
882 S7Ia.87.1.in O’Callaghan, 2003: 226.
883 Pope, ed., 2002: 146.
884 Habermas, 1979.
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Equally important is the role that implicit or, as Michael Polanyi termed it, ‘tacit’ 
knowledge plays in the Habermasian account. Thus, essential to the procedure of the 
reconstructive sciences, properly conceived, is the transformation of “a practically 
mastered pre-theoretical knowledge (know-how) of competent subjects into an 
objective and explicit knowledge (know-that).”885 In other words, a reconstructive 
science, transforms implicit into explicit knowledge, by explicating the inherent 
human tendency to behave in an ordered and rule-governed manner. At the same time 
it is not simply concerned to reconstruct any and every practically demonstrated
RRAcompetence, but only those of a universal or species defining nature. It is this that 
enables the social critic to tease out the most significant structural implications of the 
tendencies underlying human action, as well as the types of capacity its manifestation 
presupposes, what constitutes the correct or healthy functioning of those capacities, 
what constitutes their malfunctioning, how the variable degrees of healthy functioning 
and malfunctioning might be measured, and the longer term consequences of each.
A moment’s reflection makes clear that, to be at all credible, the ‘pre-theoretical’ 
knowledge required by this account must be premised upon some mechanism of habit 
formation, and it is the elaboration of just such a mechanism that has been a peculiarly 
distinguishing feature of the Aristotelian tradition. It is in writing within this tradition, 
whilst trying to make sense of more recent conceptions of linguistic competence, that 
Polanyi has pointed to the inherently self-contradictory notion of explicit knowledge 
devoid of ‘tacit coefficients’, since this would render “all spoken words, all formulae, 
all maps and graphs.. .strictly meaningless.”887 Quite to the contrary, from its earliest 
age, nearly every child engages in a vast range of behaviour underpinned by a set of 
norms of apparent infinite complexity which are intelligible, if at all, only to a handful 
of experts, and it does so because its “striving imagination has the power to implement 
its aims by the subsidiary practice of ingenious rules of which [it] remains focally 
ignorant.” In so doing, suggest Polanyi, the child has in fact discovered a whole new 
system of tacit grammar, and its imagination enables it to apply this to each new
885 Ibid: 15.
886 Ibid: 14.
887 Polanyi, 1969: 95.
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situation it encounters.888 Of particular importance for Habermas are the generative
O O Qsystems underlying communication.
Although ‘communicative action’ performs a less constitutive/substantivist, more 
properly characteristic, role relative to healthy human functioning in the systems of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, the central position Habermas affords it here nonetheless 
resonates strongly with the premium his predecessors place upon the inherently social 
nature of the human person, and the way each consequently asserts with the greatest 
possible emphasis the indispensable nature of socially mediated action and interaction 
in the attainment of human flourishing. “If man is by nature a political animal,” states 
contemporary Thomist, John O’Callaghan,
it stands to reason that his political life, which necessarily involves 
communication, is the flower of his more basic vital activities or forms o f 
/z/e....[Thus][h]is political life is his flourishing, the ‘more perfect existence’ 
that the individual naturally seeks, without which his individual existence is 
naturally incomplete and naturally less than perfect.890
It follows that “[b]eing rational, linguistic, and political are the specifically human 
ways of being an animal.”891 As Aristotle himself states, “everyone needs to 
communicate his thoughts to others” and it is communicative action taken in the 
widest sense, action of which language as normally understood is the central or 
paradigm case, that makes this possible. “Through language, men interact with one 
another, using meaningful expressions”, and it is this which “enables them to live 
together as a community.” It is the handmaiden of a completing unity forged “across 
time and space” propelled by the common, fundamental human “desire for knowledge, 
understanding and wisdom.”893
Moreover, the indivisibly material and immaterial nature of human being confers 
inherent meaningfulness upon properly human action which brings together 
communicative and expressive qualities in virtue of which both the internal 
operations, acts and thoughts of the human spirit are externalised in the material world 
and the intelligible aspects of reality are made simultaneously available to more than
888 Ibid: 200 & 205.
889 Habermas, 1979: 1,3.
890 O’Callaghan, 2003:291.
891 Ibid.
892 Aquinas, In I  P er i herm ereias.[In I. Perih .]\ecl. 2. in Sanguineti, 1992.
893 O’Callaghan, 2003: 292,296.
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one mind. In this way, it can be seen that “conceptual [and volitional] functioning on 
the part of the human animal is naturally ordered toward expression in non-linguistic 
and linguistic acts alike, forming through these linguistic and non-linguistic acts 
social and political communities.”894 Moreover, even within the context of an 
individual’s private conceptual functioning, it would seem that some sort of organised 
symbolic system is necessary owing to the fact, noted earlier, that all human thought, 
being that of embodied intellect, is essentially orientated towards cognition of 
universals in particulars. Consequently, “[t]o fix and recall items from the flux of 
experience, to be able to use this recalled knowledge in inferences and association, we 
need words to stand as... recallable proxies for the things we want to argue and think 
about.”895 In order for this to be possible, thought needs to take on a quasi-embodied 
existence “it must be something symbolically encoded, something the believer can 
retain and think about.” In this way language makes possible thought “about absent 
things, about generalities and about possibility and impossibility.”896
It is important to note here that it is precisely the embodied nature of the human 
intellect and thus of the mind’s conceptual functioning that renders the human being a 
rational being ordered towards activity of a distinctively rational kind. 
Communicative action represents both a subset of the wider category of rational 
activity as well as being its most complete expression. Crucially, it also follows from 
this that all distinctively human action will itself be possessed of a certain dual 
character. On the one hand, the basis for the underlying unity it displays is the 
capacity of the human mind to become conceptually enriched by intelligible aspects 
of reality. As intelligible, and therefore immaterial, these aspects and the concepts 
into which they are formed are, at least in principle, inherently communicable to all 
other human minds. It is for this reason that all human languages are capable of some 
form of translation and, indeed, why individual persons are capable of engaging in 
mutually intelligible discourse at all. On the other hand, as the human mind is that of a 
being composed of essential immaterial and material metaphysical co-principles, 
whatever conceptual content the mind possesses or seeks to communicate, must
894 Ibid: 298
895 O’Hear, 1997:37.
896 Ibid.
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necessarily be in some manner embodied, and it is this embodiment that forms the 
basis of linguistic diversity.
That diversity exists at a number of different levels. It exists, first, at the relatively 
superficial level of phonology or physical notation, where it is accounted for by the 
inherently conventional nature of linguistic signifiers. Secondly, diversity exists at the 
level of individual grammars, which bring together a natural grammatical endowment 
with its particular realisations through a series of conventionally mediated, though 
nonetheless tightly constrained, choices. Finally, diversity also exists at the level of 
conceptual enrichment. This is because, just as different people will know different 
things about the world, so too, at the level of communal understanding, given the 
various traditions of enquiry, environmental interactions, and condensations of 
experience, different languages will have developed different conceptual 
vocabularies, idiomatic expressions and forms of speech, each of which group 
together meanings, both singularly and collectively, in quite distinctive, though not of 
course, mutually untranslatable ways. The surface/depth character that all this confers 
upon the human action-system manifests itself not just as between particular actions, 
but also as between whole clusters of actions premised upon the development by their 
agents of habituated propensities to act in one way rather than another. Finally, and 
perhaps most significantly for the present study, owing to the inherently social nature 
of the human being, this surface/depth character, also manifests itself in the embodied 
propensities of whole communities to act in one way rather than another.
D: The Precepts of Right Use — The Natural Law
At this point, an important distinction needs to be drawn between the possession of a 
capacity to act, on the one hand, and the employment or use of that capacity, on the 
other. This corresponds to a distinction Aquinas draws between virtues of the intellect 
and those of the appetite. By doing so he points to the fact that it is possible to 
develop both intellectually and morally. It is possible to develop intellectually by 
acquiring “a more refined capacity to reason to conclusions from... [the first] 
principles [of a science], a deeper understanding of life, a more discerning sensitivity
897 See, in general: Adler, 1973; Kretzman, 1974; Mascall, 1957; and, O’Callaghan.
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in making practical judgments, and a more adept skill at making things.” It is 
possible to develop morally by developing habits such as those of treating people 
justly and of responding appropriately to one’s various desires.899
At the same time it is also important to notice a qualitative difference between these 
two types of habit.900 Thus, because intellectual virtues, whether those of the 
theoretical intellect, or of the practical intellect, confer “only aptness to act”, not the 
“right use of that aptness”, they are correctly taken to be virtues only in a relative or 
analogical sense, whereas, virtues of the appetite are virtues properly so called or 
virtues without qualification.901 “Only habits that dispose appetite give both capacity 
and the bent to use that capacity well:”902 indeed the tendency to act well is precisely 
the capacity that they are said to confer. It follows from this that any human action 
capable of being “appraised technically can also be appraised morally”,903 and that 
these two appraisals remain analytically distinct. In particular, whereas moral 
appraisal relates to the good of the whole person, technical appraisal relates only to 
the good of the particular work done.904
The paradigm case here is, of course, art. Art concerns itself primarily with the 
production of things external to the agent, and is thus to be contrasted with the “the 
pure inwardness of knowing”,905 which is the proper concern of science. Yet this basic 
distinction admits also of a degree of mutual overlap. Consequently, there also exist 
certain peculiarly “speculative arts which are at the same time sciences”. Logic is the 
most obvious example. “[Sjuch scientific arts”, writes Maritain:
“perfect the speculative intellect, not the practical intellect; but the sciences 
in question retain in their manner an element of the practical, and are arts 
only because they involve the making o f a work— in this case a work wholly 
within the mind, whose sole object is knowledge, a work which consists in 
putting order into our concepts, in framing a proposition or an argument.
The result is then, that whenever you find art you find some action or 
operation to be contrived, some work to be done.”906
Pope, 2002: 34. See also: Jacobs, 2002.
899 SriaIIae.58.3.
900 Aquinas, Q uaestiones d isputatae Virtutibus in Com m uni{QDVC],q.un.,a7,ad2.in, Reichberg, 2002:141.
901 Aristotle, Eth.N ic.2.6  (1 106a 22-23); 571aIIae,56,a.3,c., in Reichberg, 2002: 121.
902 Mclnemey, 1993: 204.
903 Ibid.
904 Maritain, 1947: 6.
905 Ibid.
906 Ibid: 3-4.
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Thus there is a sense in which all distinctively human action, that is, all rational 
action, and then, by further implication, all communicative and linguistic action, 
involves the cultivation and practice of some art or arts. To understand, then, 
something of the generative mechanisms that underlie such action is not yet to have a 
grasp of the human-action system as a whole. It is, instead, merely to understand how 
it is possible for individual creative acts to be engaged in, or to understand something 
of the manner in which the unique products of the human mind are bodied-forth in the 
world. This is to deal with the method of bringing about the goods internal to those 
individual products. There are deeper questions it leaves untouched which relate to 
the functioning of the human-action system as a whole -  which is, of course, 
synonymous with the good of the human person as a whole. These questions require 
separate consideration, and lie precisely within the province of the virtues of the 
appetite, of which the basic precepts of the natural law are simply a normative 
expression. As Ralph Mclnemy crisply explains:
The will as intellective appetite bears on things the mind sees as good, and 
there are certain things that are seen to be necessary components of the 
complete human good. Indeed, the mind grasps them as goods to which we 
are already necessarily inclined. Virtue, as second nature, is the perfection 
of a natural inclination towards the good; Judgments about goods to which 
we are naturally inclined from the starting points or principles of moral 
discourse. If particular choices are analysed in terms of a kind of syllogism 
that applies a moral rule to particular circumstances, the principles are 
nongainsayable precepts that we articulate when less general guides for 
action are questioned. The set of the principles of moral discourse is what 
Aquinas means by natural law. These judgements as to what one ought to do 
cannot be coherently denied. In this they are likened to the first principles of 
reasoning in general, and Aquinas has in mind the way in which the 
principle of non-contradiction is defended.907
Within the moral order the equivalent of the principle of non-contradiction is “Good 
should be pursued and done and evil avoided.” It makes no sense to commend evil 
because, in doing so one must commend it under the form of the good, namely, as 
desirable and worthy of pursuit. As Aquinas puts it:
[w]hatever a human being seeks, it seeks under the aspect of the good (sub 
ratione boni), and if it does not seek it as its perfect good, which is its 
ultimate end, it must seek it as tending to that perfect good, since any 
beginning is ordered towards its culmination.9 8
907 Mclnemy, 1993: 210.
908 £7Ia.IIae.l.6.
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The other exceptionless moral principles are articulations or specifications of this 
basic one.
This is the foundation of all the other precepts of nature’s law, such that 
whatever things practical reason naturally grasps to be human goods 
pertain to natural law’s precepts as to what is to be done or avoided.909
And as regards the basis upon which practical reason properly judges something to be 
a human good, or a constituent of comprehensive human flourishing, he has the 
following to say:
Since good has the character of an end and evil the contrary character, all 
those things to which a man has a natural inclination reason naturally 
grasps as goods, and consequently as things to be pursued, and it grasps 
their contraries as things to be avoided.910
Now, human beings have, in common with everything, an inclination to preserve 
themselves in existence; in common with other animals, they have an inclination to 
mate, have young, and care for them; and they have a peculiar inclination following 
on their defining trait, reason — to know and to converse and to live together in
911society.
The fact that the generative mechanisms which underlie and make possible the 
exercise of meaningful human action are capable of being analysed independent of the 
deeper precepts of the natural law, should not be taken to imply that they bear no 
relation to it; clearly they do. Indeed, a proper observance of the natural law is vital to 
maintaining the fundamental integrity of the overall action-system. In so far as its 
precepts come habitually to be departed from, to that extent truly interpersonal and 
reciprocal, that is, fully communicative, human action starts to become problematic. 
Here such departure my usefully be contrasted with potential departures from basic 
linguistic or grammatical norms. Thus, if the grammatical principles underlying 
meaningful discourse are disregarded, if  a person starts to speak ungrammatically, it 
soon becomes clear that they are speaking nonsense. They will simply not be able to
909 Sria.IIae.94.2.
910 ST  Ia.IIae.94.2.; McCabe, 2003: 63, 66. In addition, see also and especially: Mirables, 2008 and Llano, 2008. For varying 
views on precisely how this all operates and the intense controversy which exists between ‘new’ and ‘old’ natural law theorists 
see: Boyle, et.al., 1987; Donnelly, 2007,2006; Finnis, 1982, 1983; George, 1988,1994; Hassing, 2008, Lisska, 1996;
MacDonald, 1991; MacIntyre, 2004; Maritain, 1942,2001; Mclnemy, 1992,1993,1997. See also now: Silar, 2008 and Spaemann, 
2008. For a work as, if  not more, impressive than that o f John Finnis, and arguing for broadly similar, though at points also 
importantly different, see: Rhonheimer, 2000.
911 On this, see: Mclnemy, 2004; Oderberg, 2007; Richardson, 2007.
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achieve their communicative purposes. In contrast, the consequences of breaching 
basic precepts of the natural law take much longer to manifest themselves, though 
those consequences are altogether more insidious and profound.
E: The Indicative Nature of Variations in Human Law
Now, given the surface/depth nature of human action, the principles of the natural law 
are incapable of manifesting themselves in an unmediated form. They must always be 
found either to have been transgressed or to have been complied with within the 
context of an agent or group of agents executing a particular judgment or set of 
judgments, or in the context of the development by those agents of habituated 
propensities so to do. For this reason, systematic departures from the precepts of the 
natural law eventually become manifest in its mediating norm systems. In other 
words, they eventually become manifest in changes to the normative schemes which 
individuals and communities through their actions have purposed to create.
Here it should be at once realised that both the normative networks specific to 
particular human languages and those specific to particular sets of ‘human law’ are 
examples, though of differing varieties, of just such mediating norm systems, and are 
thus, in some sense, deeply connected one to another.912 What really distinguishes the 
legal and the linguistic in this context, is that whilst law taken in the broad sense 
employed in the present study concerns some form of social pressure,913 the 
normative networks specific to particular human languages are the result of action that 
is of an un-coerced, fiilly reciprocal, nature. This is not, of course, to suggest that 
there are not many examples of particular languages being both structured and 
employed in coercive and discriminatory manner. What it does suggest, however, is 
that, to the extent that they are so employed, they begin to lose their properly 
linguistic or communicative qualities and take on qualities that are of an essentially 
non-linguistic nature. There is a sense, then, in which both the mediating norm
912 George, 1999: 108-109. On this subject, see also: Bradley, 1975; Brewboeker, 2006-7; and Waestberg, 1995-6. See now also, 
Selles, 2008.
913 Whilst the principles o f right action -  the precepts o f the natural law -  can be said to regulate action that is fully compliant 
with them (that is, properly linguistic/communicative action), they only manifest themselves as norms o f  social pressure when 
there is some resistance to their observance. In other words, it is at the precise point at which particular bodies o f normative 
social pressure become necessary that the underlying precepts o f the natural law are re-characterised as pressure generating, and 
this is a quality they continue to retain, at least to some extent, short o f society’s wholesale departure from them.
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systems proper to particular languages and those manifest in specific bodies of law 
are being theorised here as something akin to ideal types. Yet whilst it makes sense to 
speak of more or less pure ‘linguistic’ forms, it makes rather less sense to speak thus 
of the various systems of law since there is a considerable qualitative range in the 
differing forms of social pressure they inevitably disclose, from the most subtle and 
tentative to the most explicit and coercive.
Here it is useful to contrast law as a system of regulative norms not only with those of 
particular languages, but also with that of physical nature. Unlike law, the norms of 
language and physical nature are not susceptible to fundamental qualitative 
variability. This is not, of course, to suggest that they do not allow for variability at 
all, just that the variability that they do allow for operates at a uniform qualitative 
level. By stating that they operate at a uniform qualitative level, what is meant here is 
that they each permit a specific degree of human freedom or volition. At one extreme, 
the various linguistic norm systems, which can be said to manifest man’s being in its 
natural, fully socialized, state, allow human volition to the maximal degree. They 
allow, in other words, for maximal, spontaneous and un-coerced expression, which is 
nonetheless guaranteed and made intelligible by the largely unconscious employment 
of regular underlying patterns. At the other extreme, the laws of physical nature 
exclude the exercise of volition altogether, though they do, of course, allow some 
forms of non-volitional indeterminacy. In contrast to both these extremes, law, like 
language, incorporates the idea of volition, and therefore is distinguishable from the 
laws of physical nature, but, unlike language, implies some degree of restriction on 
the scope of that volition. Thus, law implies a distinction between actions that are 
permissible and those that are not. In this sense, law can, in fact, be said to represent 
an admixture of these other two varieties of norm system; or, more precisely, to 
occupy a variable intermediate point between the two qualitative extremes they 
respectively represent.
Now, the very existence of law, in the above sense, presupposes that at least some 
individuals within a given community have developed tendencies to breach the deeper 
regulative principles of human nature, that is, to breach the basic precepts of the 
natural law, such that it has become necessary to ensure the observance of those 
precepts by some form of social pressure. In this sense, the emergence of law as it is
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being characterized here is consequent upon some sort of dysfunction. Were there no 
such tendencies to breach the precepts of the natural law, were those precepts adhered 
to by all in an entirely spontaneous fashion, then the norms of hilly rational action, 
that is, of communicative or linguistic action, would be entirely sufficient as would 
the particular regulative and coordinative normative systems to which they give rise in 
given contexts. Given the fact that no such halcyon community of absolute virtue has 
ever obtained in practice, norms of social pressure — laws — have, in fact, existed in all 
real communities and they have done so in a great variety of forms, placing differing 
degrees of restriction upon human volition.914 Underlying this variety, however, can 
be detected a very general overall movement towards more formal manifestations and 
away from informal ones. Indicative of a cognate overall rise in social fixation, this 
process of formalisation, understood properly, also references a general trend towards 
ever-greater diminution in the scope of un-coerced human volition. Indeed, as the 
norms of social pressure become gradually more formalised, they become 
proportionately more inflexible and restrictive. They also begin to emerge in a more 
determinate and less spontaneous fashion. In each of these respects they become less 
like the norms of language and more like those of physical nature. It is precisely in 
this sense that the degree to which the norms of social pressure have been formalised 
within a society offers an indication of the extent to which it has become alienated 
from its natural, maximally human, state. In order properly to understand the 
foundations and wider implications of the arguments that have been put forward here, 
it is necessary to set them within the overall metaphysical context of human nature 
and action, and it is to this task that Chapter 8 now turns.
914 If serious misunderstanding is to be avoided, it is important to note two quite different functions that norms of social pressure 
can perform. Where they serve to enforce observance o f  the precepts o f  the natural law (by deduction) or actions compliant with 
it (by determination), and thus operate, within Aquinas’ framework, as forms of human/positive law properly so-called, they are 
correctly understood as manifesting the consequences o f restrictions upon human volition: the original source o f those 
restrictions being violations o f the very precepts it is has now become so necessary to uphold. Where, in contrast, norms o f social 
pressure serve to effect behaviour that is in breach o f  the precepts o f  the natural law (thereby losing, on Aquinas’ schema, their 
qualification as human/positive law properly so called), they become themselves the very site at which restriction upon volition 
takes place. In the first instance, lawful authority is used to protect individual and communal freedom, in the second, normative 
pressure is used as a method for its violation. It should go without saying, of course, that this understanding depends upon a 
‘positive’ conception o f  freedom quite different to that beloved o f  the modem liberalism. In the final chapter, it will be argued, 
amongst other things, that advanced modernity manifests a shift from the employment o f  the norms o f social pressure in the fist 
sense, to their employment in the second.
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Chapter 8: The Metaphysics of Legal and 
Historical Transformation
In this final substantive chapter, it is intended to set what has been argued in chapter 7 
within a wider, metaphysical frame. To this end, what follows begins with a brief 
outline of the principles upon which a Thomistic metaphysic is based. It then proceeds 
to situate within that framework, a Thomist/Aristotelian account of the human person 
and society, integrating in the process some of the suggestive insights of more 
contemporary theorists. From there, it attempts to extend these principles in order to 
elaborate the metaphysically based theory of historical transformation implicit in what 
has been argued in Chapter 7. Finally, it undertakes to draw out the relevance and 
explanatory function of this theory with respect to the contemporary developments in 
China and India detailed in Part 2.
A: Fundamental Principles of Reality
For Aquinas the whole of reality is subject to a fundamental metaphysical distinction 
between actuality and potentiality. In so far as anything exists, it is actual, but in so 
far as it can exist and does not, it is merely potential. Whereas actuality is a type of 
ontological perfection, potentiality is a limit upon perfection since it restricts both the 
scope of what a thing can become, and the order in which that becoming can take 
place. Indeed, it is a condition of a thing being able to receive further determinations 
that it be finite or imperfect. On this basis, Aquinas speaks of multiple grades of being 
which differentiate the universe vertically according to a hierarchical order ranging 
from Pure Act to Pure Potentiality. The higher the grade of being a thing has, the 
more actuality it possesses and the less potentiality, and this compositional balance 
changes proportionately the lower down the scale of being one moves until one 
reaches Pure Potentiality (or Prime Matter), which has no actuality at all and thus can 
be said to exist only as a mental abstraction. Greater or lesser actuality is, in this 
sense, said to come from participated being. “When something receives particularly, 
that which belongs to another universally (or totally), the former is said to participate 
in the latter.”915 It is precisely to the extent that each individual thing participates in
915 Quoted in Wippel, 1993: 93.
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being as such,916 that it discloses a particular degree or intensity of existence and it is 
this degree or intensity that is said to be specified by a thing’s essence.917
The hierarchically ordered compositions of ‘existence’ and ‘essence’ are the first and 
most basic manifestations of Act and Potency,918 but they are joined by two others. 
These relate to being as differentiated this time along a horizontal rather than a 
vertical axis.919 Where change gives rise to a thing that previously did not exist, Act 
and Potency are said to realise themselves in the distinction between substantial form 
imorphe) and prime matter (hule).920 Whilst form specifies what a thing is, matter 
allows for several things to exist with the same substantial form by individuating them 
in space and time. Prime matter, which is always determined by some particular form 
and thus has no independent existence of its own, also explains substantial change. 
Without the principle of continuity prime matter provides it would not be possible to 
have a real transition from one mode of being to another. Instead, it would be 
necessary to postulate a sequence of wholly unrelated beings, each undergoing 
successive stages of spontaneous emergence and total annihilation. The final 
manifestation of Act and Potency occurs where a thing, despite undergoing change, 
remains essentially the same. Here Act and Potency find expression in the distinction 
between accidents and substance. Accidents are what determine the non-essential 
mode or manner of existence of a thing,921 whereas substance connotes a thing’s 
perduring or underlying reality.922 Just as the form/matter composition is nested 
within the essence component of the existence/essence composition, so too the 
accidents/substance composition is nested within the form component of the 
form/matter composition. It is precisely for this reason, that movement from the 
composition existence/essence to that of form/matter and finally to that of 
accidents/substance is movement to an evermore focused specification of the 
overarching composition of act and potency.
917 Thus, Norris-Clarke can write: since “every essence is a certain measure o f  being and perfection”, it follows that “the universe 
reveals itself [as] a society made up o f superiors and inferiors.” Norris-Clarke, 2001: 250-251.
918 Ibid: p. 152.
919 Ibid: 152-153.
920 Thus Aristotle’s metaphysical analysis o f  nature is usually referred to a hylomorphic.
921 Aristotle grouped accidents under nine basic ‘heads’ or ‘categories’ o f being in addition to substance.
922 Taken together, these three sets o f distinction constitute an “interlocking system of metaphysical compositions on different 
levels within a single real being” Norris- Clarke, 2001:158.
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Implied, here, is a more specific account of how the hierarchy of being plays itself out 
in the material world. Every material being is, of course, a combination, on this view, 
of form and matter. Yet within the broad category of material being a number of 
further sub-divisions exist as between those substances of less and those of greater 
qualitative perfection. The first of these divisions is that between inanimate and 
animate being. The term Anima, as used, classically, in Aristotle’s work De Anima, is 
normally translated here as ‘soul’.923 What is meant by soul in this context, however, 
and contrary to modern usage, is merely the first principle of vital activity. Thus to 
say that something has a soul is to say nothing more than that it is alive: the 
distinction between the inanimate and the animate being simply that between the non­
living and the living. Within the sub-category of the living, further distinctions arise 
between vegetative, sensitive and rational being, each of which has its own peculiar 
mode of operation made manifest through the exercise of specific sets of powers 
clustered in groups and themselves ordered hierarchically. At the vegetative level are 
found the three powers of nutrition, growth and generation, at the sensitive level, the 
powers of locomotion, appetite and perception, and at the rational level, the powers of 
will and intellect. Accordingly, the orderly and arranged hierarchy of living beings is 
“made complete by the orderly and arranged hierarchy of their operations, and in such 
a way that the bottom of the higher degree invariably comes into contact with the top 
of the lower.”924 Moreover, among the three types of living being and their associated 
powers, there exists a real order of prepossession. Consequently:
as one moves up the ladder new elements appear, the exemplification of 
which implies the possession of lower level capacities -  but not vice versa.
Thus, any species of organism which is capable of generation has the power 
of nutrition, and any which can perceive its environment is also capable of 
movement through it. Similarly at the level of souls rather than individual 
powers, whatever has a sensitive soul also has a vegetative one, and 
whatever has a rational soul has both. But once again the relationships are 
not symmetrical. Possession of a vegetative soul does not imply possession 
of any other sort and something may have a sensitive soul without having a 
rational one.925
Importantly, this should not be taken to imply that there exists in any living being 
more than one soul (or form). The relationship as between higher and lower types of
923 D e Anima, 412 a 29-412 b 9.
924 Gilson, 1957:251.
925 Haldane, 1994: 53-54.
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soul is instead one of subsumption or inclusion. Thus, in human beings “there are not 
three souls or principles of organic life but only one which subsumes the powers 
which are in turn definitive of lower forms of animation.”926 A human being 
constitutes a single compound made up of a body, which plays the part of ‘matter’, 
and of a ‘substantial form’, that acts as his vital organising principle.927
B: Human Being
Human being, then, is distinguished by its simultaneous possession of material and 
immaterial qualities and capacities, where matter is taken to be the principle of 
individuation in space and time and thus to be that which makes possible spatio- 
temporal succession.928 A human person, as a rational being, is an individual material 
substance, but one of a peculiar kind since it is distinguished from other material 
substances by its capacity to transcend the circumspections of particular bodily 
existence. It does this through a combination of its intellect and will which are 
distinctive human capacities included in the more general range of cognitive and 
appetitive capabilities possessed by all sentient beings.
A purely material being is conditioned by the forces of the material world. It is either 
a passive channel through which those forces pass and upon which they act, or it is 
equipped with diverse, inherited mechanisms of stimulus-response that give rise to 
determinate patterns of behaviour characterised by differing levels of complexity. 
Even the most sophisticated of sub-rational animal species remains classifiable in 
terms of the physical realities within which it is submerged. It is a material object, 
though one of a special type since it does not exist all at one time,929 and because it is 
such an object its individual members exist not for the sake of themselves, but for the 
sake of the species as a whole. In contrast, the human person is held to be 
distinguished by the simultaneous possession of material and immaterial qualities. 
Moreover, it is precisely these latter qualities that enable the person to be “a 
substance so complete as to be past absorption in a wider substantial unity”,930 or put 
another way, to be capable of existing in and for itself thereby being a whole rather
926 Ibid. p. 54.
927 For more recent and contemporary considerations, expositions and defences o f this view see: Braine, 2002; Cross, 2002; Lee, 
2004; Lee & George; and, Oderberg, 2005.
928 Sokolowski, 1970.
929 McCabe, 2003:43.
930 Gilby, 1953:202.
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than a part. This does not mean that the material qualities of the human person are 
without significance. Materiality remains essential to the Thomistic understanding of 
the person, since it is its materiality that renders the person an embodied rather than a 
disembodied being. The person, therefore, remains internally and indivisibly 
composite; immaterial reality plunged into the constant flux of material reality in an 
essential rather than merely contingent fashion.
It follows from this that the human person is also, on this view, capable of being 
possessed of a certain tension. For in so far as it is a material individuality, it has a 
precarious unity that is constantly in danger of slipping “back into multiplicity,” and 
of becoming subject to an “network of forces and influences” over which it has little 
real control. In so far as it is a person, however, it is entirely self-subsisting, 
possessing within itself an inner “principle of creative unity,” marked by both 
freedom and independence.932 In this way, it becomes clear not only what 
differentiates the personal and individual aspects of the human being, but also how 
those aspects are properly related one to another. Whilst material individuality, being 
a condition of human existence, is certainly not something considered bad form an 
Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective, nevertheless insofar as it is considered good, it is 
good specifically in its relation to personality and then precisely to the extent that it 
facilitates the realisation of personal ends. What is bad is allowing the individuality of 
the human being to enjoy predominance in human action, and it is only by ensuring 
that this does not happen, that what is truly distinctive in the human person will be 
permitted to flourish as its nature demands.
C: Human Action
For Aristotle and Aquinas, the good of any being is determined by the proper ends of 
its natural activities. This follows from the inherently active nature of being in 
general. When Aquinas, following Augustine, states that “goodness and being are 
really the same”, he is using the term ‘being’ as more-or-less equivalent to what is
931 On this point see especially: Oderberg, 2002 also, 2005, and, more generally, 2009.
932 Maritain, 1954: 56-88.
933 Ibid.
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actual or existing.934 The ubiquity of this activity introduces a fundamentally 
teleological dimension into the overall drama of existence. A being flourishes more 
fully by more fully realising the proper ends of its activities, since in so doing it more 
intensely realises its specific act of existence.935 By its specific act of existence 
Aquinas meant the same as its substantial form or nature, in virtue of which it is the 
kind of being it is, and according to which it has the specific or ‘species-defining’ 
powers it has.936
A given being cannot hope to achieve its final end as a fully realised or actualised 
specimen of its kind without exercising the powers or capacities with which it is 
endowed precisely in virtue of being the kind of being it is. It follows, that: “[t]he 
end, completion, or perfection of a natural substance is its having fully actualized its 
specifying capacity [or power].”937 Moreover, since existence and goodness are co­
extensive, it also follows that the proper exercise of a being’s species-defining powers 
must also make for its goodness. For “since the state or activity that constitutes a 
substance’s full actuality is that substance’s end and an end is good, that state or 
activity constitutes the substance’s good.”938 In this respect, Phillipa Foot has spoken 
of a sort of ‘natural goodness’, which “depends directly on the relations of an 
individual to the ‘life form’ of its species.”939 Thus, the goodness in plants and 
animals, for example, may be said to nest within “an interlocking set of general 
concepts such as species, life, death, reproduction, and nourishment, together with 
less general... ideas such as that offruiting, eating, or fleeing .”940 Similarly, Herbert 
McCabe points out that it is precisely because human being is “possessed of a nature, 
or an ontological structure which is a locus of intelligible necessities, [that 
it].. .possesses ends which necessarily corresponds to [its] essential constitution and 
which are the same [for all].. .”941 Human fulfilment or flourishing, then, entails 
actualizing and “bringing] to the proper fullness, that structure in man which is
934 Aquinas, Summa 77!eo/ogme[hereafter S7]Ia5.1 571a48.2; Q uaestiones disputatae de m alo[QDM ] 1.1 ad 1; Augustine, 
Confessions'Vll. 12.
935 SH a6.I. See also: Francis, 1996,2000.
936 OTa76.1; Ia5.5; IaIIae85.4.
937 MacDonald, 1991: 100. On the whole controversy surround the Fact/Value and Is/Ought objections, and how these fail within 
an Aristotelian/Thomistic ontology, see, among many other works: Geach, 1967; Martin, 2007, 2008; and, Zagal, 2008.
938 Ibid.
939 Foot, 2001: 27. See also here, the extremely important contemporary work o f Michael Thompson: Thompson, 2004, 2008. 
Also, the more populist writings over several decades o f Mary Midgley, especially: Midgley, 1995.
940 Ibid.
941 McCabe, 2003:45.
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characteristic for him.” Namely, that “structure of self-governance and self- 
possession.”942
What really distinguishes human being in this respect is the fact that, because it is 
endowed with capacities enabling it to transcend the circumstances of the particular 
environments in which it find themselves at any given moment, its active 
potentialities are possessed of a much greater range than those of even the most 
sophisticated of sub-rational species.943 The reason for this is that, “[t]he human will, 
as the soul’s faculty of action flowing from its intellectual nature, is also a spiritual 
faculty like the intellect.” As a result, “no finite good can command its adherence by 
necessity.” Instead, a person’s will “remains free to choose its own path toward the 
infinite among all finite goods.” It is for this reason that it is able “to turn away on the 
conscious level from its own authentic Good towards other [merely] apparent 
goods.”944 In this way, whilst it can be said with some truth that “ .. .human morality is 
entirely concerned with doing what [a person] want[s] to do,” in human beings, 
unlike other animals, it is necessary to reckon with “several levels of wanting” such 
that a person can “only truly do what [they] want, only truly be free, if [they] get the 
priorities right.”945 Although, then, the ultimate ends of the human person are indeed 
set, the means by which those ultimate ends are to be attained are subject to the 
judgment and free decision of the individual person andI or of the community of 
which he/she is part.
All people aim, according to Aquinas, at those things that will fulfil them in an 
ultimate sense, and would, if faced with an unmediated and absolute, or unlimited, 
good, be impelled towards it as a matter of absolute necessity, however, the world as 
it is structured and given in real, immediate and embodied experience never places 
them in such a situation. In the world of such experience the ultimate ends of the 
human person are always mediated through the world of material particulars, which 
can sometimes facilitate the attainment of a person’s ultimate ends and yet sometimes 
frustrate them. In so far as they facilitate the attainment of those ends they form a true 
basis for full human flourishing. This is linked to the fact that, given the human
942 Wojtyla, 1979: 151
943 Adler, 1993: 137.
944 Norris-Clarke, 1993: 36.
945 McCabe, 2003: 45.
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person’s nature as an essential composite of material and immaterial qualities and 
capacities, his/her wellbeing is necessarily attained through a mixture of both material 
and immaterial goods. Whereas the goods of the physical world pertain, not to the 
human being in his/her specific nature, that is to the human being as such, but rather 
to that part of his/her nature which he/she shares with other sentient animals, 
immaterial goods are those goods the attainment of which fulfils a person’s 
distinctively human capacities, and which, through their intelligence and will, take 
them beyond the particularities of the material world. Thus, there are two great orders 
of goods the possession of which it is necessary to attain in order for human life to 
flourish. Those goods which are of intrinsic value and desirable, therefore, for their 
own sake, and those goods which are merely useful, and which derive their value 
conditionally from their ability in particular circumstances to facilitate intrinsic 
goods. Consequently, the real world of lived experience both enables and requires 
judgment and choice to be made as to what, in a given situation, is likely to contribute 
to the overall realisation of human flourishing.
Moreover, after a moment’s reflection, it becomes clear that it is precisely this 
capacity to choose as between different material particulars, that enables a person to 
choose in a great variety of ways which are conducive to, support, and further his/her 
proper functioning. It is this capacity, indeed requirement, for human beings to 
choose between material particulars in the real world that grounds the huge and 
entirely natural diversity of individual people and of the societies they constitute. 
Indeed, because “he is able to choose this or that” in the process of selecting “his own 
course of action” in any particular situation, he is able, in a very real way, to choose 
between the many real and concrete routes towards the realisation of his ultimate 
good. What is more, the very act of making of these choices “bears not only upon his 
will and deeds, but more importantly upon himself.” Since, it is “[b]y making up his 
mind, [that] in a true sense he makes himself.”946
It is for this reason that, whilst the requirements of the human nature remain the same 
for all people and all human communities in terms of laying down the parameters of 
what is, and what is not, in accord with the full flourishing of the human form, they
946 Maurer, 1979: 18-19.
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far from specify, within those parameters, what actually constitutes such flourishing at 
a particular time and in a particular place. Rather, it is precisely in respecting the 
requirements of human nature, and not acting in a way which is contrary to them, that 
individual and collective diversity is enabled to reach its fullest extent; that the option 
for flourishing open to human beings and their communities are at their greatest. In 
other words, it is only in obeying the basic requirements of human nature that 
individuals and their communities are given the greatest number of opportunities for 
free action. In this sense, adherence to the requirements of human nature opens up 
possibilities; it does not close them down. It is a failure to respect those requirements 
that closes possibilities down and makes both individual persons and the culture to 
which they belong both less spontaneous and ultimately less interesting. In this way, 
on a Thomist view, a true adherence to the fundamental requirements of human 
nature offers the promise of maintaining a perfect and harmonious balance between 
unity and diversity.
At the same time, an inevitable consequence of this process of self-making or self­
activation is the fact that it simultaneously presupposes a capacity for a form of 
personal corruption. In other words, it simultaneously opens up the possibility of a 
person making choices that fundamentally frustrate rather than further his proper 
functioning. Again this is linked to the correct order for which goods should be 
striven. Insofar as the human person enjoys useful or material goods in a way that 
does not frustrate the attainment of intrinsic or immaterial goods, it is appropriate to 
speak of his healthy development and at least partial fulfilment, since his life is 
fundamentally coordinated by goods which satisfy definite and specific needs of his 
personal being. If, however, the human being aims at the attainment of useful or 
material goods in the place of intrinsic or immaterial goods, it is correct to speak of a 
degree of personal corruption, since this involves a person failing properly to 
recognise what is really, as opposed to merely superficially, in accord with the 
inherent, existential logic of his basic inclinations.
Whilst intrinsic human goods, are of value without qualification, material, or merely 
useful goods, are of value in certain circumstances but not others, and thus are 
capable of losing their value altogether in circumstances where they serve rather to 
frustrate than to support the attainment of intrinsic goods. Since the human person is,
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by its nature, endowed with certain needs that can be satisfied only by intrinsic or 
immaterial goods, the attempt to satisfy those needs with merely useful or material 
goods, has the potential to turn inappropriate striving for those useful goods into an 
inexhaustible and unlimited thirst. Indeed, although this form of striving is frequently 
accompanied by a great increase in the levels of physical movement and restlessness, 
it actually represents an over-all decrease in the intensity of truly personal activity. It 
represents an attempt to satisfy desires naturally directed towards the immaterial and 
therefore the unlimited with goods of a merely limited nature. Indeed, the 
inexhaustible potentialities represented by a person’s inclinations towards immaterial 
goods can be fully brought to act only through the equally inexhaustible satisfaction 
offered by immaterial goods. Consequently, when attempts are made to satisfy such 
inclinations with merely material goods, the inadequacy of the exhaustible 
satisfaction they provide gives rise to a habit of constant and uncontrolled movement 
from one such material good to another which becomes increasingly competitive in 
character owing to the fact that the enjoyment exhaustible goods by one person 
prevents their enjoyment by another.
D: Powers and Habits
Here, it is important to distinguish between innate powers, acquired dispositions or 
habits and particular actions. The powers of the human person can be described as 
those of its capacities for action it possesses precisely in virtue of its nature as human. 
In contrast, whereas a ‘power’ is a capacity for action, an ‘act’ is a concrete exercise 
of a power on a given occasion, and is thus the concrete bringing to expression of 
what is merely potential in the power of which it is such an expression. Finally, 
between a ‘power’ and an ‘act’, a ‘habit’ is an intermediate state which, whilst 
predisposing a person to exercise a power in a particular way, falls short of the actual 
exercise of that power.947 Typically acquired over time, and with varying degrees of 
difficulty, they are characteristics which become “natural and enduring through long 
practice, thereby making the individual, in one way or another” who they are.948 In 
this way, the overall collection of habits with which a person is endowed -  their
947 SZMIae.49.2.; 51.1; Adler, 1993: 145.
948 Adler, 1993: 116.
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overall state of habituation or habitus at any given point — comes to constitute a sort 
of second nature. Being of a relative enduring character, these dispositional sets 
make it harder, but never impossible, to alter ingrained patterns of behaviour and the 
attitudes which accompany them. It is these sets of dispositions, building upon the 
huge potential for diversity in concrete human action, which account for the gradual 
building up of differing styles of individual and collective behaviour together with the 
distinctive mentalities that implies. Like the human actions lying at their root, these 
dispositions have an inherently teleological character which confers upon embodied 
human existence its inherently narrative structure, and causes each life to be lived out 
in light of a future in which “certain possibilities beckon.. .forward and others 
repel., .some seem already foreclosed and others perhaps inevitable.”949
Importantly, habits, like acts, can contribute either to the development or to the 
corruption of the human powers of which they are specifying expressions. Insofar as 
they contribute to the development of those powers, they are called virtues, and 
insofar as they contribute to their corruption (or, systematic misdirection), they are 
called vices. In this sense, ‘virtues’ are nothing more than stable dispositions to act 
well, whereas ‘vices’ are nothing more than stable dispositions to act badly.950 Since 
human conduct is that of a rational animal it should be conformed to the standards or 
precepts of right reason. The precepts of the Natural Law as these standards are 
normally termed comprise precisely that body of dictates or norms required by the 
very existence of reasoning or rational being and it is through the power of such 
reasoning that they are grasped. Human being inevitably sees all of its properly 
human acts in relation to these precepts, and it mentally pronounces upon the 
agreement or disagreement of those acts with the fundamental standards the natural 
law spontaneously erects.951 The accuracy of such pronouncements can, of course, be 
flawed by undisciplined passions or inaccurate analyses owing to the concupiscence 
and the weakness of the human intellect, and the more particularised the judgments of 
the practical intellect become, so the more they are susceptible error. It is in this way 
that the human agent can be said to be better or worse habituated to the making such 
judgments. Thus a traditional way of describing the inherent link between the
949 MacIntyre, 1981: 200-201
950 STlaIIae.54.4, See here, Murillo, 2008, where the analogy between health or ‘bodily flourishing’ and moral probity or fully 
‘personal flourishing’ is explored with considerable insight.
951 On the harmony between the vitures and the natural law see: Hittinger, 1994; and, Hursthouse, 1999. On the parameter setting 
function o f  the natural law see Gonzalez, 2008.
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virtues/vices and the precepts of the natural law is to describe the former as the 
‘internal’ and the latter as the ‘external’ principles of human action; the former being 
a description of the degree of aptitude with which a given subject is endowed for 
attaining to the latter.
E: Human Society
Inextricably linked to the human person’s partial inhabitance of the immaterial order 
is its capacity, indeed need, to live in a society of other human beings transcending 
the biological. Since material being, as individual, exists in a largely determinate 
manner, it is, from a Thomist perspective, incapable of truly opening itself to another. 
It lacks any real interiority, and because of this its self-identity is sufficient only to 
form fixed, external relations. This means that it is incapable of being more than a 
part within a wider whole. On the other hand, the person, precisely because it goes 
beyond the material, is capable both of a recursive self-consciousness and of a self- 
determination which confers upon it enough unity, inward presence and self- 
possession to enable it to give itself fully to another without any loss of its own 
identity. In fact, the more the person becomes interiorly present to itself and the more 
it comes to an appreciation of the truly universal nature of its distinctively human 
capacities, the more its is impelled to reach out to other persons in communicative 
dialogue, and thereby to constitute, to use Aristotle’s evocative phrase, a community 
of ‘other selves’.952 In this context it is possible to understand that truly personal 
goods are always, in some sense, truly common goods. As properly perfective of a 
person’s being, their realisation requires and is signified by greater and greater 
sociality. A person leading a fully human and satisfying life becomes in the process a 
true good for all other members of society, a real satisfaction of their most basic 
needs, as they become, to the extent that they live flourishing lives, a real satisfaction 
of his or her most basic needs. Moreover, each person, as a flourishing individual, 
contributes to the good of others in a unique and unrepeatable manner, so that a 
person’s failure to so flourish is also a real loss to those other persons with whom they 
live in community who require the distinctive contributions he or she can make to 
realise the distinctive possibilities of their own personal beings.
952 Norris-Clarke, 1993: 76.
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In this way, human self-identity is increased it direct proportion to a growth in its own 
inherently dialogical character.953 Thus whilst “[hjuman society in general, not just 
societies in the plural, extends to all human beings, the total number of members of 
the animal species homo sapiens”, it is also important not to draw a straightforward 
equation between the human species and human society.954 As with the human person, 
the distinguishing feature of human society is that which goes beyond the biological.
[Wjhat [in particular] makes human society a special case compared with 
societies of other species is the development of culture, ways of acting, 
thinking and feeling which are transmitted from generation to generation 
across societies through learning, not through inheritance. Culture includes 
language and technology, both of which involve the communication of ideas 
and a possibility of sophisticated action.955
Speaking of human society, then, encompasses the totality of human relationships. It 
includes relationships between biological organisms -  homo sapiens -  and all that has 
been biologically transmitted to them. It also includes cultural relationships that arise 
from those distinctively human creations, both past and present, which involve the use 
and transmission of symbols and artefacts and have involved the active development 
and successive reconfigurations of human consciousness and of the material world.956 
In this respect, and in the processes of social interaction over time, human beings -  
consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly — construct and reproduce 
relational complexes and institutions which go beyond the individual and which come 
to obtain a certain autonomy from their original creators. These build upon:
... sequences of social practices which are widespread, impersonal, subject 
to, and yet always resistant to control. Practices are shaped in customs, 
conventions, usages, rituals, styles, manners, fashions, tastes, plans, projects, 
laws. They are lodged in the world such that people relate to each other in 
certain material settings with practical ends in mind.957
From an Aristotelian/ Thomistic perspective these diverse structural complexes must 
ultimately result from the aggregation of concrete individual and collective decisions 
rooted in the deeper capacity of the human person to choose between material 
particulars. Now, as has already been seen, this capacity stems from the irreducibly
953 Ibid.; as well as: Buber, 1971. More recently, see especially: MacIntyre, 1999; Massim-Correas, 2008; and, Llanes, 2008.
954 Albrow, 1999: 5.
955 Ibid. 6-7.
956 Ibid: 6-7.
957 Ibid. 17-18.
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composite nature of the human person. Consequently, a focus upon its explanatory 
importance entails a simultaneous recognition that “the body and bodily presence... 
[are, in some way] central to the production, reproduction, and transformation of 
social structures,”958 but also, that that presence is an expression of a deeper reality 
which, in being truly personal, is in someway also more than the merely bodily. 
Furthermore, because human action takes place within a pre-existent habitual context, 
so, by extension, it must also be right to speak of a habitual order within which social 
complexes and institutions are embodied: an habitual order which finds expression 
both in the personal habitus of individual actors, but also in external material 
environments whose precise configurations are the result of activities the relevant 
complexes are structured to sustain. Indeed, to extend the terminological and 
conceptual patrimony of Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy in this way,959 by 
speaking of a sort of social habitus, is to emphasise that:
[t]he analysis of objective structures. ..is inseparable from the analysis of the 
genesis, within biological individuals, of the mental structures which are to 
some extent the product of the incorporation of social structures; 
inseparable, too, form the analysis of the genesis of these social structures 
themselves.960
By emphasising the utter dependence of social structures, in terms of their external 
manifestation, maintenance and reproduction, upon the actions of individuals, the 
precise character of which is, in turn, dependent upon the set of dispositions they have 
come to acquire over time, such an account serves to overcome the usual dichotomies 
between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of social interaction, and between ‘public’ and 
‘private’ spheres. Indeed, it is through prolonged processes of interaction, 
socialization and acculturation that individuals develop tendencies (below the level of 
consciousness) to behave in certain ways in certain situations. These ways of acting, 
reacting and interacting represent “[vjalues, norms and ideals.. .[that are] fixed in the 
body as postures, gestures, ways of standing, walking, thinking, and speaking,” such 
as to become a sort of ‘second nature’ for the individuals concerned. They represent 
patterns of socially significant behaviour ‘coded’ into personal habitus “in such a way 
that individuals are able to act in routine [socially and institutionally appropriate] 
ways without having to think consciously about what they ought to be doing.”
958 Lopez & Scott, 2000: 90.
959 Jenks, 1992: 92-93; Lopez & Scott, 2000: 74; Panofsky, 1967. See also: Bourdieu, 1977, 1990, 1995.
960 Bourdieu, 1990: 14.
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Social action can, in a very real sense, then, be thought characterised as a form of 
“skilled accomplishment” which, like “human skills of all kinds.. .are complex, 
embodied tendencies or dispositions that are acquired through learning and long 
practice.”961 Through the development of these dispositions that common relational 
and institutional structures, which are none other than internalised and generalised 
expressions of actual social conditions faced by individuals in their actions, come to 
condition individual behaviour in a manner coherent with wider social functioning. It 
is precisely in this way that “the outcomes of interaction and agency” can be seen to 
“have emergent relational properties that are different form those of the individuals 
and interaction that produced them.”962 These relational properties are “relatively 
durable (historical, systemic or ‘macro’)” and, as such, serve to “condition subsequent 
interaction, but are [also] open to become the target of (individual, agentic, or 
‘micro’) efforts to reinforce or transform them. Thus actors cannot avoid being 
constrained by structures but they can do something about the specific form the 
constraints take.”963 Those constraints are linked into positions individuals occupy 
within particular social spaces, or, what Pierre Bourdieu describes as ‘fields of 
activity’. It is according to an individual’s position within a given ‘field’ that his/her 
access to unequally distributed sets of resources is determined. The norms and social 
relations that individuals produce, reproduce and transform in their actions are 
established in their struggles over these resources. Consequently, whilst ‘society’ 
never actually causes behaviour “it can make some behaviour easier or more costly.” 
Such action then “becomes a matter of personal determination and responsibility as to 
whether the opportunities are seized and obstacles surmounted.”964 It is precisely in 
this way that the socially embodied collections of sophisticated social practices which, 
continually expressing themselves in institutional form, come to exercise influence 
over, but not to determine, subsequent human action, enable one to speak intelligibly 
of the transmission and accumulation over time of human learning, and thus also to 
speak of social development or corruption in the widest sense of those terms.
E: Social and Historical Transformation
961 Bourdieu, 1994: 79. Lopez & Scott, 2000: 101.
962 Parker, 2000: 23. In addition see: Archer, 1988,1995, 1998. More generally see: Bhaskar, 1986, 1997.
963 Parker, 2000: 73-74.
954 Archer, et.al., 1998; Parker, 2000: 236.
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At this point it becomes pertinent to re-call the tightly interconnected nature of the 
human action system and the need, if it is to be understood adequately, to treat it as a 
dynamic whole. It is also important to re-emphasise the central position of the will 
both in stabilising that system, or, if disordered, in undermining it. Now, given what 
has already been said about the socially embedded nature of the human person, it 
should come as no surprise that, insofar as this analysis is transposed from individual 
decision-making to the wider social arena, it can be seen to ground a similarly 
dichotomous dynamic, one that was highlighted long ago in an altogether more 
eschatological context by the great Fourth century theologian, St Augustine. For 
Augustine, every human society finds its constituent principle in a common will or 
love. Indeed, it is a characteristic of love “that it becomes the bond of society which 
springs up spontaneously around it.”966 As such, a society can be said to be composed 
of a “multitude of rational creatures associated in a common agreement as to the 
things which it loves.”967 To the extent that “any group of men [is] united by a 
common love for some object” it is possible to speak of human society, and thus to 
speak, in some sense of there being as many societies or, to use Augustine’s term, 
‘cities’ “as there are collective loves.”968 Yet there underlies each of these loves, just 
as there underlies each individual act of the will, one of two basic orientations: either 
towards genuine human fulfilment, or away from it. Thus, just as individuals are able, 
because of their self-making/directing capacities, also to choose in ways which 
frustrate or undermine their full flourishing, so too the collective social complexes to 
which their actions give rise have the capacity not only to be perfective but also 
corruptive of human society.969
This highlights, of course, the irreducibly moral dimension of every social institution, 
but it also points to its irreducibly cognitive content as well. Reflecting the Thomist 
view that intellect and will mutual include and influence one another, this means not 
only that each institution or complex of institutions gives rise to, or embodies, an ethos 
sustaining more or less humanly flourishing patterns of behaviour, but also, and by the 
very same token, that it imparts a sort of tacit knowledge or belief as to precisely what 
ends that flourishing consists in. It is not just that those meaningful practices and
965 Copelston, 1950; Gilson, 1961: 171.
966 Gilson, 1961: 172.
967 Dawson, 1957: 59.
968 Gilson, 1961: 172.
969 In general, see here: Boyle, 1994; Elton, 2008; Harrison, 2007; and, MacIntyre, 1998,2004; and, Mauri, 2008.
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meaning giving perceptions that have been internalised and converted into dispositions 
of mind and body situate individuals in different social circumstances, it is also that 
they cause those individuals to approach their circumstances “as bearers of a particular 
social identity”970 and it is this, in turn, which, to a very large degree, pre-programmes 
the very terms of social and moral discourse with a background set of assumptions 
tending, in aggregate to give unspoken preference to one set of cognitive and 
inclinational orientations over another. In this way,
the plain person acquires a belief in the efficacy or truth of certain 
principles, not by taking in part of dialectical discussions about the first 
principles and the conclusions which may be drawn from them, but, rather 
by ‘taking in’ the principles that underlie contemporary conduct and belief 
while immersed in social institutions — and the practices they support — as 
well as by reflecting upon them.971
If institutions are well-integrated and properly directed towards the real goods of the 
human person and society -  then the plain persons involved in their operation and 
touched by their activities will acquire a tacit understanding of the goods of human 
flourishing. If, on the other hand, institutions and the practices they support, are in 
some way dysfunctional, then those same persons are likely to develop a tacit 
knowledge of, and aptitude for, acting in accordance with principles that are not 
conducive to human flourishing.
When this is scaled up to greater levels of generality from individual institutions or 
apparently relatively discrete complexes of institutions, to entire cultures or forms of 
life, it becomes clear that here too it is correct to speak of their preponderant cognitive 
and inclinational orientations. This is not in anyway, of course, to deny the difficulties 
involved defining the precise perimeters of any given cultural form, be it large or 
small, nor is it to deny the likelihood that within those aggregate forms there will be 
many differing counter-orientations which cause them to manifest considerable 
internal conflict and complexity. What it does involve is the claim that, to the extent 
that such cultural units can be so defined, once these various conflicting currents and 
complexities have been taken into account, it is, indeed must be, correct to speak, in 
theory at least, of some overall orientation. Finally, given that human society and its
970 Ibid.
971 Rowland, 2003: 61-62.
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institutions are embodied in a manner no less essential than the individual persons 
from whose actions and interactions they arise, it follows that the life of these 
institutional/cultural forms is itself temporally located and possessed of an irreducibly 
narrative character, along with the cognitive content and inclinational orientations 
they sustain. Indeed:
[j]ust as an individual explores her identity by continually, as it were, 
rewriting her autobiography (not of course, to change the past but to find 
new significance in it), so a culture, an institution, a church must continually 
rewrite its history. This is not precisely because the previous autobiography 
or history was mistaken (though it may well have been; self-deception and 
chauvinism, for example, are constant temptations), but because we find
Q79new questions to ask and answer.
It is for precisely this reason, that a living tradition is, in a very real sense, a sort of 
“historically extended, socially embodied argument,” to quote Alasdair Macintyre 
once more, and “an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that 
tradition.” As such, “within a tradition,” embodied as it necessarily is by a range of 
temporally extended institutional forms and complexes “the pursuit of goods extends
Q7Tthrough generations, sometimes through many generations.”
Now, in addition to institutions and complexes of institutions conditioning and, at least 
in part, constituting individual and collective practices or habits of a particular 
inclinational character, they also embody the consequences of the actions in which 
those practices issue-forth in a way that goes beyond what is merely imminent in 
human society and its members to leave a mark on the material environment. To 
understand this, it is necessary to set it within the context of a fuller explanation of the 
logic underlying disordered human action, and of how such action is implicated in a 
profound process of personal and inter-personal alienation characterised by a more or 
less systematic materialisation of the human form. Precisely to the extent that this 
happens, a person and the society in which he lives, finds itself trapped in an 
imprisoning web of forces that are essentially alien to the nature of human being as a 
locus of free and self-directing agency. Now whilst, it is true that the human being is 
inherently embodied, that within it that transcends the material, which is its highest 
and specifically distinctive part, if subordinated to the material, has the effect of
972 McCabe: 2002:199
973 MacIntyre, 1981: 222
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dragging it down in its entirety, so to speak, both in its material and immaterial 
aspects, and of powerfully distorting the social and material environments within 
which it is situated. The reason for this is that human being’s status as a metaphysical 
material/immaterial hybrid makes it simultaneously continuous and discontinuous with 
the material world. To the extent that it is continuous with the material world, every 
action a human being undertakes necessarily involves some reconfiguration of the 
material. To the extent that it is discontinuous with the material world, each of his 
actions are capable of both elevating or distorting the material. They are capable of 
elevating it -  of personalising it, so to speak -  since every action, when, in good order, 
is directed towards the reconfiguration of the material world for personal ends, for 
ends which go beyond the material. They are capable of distorting it, since, when not 
in good order, such action, whilst not appropriating the material world to personal 
ends, does not leave it unchanged. Instead, it appropriates the material world to the 
processes of personal distortion. As such, the consequences of human action are 
always both intransitive and transitive, that is, they effect a transformation both in the 
agent himself and in the external world. This means that there will only be a real, 
rather than a merely apparent, satisfaction of human needs insofar as the effort to 
secure goods in the external world are of a character that they support rather than 
violate the internal harmony of the material and immaterial aspects of the human 
person.974 To the extent that they violate that harmony, they will have succeeded in 
fabricating less a home than a prison. Indeed, in the process of a person pursuing an 
external material good for its own sake, and without regard to the simultaneous 
cultivation of his virtues, the object of his action loses its capacity to qualify as a real 
personal good and instead becomes something of an alien nature. The more this 
happens, the more a person is alienated from, and then gradually subordinated to, the 
products of his own labour.975
974 As Wojtyla puts it: . .that which is transitive in our culturally creative activity and is expressed externally as an effect, 
objectification, product, or work can be said to be a result o f the particular intensity o f  that which is intransitive and remains 
within our disinterested communion with truth, goodness and beauty. This communion, its intensity, degree and depth, is 
something completely internal; it is an immanent activity o f the human soul, and it leaves its mark and brings forth fruit in this 
same dimension. It is from this communion that we mature and grow inwardly.” Wojtyla, 1993: 263-279.
975 It is precisely in this regard that Alasdair MacIntyre, has argued that for collections o f habituated propensities to act, which he 
terms practices, to be in good order, in fact, for them to be practices properly so called at all, they must necessarily involve the 
possession o f  internal goods which he suggests are non other than the internal or intransitive consequences o f action to secure 
external good. MacIntyre’s much discussed reluctance to contemplate vicious practices, may well be explicable on the basis that 
groups and settled habits o f action are only deserving o f the name insofar as they are, in fact, involved in bringing the human 
person to act, insofar as they are not, they are merely apparent rather than real practices. For convenience, the term practice, the 
few times it is employed in this study, is used in a more agnostic manner. See, MacIntyre, 1981: 187-188.
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By the term social development, then, needs to be understood those transformations 
within society and its institutional forms and material environment that conduce to the 
attainment of truly human ends and to the overall flourishing of its individual 
members. Societal development in this restricted sense can be spoken of insofar as 
institutions, or forms of collective action, arise which enable and encourage members 
of society to go beyond their individuality and to engage in forms of cooperative 
action which deter them from seeing their interests as in fundamental conflict with 
those of their fellow human beings; thereby to transcend the evolutionary thrust of the 
purely biological world. It is in this context, that the social dimension of traditional 
norms of morality should be understood. Namely, as abstract expressions of practices 
which, respecting the distinctive nature of human society, conduce to cultivate stable 
dispositions or virtues that make for the fulfilment of the human person and therefore 
the flourishing of society through mutuality and cooperative activity in the spheres of 
physical necessity, productive engagement, and moral, spiritual and cultural 
development. These norms of morality point to the deep inclination within human 
nature towards sociability. It furnishes him with reasons not only not to act 
antisocially and therefore to avoid competition, but more than this, to act with and 
through others in a reciprocal manner as an absolute prerequisite for the attainment 
for the highest of the human goods.
In contrast, just as the emergence of institutions fundamentally directed towards 
cooperation, reciprocity, and mutuality are signs of healthy societal development,976 
so those which are coordinated by competition are indicative of a degree of social 
corruption. It has already been seen that competition is linked to the inappropriate 
pursuit of material or merely useful goods and equally this is the case in respect of 
institutional or social competition. It is in this sense that social competition may be 
seen to indicate, or to be inherently linked to, a process of social materialisation, 
whereby the higher, immaterial dimensions of the human person are collectively and 
systematically subordinated to its lower, material dimensions. Consequently, just as 
societal development can be seen as respecting the parameters of the healthily 
fimctioning society through the observance of moral norms, so societal corruption 
takes place where institutions fail to adhere to those norms, allowing themselves to be
976 There are, o f  course, many institutions which are only superficially directed towards such ends.
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coordinated instead by interpersonal and inter-societal competition and by the 
evolutionary principles of the material world.
It is precisely this competitive logic that lies at the root of the gradual rationalising 
process of societal and institutional evolution whereby certain types of institutional 
organisation are seen to confer greater physical and strategic power on those who take 
advantage of them. This is what Hall and Ikenberry have termed neo-episodic 
evolution whereby: “Certain basic changes in the historical means of social
Q77organisation have changed the terms according to which all societies must operate.” 
Once a society develops a means of organising its activities which confers upon it a 
significantly greater material strength than its potential competitors, those competitors 
are either forced to imitate this new pattern of organisation or else to be overwhelmed 
by the society which developed it. Importantly, the overall dynamic which drives this 
process is certainly not a conscious one. As Hall and Ikenberry go on to point out that: 
“historically: the breakthroughs which matter tend to be the result of fortuitous 
openings rather than the result of some inexorable logic, since most social 
organisations try to adapt their circumstances to achieve an equilibrium with them. 
Fundamental social change tends to be something which positively goes against the 
grain of social actors and their organisations. The makers of fundamental change
Q7Rtherefore are best conceptualised as adaptive failures.” Overall, this evolutionary 
process connotes a gradual shift from what Michael Mann has termed ‘despotic’ to 
‘infrastructural’ forms of organisational power, since those societies which develop 
limitations upon the arbitrary activities of their individual rulers or functionaries tend 
to be more highly efficient generators of overall and sustained material energy than 
those which do not.
Whereas most social theorists, particularly those who have recently led the revival in 
institutional explanations of economic development, have seen the anonimisation of 
power that these developments connote in broadly positive terms, from the point of 
view of the present study this, clearly, must be taken as an evaluative mistake; one, it 
might be added, conditioned by the very materialist attitudes towards human well­
being whose historical and organisational origins those same theorists have often done
977 Hall and Ikenberry, 1989: 20
978 Ibid: 20
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so much to elucidate. Instead, it needs to be appreciated quite how fundamentally this 
longer-term historical trend towards more integrated forms of ‘infrastructural power’ 
is, in fact, an expression of the increasingly systematic materialisation and thus 
alienation of the human form.
Now, it should be obvious from the above that whilst there is an almost infinite scope 
for the development of different forms of human flourishing, different styles of life 
and habits of cultural sensibility within the broad parameters of human nature, the fact 
that it is, as has been argued, possible always to ask the deeper question of any 
practice sustaining institution or group of institutions, whether on balance it is well 
ordered or disordered, means it should also be possible to ask that question at any 
given time of humanity in general, and when this is temporally extended, with due 
caution, of any period of human history. Put a slightly different way, it should be 
possible to ask of each period, how far the human form is, in fact, realising its true 
end, and how far it is, in the alternative, alienated from that end, that is, in present 
terms, materialised.
In this context, it can be said that, most fundamentally, there are just two ‘cities’ to 
which all other human groupings can be reduced. For Augustine, of course, these two 
cities were conterposed as ‘the City of God’ and the ‘City of Man’, but it is possible to 
prescind from his explicitly theological terminology and speak instead in terms of 
human flourishing and frustration. In other words, it can be stated that to the extent 
that society is associated in a love of what is good; it will be good; but if associated in 
a love of what is bad; it will be bad, with all the attendant results that this entails. It is 
precisely once the nature of these two cities has been properly grasped, that “moral 
philosophy.. .expand[s] into a philosophy of history, and beneath a multiplicity of 
peoples and events,” it becomes possible to see “how the two cities have persisted 
from the beginning of the world” as well as to “extract a law permitting [a].. .forecast 
[of] their destiny.”979 Of course, from this it does not follow, nor is Augustine 
claiming, that these ‘two cities’ are easily identifiable, or distinguishable historically, 
the one from the other. Indeed, quite the contrary, for in his view they each are, in this 
world at least, inextricably intertwined. Thus, they “have been running their course
979 Dawson, 1957: 59.
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mingling one with the other through all the changes of times from the beginning of 
the human race, and shall so move on together until the end of the world.”980
Now, for present purposes, it is just at this point that Augustine’s theory needs to 
undergo a sort of creative completion. In the first place, it is necessary to recognize a 
little more clearly, that the two loves, and thus the two cities, mingle not just within 
each given human epoch and association, but also within the heart of each individual. 
No doubt, this is not something that Augustine himself would have denied, but owing 
to the explicitly theological context in which he developed his ideas, and his 
commitment to maintaining an ultimate distinction between the ‘elect’ and the 
‘reprobate’, it sometimes risks occlusion and so it is as well to emphasize it. In the 
second place, and more fundamentally, although Augustine speaks quite clearly of the 
mingling of the two cities throughout history, he says nothing of the relative influence 
of the one over the other, nor whether this balance of influence is liable to change. To 
address these further questions it is vital to recognize that the two loves underlying 
Augustine’s two cities are expansive and not merely static. Thus, when considering the 
long-range dynamic of historical transformation, it is important not only to recognise 
that there are two principles of change -  growth and decay -  the mutual balancing of 
which have properly to be appreciated in order to ascertain the structural character of 
human society, in its most general sense, at any given point, but also to recognise that 
each of these principles manifests a discrete expansive logic of its own. When this is 
done it becomes possible to detect a remarkable coherence in the overall trajectory of 
human society through time as the relative compositional balance between these two 
principles undergoes change.
To start with, the balance is in favour of healthy societal development, that is, of 
growth. This, though tinged to a degree with societal corruption, is not overwhelmed 
by it in the sense that, once the corrupting factors with which it is intermixed are 
factored into the general equation of societal transformation, there remains an overall 
increase in societal improvement. In time, however, the relative influence of the 
principle of societal decay as opposed to that of societal growth increases. The reason 
for this is that, although the principle of societal growth is a dynamic one, its
980 Ibid: 60.
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dynamism is premised upon a respect for stable underlying regulative structures of the 
human action-system, whereas the principle of societal corruption has as one of it 
essential characteristics the implicit or explicit challenging of the parameters set by 
those structures. Thus the more the principle of societal corruption develops, the more 
it changes the present structural premises upon which society finds itself based, away 
from those structures which facilitate its maximal flourishing and thereby away from 
the structural premises which underlie societal growth. Consequently, as history 
unfolds, so the margin which societal growth enjoys over that of societal corruption 
gradually decreases until a point is reached where the principle of social corruption 
claims a greater influence upon society in general than the principle of societal growth. 
It is at this nodal point, that society as a whole changes its direction and character from 
one of overall human growth and improvement to one of overall decay.
To better understand this, the above account of how human action and its aggregate 
results condition future action should be joined to the distinction drawn towards the 
end of Chapter 7 between virtues of the intellect and virtues of the appetite, or virtues 
properly so-called. There it was explained that whereas virtues of the intellect, both 
speculative and practical, confer upon their possessors only an ‘aptness to act’ or a 
particular skill in doing or making, virtues of the appetite confer a further tendency 
for the right, or morally appropriate, use of those aptnesses or skills such that it is the 
peculiar role of the appetitive virtues to ensure people use their creative skills and 
aptitudes in ways fully consistent with human flourishing by preserving the integrity 
of the human action-system and thus its truly personal and inter-personal character. 
Now it is this which explains the distinction in habitual effect drawn above between 
societal growth and societal decay, and also the reason why it was claimed that whilst 
the former is driven by action which respects and is fully coherent with the overall 
integrity of the human action-system, the latter results from action which ultimately 
serves to undermine that integrity. It is, of course, precisely the purpose of the 
appetitive virtues to ensure that human action is coherent with that systemic integrity 
and not violative of it. To the extent that such coherence is achieved there is no need 
for further alteration of the present terms of inclinational habituation since to that 
extent it achieves the ends to which it is properly ordered to an optimal degree.
Rather, what undergoes expansive alteration in the context of societal growth, and 
then again only to the extent of that growth, are solely the habits of the intellect.
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Indeed, it is precisely because — in societal growth — there is no movement away from 
this optimal inclinational state, that expansive developments in the sphere of the 
intellectual habits together with the products to which resulting actions and clusters of 
actions give rise, are guaranteed to increase the overall human good rather than to 
undermine it. It is when there is movement away from this optimal inclinational state 
that societal decay or corruption starts to sets in. Moreover, once this optimality is 
lost, although it can, in principle at least, be restored, it is in the very nature of 
habituation in general, and of socially aggregated habituation in particular, that the 
further away from optimal inclinational habituation a human society moves, the more 
difficult it is to re-establish.
What in summary is being claimed here, then, is that in respect of any stage of human 
history it is possible not only to speak of human society as a whole owing to the 
possession by all human beings of a common underlying form, but also to speak of 
the qualitative state that human society as a whole finds itself in. It is further claimed 
that the vigour of human development results at each moment from an admixture of 
growth and decay resolving itself, to start with, into a period of overall growth but 
then transforming into one of overall decay. It is precisely in the context of this latter 
phase that the developments which have provided the major empirical focus of the 
present study need to be understood. For through them, an attempt has been made, in 
somewhat greater detail than would have otherwise been possible, to expose a 
fundamental coherence in the forces underlying advanced modernity and the 
propagation of the forms of social life peculiarly compatible with it. In particular, and 
for this reason, emphasis has been placed not upon the geographical region in which 
these forces first began to take on a systemic form but rather upon those areas and 
civilisations which had until recently offered the most radical alternatives to 
modernity. By concentrating on a period in which each civilisation, after long and 
complex histories of large-scale resistance to expansion of the originally ‘Western’ 
conduits of distinctively modem forms of material provisioning, seemed deliberately 
to accept and consciously internalise these forms, it has been possible to explore the 
manner in which profoundly different cultural substances have reacted to a common, 
institutionally mediated, ideological acid. It also serves now, and from the 
retrospective vantage-point of the larger-scale metaphysical backdrop presented by 
the present chapter, to highlight a particularly important moment in the systematic
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consolidation of those global and alienating forces which, it has been argued, are the 
expression of a coherent process of overall social materialisation.
At this point, it is important to distinguish this analysis from a more fully materialist 
conception of history. The most famous formulation of such a conception was, of 
course, that put forward by Marx in his Preface to the Critique o f Political Economy:
In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations 
that are indispensable and independent of their will: these relations of 
production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material 
powers of production. The totality of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society -  the real foundation, on which 
legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social 
consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life 
determines the general character of social, political and spiritual processes 
of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on 
the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.981
What exactly Marx meant by this and the many other related, more opaque, 
statements he made in this area has been the subject of enormous controversy. These 
exegetical questions need not be entered into. It is sufficient to note that, according to 
the understanding being advanced in the present study, the extent to which man’s 
social activity is under the control of material forces is the extent to which it is 
exclusive of real human agency or volition, and to which such indeterminacy as it 
does disclose is of the variety existing in the subhuman, material world. Now, in this 
context, it must at once be admitted that to use the terms growth and decay in the 
manner outlined above is, of course, to invite comparisons between human society 
and biological organisms, and thus to raise precisely the sceptre of the type of 
deterministic materialism just spoken of.982 Upon closer reflection, however, it should 
be abundantly clear that what is being proposed is very far from such a materialist 
understanding. What instead is being suggested is a process rather of materialisation, 
whereby the capacities grounding the freedom, creativity and thus expressive 
diversity of the human form, though not in their nature subordinate to, nor determined 
by, the forces of the material world, are, if improperly employed, capable of 
becoming, and in the context of advanced modernity have, in fact, become,
981 In Bottomore and Rubel, 1961.
982 Though a form admittedly different, in significant respects, to that put forward, on any reading, by Marx himself.
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increasingly so subordinate. In other words, in proportion as there has been a failure 
in human action to attain to truly human or natural ends, so in proportion the human 
form has been subjected to the norms of material nature and has sunk back into that 
species of determinism found in the material realm. Moreover, as this process has 
progressed, so it has come to take on an increasingly systematic and integrated 
character. As this has happened so the overall scope of human freedom has been 
diminished along with the capacity of individual or collective human action to offer 
resistance to the forces propelling further materialisation. Whilst this capacity for 
resistance is never actually extinguished, it grows ever weaker.
Now, despite insisting upon the importance of freedom and human agency in 
historical development, it should nonetheless be obvious from all that has been said, 
that the overall course and shape of the historical trajectory thus sketched does, in 
fact, result from an existential logic programmed into the very structure of the human 
form. This in itself is a controversial claim, open to many potential misunderstandings 
grounded upon well-worn objections to theories of large-scale historical coherence 
and directionality. But it is a claim rooted, in short, in the fact that there simply can be 
no such thing as wholly unregulated freedom in human action, just as there can be no 
such thing as unregulated randomness, chance or indeterminacy in the realm of 
physical nature. Rather, always implied in each manifestation of indeterminacy is a 
set of terms upon which that indeterminacy must operate for the outcomes into which 
it is capable of being resolved to qualify as comprehensible, and that set of terms will 
always serve in some manner to constrain the possible range of those outcomes in 
ways that are, at least in principle, intelligibly describable.
To conclude, then, the question may be asked: exactly what is left open to the 
exigencies of human agency on the present account? Two important things should at 
least receive mention. First, in a most basic sense, is the very fact of historical 
degeneration or corruption itself. Human freedom only opens up the possibility of 
such degeneration, it does not mean, strictly speaking, that such corruption actually 
will take place. Of course, should it be the case that there is a propensity within the 
human form itself to fall short of its natural end, it is likely that the occurrence of such 
a possibility, at least at some point, will, in fact, and given enough time, amount to a 
practical certainty; but it must be insisted that a practical certainty can never, without
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profound categorical confusion, be equated to a logical certainty, so as to make such a 
falling short inevitable in stricto sensu. Secondly, even if such corruption does take 
place, and its overall trajectory and shape is regulated at the most general level by the 
nature of the human form, neither the speed at which that degenerative transformation 
unfolds nor the precise expression it takes will be predictable or indeed describable 
independent of the precise decisions or results of decisions individuals and groups of 
individuals take overtime. As such, it is never enough simply to construct an artificial 
exclusivity with respect to either determinacy or to human freedom, it is always 
necessary to ask, instead, where the precise balance lies between the one and the 
other, and it is here that the historian will always find his challenge.
The Relevance to China and India
It is hoped by this stage that the shape of the overall theoretical framework within 
which it is being attempted to set the present study has been made sufficiently clear. It 
remains necessary, however, to draw out more explicitly its relevance and explanatory 
function with respect to the contemporary developments in China and India detailed 
in Part 2. In doing so, it is proposed to show how the normative transformations 
within each society, in expressing, as explained above, the deeper processes of 
modernisation as a form of alienating materialisation, serve to establish specific 
heuristic benchmarks against which the unfolding of those processes can be more 
effectively measured. Immediately, it is necessary to recognise the dangers of the 
mind being seduced by a certain inescapable ideological and functional banality 
underlying even the most sophisticated of these developments such that the truly 
negative inflection with which their overall shape needs properly to be viewed is 
constantly in danger of being obscured.
Primarily for this reason, it is necessary to distinguish with greater clarity between 
two forms of corruption; the first more obvious and identifiable, the second, more 
subtle but ultimately more profound and far-reaching. Thus, it is most common, and 
of course to an extent quite proper, to complain of the inequality, arbitrariness and 
general governmental ill-discipline which results from a failure to adhere to the forms 
of normative ordering -  both procedural and institutional -  commonly associated with 
the distinctive set of values which underpin advanced modernity. As such, a great deal
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of discussion was deliberately devoted in Chapters 4 to 6 to a consideration of the 
extent to which each jurisdiction can, in fact, be said to express a normative regime in 
which action in accordance with these values is more or less supported. The story 
was, of course, a not unsubtle one of movement and counter-movement, and always in 
question was the extent to which explicit legislative enactments etc. were tmly 
expressive of the realities they purported to regulate. In this respect, it is important to 
keep in mind the primarily heuristic function legal analysis performs in the present 
study, one which involves no denial of the importance of law itself as a substantive 
agent of social transformation, but which does not make that a central focus. What 
was being argued for then, was that tracing the dynamic of change as reflected in the 
formal legal systems of China and India, when understood within a properly 
elaborated theoretical frame, in which the boundaries of law were delimited in a 
‘semi-autonomous’ manner such as to emphasis the radical continuity of law with 
other social phenomena, represents a uniquely effective method of mid-range 
sociological analysis.
In this context, and giving all due allowance to the many undeniable short-term 
variables and contingencies, it was argued that the thirty year period under review 
disclosed a clear and marked movement in the direction of greater functional harmony 
with the structural precepts of a market-oriented, materialist morality through 
increasing juridification, formalisation and functional specialisation. In China, this 
manifested itself in both a fundamental programme of legal construction and 
reconstruction as well as and staged programme of progressive subsequent 
modification. In India it found expression in the re-engagement with, and dynamic 
recalibration of, a pre-existing system the fundamentals of which were already in 
place prior to the period under review.
Of course, it would be quite wrong to deny that the gradual, if sometimes halting, 
formal systematisation that these changes seemed to connote, held out the promise of 
remedying much real human suffering and injustice. Indeed, it is precisely for this 
reason that they tended to be embraced with such enthusiasm. Yet just in so far as this 
more obvious form of corruption was overcome -  together with the procedural 
irregularities and particular battery of human vices that go with it -  so it has tended to 
be replaced by a second, more fundamental form of corruption, that most
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characteristic of advanced modernity. At one level, this can be seen as being linked to 
a form of Weberian ‘rationalisation’, but, in line with earlier arguments, it is more 
properly understood as manifesting a deeper process of social materialisation.
Here, it is necessary to set individual developments within the context of a wider, 
dynamic whole. For what appears from one angle to be the remedying of injustice, 
from another angle can be seen as the purging of systemic dysfunctionalities qua a 
deeper materialist logic which is quite insensitive to these irregularities qua injustice, 
and which uses any approbation that their resolution may attract in a manner which 
ultimately facilitates its own advance. And yet if the argument of the present study is 
to be believed, it is precisely such an advance -  the progressive unfolding, and 
increasing influence, of a materialist logic -  which leads to much more profound and 
intractable forms of injustice and de-humanisation. Thus it is absolutely indicative 
that, in addition to appearing to remedy procedural and formal injustices, this deeper 
form of corruption also undermines alternative, non-materialist conceptions of the 
good life. This it does either by their cooption or by their coercion and 
marginalisation. Overall, the material contained within Part 2 must be seen in terms of 
a somewhat dialectical tension between the forces underlying these two forms of 
corruption, with a very gradual, and as between China and India quite differently 
characterised, but for all that, unmistakeable, resolution in favour of those underlying 
the latter.
All of this carries embedded within it a somewhat strong ‘modernisation’ thesis, 
though one which is both analytically and evaluatively to be distinguished from more
n o ?
the more classical ‘Modernisation Theory’ of the 1950s and 60s. With respect 
specifically to legal development in China, such a thesis has recently been well, if 
rather starkly, characterised by Albert Chen as one which:
.. .not only affirms [as characteristically modem] principles of legality or the
Rule of Law that as a matter of world history first emerged in the West, but
also implies that as non-Western legal systems transform and remake
983 This built upon Parsonian foundations, and saw ‘modernisation’ as an essentially unilinear master-process which led to 
increasingly positive development outcomes for societies as they entered the modem world through a process of staged 
development. Perhaps its most famous exponent was Rostow. See, Rostow, 1966. It has subsequently come under several waves 
o f powerful criticism. For a extremely useful analysis o f it provenance and development see, Joas and Knobl, 2004.
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themselves in the image of modem Western legal systems, they will be 
modernised and adapted to the conditions of modernity.984
This narrowly jurisprudential thesis is invariably linked to wider accounts of social 
and historical transformation and is also intimately related to more recent 
‘globalisation’ accounts which suggests that once a country with a centrally planned 
economy has been opened with a view to international economic integration there is 
no alternative “than to develop a...system that provides a hospitable environment for 
b u sin ess ..su ch  that “the logic of economic globalisation” can “to a significant 
extent [be seen to] dictate the direction and content of...reform.”985 Moreover, it is 
movement a that ultimately carries with it almost limitless cultural, social and 
political reconfigurations.
Now, until relatively recently ‘modernization’ theories were held in a certain amount 
of contempt by the majority of social theorists.986 It was only in the course of the 
1990s that mounting evidence of a renewed phase of international and inter-cultural 
integration led to a re-appropriation of more subtle and sophisticated forms of 
modernization discourse owing to the relevance they were perceived to have with 
respect to the burgeoning field of globalization theory. What is quite clear, however, 
is that despite considerable fluctuation in academic sensibility, the justificatory self­
descriptions undergirding official policies in both China and India have continued to 
adhere closely to some variant of the modernization paradigm. Thus Chen notes the 
significance of the fact that:
.. .official and mainstream scholarly discourse of law in China in the last 
three decades has not resisted Western notions of the Rule of Law on 
cultural grounds. Baptised in the Marxist tradition, most Chinese scholars of 
law adopt a critical perspective towards the law, legal and political 
institutions and legal culture of “feudal” China (referring to the long pre- 
modern era of imperial rule), and accept that modem ideas of the Rule of 
Law that emerged in the era of the “bourgeois revolutions” represented 
forces of historical progress. The official and scholarly reservation regarding 
total conversion to Western notions of law and legality stems rather from 
fidelity to socialism.987
984 Chen, 2010: 34.
985 Ibid: 35.
986 In general, see again: Joas and Knobl, 2004.
987 Chen, 2010:37-38. He goes on to write: “What is currently advocated in China is not the Rechtsstaat (the Rule o f Law state), 
but the socialist Rechtsstaat, not Rule o f Law, but socialist Rule o f Law. 106 Thus embracing the Rule o f Law does not mean 
giving up or diminishing the leadership o f the CCP. On the contrary, the Chinese authorities’ “conversion” to legality may be
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This highlights the fact that long before the reform era and for the greater part of the 
twentieth century, China’s various leaderships were wedded to world-views which 
had at their heart some form of essentially materialist understanding of development.
A similar picture can be traced, in broader, extra-legal terms, in the case of India.
Thus pre-reform policy here also embodied an intensely ‘modem’ and materialist 
conception of development in the “[t]he goals and objectives set out for the nation”:
.. .namely, the rapid agricultural and industrial development of [the] 
country, rapid expansion of opportunities for gainful employment, 
progressive reduction of social and economic disparities, removal of poverty 
and attainment of self-reliance.988
And its 1991 reforms were undertaken in recognition of the need to make:
“changes on many fronts to break away from the earlier approach which was 
characterized by extensive government control over private sector activity, 
a preferred position for the public sector over the private sector, high levels 
of protection to encourage domestic production and a restrictive approach to 
foreign investment.”989
Indeed, both countries, though their primary objectives may have been national self­
strengthening, have long envisaged the way to achieve that goal in terms of the sorts 
of material increase facilitated by large-scale and rapid industrialization, implying a 
distinctively ‘modem’ form of socio-economic organization. To this end, their 
successive leaderships have been spurred on to implement rather single-minded and 
descriptively explicit policies of economic catch-up. Consequently, the socio­
economic recalibrations which began to be undertaken by both countries in the late 
1970s, are properly characterized as the gradual substitution of more efficient and 
effective forms of material advancement for less. In other words, they represent 
cmcial turning points in the process by which the functional demands of the unfolding 
logic of materialization were more accurately understood and embraced.
Congruent in important respects with the official hermeneutic of economic and
interpreted as an attempt to use the legitimacy o f  law to bolster the legitimacy o f  the CCP at a time when the ideological attraction 
o f  communism has all but disappeared. And although notions o f  checks on and supervision o f  the exercise o f power have been 
incorporated into official discourse in contemporary China, issues like “separation o f  powers” and “multi-party elections” are still 
within the “forbidden zone” o f  discourse.”
988 Government o f India Ministry o f  Industry, 1991: Para 3.
989 Ahulwalia, 2005: 2
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institutional transformation in which Chinese and Indian reform has been framed, 
what is being argued here is that a significant degree of success has indeed been 
attained by both countries in effecting the transformations at which they have aimed. 
However, it is also being contended, first, that this success is, by its own lights, 
somewhat incomplete, and, second, that it is a success which is essentially pyrrhic in 
nature owing to the corrupting forces which lie at its heart. It is the burden of the 
present chapter as a whole to vindicate the second of these qualifications, but it is also 
necessary strongly to emphasize the first, not least for the light that it can throw upon 
the ‘transitional’ and ‘conflicted’ nature of the Chinese and Indian reform process. 
This has, of course, been well recognized both officially and unofficially. Thus Chen 
again usefully counter-poses two quotations in order to capture the commonly held 
view of Chinese legal reform over the past thirty years, that much has been 
‘accomplished’, but that much nonetheless remains to be done. Thus, Stanley Lubman 
is able to write that:
The accomplishments of the legal reform to date are impressive given the 
need to overcome the burden of Chinese tradition, thirty years of Maoism, 
and the hostility of the institutional environment in which reform must take 
place. Law has gained more importance than it has ever possessed in 
Chinese history.990
But equally, a recent government White Paper acknowledges ‘difficulties’ still to be 
overcome:
China’s legal construction is still facing some problems: The development 
of democracy and the Rule of Law still falls short of the needs of economic 
and social development; the legal framework shows certain characteristics 
of the current stage and calls for further improvement; in some regions and 
departments, laws are not observed or strictly enforced, violators are not 
brought to justice; local protectionism, departmental protectionism and 
difficulties in law enforcement occur from time to time; some government 
functionaries take bribes and bend the law, abuse their power when 
executing the law, abuse their authority to override the law, and substitute 
their words for the law, thus bringing damage to the socialist Rule of Law; 
and the task still remains onerous to strengthen education in the Rule of 
Law, and enhance the awareness of law and the concept of the Rule of Law
1 1 1 • 9 9 1among the public.
This latter quotation highlights the variegated nature of resistance to the ‘optimal’ or 
‘pure’ logic of marketisation. In so doing, it explains the need to apply a strategic or
990 Lubman, 1999: 2.
991 Chinese Government, 2008: Concluding Section.
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tactical interpretative frame if the developments detailed in Pail 2 are to be 
understood in a proper manner. It is only within such a frame that many of those 
developments can be recognized as actually advancing the logic of marketisation 
rather than hindering it, throwing up as they often have various compromise 
formations strategically appropriate to the particular stage of ‘development’ reached.
It has, thus, been important to appreciate but also to disaggregate the types of 
structural resistance, direct and indirect, offered by more conventional forms of 
corruption, by administrative dysfunction, by incongruities and outright opposition 
stemming from traditional cultural and religious life-ways,992 and from tensions 
between the raw logic of market expansion and official policy. Moreover, if this has 
been true of China, it has been still more true of India whose ethnic, religious and 
linguistic differences are seared into the national psyche at an even more profound 
level. It too has been subject to immense inter-locking problems of corruption, 
insurgency, social unrest, administrative inefficiency, and many other structural 
challenges;993 and one need advert only to the well known fact that by the first years 
of the new millennium “there were almost 13 million cases pending in the lower 
courts, and 3.5 million cases in high courts”994 to see that many of these difficulties 
have deeply effected the administration of justice also. It is only by engaging these 
various forms of resistance that it becomes possible accurately to understand the 
subtle but powerft.il way in which the logic of the market has played them off one 
against the other in service of its own advance and thus of the overall increase in 
social materialization it represents.
Though apparent throughout, this dynamic was perhaps most obvious from a system- 
side perspective, that is, from the point of view of the differing overall strategies 
employed by each country and the manner in which they have subsequently unfolded. 
It is in this context that Chapter 4 sought to chart, in broad terms, their major 
constitutional recalibrations. These recalibrations embodied a recognition by each 
country of its inability to continue acting in a manner fundamentally at variance with
992 Also should be mentioned here are the dramatic upsurges o f interest in various forms of religious and semi-religious practices 
and movements. In particular, there was the extraordinary phenomenon o f  the Falun Gong prior to its official suppression in 
1999, but also the more enduring and significant explosion o f interest in an adherence to Christianity amongst the Chinese 
population as a whole, not to mention the reinvigoration o f Islam in areas where that religion has traditionally been important. In 
India, o f course, there is the upsurge o f  Hindu nationalism under the banner of Hindutva and various manifestations o f  re- 
indigenisation in general. In general, also see the evidence and debates contained in Peri,2006 and Peerenboom, 1998.
993 In general see: Baxi, 2004; Gilley, 2005; Manor, 2005; and, Pasha, 2000.
994 Peerenboom, 2008: 7.
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the priorities of the world economy. Clearly the most noticeable developments during 
the periods of reform took place in areas directly touching upon the rapidly 
transforming economy of each. These developments have been of both extraordinary 
scope and unmistakeable direction. The economy is, of course, at the very heart of 
industrial and post-industrial society. Consequently, as these two enormous 
jurisdictions have embraced the free market so a whole battery of repeals, revisions 
and innovations in their economic legal apparatus have taken place. In each case, this 
has involved the loosening of legal restrictions upon private enterprise and initiative, 
as the expansive logic of the market has propagated outwards into every area of life. 
Now, although this has been consistent with the historical trajectory of the world 
economy more generally, in the cases of China and India over the past three decades, 
it has nonetheless been a relatively gradual and ‘resisted’ progression. Neither state 
has accepted the free market entirely upon its own terms. Rather they have offered 
complex forms of implicit and explicit, conscious and unconscious counter-pressure. 
Whilst these have not served fundamentally to confute the overall trend towards 
markestisation, they have nonetheless proved powerful enough to ensure that that 
trend has manifested itself in an altogether more incremental and, therefore, perhaps 
paradoxically, more sustainable manner.
Subsequent to the decision of 1978 in favour of overall economic and political 
redirection, the Chinese leadership adopted two closely connected and controlled 
strategies of decentralization to liberalise the economy and thereby make it more 
effective. The first strategy of decentralization, embraced upon an initially somewhat 
piecemeal and experimental basis, was that from government to basic economic units: 
from government to households and various form of economic enterprise. The second 
strategy of decentralization, was the gradual and staged devolution of economic 
power from central government to local government. These two forms of 
decentralization proved, in time, to be mutually reinforcing. Thus:
The decentralization from the central to local government gave greater 
incentives to local governments for revenue creation and economic 
development. It also allowed many regions to experiment with new and 
flexible policies, such as the setting up of special economic zones with 
favourable policies to attract FDI.995
995 Li and Nair, 2007:150.
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These new forms of economic and governmental devolution locked into a 
constitutional matrix in which freedom was seeded to the logic of the market in an 
incremental, resisted and therefore relatively more controlled manner than would 
otherwise have been the case. This led to a degree of geographical differentiation 
corresponding to the different models of devolution operating within the overall 
context of the Chinese Party-State such that each of these models came to reflect a 
different level of economic ‘development’ and international integration which, in turn, 
allowed for the more focused adoption of correspondingly appropriate strategies.
An important contributing cause of this gradualism was the subtle incongruity which 
existed between the official policy of securing the continued leadership of the 
Communist Party and strengthening the Chinese state, and increasing marketisation. It 
was only gradually that the extent to which these priorities were underpinned in the 
short to medium term by embracing more fully the expansive logic of marketisation 
was accepted and that appropriate policy changes were made in a staged fashion. This 
led both to a greater differentiation of the state from the economy and of the state 
from the Party. Yet overall, it was also this increasing embrace of the market that had 
the longer-term effect not so much of fimctionalizing the market in service of the 
Party-State, as the Party-State in service of the market.
In India a similar market driven de-regulative and devolutionary shift operated, but 
one, importantly, which seems to have been significantly slower and more resisted 
than in the case of China. The reason for this lies, it would appear, in the deeper 
diversities characteristic of the Indian polity as a whole as expressed in the basic 
terms of the post-Independence constitutional settlements. Nevertheless, and despite 
the fact that unlike China the period of reform did not entail in India a process of 
wholesale legal reconstruction, the de-regulative shifts in the Indian economy were 
accompanied by a re-engagement with, and reactivation though also significant 
transformation of, a pre-existing developmental framework. It was also accompanied 
by an increasingly apparent indigenization of governmental and legal structures 
through the activation of the higher judiciary in terms of a taking much greater 
account of the traditional normative systems operating within wider India society. 
This phenomenon, linked as it was to a similar growth in regional disparities,
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expressed an increasingly effective activation of India’s basic developmental strategy, 
since not only has the recognition of these social diversities been followed by subtly 
strategic attempts to undermine them, but also evidence exists of very gradual shift of 
emphasis in regional diversity away from cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious 
bases towards more purely economic and material ones.
At a slightly lower level of generality than the system-wide perspective adopted in 
Chapter 4, it was possible to extend subsequent analysis into other more specific areas 
of law. Thus, Chapters 5 and 6 concentrated attention upon public and family law to 
demonstrate the powerfully colonising effect that marketisation has been having 
within each country, as it has increasingly reconfigured and co-opted the various 
sources of extra-economic power, reducing their ability autonomously to set the goals 
of legal policy. In this respect, the developments charted in each chapter serve to 
emphasise that, beyond the important role growing marketisation performs in ‘freeing 
up’ capital investment, is the role it performs in driving forward specialisation and 
effecting a more efficient division of labour. In particular, they demonstrated that the 
gradual freeing of the market from legal constraints has not meant the overall retreat 
or shrinkage of the state in either jurisdiction as a law-making or norm-propagating 
body. Rather, it has involved its greater functional specialisation as an institutionally 
regulative core that ensures the tighter adherence to the overall priorities of a wider 
market society, disciplining or removing counter-systemic anti-market structural 
inhibitors.
Accordingly, it has been seen, most notably in Chapter 5, how, in a growing number 
of cases, the state has begun to use its power gradually to ensure an increasing level of 
procedural regularity and systemic integrity with respect to those institutions whose 
efficient functioning are likely to be crucial in helping further the goals of economic 
development and national strengthening. Whilst this has received more explicit 
acknowledgment in China than in India, in both jurisdictions it has been seen quite 
clearly how an increasingly important part of the state’s role has ostensibly been 
devoted to ensuring the procedural propriety of its own functionaries in the exercise 
of their powers on its behalf. This has been accompanied by an altogether more 
‘proceduralist’ drift in the sort of behaviour that the state considers as its duty to 
enforce, away from more substantive notions of the good. This, of course, accords
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well with the precepts of ‘liberal neutrality’ that, in turn, fit so well with an atomic 
view of the individual citizen as an economic consumer/producer, though this trend 
has, of course, been to only partially disguise the fact that such a ‘proceduralist’ 
approach has at its heart its own substantive conception of the good, one which, even 
when dressed up in the rhetoric of modem rights discourse, is entirely materialist in 
nature.
Moreover, in increasingly operating in this fashion, the growing tendency of the state 
to refashion traditionally extra-economic institutions in a way which is functionally 
appropriate to the development of the market should be clear. Thus, as the period of 
reform/recalibration has progressed and the state has been increasingly co-opted by 
the market, there is a sense too in which it has been increasingly utilised in its turn to 
co-opt the institutions of society more generally. This it was the major contribution of 
Chapter 6 to demonstrate, focusing as it did upon the transforming nature of the 
state’s purported regulation of the family. Here, even more so than in Chapter 5, the 
process of a sort of ‘moral re-habituation’ was seen gradually though powerfully to be 
taking place as the precepts of a market sympathetic morality so cmcial to the 
institution of a market sustaining society have propagated. Accordingly, in each 
jurisdiction it has been possible to detect a gradual freeing of citizens from 
frameworks not designed to give expression to their individual felt needs but rather 
which prioritised in the specific case the needs of the social collective.
This, it was argued, is tme despite a number of indicators which, when understood 
superficially, seem to indicate the contrary. Thus in both jurisdictions, it was seen in 
Chapter 6 how important developments took place, consistent with the state’s 
cooption of the traditional family as way of providing both for the socialization of its 
youngest members and support of those who are most vulnerable, which have 
involved greater recognition of more traditional (and collective) forms of family 
structure. This, however, can be explained, first, by the fact that each society is still 
locked into a prolonged transitional phase in which it is quite logical to make use of a 
number of transitional forms. Indeed, in a transitional economy, particularly one 
which has not achieved the economic standards of living of the more advanced 
western societies the delegation of such a responsibility for personal care and welfare 
upon the wider society is not only a rational strategy but also a necessary one.
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Moreover, it is one that has had the effect, in China and India, of ensuring as much as 
possible, though obviously with quite different degrees of success, that economically 
unproductive members of society do not substantially interfere with the processes of 
‘development’ and the efficiency of the wider economy, at the same time as trying to 
ensure that as few as possible of its citizens face the economically sub-optimal 
situation of destitution. In the second instance, the very processes by which these 
more traditional forms of socialization and care have been co-opted have prepared the 
way for their more effective longer-term transformation, since it has meant that the 
actual dynamics of their functioning has been subject to much closer scrutiny which 
has also enabled the state more subtly to use wherever possible its still very 
considerable powers to redefine structures in line with the priorities of the market.
Although, then, it is important in all of this not to lose sight of the halting nature of 
the transformations which China and India have undergone over the past three 
decades, an overview of the various legal transformations as they have unfolded under 
the pressure of worldwide economic forces, propelled by the resisted but 
unmistakable outworking of the materialist logic of market expansion, nonetheless 
provides ample evidence of the deeper form of corruption spoken of earlier and of the 
social materialization to which it is linked.
Now, whilst such a claim grows less obviously appropriate as a heuristic key the more 
detailed and temporally confined the focus of legal analysis becomes, when set at the 
much broader level at which Chapters 4 to 6 were pitched, it is capable of being 
deployed with a greater degree of confidence. Indeed, an important contention upon 
which the overall methodological approach of the present study is premised is the idea 
that the more generalized and extended a trend becomes, the more probative it is of 
deeper forces of social change. Although this in no way dispenses with, but rather 
more insistently demands, the requirement that such a trend be empirically verified, 
explanations of even quite specific events and movements are impoverished precisely 
to the extent that a wider frame within which to set them is dispensed with. Moreover, 
it follows that the wider the focus of analysis is, the stronger the basis grows for 
making future predictions. Such predictions are notoriously unreliable in relation to 
specific events and configurations, and owing to the ultimately irreducible 
contingency of human decision-making, have proved frequently misguided even at an
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altogether more general level. Indeed, part of the burden of the present study has been 
to distinguish various levels of analysis in a mutually illuminating fashion. It is this 
which lay at the heart of the claim towards the end of the previous section, that whilst 
it is correct to speak with a degree of certainty as to the shape and potential trajectory 
of human corruption in the most general sense, since it is regulated by the human 
form, the actual expression of the developments connected to that corruption if and 
when it does occur, together with their peculiar speed and character, need to be the 
target of specific, historically focused, research. It was precisely to ground more 
specific claims as to the essentially increasingly corrupt and systematic nature of the 
phenomena linked to modernity in its advanced and advancing forms that a more 
specific normative heuristic structured around legal change was elaborated and 
applied to the particular contexts of China and India during the period of reform.
The particular understanding being argued for here then, takes ‘modernisation’ to be 
an ultimately negative and regressive process, and it thus, as earlier noted, stands in 
stark contrast to classic forms of ‘modemistation theory’. It also differs from classic 
‘modernisation theory’ insofar as it recognizes a profound variation in the way 
different societies have undergone the transition to modernity. As such it emphasizes 
the inevitable tension between unifying and diversifying forces, but also points to a 
convincing manner of harmonizing them that is both shapely and empirically honest. 
A comparative rather than unitary study was conducted precisely in order to highlight 
and explore the way in which a coherent set of underlying forces meet, operate upon, 
react with and are resisted by quite different cultural forms. Importantly, it was 
exactly a lack of sensitivity to the different types or forms of ‘modernisation’ that 
initially threw ‘modernisation theory’ per se in to such theoretical disrepute. Yet even 
in the midst of its unpopularity there were always theorists, of whom perhaps the 
outstanding examples were Barrington-Moore and S.N.Eisenstadt, who attempted to 
advance more subtle and sophisticated versions.996 Eisenstadt, in particular, 
popularized the notion of ‘multiple modernities’ which has received a growing 
number of adherents in recent years.997 This centres around the idea that, under the 
pressure of European expansion, “there developed a great variety of modem and 
modernizing societies’ whose “differences crystallized out of a selective
996 Moore, 1966; Eisenstadt, 1963,1973 and 1987.
997 In general see again: Joas and Knobl, 2004. More specifically, see Katzenstein, 2006; Kaya, 2003; Roniger and Waisman, 
2002; and, Smith, 2006.
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incorporation” and combination of their own “symbolic and institutional premises” 
and those of the western hegemons.998
Though embracing the emphasis this places upon “the centrality of contingency, 
complexity, timing and context”,999 the argument being forwarded here asserts more 
strongly than do the “multiple modernists” the historically, and indeed qualitatively, 
distinctive nature of modem industrial society owing to the systematic integration of 
the materialist logic which underlies it. It is also much less sanguine about the longer- 
term survival of these differences. This is because it postulates that each variety of 
modernization, distinctive as it might be, is rooted in the ultimately deadening and 
culturally flattening process of social materialization. What it does allow for, 
however, is the interim emergence of many different forms of structural and cultural 
resistance to this process as well as for variability in the levels, effectiveness and 
longevity that such forms might take. Here the divergences between China and India 
in the present study are of direct relevance. For though much has indeed been made of 
the very powerful and gradually converging nature of developments in both countries 
during the past three decades, it has also been clear throughout that they are still 
transforming at different rates and along significantly different paths.
Form a structural and jurisprudential point of view, this contrast is once more 
reflected most obviously in their basic constitutional and political regimes. It was 
suggested throughout, of course, that these are more the result of the particular 
histories, attitudinal dispositions, cultures and overall depth and quality of diversity 
within the communities they purport to regulate than the result of adventitious 
political decisions in favour of authoritarianism or democracy. Yet whatever the 
underlying reasons which led to the adoption and survival of their different 
governmental and constitutional strategies, it seems incontestable that these strategies 
represent differences which have been profoundly consequential for the character and 
speed of reform in each country. As such, India has found it much more difficult to 
push through its reform agenda than has China, and its implementation has 
consequently been marked by much greater inconsistency. This is apparent enough 
from a simple reflection upon the recent political and governmental histories of each
998 Eisenstadt, 1987; 5.
999 Smith, 2006:4.
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country. Thus, Li and Nain list the succession of administrations holding power in 
India between 1991 and 2004 in the following terms:
The Rao administration, which embarked upon reforms after it came to 
power in 1991, was voted out of power in the next election, in 1996, 
because of voter concerns about the adverse impact of reforms -  such as the 
loss of secure public sector jobs. This made the subsequent administration 
wary of pursuing reforms, viewing them as risky to it tenure in power.
Therefore it slowed down and even suspended some of the reform 
initiatives. At the same time, political uncertainty increased because of what 
has been termed as the era of “coalition politics”. Governments were often 
based on alliances of convenience among partners with conflicting 
objectives. Paradoxically, sometimes the smallest partner in the coalition 
was the most powerful.. as it could topple the government by switching 
allegiance to a dominant rival. Such shifts explain the power changes 
evident between 1996 and 1999, when, during a span of 4 years, four 
different administrations governed the country. It was only after the 1999 
election that some stability returned, when the Bharatiya Janata Party -  
Indian People’s Party (BJP) leading the National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) (comprising 24 political parties) was able to remain in power until 
2004. However, this coalition failed to receive a strong mandate in the 2004 
election, despite the high economic growth rate during its tenure. According 
to analysts, the NDA’s loss can be attributed to voter frustration about the 
asymmetrical impact of reform, with most benefits going to people working 
in certain sectors and living in urban areas.1000
This contrasts markedly with the more or less steady leadership in China during the 
same period:
China’s leadership.. .enjoyed a long tenure allowing the pursuit of long-term 
policies. Deng remained in power from 1978-1992, and Jaing served as 
party leader from 1992 to 2002. The reforms in China were initiated and 
sponsored by the top leadership. Political entrepreneurs, Deng Xiaoping, 
and his colleagues all capitalized on Mao’s failures and seized the 
opportunity to initiate reforms. Their ability to promote the reforms was 
strengthened by the authoritarian political system.
This contrast, which is amply reflected in each more specialized area by the 
considerably greater speed and depth at which China has come to exemplify the 
various indicies of marketisation, would seem to support the contention that, all other 
things being equal “authoritarian regimes tend to outperform democratic regimes at
1000 155-156, LiandNair: 2007
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relatively low levels of economic development.”1001 Yet it is also significant if, as 
seems to be the case, the different types of regime rooted in the fact that Chinese 
society is relatively more homogenized than Indian. For it does not follow that 
because China’s marketisation has been facilitated and speeded along at earlier stages 
of economic ‘development’ by its ability to engage in more efficient forms of 
collective action that after a certain point it will not be impelled towards a the 
institution of a more representative or apparently ‘democratic’ forms of government. 
In fact, as the market ‘beds down’ so to speak, the division of labour that is so 
noticeable an accompaniment of economic ‘development’, and in particular, of 
marketisation, may very well demand precisely this scenario. It is for this reason that 
the present author is minded to agree with the Randall Peerenboom who has argued 
that China’s future is “likely to be one of authoritarian resilience with ongoing 
reforms leading eventually to a communitarian or other non-liberal variant of 
democracy.”1002
Of course, it would also follow from this that the diversities grounding of pre and 
post- ‘development’ democracies are of a fundamentally different nature and quality: 
the one based upon the much deeper and humanly rich diversities of ethnic, religious, 
cultural, linguistic and political life, the other, much more superficial, grounded upon 
the variables of felt material preference subserving the efficiencies of an ever-finer 
economic division of labour. This would certainly fit in with the progressive advance 
of social materialization being argued for above as well as with the ultimately toxic 
effect this process is having upon human communities in general. However, perhaps 
most markedly of all, it points to the fact that, insofar as India has resisted, or slowed,
1001 Peerenboom, 2008:11 See also, the following comments by Peembooms in the same pieces, pp. 7-8: “The public good nature 
o f legal reforms has been a barrier to reforms in democracies: even though reforms would be welfare enhancing overall, the 
benefits are widely dispersed, leading to collective action problems. Individual beneficiaries o f reforms may not have the 
incentive to become politically active. Those with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo inside or outside the government 
however are motivated to block reforms or to undermine reforms at the implementation stage.
In China, the government has been able to push through welfare-enhancing legal reforms despite opposition from 
certain sectors. To be sure, even in China, the policy-making process is contested, and compromises are frequently required to 
get reforms passed. Nevertheless, the Party generally retains the authority to resolve disputes between different state organs when 
necessary.
Democratic India has been was unable to pursue the same policies as authoritarian China because o f  its political 
structure. As noted, India has largely avoided neoliberal trickle-down economics and opted for slower but more equitable 
growth...[T}he Congress Party, United Front and BJP all avoided politically tough decisions such as reductions in subsidies and 
curtailment o f financial support to loss-making public enterprises. The result has been slower growth but less social dislocation 
than in China, where many SOEs have been privatized and workers have been laid o ff in large numbers. Apparently, many 
Indian citizens prefer this approach (as do many Chinese, as reflected in rising discontent over inequality, a shatp increase in 
protests and demands for social justice).” Finally, see also: Barro, 1996.
1002 Ibid: 12. n. 56. See: Peerenboom, 2007, also 1998. On the whole debate surrounding this issue and for alternative views see, 
amongst others: Dickson, 2003; Manor, 2007; and, Pei, 2006.
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the implementation of market-oriented reform more than has China, it might actually 
find itself in a humanly preferable position: a suggestion in need of many qualifying 
subtleties, but one nonetheless diametrically opposed in its underlying rationale to 
nearly every other contemporary analysis.
Chapter 9: Conclusion
It has been the central purpose of this study to analyse and explain the nature of 
historical and legal transformation. In doing so, it has put forward three closely 
related sets of argument. First, it has aimed to examine historical transformation on 
the basis of a metaphysically robust account of human nature and society. Secondly, 
in order to facilitate that examination, it has used law -  broadly defined -  as a prism 
through which the mechanisms of social pressure and reconfiguration can be seen to 
operate. Thus it has also made a number of arguments about the irreducibly contextual 
and thus indexical nature of law understood as normative pressure. Thirdly, since 
historical and legal transformation do not exist in the abstract, the study has 
concentrated in particular upon China and India over the past thirty years. It has 
focussed upon these two jurisdictions because prior to the European Reformation and 
possibly as late as the Industrial Revolution, China and India were materially the 
strongest civilizations in the world, and therefore offered the greatest potential 
resistance to the processes, which, spreading from Europe, emerged to transform the 
modem world. It has focused upon the thirty-year period in question because it is 
precisely during this period that each society has begun conclusively to reengage the 
world economy. Stmcturing these different sets of argument in relation to one another 
has enabled the study both to emphasise their mutual interdependence and to elaborate 
more effective ways that the implications of the processes with which they are 
centrally concerned can be systematically drawn out. It is useful briefly to revisit 
these sets of argument in in reverse order.
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A: China and India
The extensive developments charted in the Part 2 of the study were intended to detail, 
and indeed empirically corroborate, how much broader processes have been playing 
themselves out during the course of human history. Clearly by focusing upon the 
period of legal transformation in China and India over the past thirty years, what it 
was the purpose of Part 2 to examine was the manner in which these two legal 
systems have begun finally to accept the full implications of the processes 
underpinning advanced modernity, and to embrace its distinctive, ultimately 
pathological, forms. It was necessary to execute that examination in some detail not 
only to elaborate the power and subtly with which quite diverse cultural forms have 
been and are being reconfigured by common underlying processes, but also to 
demonstrate to a much greater level of specificity than would otherwise have been 
possible the precise ‘bite’ of the broader historical and theoretical frameworks being 
developed. At the same time, it was another central contention of the study that 
attempting to understand the more specific developments in Part 2 independent of 
these frameworks itself opened the way for a serious misunderstanding of them.
B: Law
To avoid this, it was necessary, firstly, to understand Part 2 within the wider context 
of the history of legal transformation in general, which it was the particular task of 
Chapter 3 to outline. There three major phases in that history were identified, 
characterised, it was argued, by three preponderant though not exclusive forms of 
legal norm. The first of these phases, running until the Neolithic revolution and the 
emergence of the first state structures, was characterised by the preponderance of 
legal postulates whereby the norms of social pressure tended to be tightly integrated 
with the norms of religion, tended to be seen as divine in origin and tended to be 
enforced according to the principles of collective responsibility.
A second major phase of legal transformation stretched from the Neolithic to the 
Industrial revolutions. From its earliest stages this phase disclosed a gradual increase 
in the processes of codification and the emergence of a growing number of fixed and 
explicit legal norms. Despite this fact, however, right up until the emergence of the
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modern nation-state and the Industrial revolution itself, these examples of formal law 
remained of limited significance, resting upon and coexisting alongside, a vast body 
of informal legal norms that were this phase’s preponderant legal form.
In addition to a growing recognition within this phase of the differing varieties of 
legal norm both within individual societies and between them, as well as the varieties 
of communities they were apt to sustain, there was also a deepening understanding of 
the philosophical bases upon which they rested and against which they could be 
justified. Within the western legal tradition, this reached its apogee in the realisation 
of the essential balance between what was termed lex ratio and lex voluntas — between 
the intellect and the will -  with precedence given to the former, if society was to 
realise a stable and flourishing regulatory form. It was, it was argued, the disturbance 
of this balance and the gradual subordination of reason to will, first conceptually, and 
then increasingly in ever-growing institutional forms, that lay at the heart of those 
developments propelling the emergence of the third major phase of legal 
transformation. Linked to the concomitant emergence of industrial society and the 
modem nation-state, this phase has come increasingly to be characterised by the 
preponderance of formal legal norms in the sense that the institutions to which they 
seem most intimately to be linked occupy a more an more central position of control 
and direction. These formal legal norms have been driven by the growing autonomy 
of legal authority as will and its institutional embodiments have emerged from under 
the control of reason. Moreover, these same embodiments, manifesting themselves in 
a commitment to an etoliated form of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 
have proved the perfect institutional accompaniment to the market economy
Now, in so outlining the history of legal transformation, a definition of law was first 
stated and then employed, the full implications of which only began to receive 
development and more complete justification in Chapter 7. This it did very clearly 
within the Natural Law tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, according to 
which the human action system is understood to be underpinned by a set of 
fundamental behavioural principles adherence to which is required in order for 
individual human beings and the communities they comprise to function in the 
cooperative manner necessary for them to realise to the maximum extent the full 
complement of their natural inclinations and thereby to become maximally flourishing
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specimens of their kind.
On this basis it was then suggested that law should be understood as a set of 
regulative norms distinguishable, on the one hand, from language, and on the other, 
from the norms of physical nature. In drawing this distinction it is, it was argued, 
possible to identify something peculiarly definitive of legal norms, namely, that they 
imply some form of social pressure. Social pressure, was characterised here in the 
widest possible sense such that it is capable of manifesting itself in a great variety of 
forms. It can both physical and non-physical, and can even include the process by 
which individuals voluntarily regulate and discipline their more unruly natural 
proclivities in order to live up to standards of social propriety to which they 
themselves give free intellectual assent.
In contrast to law, language and the norms of physical nature operate, it was argued, 
at the same qualitative level. The norms of physical nature are not susceptible to any 
real relevant variation at all, whilst language may and necessarily does vary in its 
particular personal and communal manifestations but remains constantly underpinned 
by a set of universal governing principles which ensure that those manifestations, to 
the extent that they are indeed truly linguistic, sustain maximal human expressivity. 
With this taxonomy in mind, it was argued that law should, in fact, be understood as 
an admixture of these other two varieties of norm system; or, more precisely, that it 
should be seen as occupying a variable intermediate position between the two 
extremes they respectively represent. In this way, language can be seen, at one 
extreme, to manifest man’s being in its most natural state, since it represents a perfect 
balance between structure and volition. It allows for maximal, spontaneous and un­
coerced expression, which is nonetheless guaranteed and made intelligible by the 
largely unconscious employment of regular underlying normative patterns. At the 
other extreme, the laws of physical nature exclude any such notion of volition, and 
represent a more or less impersonal, though not necessarily by that token wholly 
determined, unfolding of the physical universe. In contrast to both these extremes, the 
concept of law, like that of language, incorporates the idea of volition, and therefore is 
distinguishable from the norms of physical nature, but, unlike language, implies some 
degree of restriction on the scope of that volition. Thus law, in its very nature, implies 
a distinction between actions that are permissible and those that are not.
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It was also noted in Chapter 7 that upon a Thomistic understanding, the precepts of 
the Natural Law -  that is, the behavioural precepts of common human nature -  must 
find expression, if at all, in particular contexts such that they can be found either to 
have been breached or complied with in the execution of each individual and 
collective judgment. Not only should it be possible at this stage, and in light of the 
above, to see that such breaches or fulfilments collectively manifest correlate 
variations in the actual texture of the norms in which they are embodied, but also to 
see that an integrated approach to the tripartite typological taxonomy of those 
embodiments outlined at the beginning of Chapter 3, and an understanding how the 
balance between these embodiments has changed over time, offers a uniquely 
effective method for the recording and measurement of long-term social and 
historical transformation. Thus, in distinguishing, as Chapter 3 did, between legal 
postulates, informal law and formal law, each of which refer, from a Thomistic 
perspective, to a particular variety of human law, and then in tracing the 
preponderance of each in three very broad chronological periods, it was possible to 
detect a long-term trend towards increasing formalisation, understood as connoting 
increasing levels of normative explicitness and fixation, a process it was further 
argued, which discloses a cognate process of social fixation. Accordingly, as the 
norms of social pressure preponderant in each era gradually take on more formality, 
as the history of legal development shifts from a preponderance of legal postulates, to 
one of informal law and finally of formal law, so those preponderant forms of social 
pressure become, relatively speaking, less like the rules of language and more like the 
norms of physical nature. Moreover, since it is language which underpins the man’s 
most natural, free and sustainably varied forms of activity, so the extent of such a shift 
in the direction of greater formality must also indicate the extent to which mankind 
has grown alienated from its natural, maximally flourishing state, and to which its 
individual and communal diversity has been undermined. Finally, it also serves to 
chart, on the widest temporal scale, the gradual shift in overall function of normative 
pressure away from enforcing the observance of the precepts of the Natural Law or 
actions compliant with it, towards enforcing behaviour that is in breach of those 
precepts.
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C: History
Just as it was necessary to set the more recent legal transformations taking place in 
China and India within the wider sweep of the history of legal transformation, so too, 
it was necessary, secondly, to understand legal transformation as embedded with the 
wider sweep of historical transformation in general. Indeed, it is, it was argued, 
precisely because legal transformation is so embedded that law is able to serve the 
indexical function that is claimed for it. Moreover, within the context of a fuller 
understanding of historical transformation and its underpinnings it is possible to gain 
a much better appreciation of exactly how law is able to perform that function. 
Accordingly, Chapter 2 outlined historical transformation according to three broad 
chronological phases, anticipating the three phases of legal transformation outlined in 
Chapter 3. The first of these phases, it will be recalled, covered that long period in 
human history prior to the Neolithic revolution during which man moved form a 
pastoral and nomadic existence to a settled and agricultural one. This phase was 
marked by the organisation of individuals within close personal kinship groups with 
few formalised rules outside accepted common codes of behaviour and moral norms 
guaranteeing the integrity of the community. Here the primary social structure was 
linguistic and the linguistic communities thus constituted, though small, were 
extremely numerous, suggesting that local (and therefore individual) diversity and 
autonomy was considerable.
The second phase of human development, inaugurated by the Neolithic revolution, 
was caused because some communities were forced, by their growing numbers and 
geographical limitations, to exploit their environment more efficiently. The 
agricultural forms they developed inadvertently gave them a competitive advantage 
over neighbouring communities, forcing these in their turn to adopt similar forms in 
order to redress the imbalance and survive. As a function of this need for greater 
exploitation, human labour itself had to be more efficiently exploited and co­
ordinated, thus there gradually arose a division of labour between co-ordinating and 
co-ordinated sections of society accompanied by the increasing power differential that 
implied. In this division is found the origin of the state, in its many guises. With the 
development of the state came the development also of gradually more rigorous and 
explicit codes of conduct, as it became clear that the more explicitly structured a state
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was, the more efficient would be the ruler in effecting his will and, therefore, the more 
powerful. Again this was a dynamic driven by institutional competition. One 
additional factor that contributed to a state’s competitive advantage was its size and 
homogeneity. Thus though this phase in human development was accompanied by a 
considerable increase in overall population, it was also accompanied by an overall 
decrease in the number of autonomous communities, a fact which in time eventually 
expressed itself in intrastate linguistic homogenisation.
At the same time and running parallel to these developments, there was the growth of 
an evermore systematic and concentrated exploration of the various aspects of reality 
by the many emergent priestly and scriptural castes. Although their knowledge was 
frequently co-opted by those engaged in political power-struggles, with whom they 
were themselves too often complicit, this did not prevent an extraordinary increase in 
genuine religious and philosophical insight. Thus, whilst the emergence of state 
structures meant a great intensification in the power and destructiveness of human 
conflict as well as inter-personal exploitation, it also gave sufficient leisure to enough 
people thereby able to devote their lives to delving deep into the depths of reality such 
as to result in rich harvests of knowledge which otherwise would have been 
impossible. This led not only to that great trans-cultural elevation of human 
consciousness known as the Axial Age, but also to the forging of systematic traditions 
of enquiry that were able to elaborate increasingly integrated and powerful visions of 
the cosmos which came to represent, and in their turn further spawn, some of the 
greatest achievements of the human mind and spirit.
The inauguration of third phase, was marked by the second great transition in human 
history; the Industrial revolution. In this phase -  the economic -  structure has become 
increasingly dominant at the expense of the apparent autonomy even of the ruling 
classes, prompting Max Weber to speak of an iron cage of rationality. Here the co­
ordinating centre of human relations is an increasingly complex economic core more 
and more resistant to effective control. It is also marked by an evermore explicit and 
rigorous set of governing norms and structures. Since this core is so much more 
efficient than any other mode of organisation in directing resources and physical 
power, it is gradually having the effect of colonising and expanding into every area of 
human life, and of functionalising all autonomous human resources in its service. In
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particular, the great institutions of learning and devotion, together with the disciplined 
practices to which they have given rise, are no longer subject merely to piecemeal co­
option, but now to systematic exploitation and reconfiguration.
Once more, the full implications and theoretical underpinnings of the historical 
account set out in Chapter 2 did not receive full development until Chapter 8. It was 
the purpose of Chapter 8 to set that account, and ultimately, by implication, the 
account of the history of legal transformation, within the context of a more complete, 
metaphysically integrated, account of human nature and society. There it was 
explained that, according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, human nature is an 
irreducibly material-immaterial composite with inclinations stemming from both of 
these dimensions. It was further explained that each of these need to be satisfied, or 
‘brought to act’, if an individual human being is to flourish as a fully actualised 
specimen of its type; that in order for such integrated satisfaction to be achieved, 
material goods should only be sought with an eye to the securing of immaterial goods 
and never in place of them; and, finally, that a person’s metaphysically composite 
nature renders him inherently social with a natural sympathy towards other persons 
and causes each of his actions, even his most intimate, to give rise to irreducibly 
social consequences which effect a habitual trace both in his being and in that of 
society in general. It was on this basis, that the basic precepts of the Natural Law were 
explained to set the basic parameters for individual and collective flourishing; that 
flourishing being guaranteed by adherence to them, and individual and collective 
corruption by their flouting. Moreover, it was explained that just as individual and 
collective flourishing results from due proportion being given to material and 
immaterial goods, involving as it does prioritising the former, so corruption results 
from the preference of material goods in place of, or at the expense of, immaterial 
goods, since this involves attempting to satisfy unlimited immaterial inclinations with 
exhaustible material goods. Finally, on this basis, a theoretically integrated account of 
historical transformation was elaborated whereby socially embodied growth and 
socially embodied decay were seen to operate through time with a preponderance of 
social growth very gradually being replaced by a preponderance of social decay, as 
the socially habituated adherence to the precepts guaranteeing, sustaining, or making 
easy, the realisation of human flourishing came to be undermined.
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D: Synthesis
By way of a final conclusion, it is now possible to draw these various levels of 
argument together into some form of tentative synthesis.
Since nature is hierarchically ordered, systematic, and harmonious, it exhibits certain 
underlying regularities which co-ordinate its over-all shape. Man, gifted with the 
capacity for abstract thought, has the potential to ponder and lay bare these 
regularities. At the same time, being himself part of nature and acting through it, his 
own activities and thoughts are also structured in a regular manner. This is as true of 
his collective as it is of his individual practices. It is in this context that the notion of 
law must be conceptualised: as regulating and thereby exposing the underlying 
structures of the human action system, and, after a somewhat different fashion, 
through the medium of law, offering an abstract indicator of its current state. Since the 
natural state of man is signed by freedom, it follows that the socially embodied 
structures that manifest his action-system in its natural state must disclose maximal 
volitional freedom. This is precisely what the co-operative, non-conflictual structures 
of language do. Likewise, as the de-natured state of man, being signed by materiality, 
excludes volition, it follows that the socially embodied structures which manifest his 
de-natured action-system must themselves disclose maximal volitional restriction. 
Since, at any given point in history, the socially embodied human action-system has 
been found neither entirely in its natural nor in its entirely de-natured state it follows 
that there should be foimd a third type of structure which -  mixing the characteristics 
both of language and the laws of physical nature -  is signed partly by volition and yet 
partly by determination: this is law as defined it in its broadest sense. Moreover, since 
human society is in a dynamic state, it also follows that the composition of human law 
as an admixture of the other two structures, is itself variable. By looking at the state of 
human law within a given society or historical epoch, it is therefore possible to 
delineate the extent of human alienation.
As the process is one of ever-greater materialisation, so it follows that the structures 
manifesting human interaction become increasingly explicit and fixed, in other words, 
they become more and more easily locatable in space and time. This accounts for the 
differing types of positive legal norm and the gradual trend towards formalisation.
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These norms also come gradually to change their function. To start with, informal 
moral norms serve the purpose of maintaining the integrity of society in its natural, 
maximally flourishing, state. Gradually, however, as the process of materialization 
progresses, and the overall margin shifts from social growth to social decay, the 
norms of social pressure are gradually and increasingly utilised at the service of the 
integrity of denatured society. Thus, after a certain point, the more de-natured human 
society becomes, the more integrity a denatured model of human society develops at 
the expense of its natural alternative, the less resistance its further decay encounters. 
Moreover, since human society in its maximally flourishing state, is characterized by 
maximal diversity, a fact reflected in maximal linguistic diversity, to the extent its has 
been denatured, so this diversity is undermined and a forced uniformity substituted, 
something, it would seem is increasingly indicative of advanced modernity. Finally, 
since in this process of denaturing and materialisation man’s immaterial dimensions -  
his intellect and will -  though subordinated are not, by virtue of that fact, at the same 
time destroyed, they continue profoundly to affect the acts in which he engages in and 
to capacitate him far in excess of other living beings. Just, then, as he is able to 
complete and harmonise the hierarchy of material being by acting according to his 
true nature, by acting, in a disordered manner, in opposition to it, he is also able 
fundamentally to distort that hierarchy. Indeed, it is of the essence the 
denaturing/materialization process that human society gradually externalises itself in 
the material world. Thus, it is perhaps not too fanciful to speculate that the trajectories 
and pathologies of advanced modernity suggest the gradual construction of a uniform, 
materialized and alienated form of human being.
Much, of course, remains to be elaborated in the content of what has been argued in 
the present study. Its conclusions are necessarily of a tentative nature, and it is 
intended that they should offer a basis for more concentrated analysis and empirical 
verification. It is hoped that the structure and nature of the present study has at least 
pointed in the direction of how such analysis and verification might be undertaken, 
but it must be recognised that what has been presented here has been nothing more 
than a preliminary intervention, and should be received in that spirit. Nevertheless, its 
implications, if correct, are both profound and wide-ranging, they are also of profound 
human concern. It is hoped then that they will be considered worthy of the further 
study that they require; should they receive such attention, it is further hoped that they
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will help make some contribution, however small, to understanding our current 
predicament.
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